Outcome: The recall application was allowed, and the revived writ petition was closed with liberty to institute fresh proceedings on the same cause of action, including a challenge to Section 147A; the earlier protection was continued for 90 days.

Issues: Whether deletion of additions for alleged unexplained investments, loans and advances under Section 69 read with Section 115BBE of the Income-tax Act, 1961, based on the assessee's bank records and audited financial statements, was perverse and gave rise to a substantial question of law.

Analysis: Section 69 applies where investments are not recorded in the books and the assessee fails to provide a satisfactory explanation of their nature and source. Section 115BBE governs taxation of income brought to tax under Section 69. The investments, loans and advances had been disclosed in the books and were explained through the bank accounts and audited balance sheets, including balances carried forward from an earlier year. The Tribunal, as the final fact-finding authority, had evaluated those materials before directing deletion of the additions; its factual findings disclosed neither perversity nor illegality.

Conclusion: The additions under Section 69 read with Section 115BBE were not sustainable, and no substantial question of law arose from the Tribunal's deletion of those additions, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the Revisionary Authority could revise an assessment order that had accepted Form-F declarations under Section 6A(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.

Analysis: The revisionary jurisdiction in respect of the assessment year in question involved the same issue already decided for subsequent assessment years. The decision in those years, accepted without further challenge, had found that an assessment accepting Form-F declarations under Section 6A(2) was not amenable to such revision. The finality of that adjudication required consistent application to the present assessment year.

Conclusion: The Revisionary Authority lacked power to revise the assessment accepting the Form-F declarations; the revision order was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether writ jurisdiction should be exercised despite the statutory appellate remedy where non-service of the show-cause notice and denial of personal hearing are alleged; (ii) Whether the absence of remand power with the Appellate Authority permits bypassing the statutory appeal.

Issue (i): Whether writ jurisdiction should be exercised despite the statutory appellate remedy where non-service of the show-cause notice and denial of personal hearing are alleged.

Analysis: Article 226 of the Constitution of India may be invoked notwithstanding an alternative remedy in exceptional cases involving jurisdictional error or breach of natural justice. The alleged non-service of the notice and denial of an effective personal hearing depended upon verification of the notices, their mode of service, receipt, and allied record. These were disputed factual matters suitable for determination in the statutory appeal under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. Any hearing-related infirmity was curable and did not establish a jurisdictional defect.

Conclusion: The alleged defects in service and hearing do not justify writ intervention and must be raised before the Appellate Authority.

Issue (ii): Whether the absence of remand power with the Appellate Authority permits bypassing the statutory appeal.

Analysis: The power to decide an appeal on merits through a fresh and independent appraisal of the record is distinct from the power to remand. The lack of remand power does not impair the Appellate Authority's jurisdiction to entertain the appeal and determine the objections on merits.

Conclusion: Absence of remand power does not permit bypassing the statutory appellate remedy.

Final Conclusion: The factual and procedural objections remain open for independent adjudication on their merits in the statutory appellate process.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory appeal should not be bypassed for fact-dependent and curable allegations of defective service or breach of natural justice, and the absence of remand power does not diminish the appellate authority's power to decide the appeal on merits.

Issues: Whether refunds arising from TDS assessment and appellate give-effect orders may be withheld for want of financial-year particulars or furnishing of Form 26B, in the absence of an order for refund adjustment, and whether interest is payable on the refundable amounts.

Analysis: Section 201 governs assessment of tax deducted at source, whereas Section 200A and Rule 31A provide for processing and adjustment of TDS statements prior to assessment. A refund arising upon assessment or an appellate order constitutes a vested and crystallised right and is not made subordinate to the procedural mechanism under Section 200A or Form 26B. The give-effect orders forming the basis of the refund were already in the departmental records, and no order under Section 245 authorising withholding or adjustment of the refund was shown.

Conclusion: The issue is decided in favour of the assessee: refunds arising from the give-effect orders cannot be withheld on the stated technical ground and must be processed with applicable interest under Section 244A(1) and Section 244A(1A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 until payment.

Issues: (i) Validity and scope of the Explanation to Section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in permitting reassessment of subsequently noticed escaped income without compliance with Section 148A, including where no addition is made on the original basis; (ii) Whether search-derived or other external material can enlarge a pending reassessment instead of initiating separate search-based proceedings.

