Issues: (i) Whether approval of the resolution plan extinguished the petitioner's claims against the corporate debtor and the successful resolution applicant. (ii) Whether the disputes sought to be referred to arbitration were non-arbitrable in view of the approved resolution plan and the insolvency regime.

Issue (i): Whether approval of the resolution plan extinguished the petitioner's claims against the corporate debtor and the successful resolution applicant.

Analysis: The approval of a resolution plan under the insolvency framework gives statutory finality to claims that were submitted, collated, and dealt with in the resolution process. The successful resolution applicant is entitled to take over the corporate debtor on a clean slate, and claims not forming part of the approved plan cannot survive for enforcement against the corporate debtor or its successor. Once the Supreme Court had settled the treatment of the petitioner's claim in the insolvency proceedings, the controversy regarding those pre-resolution claims stood concluded.

Conclusion: The petitioner's claims, except to the extent admitted in the approved resolution plan, stood extinguished; this issue was decided against the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether the disputes sought to be referred to arbitration were non-arbitrable in view of the approved resolution plan and the insolvency regime.

Analysis: At the referral stage, the Court may refuse reference where the dispute is demonstrably non-arbitrable. Here, permitting arbitration would amount to reopening matters already concluded by the approved resolution plan and would undermine the finality attached to the insolvency resolution process. The court found that the reference sought was not merely debatable but would revive dead claims barred by the clean slate principle and the binding effect of the plan.

Conclusion: The disputes were non-arbitrable and no reference to arbitration was warranted; this issue was decided in favour of the respondent.

Final Conclusion: The petition failed because the approved resolution plan had closed the petitioner's pre-resolution claims and the proposed reference would impermissibly reopen settled insolvency outcomes.

Ratio Decidendi: Once a resolution plan is approved, claims not preserved or admitted under that plan are extinguished and cannot be revived through arbitration; the referral court must refuse reference where entertaining the dispute would reopen a final insolvency resolution and defeat the clean slate principle.

Issues: Whether cement cleared for self-use and free issue to a contractor was eligible for concessional rate of duty under Notification No. 4/2006-CE dated 01.03.2006.

Analysis: The appeal turned on the character of the clearances. The Tribunal noted that the same controversy had already been examined in an earlier decision applying the notification to cement cleared in packs bearing MRP for industrial, institutional, and self-consumption clearances. Following that view and the principle of judicial discipline, the Tribunal held that cement used for self-consumption within the factory and cement issued free of cost to a contractor for construction work could not be denied the benefit merely because the goods were not sold in the ordinary retail market.

Conclusion: The clearances in question were eligible for the concessional duty treatment under the notification, and the demand was not sustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: Cement cleared in MRP-marked bags for self-use or free issue for construction within the assessee's premises is not excluded from concessional duty benefit merely because there is no retail sale.

Issues: Whether the complaint under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 contained the requisite specific averments to fasten vicarious liability on the appellant and justify continuation of the criminal complaint against him.

Analysis: The complaint stated only that the accused partners were responsible for the day-to-day conduct and business of the firm and that the firm, through its partners, purchased goods on credit. It did not contain any clear and specific averment that the appellant was, at the relevant time, in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the firm when the offence was committed. The statutory requirement under Section 141(1) is that both ingredients must be pleaded and read conjunctively. Mere general reference to partnership or day-to-day business responsibility is insufficient to attract vicarious criminal liability. In these circumstances, the materials in the complaint did not satisfy the threshold required for proceeding against the appellant, and the complaint could be quashed in exercise of inherent jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The complaint was not maintainable against the appellant for want of mandatory averments under Section 141(1), and the criminal complaint was liable to be quashed as against him.

Final Conclusion: The appellant succeeded, and the impugned order declining quashing was set aside insofar as he was concerned.

Ratio Decidendi: In a prosecution under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, vicarious liability can be fastened only if the complaint specifically avers that the accused was, at the relevant time, in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business; a bare or general statement is insufficient.

Issues: Whether, in light of the agreement, the arbitral award, and the earlier judgment, any date could be fixed for conversion of the awarded amount from US Dollars into Indian Rupees.

Analysis: The agreement provided for payment in Iraqi Dinars and US Dollars and specified conversion only between Iraqi Dinars and US Dollars. It did not contemplate payment in Indian currency. The award likewise directed payment in Iraqi Dinars and stated that such amount would be convertible into US Dollars as per the original agreement. The earlier judgment had also made it clear that the directions in the award would govern the field. On this material, there was no contractual or adjudicatory basis to convert the awarded amount into Indian Rupees or to identify a date for such conversion.

