2023 - Case Laws

❯

❯❯

0 / 200

Expand Note

Add to Folder

No Folders have been created

Are you sure you want to delete "My most important" ?

NOTE:

Open Link

Case Laws

All › 2023

Showing Results for :

Reset Filters

Results Found:

Page of 950

Press 'Enter' after typing page number.

3141 to 3160 of 18998 Results

Show AI Text Quick Glance by AI Headnote

2023 (10) TMI 525 - CESTAT ALLAHABAD Central Excise

AI TextQuick Glance (AI)Headnote

Issues Involved:
1. Denial of CENVAT credit on printers and cartridges used in the office.
2. Denial of CENVAT credit on corrugated boxes delivered outside the factory premises.

Summary:

Issue 1: Denial of CENVAT credit on printers and cartridges used in the office

The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the denial of CENVAT credit on printers and cartridges used in the office, citing the exclusion clause under Rule 2(a)(A)(i) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, which specifically excludes "any equipment or appliance used in an office" from the definition of capital goods. The appellant's argument that printers and cartridges are essential for production and should be considered capital goods under Chapter 84 of the Central Excise Tariff Act was rejected. The Tribunal referenced the decision of the Mumbai Bench in Bharti Airtel Ltd, which affirmed that office equipment does not qualify as capital goods if not directly related to the output service. Consequently, the credit of Rs.52,951/- on printers and cartridges was disallowed.

Issue 2: Denial of CENVAT credit on corrugated boxes delivered outside the factory premises

The Commissioner (Appeals) denied CENVAT credit on corrugated boxes delivered to a warehouse at Lawrence Road, Delhi, rather than the factory premises. Rule 3 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, stipulates that credit is admissible for inputs received in the factory of the manufacturer. However, the Tribunal found that the warehouse acted as a depot from where the final product (sugar) was repacked and cleared, aligning with the principle that inputs used in relation to the manufacture and clearance of finished products are eligible for credit. Citing the case of Hawkins Cookers Ltd., the Tribunal allowed the CENVAT credit of Rs.41,078/- for the corrugated boxes.

Conclusion:

The appeal was partially allowed. The CENVAT credit of Rs.41,078/- for the corrugated boxes was held admissible, while the credit of Rs.52,951/- for printers and cartridges was disallowed. The demand of interest and penalty under Rule 15 (2) read with Section 11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944, was upheld to the extent of the disallowed credit. The judgment was pronounced on 11/10/2023.

Appeal partially allowed: CENVAT credit for corrugated boxes allowed, printers and cartridges disallowed. Interest and penalty upheld.
The Tribunal partially allowed the appeal, holding the CENVAT credit of Rs.41,078/- for corrugated boxes admissible, while disallowing the credit of Rs.52,951/- for printers and cartridges. The demand for interest and penalty under Rule 15(2) read with Section 11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944, was upheld to the extent of the disallowed credit. The judgment was pronounced on 11/10/2023.

CENVAT credit admissibility on office equipment and printer cartridges - Exclusion of equipment or appliance used in office from 'capital goods' under Rule 2(a)(A) - Burden of proof on manufacturer under Rule 9(5) for admissibility of CENVAT credit - CENVAT credit admissible only for inputs received in the factory of manufacture under Rule 3 - CENVAT credit for packing materials delivered at depot/warehouse when used in relation to manufacture - Judicial precedent prevails over Board circularsCENVAT credit admissibility on office equipment and printer cartridges - Exclusion of equipment or appliance used in office from 'capital goods' under Rule 2(a)(A) - Burden of proof on manufacturer under Rule 9(5) for admissibility of CENVAT credit - Judicial precedent prevails over Board circulars - CENVAT credit claimed on printers and printer cartridges used in the appellant's office is not admissible. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal upheld the disallowance of CENVAT credit on printers and cartridges used in the office. The exclusion in the definition of 'capital goods' (Rule 2(a)(A)) specifically omits equipment or appliances used in an office, and the printers/cartridges fall within that excluded category. The appellant's reliance on a Board clarification that goods used in the factory are generally allowable was held to be inapposite where the statutory definition expressly excludes office equipment, and judicial decisions interpreting the rule were given precedence over the circular. Further, the onus to establish admissibility rests on the manufacturer under Rule 9(5); the appellant did not establish sufficient nexus or usage in manufacturing premises to counter the exclusion. Applying these principles, the Tribunal affirmed that credit on the printers and cartridges is not allowable and sustained demand, interest and penalty to the extent of the disallowed credit. [Paras 4]Credit on printers and printer cartridges used in the office is not admissible; demand, interest and penalty in respect of this disallowance are upheld.CENVAT credit admissibility on office equipment and printer cartridges - CENVAT credit admissible only for inputs received in the factory of manufacture under Rule 3 - CENVAT credit for packing materials delivered at depot/warehouse when used in relation to manufacture - CENVAT credit claimed on corrugated packing boxes delivered at the appellant's depot/warehouse is admissible where they were used in relation to manufacture and clearance. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that Rule 3 requires credit to relate to inputs received in the factory or used in relation to manufacture and clearance of finished goods. The facts showed the corrugated boxes were delivered to the appellant's warehouse/depot from which the finished goods were repacked and cleared; these facts were not disputed. Relying on established authority that packing material used at depots for packing goods for clearance may be eligible where it is used in relation to manufacture and clearance, the Tribunal found no justification to deny credit for these packing materials and allowed the claimed credit. Accordingly, the adjudicating authority's denial as to these inputs was set aside. [Paras 4]Credit on corrugated packing material delivered at the depot/warehouse and used in relation to manufacture and clearance is admissible; the disallowance in respect of these packing materials is reversed.Final Conclusion: Appeal partially allowed: CENVAT credit on the corrugated packing material delivered at the depot/warehouse and used in relation to manufacture and clearance is admitted; CENVAT credit on printers and printer cartridges used in the office is disallowed. Demand of interest and penalty is sustained to the extent of the disallowed credit.

2023 (10) TMI 524 - CESTAT CHANDIGARH Central Excise

AI TextQuick Glance (AI)Headnote

Cenvat credit demand cannot rest on untested third-party statements; cross-examination and corroboration are essential for sustainability.
CESTAT Chandigarh held that a demand of Cenvat credit, interest and penalties cannot be sustained where it rests mainly on third-party statements and the assessee is denied cross-examination. Statements recorded during investigation are not substantive evidence unless the statutory procedure under Section 9D of the Central Excise Act is followed. The Tribunal also noted that the documentary material produced by the assessees, including goods receipts, stock records, RG-23C Part I, banking records and monthly returns, was not properly considered, while the department produced no independent evidence of non-receipt of goods. On that basis, the demand and penalties were set aside.

Admissibility of statements recorded during investigation and requirement of examination-in-chief and cross-examination under Section 9D - reliance on statements without affording opportunity of cross-examination - Cenvat credit denial on the ground of non-receipt of inputs - treatment of transporter Goods Receipts, RG 23C/Daily Stock Account and bank records as evidence of receipt - imposition of penalty under Rule 13 and Rule 26 in absence of proved intention to evade dutyAdmissibility of statements recorded during investigation and requirement of examination-in-chief and cross-examination under Section 9D - reliance on statements without affording opportunity of cross-examination - Reliance by adjudicating authorities on statements recorded during investigation without affording the assessee opportunity for examination in chief of the makers and for cross examination is impermissible and vitiates the order. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found that the adjudication was founded primarily on statements of third parties (manufacturers and dealers) recorded during investigation, but the assessee's request for cross examination was not permitted. Applying the principles in the cited Punjab & Haryana High Court authorities, the Tribunal held that if the Revenue intends to rely on statements recorded under Section 14, it must have the makers examined in chief before the adjudicating authority, provide the assessee a copy of that examination, and permit cross examination. Statements recorded behind the back of the assessee which are not dealt with by examination in chief and cross examination cannot be relied upon in adjudication. The impugned order's reliance on such untested statements rendered the decision legally unsustainable. [Paras 14, 15, 16]Findings based solely on untested statements were held inadmissible; the impugned order was set aside on this ground.Cenvat credit denial on the ground of non-receipt of inputs - treatment of transporter Goods Receipts, RG 23C/Daily Stock Account and bank records as evidence of receipt - The authorities failed to consider or record findings on documentary evidence (transporter Goods Receipts, RG 23C/Daily Stock Account and bank statements) produced by the assessee to establish receipt of inputs; in the absence of independent evidence disproving receipt, the demand could not be sustained. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal noted that the appellant produced GRs issued by the transporter, entries in Daily Stock Account and RG 23C Part I, and bank statements showing payments, and that monthly statutory returns reflected clearance of finished goods and availing of credit. The Commissioner (Appeals) did not examine these documents nor adduce independent evidence to prove non receipt. Precedents where reliance only on supplier statements was held insufficient, and where documentary proof of invoiced transactions and payments through banking channels warranted relief, were applied. Because the lower authorities did not evaluate these materials or record contrary independent findings, the demand could not be upheld. [Paras 4, 8, 16, 17]Documentary evidence of receipt was not considered by the authorities; absence of independent evidence of non receipt led to setting aside the demand.Imposition of penalty under Rule 13 and Rule 26 in absence of proved intention to evade duty - Penalty confirmed by the authorities could not be sustained where the foundational demand itself was unsupported because the adjudication ignored procedural safeguards and documentary evidence; penalty cannot be imposed in the absence of intention to evade duty. - HELD THAT: - Given that the demand for reversal of Cenvat credit was quashed on grounds that statements relied upon were inadmissible and that documentary evidence of receipt was not considered, the Tribunal found that the penalties imposed on the appellants lacked a lawful foundation. The Tribunal observed that statutory returns and lack of any proof of fraudulent intention weigh against imposition of penalty, and that penalties premised on an unsustainable demand cannot stand. [Paras 12, 16, 17]Penalties imposed under Rule 13 and Rule 26 were held unsustainable and set aside along with the demand.Final Conclusion: Both appeals were allowed; the impugned order of the Commissioner (Appeals) confirming the demand and penalties was set aside for failure to afford the assessee procedural safeguards regarding reliance on investigational statements and for failure to consider the documentary evidence of receipt and statutory returns.