Issue (i): Validity and scope of the Explanation to Section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in permitting reassessment of subsequently noticed escaped income without compliance with Section 148A, including where no addition is made on the original basis.

Analysis: The amended substantive provision omits the words "and also" found in the unamended Section 147; consequently, authorities founded on that language do not govern the amended regime. The Explanation manifests an unambiguous legislative intention to permit assessment or reassessment of any escaped-income issue that comes to notice during the pending proceedings, without a fresh procedure under Section 148A. An Explanation may enlarge the scope of the main provision where its plain language demonstrates that legislative intention.

Conclusion: The Explanation to Section 147 is valid and permits reassessment of subsequently noticed escaped-income issues without compliance with Section 148A, even where the original issue results in no addition; against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether search-derived or other external material can enlarge a pending reassessment instead of initiating separate search-based proceedings.

Analysis: The expression "any issue" in the Explanation carries no restriction that the subsequently noticed information must have been available when reassessment began or must arise from the original reassessment material. Material obtained in a search or from an external source may therefore disclose a further escaped-income issue. During pending reassessment, the statutory scheme permits either enlargement of those proceedings on such material or separate proceedings under the search-assessment mechanism.

Conclusion: Search-derived or other external material may lawfully enlarge pending reassessment proceedings; against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The expanded reassessment based on subsequently received search material is authorised by the Explanation to Section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the plain language of an Explanation discloses legislative intent to expand the main provision, that effect must be given; the Explanation to Section 147 permits reassessment of any escaped-income issue subsequently noticed during proceedings without fresh compliance with Section 148A.

Issues: (i) Whether the payment to a non-resident under foreign pharmaceutical arrangements accrued or arose in India so as to support reassessment; (ii) Whether the Authority for Advance Rulings could decline to answer the admitted application while determining that income belonged to a non-applicant and treating the arrangement as designed for tax avoidance; (iii) Whether the reassessment proceedings for Assessment Year 2014-15 were within the limitation prescribed for reassessment; (iv) Whether tax deducted at source could be withheld against a protective assessment when the income was asserted to belong to another assessee.

Issue (i): Whether the payment to a non-resident under foreign pharmaceutical arrangements accrued or arose in India so as to support reassessment.

Analysis: Under Section 5(2)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, a non-resident is chargeable only in respect of income received, accruing, arising, or deemed to accrue or arise in India. Section 9 specifies the circumstances in which income is deemed to accrue or arise in India. The residence of the payer, its accounting of the payment, or its claim for deduction does not, by itself, determine the situs of income. A real and substantive nexus must exist between India and the juridical or commercial source of the income-producing right or activity, unless the receipt is covered by a statutory deeming provision.

Analysis: The contractual rights, regulatory approvals, settlement, marketing rights, alleged forbearance, and market exploitation concerned the United States. No sufficient nexus with India, business connection, or applicable deeming provision was established. An opinion of a foreign attorney general, without a judicial determination or admission of guilt, could not establish that the agreement or payment was illegal for Indian tax purposes. Tax authorities cannot substitute their view of commercial prudence for the parties' business decision to settle a foreign contractual dispute.

Conclusion: The payment did not accrue or arise in India and was not chargeable to tax under the Income-tax Act, 1961. The reassessment notices and consequential proceedings for Assessment Years 2012-13 and 2013-14 lacked jurisdiction, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the Authority for Advance Rulings could decline to answer the admitted application while determining that income belonged to a non-applicant and treating the arrangement as designed for tax avoidance.

Analysis: The advance-ruling jurisdiction under Sections 245Q, 245R and 245S of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is applicant-specific and transaction-specific. The Authority could determine only the questions raised by the applicant and incidental matters necessary to answer them; it could not determine the tax liability or entitlement to income of a non-applicant. Having admitted the application and declined to reconsider admissibility, the Authority was required under Section 245R(4) to pronounce a ruling on the specified questions. The proviso to Section 245R(2) could not be invoked at the final stage to avoid answering the application.

Analysis: A prima facie finding of tax avoidance requires identification of an Indian tax incidence which the arrangement was designed to avoid. In the absence of a basis establishing that the payment was taxable in India, speculative inferences about commercial conduct, alleged collusion, or tax treatment in foreign jurisdictions could not sustain findings of sham, illegality, or tax avoidance.