Conclusion: No date for conversion from US Dollars into Indian Rupees could be fixed, and the awarded amount was payable only in the foreign currency contemplated by the agreement and award.

Final Conclusion: The reference question was answered by holding that Indian Rupee conversion was not warranted on the facts and terms governing the award, and the appeals were disposed of accordingly.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the contract and award provide only for payment in foreign currency and do not authorise conversion into Indian Rupees, the court cannot superimpose a rupee conversion date contrary to those terms.

Issues: (i) whether the impugned order was vitiated because the coram which heard the final arguments did not remain constant and the final order was signed by fewer members than those who heard the matter, coupled with an inordinate delay in pronouncement; (ii) whether the Competition Commission was required to grant an oral hearing after receipt of the supplementary investigation report and on the issue of penalty and its quantum.

Issue (i): Whether the impugned order was vitiated because the coram which heard the final arguments did not remain constant and the final order was signed by fewer members than those who heard the matter, coupled with an inordinate delay in pronouncement.

Analysis: The statutory scheme under Section 36 of the Competition Act, 2002 requires the Commission to act in accordance with natural justice, while Section 22 contemplates decision by the members present and voting and the relevant business regulations emphasise orderly hearing and signing of final orders. The Tribunal relied on the principle that a body hearing a matter should itself decide it, and treated the constant-coram requirement as integral to fair hearing. It noted that the matter had remained reserved for a long period and that the final order was issued by a smaller set of members after some members had demitted office, creating a serious infirmity in the decision-making process and a legitimate apprehension of prejudice.

Conclusion: The challenge succeeded. The impugned order was held to be vitiated and was set aside in favour of the appellants.

Issue (ii): Whether the Competition Commission was required to grant an oral hearing after receipt of the supplementary investigation report and on the issue of penalty and its quantum.

Analysis: The Tribunal read Sections 26 and 36 of the Competition Act, 2002 together with the procedural regulations to hold that once further investigation had been directed and a supplementary report was considered, fairness required an opportunity of oral hearing to the affected parties. It further held that, where penalty was in contemplation, the parties should have been heard on the issue of quantum as part of the final adjudicatory exercise.

Conclusion: The omission to grant oral hearing on the supplementary report and penalty issue was held to be contrary to natural justice and in favour of the appellants.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order could not be sustained for breach of natural justice, and the matters were remitted for fresh consideration by an appropriately constituted coram with all contentions kept open.

Ratio Decidendi: In a quasi-judicial proceeding, the same members who substantially hear the matter must participate in the final decision, and where further material is introduced through supplementary investigation, fairness may require a fresh opportunity of oral hearing before final adjudication.

Issues: Whether the applicant was entitled to regular bail in a case alleging forgery and GST evasion.

Analysis: The Court noted that the applicant had remained in custody since 21.01.2023, the investigation was complete and the charge-sheet had been filed. It also took note that no GST departmental proceedings had been initiated against the applicant under the GST enactments, and that co-accused had already been enlarged on bail. Without entering into a detailed appraisal of the evidence, the Court found the matter fit for exercise of discretion in favour of release on bail.

Conclusion: Regular bail was granted to the applicant.

Issues: Whether the tractor-mounted loader manufactured by the assessee was classifiable as a special purpose motor vehicle under heading 8705 or as an accessory to tractor under heading 8708, and whether it was eligible for SSI exemption under Notification No. 8/2003-CE dated 01.03.2003.

Analysis: The product was found to be an independently manufactured loader fitted to a tractor supplied by the customer, and not a permanently fabricated special purpose vehicle on a chassis. Chapter Note 2 of Chapter 87 and the HSN explanatory notes were applied to hold that interchangeable working tools designed for fitting to tractors remain classified in their respective headings even when mounted on the tractor. On the facts, the loader was capable of being mounted and dismantled without destroying the tractor or the attachment, and therefore retained its character as an interchangeable accessory. The reasoning also distinguished special purpose motor vehicles, which are ordinarily permanently built for a particular use and do not revert to the original vehicle on removal of the attachment.

Conclusion: The loader was correctly classifiable under heading 8708 as an accessory of tractor, not under heading 8705 as a special purpose motor vehicle, and the assessee was entitled to SSI exemption under Notification No. 8/2003-CE dated 01.03.2003.

Issues: Whether clinker captively consumed in the manufacture of cement cleared to Special Economic Zone units without payment of duty was eligible for exemption under Notification No. 67/1995-CE.