2023 (10) TMI 510 - CESTAT CHENNAI Customs

AI TextQuick Glance (AI)Headnote

Customs valuation: declared transaction value cannot be rejected on unverified contemporaneous imports lacking reliable comparability.
Declared transaction value in customs valuation cannot be rejected on the basis of alleged contemporaneous imports unless the statutory conditions for rejection are satisfied and the relied-upon imports are shown to be genuine, reliable comparables. Here, the comparison failed because differences existed in description, grade, country of origin, quantity, and place of exportation or importation, and the import data was not put to the importer for rebuttal. The reasoning in the original order also showed uncertainty about the applicability of the comparison under the valuation rules. On that basis, rejection of the declared value and re-determination of the import value were held unsustainable and set aside in favour of the assessee.

Transaction value principle - Re-determination of import value under Rule 9 of the Customs Valuation Rules, 2007 - Comparability of contemporaneous imports - Admissibility of comparable values and opportunity to rebut - Inapplicability of alternative valuation methods under Rules 4-8 due to non-quantifiable variable factorsTransaction value principle - Comparability of contemporaneous imports - Admissibility of comparable values and opportunity to rebut - Re-determination of import value under Rule 9 of the Customs Valuation Rules, 2007 - Inapplicability of alternative valuation methods under Rules 4-8 due to non-quantifiable variable factors - Validity of the authorities' re-determination of the import value declared by the appellant - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal examined whether the assessing authorities were justified in rejecting the declared transaction value and re-determining import value under Rule 9. The adjudicating authority relied on a table of alleged contemporaneous imports as comparables but did not put those entries to the appellant for rebuttal. The contemporaneous imports relied upon were of variable and distinguishing descriptions (different types, grades, country of origin, place of exportation/importation and differing quantities), casting doubt on their admissibility as true comparables. The assessing officer himself recorded that valuation under Rules 4 and 5 could not be applied due to such variable factors and that Rules 7 and 8 could not be applied for want of quantifiable data, thereby undermining the consistency of his approach in treating the contemporaneous imports as reliable comparables. The quantity disparity between the appellant's import and the alleged comparables further reinforced incomparability. For these reasons the re-determination lacked a proper legal basis, was not in accordance with the valuation regime's requirements for comparability and opportunity to rebut, and therefore could not stand. [Paras 7, 8]The re-determination of the import value by the Revenue is set aside and the appeal is allowed.Final Conclusion: The Tribunal held that the Revenue's re-determination of the declared import value was unsupported by admissible comparables and proceeded without affording the appellant an opportunity to rebut; consequently the reassessment under Rule 9 was set aside and the appeal allowed.

2023 (10) TMI 509 - CESTAT CHENNAI Customs

AI TextQuick Glance (AI)Headnote

Customs valuation: transaction value stands where relationship is unproven to have influenced the declared import price.
Declared import value under the Customs Valuation Rules, 2007 cannot be rejected solely because the importer, supplier and Government of India are alleged to be related persons. Rejection of transaction value requires evidence that the relationship influenced the price under the applicable deeming tests for relationship and the transaction value rule. On the record, no material showed flow-back, undervaluation, or any price influence from the relationship, and the burden to displace the declared value was not met. Earlier tribunal decisions on the same transaction structure also supported acceptance of the declared value, so the Department's challenge to the valuation failed.

Related persons under the Customs Valuation Rules, 2007 - transaction value accepted where relationship did not influence price (Rule 3(3)(a) of CVR, 2007) - burden on revenue to prove that relationship influenced the price - long term off take agreement (UOTA) and long term pricing (LTP) as determinative of priceRelated persons under the Customs Valuation Rules, 2007 - transaction value accepted where relationship did not influence price (Rule 3(3)(a) of CVR, 2007) - burden on revenue to prove that relationship influenced the price - long term off take agreement (UOTA) and long term pricing (LTP) as determinative of price - Validity of the impugned orders dropping proceedings rejecting declared transaction value on account of alleged related party influence - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal examined the Commissioner's orders which dropped proceedings initiated to reject the declared import values of urea on the ground that the importer and the foreign supplier were related and that such relationship had influenced the price. Having considered the impugned orders and the consistent decisions of the Ahmedabad and Chennai Benches, the Tribunal held that the Revenue failed to establish that the relationship influenced the price. Rule 2(2) of the Customs Valuation Rules, 2007 lists specific modes by which persons may be deemed related; the authority did not prove that those criteria were satisfied so as to establish a legally cognisable relationship that affected price. Even if a relationship were to be deemed to exist, Rule 3(3)(a) requires acceptance of the transaction value where examination indicates the relationship did not influence the price. The long term Urea Off Take Agreement (UOTA) and related JV arrangements and long term pricing (LTP) showed pre determined pricing (including market price based mechanisms and a fixed LTP for 15 years), contemporaneous consideration of international market trends, and governmental involvement and acceptance (including a government notification recognising the UOTA price framework). On these facts, and in the absence of evidence of any flow back or manipulation, the Revenue did not discharge the onus to rebut the transaction value. The impugned proposals for re determination, differential duty, interest and penalties therefore lacked legal foundation and were unsustainable. [Paras 9, 10, 11, 12]The appeals filed by the Department are dismissed; the impugned orders dropping the proceedings are upheld and demands, interest and penalties premised on rejection of the declared value are set aside; cross objections disposed in support of the respondent.Final Conclusion: The Tribunal upheld the Commissioners' orders dropping proceedings because the Revenue failed to prove that any relationship between the importer, the Government/agents and the foreign supplier influenced the transaction price; the declared transaction value is therefore accepted and the appeals by the Department are dismissed.

2023 (10) TMI 504 - CESTAT HYDERABAD Service Tax

AI TextQuick Glance (AI)Headnote

Tribunal overturns Impugned Order, Appellant not liable for service tax. Cenvat credit granted.
The Tribunal allowed the appeal, setting aside the Impugned Order. The Appellant was deemed not liable to pay service tax on electricity and water charges to concessionaires and was entitled to Cenvat credit on Outdoor Catering and Club Membership services. The consequential benefits were granted to the Appellant, and the issue of limitation was left open.

Supply of electricity and water as sale of goods not taxable as service - Management, Maintenance and Repair Service (MMRS) - Reimbursement / pure agent principle - Exemption of services within Airport including supply of water and electricity - Exclusion of value of goods from taxable service value - Cenvat credit admissibility for business-related input servicesSupply of electricity and water as sale of goods not taxable as service - Management, Maintenance and Repair Service (MMRS) - Reimbursement / pure agent principle - Exemption of services within Airport including supply of water and electricity - Exclusion of value of goods from taxable service value - Whether service tax was rightly demanded on electricity and water charges recovered from concessionaires for the period 2008-09 to 30.06.2010 - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found that the amounts recovered by the appellant for electricity and water were essentially sales of goods and could not be treated as services under MMRS. The concessionaire agreements showed separate utility invoicing on the basis of actual consumption and the supplies were independent activities within the airport premises. The Department's reliance on classification as MMRS was not sustained when the contract is viewed in entirety. The Tribunal further noted the Government's subsequent exemption of supply of water and electricity within airports and the DO letter reflecting intent to exclude such activities from service tax, and observed that Notification No.12/2003 providing exclusion of value of goods from taxable service value would also preclude service tax on these supplies. Having considered the admitted facts and authorities, the Tribunal held there was no service tax liability on the electricity and water charges (including the markup collected) for the period in question. [Paras 14, 15, 16, 17, 18]No service tax is leviable on electricity and water charges recovered from concessionaires for the period 2008-09 to 30.06.2010; the demand is set aside.Cenvat credit admissibility for business-related input services - Whether Cenvat credit on Outdoor Catering services and Club Membership was admissible for the relevant period - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that Outdoor Catering services qualify as input services relating to business for the period prior to 01.07.2011 and are not excluded; hence Cenvat credit was allowable. The Club Memberships in question were corporate memberships with professional associations and not individual recreational memberships, and thus similarly related to business and eligible for credit. The Tribunal followed the cited authorities recognising such claims as admissible input credit. [Paras 19]Cenvat credit on Outdoor Catering services and on the company's Club/association memberships is admissible for the relevant period.Final Conclusion: Appeal allowed; the impugned order is set aside on merits-no service tax is payable on electricity and water charges for 2008-09 to 30.06.2010 and Cenvat credit on Outdoor Catering and corporate Club/association memberships is allowable; appellant entitled to consequential benefits; question of limitation kept open.

2023 (10) TMI 503 - CESTAT MUMBAI Service Tax

AI TextQuick Glance (AI)Headnote

Issues involved:
The issues involved in the judgment are whether the appellant's services qualify as export of services, whether the appellant can be considered an intermediary under the Place of Provision of Services Rules, 2012, and whether the appellant is eligible for a refund of service tax.