Conclusion: The refusal to rule and the findings concerning the non-applicant, collusion, sham arrangement, and tax avoidance were without jurisdiction. The advance-ruling order was set aside, and the payment was held not chargeable to tax under the Income-tax Act, 1961, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the reassessment proceedings for Assessment Year 2014-15 were within the limitation prescribed for reassessment.

Analysis: Invocation of the extended limitation under Section 149(1)(b) required the existence of a qualifying asset, transaction, or entry belonging to the assessee. A deposit in another entity's bank account could not be treated as the assessee's asset merely by assuming that the underlying income belonged to it. Further, the basis for invoking the extended period was not disclosed in the notice under Section 148A(b), depriving the assessee of an opportunity to respond before the order under Section 148A(d).

Analysis: The original notice having been issued on the last available day, no surviving limitation period remained after the assessee's response. The order under Section 148A(d) and the consequential notice under Section 148 were issued beyond the available period and could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The reassessment order under Section 148A(d) and notice under Section 148 for Assessment Year 2014-15 were time-barred and without jurisdiction, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether tax deducted at source could be withheld against a protective assessment when the income was asserted to belong to another assessee.

Analysis: A protective assessment may be made where there is doubt as to the person in whose hands income is assessable, but the law does not recognise protective recovery. Where the Revenue maintains that the income is substantively assessable in another assessee's hands, it cannot indefinitely withhold the refund due to the person from whose payment tax was deducted merely because protective proceedings were framed.

Conclusion: The refund of tax deducted at source, with applicable interest, could not be withheld under the protective assessment and was required to be released upon the prescribed security, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Indian taxing jurisdiction over a non-resident's receipt requires a substantive territorial nexus with the income-producing right or activity, or a specific statutory deeming basis; payer residence alone is insufficient. The invalid reassessment action, the unsustainable advance-ruling refusal, and the withholding of refund could not stand.

Ratio Decidendi: For a non-resident, income does not accrue or arise in India merely because an Indian resident makes the payment; chargeability requires a real nexus with India or a specific statutory deeming provision.

Issues: Whether revisionary jurisdiction under Section 263 could be invoked to set aside the assessment on the ground that further verification of the trademark acquisition, its valuation and the consequential depreciation claim was required.

Analysis: The assessment record showed that the Assessing Officer had issued notices, specifically sought details of additions to fixed assets, and received supporting bills, financial statements, depreciation details and explanations concerning the trademark acquisition. The acquisition, capitalization and depreciation claim had been disclosed in the audited accounts, and the Assessing Officer accepted the claim after enquiry. A valuation report is not mandatorily required merely because a fixed asset of substantial value is acquired. The assessment view was a legally permissible and plausible view based on the material produced.

Analysis: Revision under Section 263 requires both error in the assessment order and prejudice to the Revenue. The distinction between absence of enquiry and allegedly inadequate enquiry remains material notwithstanding Explanation 2(a). Where the Assessing Officer has made enquiries and adopted a plausible view, the revisionary authority cannot substitute its own view merely because it considers further or differently structured verification desirable. The revisionary authority also cannot direct a fishing or roving enquiry without independently establishing, on material, that the assessment order is erroneous and prejudicial to the Revenue.

Conclusion: The conditions for revision under Section 263 were not established; the revisionary order was quashed and the original assessment was restored, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether exemption under Section 54B was allowable where the Revenue had accepted the identical claim of the assessee's co-owner in respect of the same agricultural land and reinvestment; (ii) Whether the appellate addition of agricultural income as income from other sources could be sustained without a notice of enhancement.

Issue (i): Whether exemption under Section 54B was allowable where the Revenue had accepted the identical claim of the assessee's co-owner in respect of the same agricultural land and reinvestment.

Analysis: The assessee and his brother were co-owners of the agricultural land sold and had claimed Section 54B exemption in respect of investment in the same new land. The Revenue had accepted the brother's corresponding claim in reassessment proceedings on identical facts. The identical claim of the assessee could not consequently be denied.

Conclusion: The Section 54B exemption was allowable to the assessee for both assessment years, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the appellate addition of agricultural income as income from other sources could be sustained without a notice of enhancement.

