Issues: Whether a person who is not the drawer, signatory, or account-holder of the dishonoured cheque can be prosecuted under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Analysis: Section 138 fastens criminal liability on the drawer of the cheque when the cheque, drawn on an account maintained by that person, is returned unpaid and the statutory notice and payment conditions are not satisfied. Section 7 defines the drawer as the maker of the cheque. The provision is penal in nature and therefore requires strict construction. On the admitted facts, the cheque was not drawn by the petitioner, was not issued from her account, and she was not a signatory or joint account-holder. The complaint was also not laid against the entity through which any alleged business involvement was asserted. Mere asserted participation in the underlying transaction or alleged joint liability does not create criminal liability under Section 138.

Conclusion: The petitioner could not be impleaded as an accused under Section 138 for a cheque not drawn by her, and the complaint was liable to be quashed against her.

Final Conclusion: Criminal process under the cheque dishonour law cannot be extended to a person who is not the drawer or signatory of the cheque merely because of alleged involvement in the underlying transaction.

Ratio Decidendi: Liability under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 attaches only to the person who draws the cheque on an account maintained by that person, and joint or alleged underlying liability does not by itself permit prosecution of a non-drawer.

Issues: Whether the statutory pre-deposit of 10% for filing an appeal under the GST regime can be discharged from the Electronic Credit Ledger, and whether the appeal should be entertained on merits despite the appellate rejection.

Analysis: The Court noted that the coordinate Bench view on the issue had been stayed by the Supreme Court and that the later departmental notification concerning delayed appeals also reflected a scheme in which a part of the required payment could be made through the Electronic Credit Ledger. In that situation, and pending the Supreme Court's decision, insistence on payment from the Electronic Cash Ledger alone was held not to be appropriate. Since the petitioner had already remitted 10% from the Electronic Credit Ledger, the appeal could not be treated as non-maintainable on that ground.

Conclusion: The pre-deposit could not be insisted upon exclusively from the Electronic Cash Ledger, and the appeal was directed to be considered on merits.

Issues: (i) Whether the acceptance of the police refer report, whereby the scheduled/predicate offences were found not made out, disables continuation of proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. (ii) Whether the pending protest complaint and the subsequent allegations based on unscheduled offences sustain the continuation of proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Issue (i): Whether the acceptance of the police refer report, whereby the scheduled/predicate offences were found not made out, disables continuation of proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Analysis: The statutory scheme of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 makes the existence of proceeds of crime arising from a scheduled offence the jurisdictional foundation for action under the Act. The definition of proceeds of crime and the offence of money-laundering both presuppose a criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. On the facts, the investigation culminated in a refer report concluding that no offence was made out, and the jurisdictional court accepted that report. Once that foundation disappeared, the continuance of money-laundering proceedings could not be justified.

Conclusion: The issue is answered in favour of the petitioners. The accepted refer report meant that the predicate offences were no longer available to support continuation of proceedings under the Act.

Issue (ii): Whether the pending protest complaint and the subsequent allegations based on unscheduled offences sustain the continuation of proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Analysis: A protest complaint, by itself, only operates as an objection to the final report and does not revive a concluded basis for money-laundering action unless it discloses a scheduled offence capable of constituting a predicate offence. The later complaint raised additional allegations relating to offences which were not scheduled offences, and the conspiracy allegation was tied to those unscheduled offences. As such, the pending protest complaint did not provide a valid statutory foundation for continuation of proceedings under the Act.

Conclusion: The issue is answered in favour of the petitioners. The pending protest complaint and the later allegations did not furnish a sustainable basis to continue the proceedings under the Act.

Final Conclusion: The money-laundering proceedings were quashed because the jurisdictional prerequisite of an existing predicate offence was not established on the record before the Court.

Ratio Decidendi: Proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 cannot be initiated or continued unless there exists a live predicate offence giving rise to proceeds of crime; once that foundation is extinguished, ancillary action under the Act cannot survive.

Issues: (i) Whether the group of companies doctrine is a valid principle in Indian arbitration law and whether it can be grounded in the expression "claiming through or under" in Sections 8 and 45 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; (ii) Whether a non-signatory may be treated as a party to an arbitration agreement under Section 7 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and what standards govern that determination at the referral stage under Sections 8 and 11.

Issue (i): Whether the group of companies doctrine is a valid principle in Indian arbitration law and whether it can be grounded in the expression "claiming through or under" in Sections 8 and 45 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Analysis: The expression "claiming through or under" is directed to derivative claims in the nature of succession, assignment, subrogation, or novation. It does not describe a non-signatory who is sought to be joined as a party in its own right. The doctrine of group of companies is not a doctrine of derivative status; it is a consensual doctrine used to identify the real parties to the arbitration agreement from the conduct, relationship, and surrounding circumstances of the transaction. The earlier approach that traced the doctrine to the phrase "claiming through or under" was therefore incorrect. At the same time, the doctrine itself remains part of Indian arbitration jurisprudence and is retained as a principle for identifying mutual intent in complex multi-party transactions.

