Issues: Whether the interim order dated 18 September 2023 should be made absolute and the appeal allowed, subject to the appellant remaining present before the Trial Court and cooperating with the proceedings.

Conclusion: The interim order was made absolute subject to the stated condition, and the appeal was allowed. All contentions on merits were kept open.

Issues: Whether an appeal under Section 13(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 lies against an order rejecting an application under Order VII Rule 10 and Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Analysis: The appeal right under Section 13(1A) is controlled by the proviso, which restricts appeals from orders to those specifically enumerated in Order XLIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. An order rejecting an application under Order VII Rule 10 or Order VII Rule 11(d) is not included in Order XLIII. The Court distinguished the authorities relied upon by the appellants and followed the principle that a statutory right of appeal must be clearly conferred and cannot be expanded by interpretation.

Conclusion: The appeal was not maintainable and was liable to be dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: Under Section 13(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, an appeal lies only from orders specifically enumerated in Order XLIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 or Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and an order rejecting an application under Order VII Rule 10 or Order VII Rule 11(d) is not appealable.

Issues: (i) Whether the acquittal for the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was justified. (ii) Whether the appellant had made out grounds to interfere with the acquittal.

Issue (i): Whether the acquittal for the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was justified.

Analysis: The execution of the cheque having been admitted, the presumption under Section 139 arose that it was issued towards discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability. That presumption was rebuttable, but the accused was required to establish a probable defence on the standard of preponderance of probabilities. The defence of material alteration could not succeed where the cheque had been issued as a signed blank cheque, because Section 20 authorises the holder to complete the instrument, and Section 87 yields to that provision. The endorsement from the bank and the material on record did not justify a finding that the cheque was void for material alteration.

Conclusion: The acquittal on the ground of material alteration was not justified and was liable to be set aside.

Issue (ii): Whether the appellant had made out grounds to interfere with the acquittal.

Analysis: In an appeal against acquittal, interference is warranted where the trial court's view is perverse or based on an error in appreciation of the evidence and governing legal presumptions. The trial court treated the cheque as materially altered despite the legal effect of a signed blank cheque and without properly applying the presumptions under Section 139 and the interaction between Sections 20 and 87. The appellate interference was therefore justified.

Conclusion: Grounds to interfere with the acquittal were made out.

Final Conclusion: The conviction of the accused under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was restored by reversing the acquittal, and sentence with compensation was imposed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a signed blank cheque is delivered to the holder, completion of its contents within the authority so given does not constitute material alteration; the statutory presumption under Section 139 operates unless rebutted on a preponderance of probabilities.

ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED

1. Whether an application by the Official Liquidator to recover an advance payment made by a company prior to winding up is barred by limitation under Section 458A of the Companies Act, 1956.

2. The legal effect and temporal application of Section 458A of the Companies Act, 1956 on the computation of limitation for claims enforceable by an Official Liquidator when the underlying cause of action arose before the winding up order.

3. Whether Section 458A can revive or validate claims which were statute-barred prior to the winding up order.

ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue 1 - Whether the recovery application by the Official Liquidator is barred by limitation under Section 458A.

Legal framework: Section 458A excludes from computation of limitation the period from commencement of winding up to the date of the winding up order (both inclusive) and one year immediately following the winding up order, notwithstanding the Limitation Act.

Precedent treatment: The Court treated the authoritative exposition that Section 458A allows the Official Liquidator to exclude the winding-up period and one year thereafter from the computation of limitation for claims that were legally enforceable on the date of the winding up order; however, it does not revive claims already statute-barred before the winding up order.

Interpretation and reasoning: The payment in question was made on 10.04.2008, giving an original three-year limitation period that expired on 10.04.2011-prior to the winding up order dated 03.06.2011. The Court applied Section 458A by treating limitation as commencing on the date of the winding up order (03.06.2011) and extending one year thereafter, so that the permissible window for the Official Liquidator to sue expired on 03.06.2015. The application was filed on 26.10.2017, which is beyond the excluded/extended period, and therefore time-barred under Section 458A.

Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - Section 458A cannot be used to resurrect a claim that had already become time-barred before the winding up order; limitation is to be computed so that, for claims enforceable on the date of winding up, the excluded period applies but it does not operate retroactively to revive already barred claims.

Conclusion: The recovery application by the Official Liquidator is barred by limitation under Section 458A and must be dismissed.

Issue 2 - Temporal effect of Section 458A on claims arising before the winding up order.