Analysis: The assessment had concerned additions relating to sale consideration and investment in property, and had not addressed the taxability of the agricultural income. The appellate authority made the impugned additions on the basis of a remand report without issuing a notice of enhancement under Section 251(2).

Conclusion: The additions treating the agricultural income as income from other sources were unsustainable and were deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: For both assessment years, taxable income is to be determined after allowing the agricultural-land reinvestment exemption and excluding the impugned additions relating to agricultural income.

Ratio Decidendi: An appellate authority cannot sustain an enhancement by introducing an addition not made in assessment without issuing the statutory notice of enhancement.

Issues: (i) Whether sufficient cause existed for condonation of the delay in filing the appeal; (ii) Whether interest earned by a co-operative credit society on short-term deposits with co-operative banks and scheduled banks was deductible under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Whether sufficient cause existed for condonation of the delay in filing the appeal.

Analysis: The delay resulted from the absconding of the former chief executive officer amid allegations of fund misappropriation, the death of the subsequently responsible official, successive management changes, and service of communications exclusively through an email account controlled by the former tax adviser. The assessee derived no benefit from delayed filing. Preference was given to substantial justice over technical considerations.

Conclusion: The delay was condoned on sufficient cause being established, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether interest earned by a co-operative credit society on short-term deposits with co-operative banks and scheduled banks was deductible under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The assessee was engaged solely in providing credit facilities to its members, and the deposits represented funds not immediately required for lending. Interest from the temporary deployment of such funds was attributable to the credit-facility business. The ruling concerning interest on amounts retained and payable to members was distinguishable because the deposited funds were neither members' dues nor liabilities. The deduction claimed under Section 80P(2)(a)(i), rather than the separate deduction concerning investments with another co-operative society, was applicable.

Conclusion: Interest of Rs. 29,08,301 earned from the deposits was attributable to the business of providing credit facilities to members and qualified for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i), in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The addition made by treating the bank-deposit interest as non-qualifying income was required to be deleted, and the claimed deduction was available.

Ratio Decidendi: Interest earned by a co-operative credit society from temporary bank deposits of funds not immediately required for lending to members is income attributable to its credit-facility business and qualifies for deduction under Section 80P(2)(a)(i).

Issues: Whether parole should be granted to enable the appellant to attend to his wife suffering from stage IV cancer and facilitate her treatment.

Analysis: The wife's stage IV cancer was undisputed. The availability of other family members to provide care was insufficient to refuse parole in light of the seriousness of her ailment.

Conclusion: Parole for five days was warranted on humanitarian grounds.

Issues: Whether service tax could be levied under construction of residential complex service on a composite works contract executed before works contract service became taxable on 1 June 2007.

Analysis: The contracts involved the use and transfer of materials together with construction, rendering them composite works contracts rather than service contracts simpliciter. A separate taxable entry for works contract service was introduced only from 1 June 2007. The pre-existing service entry did not provide a charge or valuation mechanism to segregate the service element from the goods element in such a composite contract. Abatement notifications could not cure the absence of a levy.

Conclusion: Service tax under construction of residential complex service was not leviable on the pre-1 June 2007 composite works contracts; the demand was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether a differential excise-duty demand on inter-unit clearances is sustainable where the duty paid is fully available as CENVAT credit to the receiving units; (ii) Whether the extended period could be invoked where the valuation particulars were disclosed in ER-1 returns and the transaction was revenue neutral.

Issue (i): Whether a differential excise-duty demand on inter-unit clearances is sustainable where the duty paid is fully available as CENVAT credit to the receiving units.

Analysis: Rule 8 of the Central Excise Valuation (Determination of Price of Excisable Goods) Rules, 2000 governed valuation of the clearances to the assessee's own units. The goods cleared were inputs for dutiable finished products at the receiving units, and the excise duty paid on such clearances was available as CENVAT credit to those units. Since the transferor and receiving units formed part of the same assessee, any differential duty would correspondingly be available as credit, resulting in revenue neutrality.

Conclusion: The differential duty demand was unsustainable on merits because the inter-unit clearances were revenue neutral. This conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended period could be invoked where the valuation particulars were disclosed in ER-1 returns and the transaction was revenue neutral.