Conclusion: The doctrine is valid in law, but it is not anchored in the phrase "claiming through or under".

Issue (ii): Whether a non-signatory may be treated as a party to an arbitration agreement under Section 7 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and what standards govern that determination at the referral stage under Sections 8 and 11.

Analysis: Section 7 permits an arbitration agreement to arise from a written record of agreement and does not require signature in every case. The decisive inquiry is whether the non-signatory consented, expressly or by conduct, to be bound by the arbitration agreement. The court or tribunal must examine the written record together with surrounding circumstances such as the non-signatory's relationship with the signatory, commonality of subject-matter, composite nature of the transaction, and performance of the contract. Mere membership of the same corporate group or a "single economic reality" is insufficient by itself. At the referral stage, the court is to make only a prima facie determination of the existence of an arbitration agreement and should ordinarily leave the final question of joinder of the non-signatory to the arbitral tribunal under the principle of competence-competence.

Conclusion: A non-signatory may be bound as a party under Section 7 on proof of mutual intent and conduct, and the referral court's role is limited to a prima facie examination.

Final Conclusion: The reference is answered by affirming the continuing validity of the group of companies doctrine, while confining it to Section 7 and rejecting its dependence on the phrase "claiming through or under"; the tribunal remains the primary forum for deciding whether the non-signatory is bound.

Ratio Decidendi: A non-signatory can be treated as a party to an arbitration agreement only when the written record and surrounding circumstances show mutual intent to arbitrate, and the group of companies doctrine operates as an aid to that inquiry rather than as a doctrine of derivative entitlement under Sections 8 or 45.

Issues: Whether the respondents' action of blocking input tax credit and proceeding on the show cause notice in respect of a company under insolvency resolution should be permitted as such, or should be dealt with by the National Company Law Tribunal.

Analysis: The petition arose from a dispute concerning blocking of the company's electronic credit ledger and issuance of a show cause notice under the State GST law while insolvency proceedings and a moratorium under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code were pending. In the peculiar facts, the Court found it appropriate that the department first move the NCLT for appropriate orders regarding the action proposed against the petitioner. The Court also directed that status quo be maintained for one week only to enable the department to approach the NCLT, and clarified that any adjudication on the show cause notice affecting recovery would remain subject to the NCLT's orders if the resolution proceedings continued.

Conclusion: The respondents were required to seek appropriate orders from the NCLT, status quo was protected for a limited period, and further recovery-related action was made subject to the NCLT's decision.

Final Conclusion: The petition was disposed of by granting limited interim protection and by channeling the disputed recovery steps through the insolvency forum, while keeping all substantive contentions open.

Ratio Decidendi: Where GST recovery-related action may affect a company under a moratorium in insolvency proceedings, the appropriate course is to seek directions from the NCLT and keep consequential action subject to those directions.

Issues: (i) Whether, for computing deduction under Section 80-IA, the market value of electricity transferred from the captive power undertaking to the assessee's other business should be taken as the price at which surplus power was sold to the State Electricity Board or the price at which the Board supplied electricity to industrial consumers. (ii) Whether the assessee was required to make a separate exercise of option in a particular form to avail depreciation under the WDV method under Rule 5(1A) of the Income-tax Rules, 1962. (iii) Whether the expenditure paid to Shri S.K. Gupta and his group of companies could be disallowed on the basis of retracted statements recorded during search.

Issue (i): Whether, for computing deduction under Section 80-IA, the market value of electricity transferred from the captive power undertaking to the assessee's other business should be taken as the price at which surplus power was sold to the State Electricity Board or the price at which the Board supplied electricity to industrial consumers.

Analysis: Section 80-IA(8) requires intra-assessee transfers to be taken at market value, meaning the price goods would ordinarily fetch in the open market. The price at which surplus electricity was compulsorily sold to the State Electricity Board under the statutory regime and power purchase arrangement was not a price formed in an open competitive market. By contrast, the tariff charged by the Board to industrial consumers represented the price at which electricity was available to a consumer in the market environment relevant to the assessee's captive unit. The transfer value had therefore to be aligned with that consumer-side market price, not the contracted sale price to the Board.

Conclusion: The issue is answered in favour of the assessee and against the revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessee was required to make a separate exercise of option in a particular form to avail depreciation under the WDV method under Rule 5(1A) of the Income-tax Rules, 1962.