Legal framework: Section 458A has overriding effect on the Limitation Act for suits or applications in the name and on behalf of a company being wound up by the Tribunal/Court, by excluding the winding up duration and one subsequent year from limitation calculation.

Precedent treatment: The Court relied upon established authority that construes Section 458A as providing relief to the Official Liquidator for claims that were legally enforceable on the date of the winding up order by excluding the specified period, thereby effectively extending the time to initiate proceedings for such claims.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court emphasized that the legislative purpose of Section 458A is to permit the Official Liquidator to prosecute claims which were enforceable at the time of winding up without prejudice to the beneficiaries; however, this statutory exclusion cannot be stretched to mean restoration of claims which had already lapsed under the Limitation Act before the winding up order was passed.

Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - Section 458A is prospective in effect with respect to exclusion of time; it operates to protect enforceable claims at the date of winding up but does not revive previously extinguished claims.

Conclusion: For claims arising prior to the winding up order, limitation is assessed by determining whether the claim was enforceable on the date of winding up; if it was already barred before that date, Section 458A does not enlarge the Official Liquidator's right to sue.

Issue 3 - Whether Section 458A revives claims already statute-barred before the winding up order.

Legal framework: The plain language of Section 458A and its stated overriding effect over the Limitation Act must be read in the context of whether the claim was legally enforceable at the date of the winding up order.

Precedent treatment: The Court followed authority holding that Section 458A cannot be construed to revive a claim that was not enforceable on the date of winding up; the provision is intended to prevent loss to the company or its shareholders by allowing the Official Liquidator to pursue claims that would otherwise be defeated by the passage of time during the winding up process.

Interpretation and reasoning: Applying the legal test, the Court observed the claim's limitation had expired before the winding up order was passed; therefore, the statutory exclusion could not be used to resuscitate the claim. The Court contrasted claims enforceable at the winding up date (which benefit from exclusion) with claims already time-barred (which do not).

Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - Section 458A does not operate as a remedial device to revive claims already extinguished by limitation prior to the winding up order; this is a core conclusion determining the result in the case.

Conclusion: Section 458A cannot revive a pre-winding-up statute-barred claim; accordingly, the application to recover the advance payment, being filed after the excluded/extended period, was not maintainable.

Disposition and Direction

The application for recovery filed by the Official Liquidator was dismissed as barred by limitation in terms of Section 458A of the Companies Act, 1956; the Court's conclusion rests on the finding that the cause of action became time-barred prior to the winding up order and Section 458A does not revive such a claim.

Issues: Whether the order treating the assessee as an assessee in default for non-deduction of tax at source on lease rent was barred by limitation under section 201(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and whether the subsequent assessment could stand.

Analysis: The assessee had filed the relevant TDS returns for the assessment year within time. The Tribunal noted that, under section 201(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 as applicable to the year in question, an order under section 201 could not be passed beyond the prescribed period from the end of the financial year. It further recorded that an earlier order under sections 201 and 201(1A) had already accepted the assessee's claim, and that the same had neither been reopened nor revised under section 263. On these facts, the later order dated 28/12/2017 was found to be beyond limitation and unjustified.

Conclusion: The order under sections 201 and 201(1A) was held to be time-barred and void ab initio.

Final Conclusion: The assessee succeeded in both appeals, and the impugned TDS demand orders were set aside.

Issues: (i) Whether receipts from supply planning services under the 2008-2011 contract were taxable as royalty or fees for technical services under Article 13 of the India-UK DTAA and section 9 of the Income-tax Act. (ii) Whether receipts from grading services were taxable as royalty or taxable only as business income. (iii) Whether receipts from the DTC Accredited Business Programme were taxable as royalty or fees for technical services.

Issue (i): Whether receipts from supply planning services under the 2008-2011 contract were taxable as royalty or fees for technical services under Article 13 of the India-UK DTAA and section 9 of the Income-tax Act.

Analysis: The supply planning services under the later contract were found to be materially different from the earlier value-added services arrangement. The services were confined to intention-to-offer communication, consistency of boxes, extranet access, key account management, and integrity verification. These activities were held to be only informational and commercial in nature, and did not amount to managerial, technical, or consultancy services. The services also did not make available technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how, or processes to the recipient. The use of extranet was treated as a communication platform, not as a technical service. The consideration was also held not to be royalty, since the arrangement involved sharing basic commercial information about intended supplies and not the use of, or right to use, any plan, trademark, or industrial or commercial experience in the relevant treaty sense.