Analysis: The valuation adopted for captive clearances was disclosed in the ER-1 returns. Further, revenue neutrality meant that no additional benefit could accrue to the assessee from the valuation adopted. These circumstances excluded suppression of facts and precluded invocation of the extended limitation period.

Conclusion: The demand for the extended period was time-barred. This conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Differential duty on revenue-neutral inter-unit transfers cannot be sustained, and the extended limitation period is unavailable where the relevant valuation particulars were disclosed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where excise duty on goods transferred to an assessee's own manufacturing unit is fully creditable at that unit, the transaction is revenue neutral and a differential duty demand is unsustainable; disclosure of the valuation particulars also negates suppression for invoking the extended period.

Issues: Whether an ex parte tax assessment order could be sustained where it was not passed on the notified hearing date and no notice of the subsequently fixed hearing date was given.

Analysis: Where the assessing authority does not decide the matter on the date fixed for hearing and instead fixes another date, it must communicate that subsequent date to the taxpayer. Failure to do so deprives the taxpayer of an effective opportunity of personal hearing and results in a breach of the principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: An ex parte assessment made without notice of the subsequent hearing date is unsustainable for breach of natural justice.

Issues: Whether a show cause notice and adjudication order electronically uploaded on the GST portal, but bearing neither a physical signature nor a digital signature, are legally valid under Rule 26(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017.

Analysis: Rule 26(3) makes electronic issuance and authentication through a digital signature certificate, e-signature, or other Board-notified mode cumulative and mandatory requirements. Portal upload, generation of an ARN or reference number, and the officer's authenticated portal login establish only access to the portal; they do not authenticate the contents of a particular notice or order. A signature attributes the document to the competent officer, fixes responsibility, and protects against arbitrariness. No notified alternative mode of verification was shown. The complete absence of authentication is a jurisdictional defect, not a curable irregularity under Section 160. The statutory appellate remedy does not bar writ jurisdiction where the purported adjudication order has no legal existence.

Conclusion: The unsigned show cause notice and adjudication order were non est in law; consequently, the recovery notice and bank-account attachment founded on them could not survive. Fresh proceedings may be initiated in accordance with law using duly authenticated documents.

Issues: (i) Whether the show-cause notice issued on 29.11.2024 satisfied the requirement under Section 73(2) that it be issued at least three months before the terminal date for an order under Section 73(10); (ii) Whether the ex parte determination under Section 73(9) should be interfered with to afford an opportunity to contest the show-cause notice.

Issue (i): Whether the show-cause notice issued on 29.11.2024 satisfied the requirement under Section 73(2) that it be issued at least three months before the terminal date for an order under Section 73(10).

Analysis: Section 73 establishes a single statutory adjudicatory process beginning with the notice under Section 73(1) and culminating in the order under Section 73(9), subject to the outer limit in Section 73(10). A month is a calendar month under Section 3(35) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, and the date of issuance is excluded while computing the prescribed interval under Section 9 of that Act. Section 73(2) requires a minimum available interval before the statutory terminal date; it does not prescribe an independent backward-calculated corresponding-date cut-off. Excluding 29.11.2024, the full calendar months of December 2024, January 2025 and February 2025 were available before 28.02.2025.

Conclusion: The notice was within the limitation prescribed by Section 73(2), in favour of the Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether the ex parte determination under Section 73(9) should be interfered with to afford an opportunity to contest the show-cause notice.

Analysis: The statutory scheme under Sections 73 and 75 contemplates an opportunity to contest the proposed demand before its determination. Since the proceedings had culminated during the pendency of the challenge, an opportunity to submit a reply to the notice was necessary to enable adjudication after consideration of the appellant's defence.

Conclusion: The determination under Section 73(9) was interfered with to enable the appellant to contest the notice, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The notice remains valid, but the demand requires fresh completion of the statutory adjudicatory process after the appellant is given the specified opportunity to respond.

Ratio Decidendi: For Section 73(2), the minimum interval of three months is satisfied where, after excluding the date of issuance of notice, three calendar months remain available before the terminal date under Section 73(10); a backward corresponding-date calculation is not an independent limitation cut-off.

Issues: Whether Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 could be invoked and a 100% penalty imposed for input tax credit mismatch where tax and interest were paid before issuance of the show cause notice.