Analysis: Rule 5(1A) permits an eligible undertaking to opt for depreciation under Rule 5(1) read with Appendix I instead of Appendix IA, provided the option is exercised before the due date for furnishing the return. The rule does not prescribe any special or formal mode of exercising the option. The assessee had indicated the choice in the return filing process within time, which satisfied the statutory requirement.

Conclusion: The issue is answered in favour of the assessee and against the revenue.

Issue (iii): Whether the expenditure paid to Shri S.K. Gupta and his group of companies could be disallowed on the basis of retracted statements recorded during search.

Analysis: The disallowance rested on statements later retracted by affidavit and followed by a subsequent statement reiterating the rendering of services. The revenue did not effectively dislodge this later material, and the assessee was not afforded cross-examination on the basis of the retracted statement. On the record, the Tribunal's factual finding that the expenditure was supported could not be said to be perverse.

Conclusion: The issue is answered in favour of the assessee and against the revenue.

Final Conclusion: The common challenge raised by the revenue fails on the issues decided, and the deductions and expenditure reliefs upheld by the Tribunal and the High Courts remain undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: For Section 80-IA(8), market value means the price ordinarily obtainable in an open competitive market, and a statutory or contracted transfer price to a dominant buyer cannot be treated as that market value for computing eligible profits.

Issues: (i) whether penalty under Section 114 of the Customs Act, 1962 could be sustained on the basis of statements of co-noticees when the appellant had been acquitted in the connected criminal case on the same facts; (ii) whether the adjudicating authority was required to decide the confiscation of the seized foreign currency and vehicle in the de novo proceedings, warranting remand.

Issue (i): whether penalty under Section 114 of the Customs Act, 1962 could be sustained on the basis of statements of co-noticees when the appellant had been acquitted in the connected criminal case on the same facts.

Analysis: The proceedings under the Customs Act were separate from the criminal prosecution, and an acquittal did not automatically nullify the adjudication. However, the material relied upon for penalty consisted only of statements of co-noticees, while the trial court had found no direct incriminating material against the appellant and had acquitted him on the same factual matrix. In such circumstances, uncorroborated accomplice material was insufficient to sustain penal liability, especially when no additional independent evidence was produced by the Revenue.

Conclusion: The penalty under Section 114 of the Customs Act, 1962 was not sustainable and was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): whether the adjudicating authority was required to decide the confiscation of the seized foreign currency and vehicle in the de novo proceedings, warranting remand.

Analysis: The earlier order had been set aside and the matter remanded for fresh adjudication, so the Commissioner was obliged to deal with all issues covered by the show cause notice, including confiscation of the foreign currency and the vehicle under the relevant confiscation provisions. Since the impugned order failed to determine those issues, the adjudication was incomplete and required further consideration.

Conclusion: The matter was remanded to the Commissioner for a limited decision on confiscation in favour of the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The penalty against the appellant was annulled, while the confiscation aspects were sent back for fresh determination, leaving the dispute only partially resolved.

Ratio Decidendi: Penal action under the Customs Act cannot rest solely on uncorroborated co-noticee statements when the connected criminal court has acquitted the noticee on the same facts, and a de novo adjudication must decide every issue specifically covered by the show cause notice.

The Tribunal examined whether the decision of ITC Limited Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Kolkata IV reported in 2019 (360) ELT 216 (S.C.) was applicable to the present case. The respondent had filed 27 Bills of Entry for importing goods from Japan and paid customs duty at the time of assessment. Later, the respondent obtained the Certificate of Country of Origin retroactively and filed refund claims under Notification No.55/2011-Cus (NT) dated 01.08.2011. The Tribunal noted that the Notification allows for the issuance of the Certificate of Origin retroactively and permits filing refund claims within twelve months from the date of filing the Bills of Entry. Since the respondent was not entitled to claim the refund at the time of filing the Bills of Entry but did so upon obtaining the Certificate of Origin, the Tribunal held that the ITC Limited judgment was not applicable. Therefore, the rejection of the refund claim based on the ITC case was deemed unsustainable. The refund claims filed by the respondents were allowed.

The Tribunal also addressed whether the bar of unjust enrichment was applicable. The adjudicating authority initially found that the respondent, being a manufacturer who uses the imported goods to produce Graphite Electrodes for export, had not passed on the incidence of duty to any other person. This finding was not challenged by the Revenue and thus attained finality. The Tribunal further noted that since the respondent uses the imported goods in manufacturing and exports the final product, the question of unjust enrichment does not arise. The Tribunal held that the respondent had passed the bar of unjust enrichment and was entitled to the refund as prayed. The adjudicating authority was directed to process the refund within 60 days.

The appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed, and the Cross Objection filed by the respondent was allowed with consequential relief.