Export of Services:
The appellant, engaged in guiding students seeking admissions in foreign universities, claimed that their services were export of service as they did not collect consideration from prospective students. The appellant filed a refund claim for the service tax paid, contending that their services were provided outside India. The original authority rejected the refund claim. The appellant argued that they were not providing services to Indian students but to universities abroad, making their services export of services. The Tribunal held that the appellant's services were indeed export of services, citing a similar case precedent.

Intermediary Status:
The Revenue contended that the appellant functioned as an intermediary under Rule 2(f) of the Place of Provision of Services Rules, 2012. The appellant, however, argued that they were not intermediaries as they did not receive consideration from prospective students. The Tribunal referred to a previous case where similar organizations were not considered intermediaries. The Tribunal held that the Revenue's contention that the appellant was an intermediary was not in accordance with the law.

Refund Claim:
The Revenue argued that the appellant was not eligible for a refund as they had not revised their ST-3 return for a specific period. The appellant later submitted a letter agreeing to forego a part of the refund claim. The Tribunal noted that the appellant had foregone a portion of the refund claim and reduced the refund amount accordingly. The Tribunal remanded the matter to the original authority to collect foreign inward remittance certificates for the remaining refund amount and allowed the refund upon submission of the required certificates.

Decision:
The Tribunal allowed the appeal by way of remand, holding that the appellant's services were export of services and that they were not intermediaries as per the law. The Tribunal directed the appellant to produce all necessary foreign inward remittance certificates to receive the refund amount. The impugned order was set aside for this purpose.

Appeal allowed for export services, not intermediaries. Appellant must provide foreign remittance certificates for refund.
The Tribunal allowed the appeal, determining that the appellant's services qualified as export of services and that they were not considered intermediaries under the law. The Tribunal instructed the appellant to provide the required foreign inward remittance certificates to receive the refund amount, setting aside the original authority's decision on the matter.

Export of services - place of provision of services - intermediary - receipt of consideration as essential element of service - refund of wrongly paid service tax subject to production of foreign inward remittance certificatesExport of services - receipt of consideration as essential element of service - Whether the appellant's activity of guiding prospective students amounted to a service provided to those students or constituted export of services to foreign universities - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found that the appellant did not charge or receive any consideration from prospective students and therefore, having regard to the definition of service, was not providing a service to the students in India. The consideration was received from foreign universities which engaged the appellant and paid commission to it. On this basis the Tribunal held that the services in question were services provided to the foreign universities and, accordingly, qualified as export of services. [Paras 5]Appellant was not providing service to prospective students; the services are export of services to foreign universities.Place of provision of services - intermediary - Whether the appellant could be treated as an intermediary under Rule 2(f) of the Place of Provision of Services Rules, 2012 - HELD THAT: - Having examined the nature of the appellant's activities and having regard to the Tribunal's earlier decision in Sunrise Immigrations Consultants Pvt. Ltd., the Tribunal held that organisations undertaking similar activities could not be treated as intermediaries under Rule 2(f). The Revenue's contention that the appellant functioned as an intermediary was rejected as not being in accordance with law. [Paras 5]Appellant is not an intermediary under Rule 2(f); the revenue's intermediary contention is rejected.Refund of wrongly paid service tax subject to production of foreign inward remittance certificates - Adjudication of the appellant's refund claim after partial waiver and requirement for proof of foreign receipts - HELD THAT: - The appellant voluntarily chose not to press the refund claim for the period(s) they identified (forfeiting a specified portion of the claim). As to the remaining refund claim, the Tribunal observed that the appellant had not produced all foreign inward remittance certificates (FIRCs) for the transactions corresponding to the balance refund amount. The Tribunal therefore remanded the matter to the original authority with a narrowly confined direction: the authority must not raise other issues but should collect the FIRCs from the appellant in respect of the transactions comprising the remaining refund claim and allow refund only where FIRCs are produced. [Paras 4, 5, 6]Appeal allowed by remand: original order set aside and matter remitted to the original authority to verify FIRCs and grant refund insofar as FIRCs are produced for the remaining claim.Final Conclusion: The Tribunal held that the appellant's activities were exports of services to foreign universities and not services to Indian students, rejected the Revenue's intermediary contention, recorded the appellant's waiver of part of the claim, set aside the impugned order and remanded the matter to the original authority to verify foreign inward remittance certificates and allow the balance refund only in respect of transactions where such evidence is produced.

2023 (10) TMI 502 - CESTAT CHENNAI Service Tax

AI TextQuick Glance (AI)Headnote

Tribunal grants refund claim for Service Tax on personal flat purchase
The Tribunal allowed the appeal regarding a refund claim for Service Tax on a flat purchased for personal use. The appellant successfully argued that the flat was for personal use, entitling her to the refund. The Tribunal found the denial of the refund unjustified, citing the appellant's bearing of the tax burden. The time-limitation for the refund application was calculated from the original filing date. The decision was supported by consistent rulings from co-ordinate Benches, deeming the denial of the refund unsustainable.

Claim for refund under Section 11B - time limitation for refund - reckoning from original application - person who has borne the incidence of tax entitled to refund - treatment of builder's payment vis a vis buyer's right to refundTime limitation for refund - reckoning from original application - claim for refund under Section 11B - The refund application was not time barred because time limitation under Section 11B is to be reckoned from the date of the original application filed on 18.03.2011. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal accepted the appellant's submission and the authorities relied upon holding that when an original refund application is filed within the statutory period, subsequent re presentation in correct form relates back to the original filing. The Tribunal noted that the refund claim was originally filed by registered post on 18.03.2011 and later re submitted after rectification, and relied on precedent holding that such continuous attempts to seek rebate relate back to the original filing. The Department's later objection to limitation therefore could not be sustained and the impugned orders rejecting the claim on time bar grounds had to be set aside. [Paras 10]Time bar defence rejected; refund claim is within time as the limitation runs from the original application.Person who has borne the incidence of tax entitled to refund - treatment of builder's payment vis a vis buyer's right to refund - claim for refund under Section 11B - The appellant, having borne the incidence of Service Tax (as admitted by the builder), is entitled to claim refund under Section 11B and the rejection of the claim on the ground that the builder had properly paid the tax was unsustainable. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal examined Section 11B which permits 'any person' who establishes that the duty was collected from or paid by him and the incidence was not passed on to another person to claim refund. The record showed the builder had remitted the tax but admitted that the tax element was included in the consideration paid by the appellant and certified the same. The Tribunal held that such a person falls within 'any person' in Section 11B and is entitled to refund. The adjudicating authorities' reasoning that denial was justified because the builder had discharged Service Tax for self use was rejected as devoid of logic where the buyer had in fact borne the tax and the Department had accepted remittance; accordingly the impugned orders were set aside. [Paras 11, 12]Merits of refund claim accepted; appellant entitled to refund and impugned order set aside.Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed; the impugned order rejecting the refund claim is set aside and the appellant is entitled to refund with consequential benefits as per law.

2023 (10) TMI 484 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT GST

AI TextQuick Glance (AI)Headnote

ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED

1. Whether cancellation of GST registration under Section 29(2)(c) for failure to file returns for six consecutive months is sustainable where the registrant admits tax liability, alleges unavoidable personal calamities preventing filing, and expresses willingness to pay dues.

2. Whether the Court may exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 to order restoration of GST registration and permit payment of admitted tax by instalments when departmental appellate or adjudicatory fora are non-functional or an alternative remedy exists.

3. The extent to which the Court should follow or depart from departmental limitations and precedents concerning grant of instalment facilities (including maximum instalments permitted by departmental circulars) when exercising equitable discretion to avert commercial death of a business.

ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue 1: Validity of cancellation under Section 29(2)(c) where non-filing arose from exceptional personal circumstances and liability is admitted

Legal framework: Section 29(2)(c) permits cancellation of registration where a taxable person fails to file returns for consecutive six months. The statutory scheme contemplates automatic cancellation for protracted non-compliance but does not preclude consideration of surrounding facts and bonafides when challenged judicially.

Precedent treatment: The Court considered judgments that treated admission of tax liability and demonstrable financial/extraordinary hardship as factors weighing in favour of relief by restoration subject to conditions (see cited High Court decisions). Those authorities permitted belated return acceptance and instalment payment rather than strict enforcement of cancellation in cases of admitted liability and genuine hardship.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court found cancellation factually based on admitted non-filing. However, it emphasized the petitioner's uncontested explanation of exceptional personal calamities (deaths in family), mental and financial exhaustion, and an unequivocal willingness to discharge the tax liability with interest. Weighed collectively, those facts furnished a sufficient equitable basis to mitigate the sanction of cancellation and to justify conditional restoration. The Court balanced the statutory object of compliance with the substantive unfairness of depriving a business of registration where the tax is not disputed and payment can be structured.

Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - where non-filing under Section 29(2)(c) is established but the registrant demonstrates bona fide exceptional circumstances and admits liability with willingness to pay, the Court may direct restoration subject to conditions (payment and instalments). Obiter - observations on the emotional state of the proprietor as a general mitigation principle beyond the facts of the case.

Conclusions: Cancellation was not immune from equitable intervention. Restoration was appropriate on the facts because liability was admitted and the petitioner proposed to clear dues; the Court therefore directed conditional restoration rather than upholding cancellation absolutely.