Analysis: Section 73 applies to wrongly availed or utilised input tax credit in the absence of fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts, while Section 74 requires a demonstrable nexus between the mismatch and such culpable conduct with intent to evade tax. A mere mismatch between Form GSTR-3B and Form GSTR-2A, without evidence connecting it to deliberate non-disclosure, fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression, does not justify invocation of Section 74. Payment of the ascertained tax and interest before the show cause notice, including after departmental verification, falls within Section 73 where the requisite intent to evade is not established. A third-party supplier's default cannot, without further evidence, be attributed to the recipient as suppression of facts.

Conclusion: Invocation of Section 74 and imposition of the 100% penalty were invalid and unjustified; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the First Appellate Authority was disqualified by a reasonable apprehension of institutional bias because the departmental appeal followed a review order of a superior officer; (ii) Whether penalties under Section 74 for audit-related input-tax-credit and transitional-credit issues could be sustained, and whether the pre-show-cause-notice tax and interest payments were liable to be treated under Section 73(5).

Issue (i): Whether the First Appellate Authority was disqualified by a reasonable apprehension of institutional bias because the departmental appeal followed a review order of a superior officer.

Analysis: The statutory appellate framework under Section 107 confers independent quasi-judicial authority on the appellate officer. A departmental review decision merely initiates appellate proceedings and does not dictate their merits. Departmental hierarchy alone, without personal interest, animus, or direct prejudice, does not establish a real likelihood of bias.

Conclusion: The objection based on institutional bias fails, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether penalties under Section 74 for audit-related input-tax-credit and transitional-credit issues could be sustained, and whether the pre-show-cause-notice tax and interest payments were liable to be treated under Section 73(5).

Analysis: Section 74 requires foundational facts demonstrating fraud, willful misstatement, or suppression of facts with intent to evade tax, together with the proper officer's independent satisfaction on concrete material. Audit detection and access to the relevant returns and declarations through departmental records do not, without proof of deliberate evasion, establish the requisite mens rea. The agreed tax and applicable interest for the relevant issues had also been discharged before issuance of the show-cause notice; consequently, the statutory pre-show-cause-notice payment mechanism and resulting penalty immunity under Section 73 applied.

Conclusion: The Section 74 penalties on Issues 1 and 3 are unsustainable, in favour of the assessee; the tax credit reversals and interest payments for those issues are payments under Section 73(5).

Final Conclusion: The appellate penalty determination for Issues 1 and 3 is nullified, while the voluntary tax-and-interest discharges for those issues take effect under the ordinary demand-settlement regime.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 74 penalties require pleaded and established foundational facts of deliberate tax evasion; audit-based discrepancies and accessible statutory records, without proof of fraud, willful misstatement, or suppression with intent to evade, cannot attract that provision.

Issues: Whether the addition for alleged excess of stamp duty value over consideration under section 56(2)(x) could be computed by reference to the value on registration of the conveyance, rather than the value on the date of allotment and advance payment.

Analysis: The trust's existence before the PAN incorporation date was substantiated by its formation resolution, trustee affidavit and bank account opened in its name before that date. The booking advance was paid through banking channels and confirmed by the developer. The allotment letter, coupled with payment of consideration through banking channels, qualified for application of the provisos to section 56(2)(x), requiring adoption of stamp duty value as on the agreement/allotment date where that date differs from registration. The stamp duty value in financial year 2001-02 was lower than the actual consideration.

Conclusion: No addition under section 56(2)(x) was sustainable, as there was no excess of the relevant stamp duty value over the purchase consideration.

Issues: Whether late fee under Section 234E could be levied through an intimation under Section 200A for delayed quarterly TDS statements pertaining to financial year 2012-13.

Analysis: The power to compute and demand late fee under Section 234E through Section 200A was introduced with effect from 1 June 2015 and operates prospectively. For TDS statements relating to a period preceding that date, an intimation under Section 200A demanding such fee lacks statutory authority. In view of conflicting High Court decisions, the interpretation favourable to the assessee was applied.

Conclusion: Late fee under Section 234E was not chargeable for the relevant TDS statements pertaining to financial year 2012-13; the levy was directed to be deleted in favour of the assessee.