Conclusion: The receipts from supply planning services were held not taxable as royalty or fees for technical services, and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether receipts from grading services were taxable as royalty or taxable only as business income.

Analysis: The grading activity consisted of examination, testing, certification, and issuance of grading reports for diamonds. It was held that the activity did not involve granting any right to use copyright, trademark, design, process, or other intellectual property. The service provider used its own expertise to render the grading service, but did not impart or transfer that expertise to the customer. The activity was therefore not royalty within the treaty definition. The receipts were treated as consideration for services and, in the absence of a permanent establishment, not taxable in India as royalty.

Conclusion: The receipts from grading services were held not to be royalty and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether receipts from the DTC Accredited Business Programme were taxable as royalty or fees for technical services.

Analysis: The programme was held to be neither a transfer of any intellectual property right nor a grant of use of any trademark, logo, or registered sign. The record also showed that no logo or signature was designed for the programme and that the name alone could not be treated as royalty. The services rendered under the programme did not make available technical knowledge, skill, or know-how, and therefore did not satisfy the treaty test for fees for technical services. In the absence of a permanent establishment, the receipts were not chargeable to tax in India.

Conclusion: The receipts from the DTC Accredited Business Programme were held not taxable as royalty or fees for technical services, and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The taxability additions based on royalty and fees for technical services were not sustained, and the connected rate and consequential grounds did not survive independently.

Ratio Decidendi: Under Article 13 of the India-UK DTAA, services are taxable as fees for technical services only if they involve technical or consultancy services that make available technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how, or processes to the recipient, and payments are taxable as royalty only where there is use of, or the right to use, protected intellectual property or commercial experience in the treaty sense.

Issues: Whether the applicant was entitled to regular bail in connection with the alleged offence under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: The application was considered under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The allegations related to availing of input tax credit on the basis of fake invoices. The record indicated that the applicant had been in custody since 13.10.2023, the investigation was virtually over, the case rested principally on documentary material already seized by the investigating agency, and the applicant's further custodial presence was not shown to be necessary. The trial was also not likely to conclude in the near future.

Conclusion: The applicant was entitled to be enlarged on regular bail.

Issues: Whether the secured creditor's debt had priority over the State's tax and excise dues and whether the revenue entries recording the State's claim over the secured asset were liable to be removed.

Analysis: The property had been mortgaged in favour of the bank earlier in time, and the bank's security interest was recorded in the central registry before the State departments entered their revenue claims. The Court applied the settled principle that secured creditors stand in priority over unsecured or later claims, and relied on the statutory mandate under the SARFAESI Act that secured debts are to be paid in priority and that the Act operates with overriding effect. It was further held that the State's first-charge provision under the Himachal Pradesh Value Added Tax Act could not prevail against the secured creditor's rights under the SARFAESI framework.

Conclusion: The secured creditor's claim prevailed over the State's tax and excise claims, and the red entries in the revenue record were liable to be removed.

Ratio Decidendi: A secured creditor's right under the SARFAESI Act, especially where the security interest is prior in time and the Act confers priority and overriding effect, prevails over a later statutory first charge claimed by the State under revenue legislation.

Issues: (i) whether a society registered under the H.P. Societies Registration Act is a body corporate and falls within the expression "company" for the purposes of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act; (ii) whether a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is maintainable against office-bearers when the society/company itself is not arrayed as an accused.

Issue (i): whether a society registered under the H.P. Societies Registration Act is a body corporate and falls within the expression "company" for the purposes of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act

Analysis: Section 141 fastens vicarious liability on persons in charge of, and responsible for, the conduct of business where the offence is committed by a company, and the expression "company" includes a body corporate, firm, or association of individuals. Section 14 of the H.P. Societies Registration Act declares every registered society to be a body corporate with perpetual succession, a common seal, and capacity to sue and be sued. The registered society in question therefore answers the description of a body corporate and cannot be excluded from the reach of Section 141 merely because it is registered under the Societies Registration Act rather than the Companies Act.

Conclusion: The society is a body corporate and is covered by the expression "company" for the purposes of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Issue (ii): whether a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is maintainable against office-bearers when the society/company itself is not arrayed as an accused

Analysis: The prosecution of persons who are only vicariously liable under Section 141 is contingent upon the arraignment of the principal offender, namely the company or body corporate, as an accused. The binding rule stated in the Supreme Court precedents applied in the judgment is that, in the absence of the company being made an accused, the complaint against the office-bearers cannot be sustained. As the society was not impleaded as an accused, the foundational requirement for proceeding against the petitioner and the other office-bearer was missing.