Issue 2: Jurisdiction of the Court to restore registration and allow instalments where departmental tribunals or appellate bodies are non-functional or an alternative remedy exists

Legal framework: Article 226 confers power on High Courts to grant writs for enforcement of fundamental rights and for other purposes; judicial review can be exercised where statutory adjudicatory or appellate mechanisms are ineffective or non-functional. Departmental schemes and circulars provide internal mechanisms for instalment payments, and procedural remedies exist before departmental appellate fora.

Precedent treatment: The Court relied on and followed high-court authorities which exercised judicial discretion to grant instalment relief and restoration where the taxpayer had no effective remedy in practice or where the strict departmental limits would lead to commercial collapse. Those authorities nonetheless recognized limits on judicial extension of administrative maxima absent departmental concurrence.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court accepted as fact that the GST Tribunal was not functional in the State at the relevant time, thereby creating an effective absence of an alternate efficacious remedy. In that context, judicial intervention under Article 226 was appropriate to prevent irreparable commercial prejudice. However, the Court acted cautiously and structured relief by restoring registration only upon advance part payment and by directing the departmental authority to compute and communicate remaining dues and instalment schedule, thereby preserving departmental role in assessment and collection while filling the remedial lacuna occasioned by non-functioning tribunals.

Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - where departmental appellate or adjudicatory fora are non-functional, the High Court may entertain writs and, in appropriate cases of admitted liability and bona fide hardship, order restoration and structured payment. Obiter - guidance about the conditions under which Article 226 should be invoked generally (e.g., avoid substituting departmental policy without need).

Conclusions: The Court lawfully entertained the writ due to the non-functionality of the tribunal and was justified in directing restoration and staged payment as a temporizing but effective remedy, while preserving departmental determination of outstanding amounts and oversight of instalment compliance.

Issue 3: Scope of judicial power to prescribe instalment schemes vis-à-vis departmental maxima and safeguards against abuse

Legal framework: Departmental circulars empower Commissioners/Chief Commissioners to permit payment of arrears in specified maximum monthly instalments (e.g., up to 24 or, with higher authority, up to 36). The statutory and administrative scheme aims to balance revenue protection with taxpayer rehabilitation; discretion is vested in executive authorities to fix instalments and conditions.

Precedent treatment: The Court relied on authorities where High Courts either (a) directed acceptance of belated returns and instalments within or consistent with departmental maxima, or (b) where departmental authorities consented, permitted extension of instalments while imposing periodic review and revival of cancellation on default. Courts in those cases avoided unilaterally prescribing manifestly longer schedules against departmental policy unless the department agreed or exceptional circumstances warranted judicially-crafted conditional relief.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court acknowledged the departmental instalment regime but did not substitute its own revenue-assessment function. Instead it required an initial deposit (Rs.6,00,000 in the case) as a condition precedent to restoration, directed the department to compute remaining outstanding with interest, and ordered that the balance be paid in six equal monthly instalments. The Court imposed temporal and performance-based thresholds, thereby providing a concrete remedy while protecting revenue via upfront payment and limited instalment span, and retaining departmental involvement in quantification and monitoring. The Court also signalled that default would revive cancellation, mirroring safeguards in precedents.

Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - courts may condition restoration on a combination of upfront payment and structured instalments, but should ordinarily leave assessment of outstanding dues and fixation of instalments to departmental authorities subject to judicially imposed temporal limits and review mechanisms. Obiter - endorsement of particular instalment durations as generally appropriate is fact-dependent and not a universal prescription.

Conclusions: Judicially-ordered instalment relief is permissible but must be formulated to protect revenue (advance payment, department to compute balance, limited instalment period, consequences for default). The Court applied these principles by restoring registration upon immediate payment and directing departmental determination of balance payable in six monthly instalments, with the implicit proviso that default may revive cancellation.

GST Registration Restored: Pay in Installments Amid Exceptional Circumstances, Compliance Required Within a Week.
The HC directed the restoration of the petitioner's GST registration within a week, contingent upon the deposit of a specified amount. The remaining tax dues are to be paid in six equal monthly installments. The Court recognized the petitioner's exceptional circumstances and willingness to pay, allowing the writ petition without costs.

Cancellation of GST registration for non-filing of returns - restoration of GST registration upon deposit and instalment payments - installment facility for payment of admitted tax - exercise of discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution - writ jurisdiction where statutory tribunal is non-functionalCancellation of GST registration for non-filing of returns - writ jurisdiction where statutory tribunal is non-functional - Validity of cancellation of the petitioner's GST registration and exercise of writ jurisdiction by the High Court - HELD THAT: - The Court considered the cancellation of the petitioner's GST registration which was effected on account of non-filing of GSTR-01 and GSTR-3B for a continuous period exceeding six months. Noting that the GST Tribunal in the State was non-functional pursuant to the Central Government notification, the Court entertained the writ petition under Article 226. On the facts, the petitioner's proprietor had suffered bereavements and the petitioner did not dispute the tax liability and expressed willingness to pay dues. Having regard to these circumstances and the admitted liability, the Court found it appropriate to grant equitable relief rather than sustain the cancellation without any opportunity for payment, applying the Court's discretionary jurisdiction in writ proceedings where alternative statutory remedy was presently inaccessible in practice. [Paras 2, 3, 4, 9, 12]Writ jurisdiction was exercised and cancellation not permitted to remain operative without affording the petitioner an opportunity to regularise the liability.Installment facility for payment of admitted tax - restoration of GST registration upon deposit and instalment payments - exercise of discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution - Whether the petitioner's registration should be restored subject to an initial deposit and payment of the balance in instalments and on what terms - HELD THAT: - Relying upon precedents where courts granted relief by permitting belated returns and instalment payment of admitted tax, the Court directed restoration of registration on terms tailored to the facts: the petitioner's willingness to pay, the peculiar hardships suffered, and the public interest in enabling continuance of business and recovery of tax. The Court mandated an initial deposit upon restoration and directed the department to communicate the outstanding amount with interest to be paid in fixed monthly instalments. The relief is conditional and subject to compliance with the schedule, reflecting the principle that equitable instalment relief may be granted in writ proceedings when liability is admitted and tribunal remedies are practically unavailable. [Paras 10, 11, 12, 13]Registration restored subject to an initial deposit and payment of the remaining admitted liability with interest by way of monthly instalments as directed.Final Conclusion: Writ petition allowed: having entertained the petition because the GST Tribunal was non-functional, the Court restored the petitioner's GST registration on conditions - an initial deposit upon restoration and payment of the remaining admitted tax with interest by way of monthly instalments - and dismissed the challenge to cancellation only on the terms directed; no order as to costs.

2023 (10) TMI 483 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT GST

AI TextQuick Glance (AI)Headnote

GST Orders Quashed: Court Cites Violation of Natural Justice for Lack of Proper Hearing; Case Remanded for Fresh Proceedings.
The HC quashed the orders issued under Section 73 of the GST Act and the subsequent appellate dismissal, citing a violation of natural justice principles due to the absence of a proper hearing. The court emphasized the necessity of a fair hearing as mandated by Section 75(4) of the GST Act. The matter was remanded for fresh proceedings, ensuring the petitioner receives a proper hearing. The writ petition was allowed, with the court highlighting the importance of appellate remedies and fair hearing processes, even in cases involving delayed appeals.

Hearing requirement under Section 75(4) of the GST Act - assessment under Section 73 of the GST Act - principles of natural justice - condonation of delay in filing appeal - judicial review under Article 226 concerning condonation of delayHearing requirement under Section 75(4) of the GST Act - assessment under Section 73 of the GST Act - principles of natural justice - Validity of the assessment order dated 20.02.2023 passed under Section 73 in the absence of a hearing as required by Section 75(4) and natural justice. - HELD THAT: - Record shows that the petitioner was issued a notice under Section 73 read with Rule 142(5) and a reminder indicating a last date for reply, but the reminder recorded 'NA' against date, time and venue of personal hearing and no hearing was granted. The Court found that the mandatory requirement to grant an opportunity of hearing under Section 75(4) was not complied with and that passing the assessment order without affording such opportunity violated the principles of natural justice. As the absence of any hearing or recorded application of mind on the point is evident from the records, the assessment order cannot stand and requires reconsideration after affording the statutory hearing. [Paras 5, 6, 9]The assessment order dated 20.02.2023 is quashed and the matter is remanded to the assessing authority to pass fresh orders after giving the petitioner an opportunity of hearing.Condonation of delay in filing appeal - judicial review under Article 226 concerning condonation of delay - Validity of the appellate order dated 31.07.2023 which dismissed the delay condonation application and the appeal without apparent application of mind. - HELD THAT: - The appellate order dismissing the delay application and the appeal was recorded without any material in the file demonstrating that the appellate authority applied its mind to the condonation request. Reliance placed on the Supreme Court's approach permitting Article 226 courts to examine factual circumstances in condonation cases underscores that the appellate remedy is valuable and merits considered adjudication. Given the absence of reasons or any demonstrable consideration, the impugned appellate order was held to be vitiated and therefore liable to be set aside and remanded for fresh decision on the condonation application and appeal after due consideration and, if appropriate, hearing. [Paras 5, 7, 8, 9]The appellate order dated 31.07.2023 is quashed and the matter is remanded to the appellate authority to decide the delay condonation application and the appeal afresh with application of mind and after affording opportunity to the petitioner as may be appropriate.Final Conclusion: Writ petition allowed: both the assessment order dated 20.02.2023 and the appellate order dated 31.07.2023 are quashed and the matters are remanded for fresh adjudication after affording the petitioner an opportunity of hearing; record handed over to Standing Counsel.