Analysis: The Tribunal applied the earlier decision in the assessee's own case and held that clearances to SEZ units were made without payment of duty by following the prescribed statutory procedure, including bond execution and the ARE-1 route. Such clearances were not treated as fully exempted goods. The Tribunal further held that, after the SEZ regime replaced the earlier free trade zone framework, the exemption notification continued to cover clinker used captively in the manufacture of cement cleared to SEZ units/developers without duty.

Conclusion: The assessee was eligible for exemption under Notification No. 67/1995-CE on clinker captively consumed for cement cleared to SEZ units without payment of duty.

Final Conclusion: The duty demand was unsustainable and the assessee obtained relief against the impugned order.

Ratio Decidendi: Where intermediate goods are captively consumed for manufacture of final goods cleared to SEZ units without payment of duty in accordance with the prescribed procedure, the exemption for captive consumption under Notification No. 67/1995-CE remains available.

Issues: Whether the assessee was entitled to the benefit of Notification No. 6/2006-CE dated 01/03/2006 in respect of 55 vehicles cleared to NEKRTC and others, and whether the alleged availment of Cenvat credit on inputs used in their body-building activity had been correctly established.

Analysis: The claim of the assessee was that separate accounts were maintained for inputs used in the two sets of body-building activities and that no Cenvat credit was availed for the 55 vehicles in question. The supporting statements and annexures produced before the authorities below were not examined on facts, and no finding was recorded on the core factual question whether credit had in fact been taken for those vehicles. In these circumstances, the matter required factual verification by the adjudicating authority after granting an opportunity of hearing.

Conclusion: The issue on merits was not finally determined and the matter was remanded to the adjudicating authority for fresh examination. The assessee succeeded to the extent of obtaining a remand, and the substantive question of eligibility under the exemption notification was left open.

Issue 1: Exemption under Section 10(38) for LTCG

The respondent-assessee filed a return for the assessment year 2013-14, claiming exemption under Section 10(38) for LTCG from the sale of shares of CCL International Limited. The case was selected for scrutiny, and the Assessing Officer included Rs.1,61,09,716/- as income from other sources, initiating penalty proceedings. The First Appellate Authority allowed the exemption claim, stating the shares were sold on a recognized stock exchange, held for more than twelve months, and STT was paid. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal upheld this decision, noting the lack of evidence from the Assessing Officer to rebut the respondent's claim. The Tribunal dismissed the revenue's appeal, confirming the exemption under Section 10(38).

Issue 2: Dismissal of Revenue's Appeal

The revenue argued that the respondent's LTCG claim was a bogus accommodation entry to disguise unaccounted income. The Tribunal found that the revenue failed to provide evidence to support this claim, relying solely on a statement obtained during a survey under Section 133A, which has no evidentiary value. The Tribunal emphasized that the sale of shares was through a recognized stock exchange with STT paid, thus qualifying for the exemption under Section 10(38). The Tribunal dismissed the appeal, noting the absence of incriminating evidence against the respondent and the compliance with legal requirements for the exemption.

Conclusion:

The High Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, stating that the revenue failed to demonstrate any substantial question of law. The Court confirmed that the respondent-assessee met all requirements for the exemption under Section 10(38), and the orders of the appellate authorities were based on proper evidence and legal principles. The appeals were dismissed with no order as to costs.

Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to a direction requiring seven days' advance notice before any apprehension or arrest in connection with the FIR, while the prayer for quashing or stay of investigation was not examined on merits.

Analysis: The petitioner was not named as an accused in the FIR, though his name surfaced during investigation from diary entries attributed to the deceased. The investigation against him had remained stayed for more than five years under an earlier order, and the Court found that the stay had only recently been lifted. In these peculiar facts, the Court held that it was appropriate to exercise inherent jurisdiction to secure the ends of justice by granting a limited protective measure. At the same time, the Court declined to enter into the merits of the request for quashing or continued stay of investigation at that stage.

Conclusion: The petitioner was held entitled to seven days' advance notice before arrest in the stated FIR, and the request for broader relief was left open.

Final Conclusion: The petition succeeded only to the limited extent of pre-arrest notice, and the matter was otherwise disposed of without adjudicating the merits of quashing or stay.

Ratio Decidendi: Where investigation had remained stayed for a long period and the accused was not yet formally named, the High Court may invoke its inherent powers to grant a narrowly tailored pre-arrest protective direction to secure the ends of justice without finally determining the merits of the criminal case.