Conclusion: The complaint against the office-bearers alone was not maintainable and was liable to be quashed qua the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The petition succeeded because the prosecution could not proceed against the office-bearers alone without joining the society as the principal accused, and the complaint and consequent proceedings were set aside insofar as they related to the petitioner.

Ratio Decidendi: For an offence under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, a body corporate or society falling within the expression "company" must be arraigned as an accused before vicarious liability can be fastened on its office-bearers.

The core issue was whether the ITAT was justified in holding that the deduction under Section 54B of the Income Tax Act, 1961 cannot be allowed to the assessee since the investment in the purchase of new agricultural land was made in the name of his wife.

The appellant sold agricultural land and claimed deduction under Section 54B for investments made in new agricultural lands, including those purchased in his wife's name. The CIT (A) allowed the exemption, but the ITAT annulled it, stating that the exemption could only be allowed if the investment was made in the assessee's own name.

The appellant argued that Sections 54, 54B, and 54F of the IT Act are pari materia and cited precedents where deductions were allowed for property purchased in the name of a spouse. The appellant also invoked the principle that when two interpretations are possible, the one favoring the taxpayer should be preferred.

The respondent countered that the term 'assessee' under Section 2(7) of the IT Act must be strictly interpreted, and the exemption cannot be extended to property purchased in the name of the assessee's wife.

The court examined the statutory language of Section 54B and relevant case law, including the Supreme Court's rulings on strict interpretation of exemption provisions. The court concluded that the term 'assessee' as defined under Section 2(7) does not include the spouse, and thus, the exemption cannot be extended to investments made in the wife's name.

Applying these principles, the court held that the ITAT was justified in denying the deduction under Section 54B of the IT Act, as the land was not purchased in the assessee's own name.

As a result, the appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.

Issues: Whether the respondent was entitled to exemption under the relevant central excise notifications on the sale of yarn to apex handloom co-operative societies, and whether the demand of duty, interest and penalty could be sustained.

Analysis: The notification granted exemption to specified goods purchased by a registered apex handloom co-operative society, National Handloom Development Corporation, or State Government Handloom Development Corporation, subject to payment by cheque from the purchaser's own bank account and production at clearance of a certificate that the yarn was going to be used only on handlooms. On the evidence, the yarn was purchased by the two apex bodies, payments were made by account payee cheques from their own accounts, and certificates covering the intended use were produced. The inference that the goods were really sold to traders was not supported by material on record. The conditions in the exemption notification did not require proof of actual end use by the ultimate user, and the authorities could not add a condition not found in the notification. In fiscal interpretation, exemption clauses are construed strictly, but once the assessee falls within the language of the notification, the benefit cannot be denied by conjecture or intendment.

Conclusion: The respondent satisfied the conditions of the exemption notifications and was entitled to the benefit of exemption. The demand of duty, interest and penalty was unsustainable.

Issues: (i) whether interference with the acquittal was warranted in the appeal; (ii) whether the presumption under the Negotiable Instruments Act stood rebutted and the ingredients of the offence under Section 138 were proved.

Issue (i): whether interference with the acquittal was warranted in the appeal.

Analysis: In an appeal against acquittal, the appellate court may reappraise the evidence, but it must give due weight to the presumption of innocence reinforced by the trial court's acquittal. Interference is justified where the trial court's view is not a possible view or is perverse.

Conclusion: Interference was warranted because the trial court's approach ignored the governing principles and adopted an unsustainable view.

Issue (ii): whether the presumption under the Negotiable Instruments Act stood rebutted and the ingredients of the offence under Section 138 were proved.

Analysis: Once the cheque and signatures were admitted, presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 arose that the cheque was issued for consideration and in discharge of a debt or liability. The accused did not lead defence evidence, and mere denial under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was insufficient. The cross-examination and suggestions did not rebut the presumption on a preponderance of probabilities. The cheque was proved to have been dishonoured for insufficient funds, and service of demand notice was established. The statutory ingredients of Section 138 were therefore satisfied.

Conclusion: The presumption was not rebutted and the offence under Section 138 stood proved against the accused.

Final Conclusion: The acquittal was set aside and the accused was convicted under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, with the matter posted for hearing on sentence.

Ratio Decidendi: Admission of the drawer's signature on a cheque triggers the statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and 139, and those presumptions can be displaced only by a probable defence proved on the preponderance of probabilities; in an appeal against acquittal, interference is justified where the trial court ignores these settled principles and reaches a perverse view.