2023 (10) TMI 451 - CESTAT CHENNAI Customs

AI TextQuick Glance (AI)Headnote

Issues Involved:
1. Legality and propriety of absolute confiscation of 4000 grams of gold under Section 111 (d) & (i) of the Customs Act, 1962.
2. Justification of penalties imposed under Section 112 (a) and (b) and Section 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962.

Summary:

Issue 1: Legality and Propriety of Absolute Confiscation of Gold
The appellant challenged the Order-in-Original which ordered absolute confiscation of 4000 grams of gold under Section 111 (d) & (i) of the Customs Act, 1962, read with the Foreign Trade (Development & Regulations) Act, 1992. The appellant argued that he was not given an opportunity to declare the gold and pay appropriate customs duty. However, the Tribunal found that the appellant was not an eligible passenger and was attempting to smuggle the gold for a consideration of Rs.25,000. The gold was confiscated as it was imported contrary to prohibitions under the Customs Act and Foreign Trade Policy. The Tribunal upheld the absolute confiscation, citing the appellant's frequent travel and awareness of import regulations, and the absence of required foreign currency for duty payment.

Issue 2: Justification of Penalties
The appellant was penalized Rs.9,00,000 under Section 112 (a) & (b) and Rs.4,00,000 under Section 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962. The appellant contended that both penalties could not be imposed jointly and argued against the concealment and opportunity to declare the gold. The Tribunal noted that penalties under both sections are permissible. Section 112 penalizes acts rendering goods liable for confiscation, while Section 114AA penalizes false declarations. The appellant's Customs Declaration Form indicated "nothing" against the value of imported goods, justifying the penalty under Section 114AA. However, considering the appellant's acceptance of smuggling for Rs.25,000, the Tribunal reduced the penalties to Rs.2,00,000 under Section 112 and Rs.1,00,000 under Section 114AA.

Conclusion:
The appeal was partly allowed, upholding the confiscation of gold but reducing the penalties imposed. The Tribunal emphasized the seriousness of smuggling and the appellant's failure to meet import conditions.

Tribunal Confirms Gold Confiscation Under Customs Act, Reduces Penalties for Smuggling Attempt Under Sections 112 and 114AA.
The Tribunal upheld the absolute confiscation of 4000 grams of gold under Section 111 (d) & (i) of the Customs Act, 1962, as the appellant attempted to smuggle the gold without declaring it or paying customs duty, violating import regulations. The penalties initially imposed were Rs.9,00,000 under Section 112 (a) & (b) and Rs.4,00,000 under Section 114AA. The Tribunal found both penalties permissible but reduced them to Rs.2,00,000 and Rs.1,00,000, respectively, acknowledging the appellant's acceptance of smuggling for Rs.25,000. The appeal was partly allowed, maintaining the confiscation while reducing penalties.

Confiscation under Section 111(d) and 111(i) of the Customs Act, 1962 - Prohibited goods as including restricted imports where conditions are not complied with - Discretion under Section 125 to allow or refuse redemption of prohibited goods; mandatory redemption for non-prohibited goods - Penalty under Section 112 for acts rendering goods liable to confiscation - Penalty under Section 114AA for use of false or incorrect declaration - Smuggling and modus operandi evidence as basis for confiscationConfiscation under Section 111(d) and 111(i) of the Customs Act, 1962 - Prohibited goods as including restricted imports where conditions are not complied with - Smuggling and modus operandi evidence as basis for confiscation - Discretion under Section 125 to allow or refuse redemption of prohibited goods - Absolute confiscation of 4000 grams of gold under Section 111(d) and 111(i) of the Customs Act, 1962 is legal and proper. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found that import of gold in the appellant's case was subject to statutory restrictions and, since the appellant did not satisfy those conditions, the gold amounted to prohibited goods within the meaning of Section 2(33) and was liable to confiscation under Section 111(d) and 111(i). The appellant had admitted in a handwriting statement that he carried the gold for consideration and described the modus operandi of delivery in Dubai and intended delivery in the airport toilet, conduct consistent with smuggling. He was not an eligible passenger, was carrying 4 kg when even an eligible passenger could import only 1 kg on payment of duty in convertible foreign currency, and lacked foreign exchange to pay duty on 4 kg. The Tribunal held that these facts, the undisputed statement under Section 108 and the intercepted circumstances justified absolute confiscation; the adjudicating authority exercised its permissible discretion under Section 125 in declining redemption given the factual background of deliberate smuggling. Reliance on decisions allowing redemption in distinguishable facts did not warrant interference. [Paras 7, 8]Absolute confiscation of the 4000 grams of gold is upheld.Penalty under Section 112 for acts rendering goods liable to confiscation - Penalty under Section 114AA for use of false or incorrect declaration - Imposition of penalties under Section 112 (a) & (b) and under Section 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962 is justified, but quantum is excessive and liable to reduction. - HELD THAT: - Once the goods were held liable for confiscation, penalty under Section 112 for improper importation was imposable as the appellant either did or omitted acts rendering the goods liable for confiscation and/or was concerned in carrying the goods. The declaration form showing 'nothing' against total value supported imposition of penalty under Section 114AA for use of a false or incorrect declaration. There is no statutory bar to imposing both penalties concurrently. Considering the appellant's admitted conduct (carrying gold for consideration, frequent travel, no evidence of lawful purchase or entitlement), penalties were sustainable on law and facts. However, in view of mitigating circumstances (appellant accepted he acted for a small consideration), the Tribunal reduced the penalty under Section 112 to Rs.2,00,000 and under Section 114AA to Rs.1,00,000. [Paras 9, 10]Penalties sustained but reduced to Rs.2,00,000 under Section 112 and Rs.1,00,000 under Section 114AA.Final Conclusion: The appeal is partly allowed: the absolute confiscation of the 4 kg of gold is upheld; penalties under Sections 112 and 114AA are sustained but reduced to the amounts specified by the Tribunal; consequential relief, if any, to follow as per law.

2023 (10) TMI 450 - NATIONAL COMPANY LAW APPELLATE TRIBUNAL , PRINCIPAL BENCH, NEW DELHI Insolvency and Bankruptcy

AI TextQuick Glance (AI)Headnote

NCLAT allows delay for certified copy but dismisses claim for 1270-day delay post-approval.
The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal condoned the delay in filing Comp. App. (AT) (Ins.) Nos. 856 & 857/2023 based on the exclusion of time spent obtaining the Certified Copy of the Impugned Order. However, the Tribunal dismissed the Appeal against the Order in C.P. (IB) 271/PB/2017 due to a significant delay of 1270 days in filing the claim after the Resolution Plan was approved, citing the risk of derailing the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process.

Condonation of delay by excluding period spent in obtaining certified copy - Exclusion of time in computing limitation for appeals under Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act - Due diligence in applying for certified copy - Time bound nature of CIRP and finality of approved resolution plan - Rejection of belated claims in CIRP to prevent derailment of the resolution processCondonation of delay by excluding period spent in obtaining certified copy - Exclusion of time in computing limitation for appeals under Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act - Due diligence in applying for certified copy - Delay in filing the Comp. App. (AT) (Ins.) Nos.856 & 857/2023 was condoned by excluding the period spent in obtaining the paid certified copy of the impugned order. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal applied Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act to exclude the time taken to obtain the certified copy from computation of the limitation period for filing the appeal. The appellants had applied for a certified copy on 17.04.2023 and received it on 03.05.2023; excluding that interval, the appeal was e-filed within 30 days. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court's observation in Sanket Kumar Agarwal & Anr. Vs. APG Logistics Private Limited that where an applicant exercises due diligence in applying for a certified copy, the period taken by the court to supply the copy must be excluded. Applying that principle and Section 12(2), the Tribunal allowed the application for condonation of delay and granted the benefit of exclusion of time spent in obtaining the paid certified copy. [Paras 6]I.A. No.2916/2023 allowed; delay in filing Comp. App. (AT) (Ins.) Nos.856 & 857/2023 condoned by excluding time taken to obtain the certified copy.Time bound nature of CIRP and finality of approved resolution plan - Rejection of belated claims in CIRP to prevent derailment of the resolution process - The Appellants' claims, filed after an inordinate delay of 1270 days and after the CoC had approved the resolution plan, were rightly rejected and the appeal against that rejection was dismissed. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that the CIRP is a time bound process requiring urgency and discipline from stakeholders; permitting a claim after 1270 days and after Committee of Creditors had approved the resolution plan would reopen settled issues and derail the process. The Tribunal followed the Supreme Court's reasoning in M/s. RPS Infrastructure Ltd. Vs. Mukul Kumar & Anr. , which cautioned against allowing belated claims once a plan is accepted by the CoC, and observed that reopening the matter would create uncertainty and invite similar late claims. Given the inordinate delay and the CoC's approval of the resolution plan, the Adjudicating Authority's rejection of the delayed claims was not interfered with. [Paras 19, 20]Comp. App. (AT) (Ins.) Nos.586 & 587/2023 dismissed; rejection of belated claims upheld to preserve finality and time bound nature of CIRP.Final Conclusion: The Tribunal allowed condonation of delay in filing two appeals by excluding the period spent in obtaining the certified copy of the impugned order; separately, the Tribunal dismissed the appeals challenging rejection of belated claims filed after 1270 days, upholding the Adjudicating Authority's decision to refuse such claims to protect the time bound resolution process and finality of the approved resolution plan.

2023 (10) TMI 1382 - CESTAT AHMEDABAD Service Tax

AI TextQuick Glance (AI)Headnote

Case Remanded for Reassessment: Tribunal Reviews Service Classification for Accurate Tax Liability Determination.
The Tribunal remanded the case to the Adjudicating Authority for reconsideration, focusing on whether the service provided falls under Goods Transport Agency (GTA) service. The Tribunal set aside the previous orders, emphasizing the necessity of analyzing the nature of the service and the agreements to correctly classify the service for tax liability purposes.

Supply of tangible goods for use service - Transfer of right to possession and effective control - Distinction between renting of motor vehicles and transportation charged per trip - Classification as Goods Transport Agency (GTA) service - Remand for fresh consideration of service classification and tax liabilityDistinction between renting of motor vehicles and transportation charged per trip - Supply of tangible goods for use service - Per-trip charges for providing cylinder skid vehicles indicate a transportation activity rather than a renting of vehicle transaction and therefore do not prima facie constitute a supply of tangible goods for use service. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal noted as an undisputed fact that charges for providing the vehicle to Raj & Company were levied on a per trip basis. The bench observed that renting of vehicles is characteristically charged on a fixed or periodic (for example monthly) or lump-sum basis, whereas a per-trip charging structure prima facie denotes a transportation service. On this factual basis the finding of the authorities below, which had treated the transaction as supply of tangible goods for use by rejecting the undated agreement and certificate, is set aside to the extent that the transaction cannot be sustained as a renting/supply-for-use merely on the basis of the record before the Tribunal. [Paras 4]The transaction is prima facie transportation rather than renting; the finding of supply of tangible goods for use service cannot be upheld on the present record.Classification as Goods Transport Agency (GTA) service - Remand for fresh consideration of service classification and tax liability - Whether the activity falls within GTA service and whether service tax liability could be treated as discharged by the appellant was not finally adjudicated and is remanded for fresh consideration by the Adjudicating Authority. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal explicitly recorded that the specific question of classification under GTA and the consequence as to which party bears the service tax liability was not examined below and was not squarely contested before the Tribunal. Given the factual indication that the activity may be transportation, the Tribunal directed that the matter be reconsidered afresh by the Adjudicating Authority from the perspective of GTA classification and attendant tax consequences. All other issues were left open for determination by the authority on remand. [Paras 4, 5]Matter remanded to the Adjudicating Authority for fresh consideration on classification as GTA service and related service tax liability; other issues kept open.Final Conclusion: Impugned orders set aside; appeals allowed to the extent that the matter is remanded to the Adjudicating Authority for fresh consideration of classification as a GTA/transportation service and the attendant service tax consequences, with other issues left open.

2023 (10) TMI 1366 - ITAT AHMEDABAD Income Tax

AI TextQuick Glance (AI)Headnote

ITAT accepts book results after finding proper maintenance despite stock register formatting issues under Section 68
The ITAT Ahmedabad ruled in favor of the assessee regarding cash deposits made during demonetization. The AO had rejected the books of accounts and treated cash deposits as unexplained cash credit under Section 68. The tribunal found that the assessee maintained proper books with audited financial statements, purchase details, and supporting vouchers. The only deficiency was stock register format. The tribunal held that books cannot be rejected merely for formatting issues without identifying specific defects. Since the AO rejected books but failed to estimate profit properly, the addition was deleted and book results were accepted.

Section 145(3) rejection of books of account - best judgment assessment under section 144 - unexplained cash credit under section 68 - estimation of gross profit - preponderance of probability test - acceptance of books where no corroborative defect is shownSection 145(3) rejection of books of account - unexplained cash credit under section 68 - estimation of gross profit - best judgment assessment under section 144 - Whether the books of account of the assessee were liable to be rejected and the cash deposits during the demonetisation period could be treated as unexplained cash credits u/s 68 and additional income estimated by applying a gross profit rate. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal examined whether the Assessing Officer had recorded specific and corroborative material justifying rejection of the assessee's books under section 145(3). Although the AO pointed to a sharp rise in cash sales and deposits during the demonetisation window and deficiencies in the format of the stock details, no defect in the supporting documentary evidence (audited accounts, purchase details, stock summary, bills/vouchers) was specifically identified. The Tribunal held that mere absence of stock details in the requested format and variations in gross profit or cash trends, without corroborative evidence of falsification, do not ipso facto warrant rejection of books. Further, once books are rejected, the AO must make an overall best judgment assessment under section 144 and cannot, inconsistently, proceed to make piecemeal additions such as treating deposited cash as unexplained credits under section 68 while relying on the same books for other particulars. Relying on precedents and the statutory scheme, the Tribunal concluded that the AO had not established the necessary satisfaction to reject the accounts, and therefore the additions under section 68 and on account of estimated gross profit could not be sustained. [Paras 9]Books of account are not liable to be rejected; the additions on account of unexplained cash deposits u/s 68 and the estimated gross profit are deleted and the book results are accepted.Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed: the Tribunal set aside the findings rejecting the books and deleted the additions made by the AO (treatment of cash deposits as unexplained credit u/s 68 and the estimated GP addition), directing acceptance of the assessee's book results for AY 2017-18.

2023 (10) TMI 1365 - ITAT MUMBAI Income Tax

AI TextQuick Glance (AI)Headnote

Issues Involved:
The judgment involves the following issues:
1. Allowance of deduction u/s 80P(2)(d) for interest earned from Co-operative Banks.
2. Interpretation of deduction under section 80P(2)(d) as opposed to section 80P(4).
3. Consideration of written submissions and past decisions regarding similar deductions.
4. Condonation of delay in filing the appeal.

Issue 1: Allowance of Deduction u/s 80P(2)(d) for Interest Earned from Co-operative Banks:
The appeal was filed by the Navrang Basant Co-operative Housing Society Limited against the appellate order dismissing their appeal regarding the denial of deduction u/s 80P(2)(d) for interest earned from Co-operative Banks. The Assessing Officer rejected the claim for deduction under section 80P(2)(d) on the grounds that interest received from cooperative banks was not eligible for deduction under section 80P as they are not cooperative societies. The Tribunal, after considering the facts, held that the assessee, being a cooperative housing society and not a cooperative bank, was eligible for deduction u/s 80P(2) of the Act. The Tribunal reversed the order of the CIT (A) and allowed the deduction on interest income, citing relevant Supreme Court judgments to support its decision.

Issue 2: Interpretation of Deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) as Opposed to Section 80P(4):
The Assessing Officer contended that deduction under section 80P(2)(d) was not allowable as per sub-section 4 of section 80P of the Act. The Tribunal clarified that section 80P(4) denies deduction to cooperative banks only, not to cooperative housing societies like the appellant. By differentiating between the nature of the appellant's entity and a cooperative bank, the Tribunal upheld the eligibility of the appellant for deduction under section 80P(2)(d).

Issue 3: Consideration of Written Submissions and Past Decisions:
The appellant argued that the CIT (A) erred in not considering the written submissions filed, the decision of the CIT(A) for A.Y. 2015-16 in the appellant's own case, and decisions of the jurisdictional Tribunal where deduction u/s 80P(2)(d) was allowed for interest income earned from Co-operative Banks. The Tribunal reviewed these arguments and found merit in the appellant's contentions, ultimately allowing the deduction based on the appellant's status as a cooperative housing society.

Issue 4: Condonation of Delay in Filing the Appeal:
The appeal of the appellant was filed late, leading to a delay of 82 days. The appellant attributed the delay to not receiving the order of the CIT (A) in time. The Tribunal, following the principle that a pedantic approach should not be taken in condoning delays, accepted the appellant's explanation and condoned the delay. Despite objections from the Departmental Representative, the Tribunal allowed the appeal on its merits after considering the delay issue.

This judgment by the Appellate Tribunal ITAT Mumbai highlights the importance of correctly interpreting the provisions of the Income-tax Act, particularly regarding deductions for entities like cooperative housing societies. The Tribunal's decision to allow the deduction u/s 80P(2)(d) for interest income earned from Co-operative Banks in the case of the appellant sets a precedent based on the entity's nature and eligibility criteria specified in the relevant sections of the Act.

Cooperative housing society entitled to section 80P(2) deduction on interest income from cooperative banks
ITAT Mumbai held that a cooperative housing society was entitled to deduction under section 80P(2) on interest income received from cooperative banks. The tribunal ruled that section 80P(4), which denies deduction to cooperative banks, does not apply to the assessee as it is a housing society and not a cooperative bank. The decision was supported by SC precedent in Kerala State Co-Operative Agricultural Rural Development Bank Ltd case. The tribunal reversed CIT(A)'s order and directed AO to allow the deduction.

Deduction under section 80P(2)(d) for cooperative societies - Scope of exclusion in section 80P(4) limited to cooperative banks - Interest income from deposits in cooperative banks and entitlement to deduction - Condonation of delay-exercise of discretion and merits-based considerationCondonation of delay-exercise of discretion and merits-based consideration - Application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal was allowed. - HELD THAT: - The appeal was filed 82 days beyond the limitation period. The assessee explained non-receipt of the appellate order and placed on record an affidavit showing prompt action once the demand was received and the order became known. The Tribunal applied a non-pedantic approach to condonation, observing that the appeal raised a substantive question of law and that the assessee acted promptly upon knowledge of the order. The delay was therefore condoned and the appeal admitted for adjudication on merits. [Paras 6]Delay in filing the appeal is condoned and the appeal admitted.Deduction under section 80P(2)(d) for cooperative societies - Scope of exclusion in section 80P(4) limited to cooperative banks - Interest income from deposits in cooperative banks and entitlement to deduction - Assessee, a cooperative housing society, is entitled to deduction under section 80P(2)(d) in respect of interest earned on deposits with cooperative banks; the exclusion in section 80P(4) applies only to cooperative banks themselves and does not deny the deduction to cooperative societies. - HELD THAT: - The assessee is a housing cooperative society which had claimed deduction under section 80P(2)(d) for interest received from deposits placed with various cooperative banks. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim relying on sub-section (4) of section 80P, treating the interest as ineligible. The CIT(A) affirmed that view relying upon earlier authority. The Tribunal, however, held that section 80P(4) operates to deny the deduction only to cooperative banks and does not extinguish the statutory entitlement of other cooperative societies under section 80P(2)(d) to claim deduction on specified cooperative receipts. The Tribunal noted and followed the view of the Supreme Court in Kerala State Co-Operative Agricultural & Rural Development Bank Ltd. V Assessing Officer (as relied upon in the order) to conclude that the exclusion in sub-section (4) is limited to cooperative banks. Accordingly, the disallowance was reversed and deduction under section 80P(2)(d) was directed to be allowed to the housing society. [Paras 8]The disallowance is reversed and deduction under section 80P(2)(d) is allowed in respect of the interest income.Final Conclusion: Delay in filing the appeal is condoned and, on merits, the Tribunal allows the appeal by holding that a cooperative housing society is entitled to deduction under section 80P(2)(d) for interest earned from cooperative banks, since the exclusion in section 80P(4) applies only to cooperative banks themselves.

2023 (10) TMI 1347 - NATIONAL COMPANY LAW APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, CHENNAI Companies Law

AI TextQuick Glance (AI)Headnote

Tribunal Dismisses Withdrawal, Allows Appellant to Seek Recall and Review Order Within Two Weeks, Addresses Legal Heir Issue.
The Tribunal dismissed the withdrawal of Comp App (AT) (CH) No. 76/2023 without costs, closing pending IA Nos. 1015 & 1016/2023. It allowed the Appellant to file an Interlocutory Application before the NCLT, Chennai, within one week to recall the Impugned Order in CP/138/(CHE)/2022, with a decision due within two weeks. The Tribunal also addressed an order concerning a deceased legal heir, requiring a timely application for review within the same timeframe, and mandated a reasoned decision by the Tribunal, considering alleged fraud.

Dismissal of appeal on withdrawal - permission to file interlocutory application - recall of impugned order - direction for prompt adjudication - requirement of reasoned/speaking order - opportunity of hearing to partiesDismissal of appeal on withdrawal - The appeal Comp App (AT) (CH) No. 76/2023 is dismissed as withdrawn on the appellant's request. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal acceded to the learned counsel for the appellant's request to withdraw the instant appeal and accordingly dismissed Comp App (AT) (CH) No. 76/2023 as withdrawn. The connected interlocutory applications IA Nos. 1015 & 1016/2023 were ordered to be closed. The order of dismissal was made without imposition of costs.Comp App (AT) (CH) No. 76/2023 dismissed as withdrawn; connected IA Nos. 1015 & 1016/2023 closed; no costs.Permission to file interlocutory application - recall of impugned order - direction for prompt adjudication - opportunity of hearing to parties - requirement of reasoned/speaking order - The appellant is permitted to file an interlocutory application before the National Company Law Tribunal, Chennai Bench, seeking recall of the impugned order, and the Tribunal issued directions governing filing and disposal. - HELD THAT: - Although the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn, the Tribunal expressly clarified that this dismissal shall not preclude the appellant from moving the NCLT by an interlocutory application to recall the impugned order in CP/138/(CHE)/2022. The Tribunal directed that if such application is filed within one week from the date of the order, the Registry shall number it after scrutiny. The application is to be disposed of by hearing both the petitioner/appellant and the respondent, and a decision on the application shall be rendered within two weeks thereafter. The Tribunal further permitted counsels to raise relevant pleas before it and indicated that any order passed by this Tribunal should be reasoned and uninfluenced by the observations recorded in the present appeal, thereby requiring a speaking order based on the parties' contentions.Appellant may file interlocutory application within one week; Registry to number after scrutiny; NCLT to hear both parties and decide the application within two weeks; any order to be reasoned and uninfluenced by prior observations.Final Conclusion: The appeal is dismissed as withdrawn and related interlocutory applications are closed; subject to that dismissal, the appellant is granted a limited opportunity to approach the NCLT by an interlocutory application to seek recall of the impugned order under the timelines and procedural directions specified by the Tribunal, and any subsequent order is to be a reasoned one after hearing both parties.

2023 (10) TMI 1335 - ITAT AHMEDABAD Income Tax

AI TextQuick Glance (AI)Headnote

Trust registration denial overturned due to inadequate hearing and unspecified document deficiencies in section 12AB application
ITAT Ahmedabad allowed the appeal for statistical purposes after CIT(E) denied registration u/s 12AB to a Trust. CIT(E) rejected the application citing concerns about 30% donation transfers to Red Cross Society branches, claiming these were contractual rather than voluntary donations. ITAT held that CIT(E) failed to specify document deficiencies or provide adequate hearing opportunity. The matter was remanded to CIT(E) with directions to afford proper hearing and consider fresh evidence before deciding on registration.

Registration under Section 12AB - registration under Section 80G(5) - opportunity of being heard under the Second Proviso to Section 12AB(1)(b)(ii)(B) - genuineness of activities - voluntary donation versus contractual/compulsory transfer of funds - requirement of a speaking order specifying deficienciesRegistration under Section 12AB - opportunity of being heard under the Second Proviso to Section 12AB(1)(b)(ii)(B) - requirement of a speaking order specifying deficiencies - genuineness of activities - voluntary donation versus contractual/compulsory transfer of funds - Assessee's application for registration under Section 12AB was set aside for fresh consideration by the CIT(E) with directions to afford further opportunity of being heard and to pass a speaking order after considering documents and explanations. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found that the CIT(E) rejected the registration application primarily on the ground that the Trust's rules required transfer of a proportion of donations to State/UT branches and national headquarters, treating such transfers as contractual or compulsory and therefore not application of funds for the applicant's objects. The Tribunal held that the CIT(E)'s second notice did not specify the exact deficiencies or the precise clarification required on this point. In absence of a specific show-cause identifying the defect, the rejection without confronting the assessee with the precise issue and without affording a proper opportunity of hearing was impermissible. To avoid miscarriage of justice the matter was restored to the file of the CIT(E) who is directed to provide further opportunity, consider the documents and evidence the assessee files, and dispose of the application under Section 12AB by a speaking order; failing cooperation by the assessee, the CIT(E) may proceed in accordance with law. [Paras 7, 8]Appeal allowed; registration under Section 12AB remanded to the CIT(E) for fresh consideration after giving further opportunity of hearing and passing a speaking order.Registration under Section 80G(5) - registration under Section 12AB - consequential determination - Assessee's application for registration under Section 80G(5) was set aside and remanded to the CIT(E) for decision on merits after the Section 12AB issue is reconsidered. - HELD THAT: - The CIT(E) had rejected registration under Section 80G(5) solely because registration under Section 12AB was denied. Since the Tribunal has directed fresh consideration of registration under Section 12AB, the Tribunal remitted the separate appeal against denial under Section 80G(5) back to the CIT(E) to be decided on merits after affording the assessee an opportunity of hearing, following the outcome and reconsideration of the Section 12AB application. [Paras 10]Appeal allowed; registration under Section 80G(5) set aside and remitted to the CIT(E) for reconsideration and decision after giving the assessee an opportunity of hearing.Final Conclusion: Both appeals are allowed for statistical purposes; the order denying registration under Section 12AB is set aside and remitted to the CIT(E) for fresh consideration with an opportunity of hearing and a speaking order, and the consequential denial under Section 80G(5) is likewise remitted for decision on merits.

2023 (1) TMI 1298 - CESTAT CHANDIGARH Central Excise

AI TextQuick Glance (AI)Headnote

Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of Section 11A for recovery of "erroneous refund".
2. Validity of the refund sanctioned under Notification No. 56/2002.
3. Allegations of fraud, collusion, or willful misstatement by the appellants.
4. Imposition of penalty on the company and Shri Dinesh Garg.

Summary of Judgment:

1. Applicability of Section 11A for Recovery of "Erroneous Refund":
The appellants argued that Section 11A, which deals with the recovery of duty "erroneously refunded," is not applicable to refunds under Notification No. 56/2002. They cited a Board Circular dated 19.12.2002, which clarified that the refunds under this notification are not due to excess payment of excise duty but are a mechanism to operationalize the exemption. Therefore, the provisions of Section 11A concerning "erroneous refund" do not apply.

2. Validity of the Refund Sanctioned under Notification No. 56/2002:
The refund was duly sanctioned by the Departmental officers in terms of Notification No. 56/2002, and such orders are appealable under Section 35 of the Central Excise Act, 1944. The appellants contended that the refund orders had been accepted by the Department after due application of mind and thus could not be termed "erroneous." They relied on various case laws, including Krishi Rasayan Exports Pvt. Ltd. and others, to support their argument.

3. Allegations of Fraud, Collusion, or Willful Misstatement:
The Tribunal found no material evidence to suggest that the appellants had suppressed any material facts or made any willful misstatement to evade payment of duty. The High Court of J&K in Krishi Rasayan Exports Pvt. Ltd. had previously ruled that the extended period of limitation under Section 11A could not be invoked in the absence of fraud, collusion, or willful misstatement. The Tribunal concurred with this view, noting that the refunds were sanctioned after a transparent process and periodic audits.

4. Imposition of Penalty on the Company and Shri Dinesh Garg:
Since the impugned order was found to be legally unsustainable on merits, the question of imposing penalties on the company or Shri Dinesh Garg did not arise. The Tribunal set aside the penalties.

Conclusion:
The Tribunal concluded that the impugned order was not legally sustainable and set it aside. Both appeals were allowed, and the penalties were dismissed. The judgment was pronounced on 11/10/2023.

Tribunal rules in favor of appellants on erroneous refund issue under Notification No. 56/2002
The Tribunal found in favor of the appellants, ruling that Section 11A for the recovery of "erroneous refund" was not applicable to refunds under Notification No. 56/2002 as they were not due to excess payment but a mechanism for exemption. The Tribunal upheld the validity of the refund sanctioned under the notification and dismissed allegations of fraud, collusion, or willful misstatement. Consequently, the penalties imposed on the company and Shri Dinesh Garg were set aside, and both appeals were allowed.

Recovery of erroneously refunded duty - Operational mechanism of exemption notifications (refund as mechanism to operationalize exemption) - Applicability of Section 11A to refunds under Notification No.56/2002 - Extended limitation proviso requiring fraud, collusion or willful misstatement or suppression of facts - Finality of sanctioning order and exclusive remedy by appeal/revisionOperational mechanism of exemption notifications (refund as mechanism to operationalize exemption) - Applicability of Section 11A to refunds under Notification No.56/2002 - Refunds sanctioned under Notification No.56/2002 are not refunds in the sense of Section 11B and therefore recovery under Section 11A for 'erroneous refund' is not applicable to such sanctioned refunds. - HELD THAT: - The notification prescribes a distinct mechanism whereby duty paid from an account current is refunded to give effect to the exemption and CBEC Circular No.682/73/2002 clarified that such 'refund' is to operationalize the exemption and not an excess payment refund under Section 11B. On that basis the Tribunal held that the concept of 'erroneous refund' contemplated by Section 11A does not apply to refunds made under Notification No.56/2002 and that the adjudicating authority could not invoke Section 11A to recover amounts refunded under the notification. [Paras 5, 6]Section 11A is not applicable to refunds made under Notification No.56/2002.Extended limitation proviso requiring fraud, collusion or willful misstatement or suppression of facts - Recovery of erroneously refunded duty - The extended five-year limitation under the proviso to Section 11A can be invoked only where the purported erroneous refund resulted from fraud, collusion, willful misstatement or suppression of facts with intent to evade duty; such conditions were not established on record. - HELD THAT: - The proviso to Section 11A extends limitation only upon demonstrable fraud, collusion or willful misstatement/suppression with intent to evade duty. The Tribunal, following High Court and Supreme Court pronouncements, found no material to show suppression, misstatement or intent to evade duty; periodical returns were filed, refunds were sanctioned after verification and speaking orders were passed. Absent such material the extended period cannot be invoked and the show-cause was thus time-barred. [Paras 12, 13, 14, 22]Extended limitation under the proviso to Section 11A is not attracted in the absence of fraud, collusion or willful misstatement/suppression of facts.Finality of sanctioning order and exclusive remedy by appeal/revision - Recovery of erroneously refunded duty - A refund sanctioned by the competent adjudicating authority by a speaking order which is appealable under the Act and has not been successfully challenged attains finality and cannot be reopened by collateral proceedings under Section 11A. - HELD THAT: - Authorities and earlier judicial decisions were relied on to hold that once refund sanction orders are passed after due application of mind and are subject to statutory appeal/revision, the proper course for revenue is to challenge those orders by appeal or revisional proceedings. Initiating collateral recovery proceedings under Section 11A against a sanctioning order that stands unchallenged is impermissible; consequently, recovery and concomitant penalties based on such collateral action are unsustainable. [Paras 15, 16, 21]Sanctioning orders granting refund which have attained finality cannot be termed 'erroneous refund' for purposes of Section 11A; parallel recovery and penalties cannot be sustained.Recovery of erroneously refunded duty - Consequential penalties and proceedings against the company and its partner arising from the impugned recovery order are not maintainable where the recovery itself is unsustainable. - HELD THAT: - Since the Tribunal found the impugned order of recovery to be legally untenable-because Section 11A did not apply and extended limitation was not attracted-penalties premised on that recovery could not be upheld. The Tribunal therefore set aside the impugned order and held that penalty could not be imposed in consequence. [Paras 8]Penalties and recovery proceedings against the appellants and the partner cannot be sustained and stand set aside.Final Conclusion: The appeals are allowed; the impugned order of recovery and penalties under Section 11A arising from refunds under Notification No.56/2002 is set aside because such refunds are mechanisms to operationalize exemption and not refundable under Section 11B, the extended limitation proviso was not attracted for want of fraud/collusion or willful suppression, and sanctioning orders that have attained finality cannot be reopened by collateral proceedings under Section 11A.

2023 (10) TMI 1608 - ITAT BANGALORE Income Tax

AI TextQuick Glance (AI)Headnote

Ex parte assessment requires fresh hearing and evidence opportunity before reassessment through de novo proceedings.
Ex parte assessment and first appellate proceedings were addressed by requiring a fresh opportunity for the assessee to submit evidence supporting its claims. As neither stage considered submissions or supporting material from the assessee, the matter was remanded for de novo assessment, with directions to the Assessing Officer to provide an adequate hearing before reassessing the claims.

2023 (10) TMI 1598 - ITAT HYDERABAD Income Tax

AI TextQuick Glance (AI)Headnote

Cash consideration for immovable property transfers attracts section 269SS penalty absent proved reasonable cause.
Cash received as consideration for transfer of immovable property was treated as falling within the scope of section 269SS because the expression "specified sum" was read to include sums received in relation to such transfer, including amounts received "otherwise" than as advance. On that basis, acceptance of cash under the sale deed was held to constitute a violation attracting penalty under section 271D. The taxpayer also failed to establish reasonable cause for receiving part of the consideration in cash, so the statutory protection under section 273B was unavailable. The penalty was accordingly sustained.

Scope of specified sum in immovable property transactions - cash receipt of sale consideration under section 269SS - reasonable cause for penalty under section 271DSpecified sum - immovable property transaction - cash sale consideration - Receipt in cash of sale consideration in a concluded transfer of immovable property falls within the expression specified sum under section 269SS. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that the definition of specified sum in Explanation 4 to section 269SS covers any sum of money received, whether by advance or otherwise, in relation to transfer of immovable property. It treated the word otherwise as wide enough to include all modes in which money is accepted in cash in connection with such transfer, and therefore rejected the contention that concluded sale transactions stood outside section 269SS. [Paras 9, 10]Cash received as part of sale consideration for immovable property was held to attract section 269SS, and the plea that the provision did not apply to a concluded transaction was rejected.Reasonable cause - penalty under section 271D - contravention of section 269SS - The assessee failed to establish reasonable cause for accepting cash in excess of the statutory limit, and penalty under section 271D was therefore sustainable. - HELD THAT: - On the admitted recital in the sale deed that cash had been accepted, the Tribunal found a clear contravention of section 269SS. It further held that no reasonable cause had been shown for accepting consideration in cash beyond the prescribed limit, and followed the Kerala High Court decision in CIT, Trichur Vs. AL-Ameen Educational Trust Kulapully, P.O. Shornpur as well as the coordinate bench decision in Sri Surender Reddy Vanteru . [Paras 10]The penalty was upheld, and the appeal was dismissed.Final Conclusion: The Tribunal held that cash received as sale consideration in relation to transfer of immovable property is covered by section 269SS, even in a concluded transaction. As no reasonable cause was established for the cash receipt, the penalty under section 271D was sustained and the assessee's appeal was dismissed.

2023 (10) TMI 1582 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT Income Tax

AI TextQuick Glance (AI)Headnote

Opportunity of hearing: failure to grant requested video-conference vitiated faceless reassessment, requiring fresh proceedings.
Reassessment proceedings under the Income-tax Act were set aside where the taxpayer's request for a video conferencing hearing under the faceless assessment procedure was not honoured, producing a denial of opportunity to be heard contrary to principles of natural justice; the court applied faceless-assessment procedural standards and quashed the reassessment and consequent demand as procedurally vitiated. The Revenue is directed to proceed anew from the stage of granting a video conferencing hearing and to afford the hearing within twelve weeks of receipt of the order.

Page of 950

Press 'Enter' after typing page number.

3141 to 3160 of 18998 Results

Case Laws

All › 2023

All Case Laws

Showing Results for :

Reset Filters

Page of 950

Press 'Enter' after typing page number.

3141 to 3160 of 18998 Results

No Records Found

Case Laws

All Case Laws

Topics

Acts Income Tax

➔Previous Next ➔

Contact Us At :

FAQs :

Most Asked Video Tutorials :

Submit Feedback/Suggestion :

Case Laws

Case Laws

Topics