Issues: (i) Whether dishonour of the cheques attracted Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 where the drawer's bank account had been frozen or seized before presentation and the return memo recorded funds insufficient or stop-payment remarks. (ii) Whether the accused had rebutted the statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 by pleading that the cheques were security cheques and that no legally enforceable liability existed. (iii) Whether alleged non-service of statutory notice and the accused's custody in another case negatived liability under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Issue (i): Whether dishonour of the cheques attracted Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 where the drawer's bank account had been frozen or seized before presentation and the return memo recorded funds insufficient or stop-payment remarks.

Analysis: The account statements and bank evidence showed that the accused's account had either no sufficient balance or negligible balance at the relevant times, including when the account was seized. The Court held that dishonour for reasons such as insufficient funds, stop payment, or account being frozen does not, by itself, take the case outside Section 138. The cited precedents on closed accounts and stop-payment instructions supported the proposition that the offence remains attracted where the drawer lacks sufficient funds or control over payment, unless a probable defence is established.

Conclusion: The cheques' dishonour remained within the ambit of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, and the plea based on freezing of the account failed.

Issue (ii): Whether the accused had rebutted the statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 by pleading that the cheques were security cheques and that no legally enforceable liability existed.

Analysis: Once execution and signature on the cheques were admitted, the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 arose in favour of the complainant. The accused led no credible material to show that the cheques were not issued in discharge of liability or that the security-cheque plea was probable. The Court reiterated that the burden on the accused is only to raise a probable defence on a preponderance of probabilities, which was not done here.

Conclusion: The statutory presumptions were not rebutted and the defence of security cheque failed.

Issue (iii): Whether alleged non-service of statutory notice and the accused's custody in another case negatived liability under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Analysis: The notice was sent to the correct address by registered post, attracting the presumption of service. Even assuming that the accused was in custody and did not actually receive the notice, he did not make payment within fifteen days of summons or take steps to tender the cheque amount. The Court held that the plea of non-service did not exonerate him in the facts of the case.

Conclusion: The plea of non-service of notice and custody did not defeat the prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Final Conclusion: The conviction and sentence, as modified by the appellate court, were upheld and all the revision petitions were rejected.

Ratio Decidendi: Where execution of a cheque is admitted, presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 arise, and dishonour for insufficiency of funds, stop-payment, or a frozen account will still attract Section 138 unless the accused rebuts the presumption by a probable defence on a preponderance of probabilities.

Issues: (i) Whether the Tribunal misdirected itself on facts and in law in rejecting the Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM) used by the Transfer Pricing Officer for ascertaining the arm's length price (ALP)?

Analysis: The Tribunal found on facts that the assessee resold imported goods in the market without making any value addition and that no comparable instances supporting TNMM were placed on record by the TPO or DRP. The factual findings included that the assessee's activity was that of a pure reseller/distributor and that the determinative factor for benchmarking was the gross margin earned on resale after cost of sale. The Court considered precedents of this Court and tribunals which establish that where goods purchased from associated enterprises are resold as such without significant value addition, the Resale Price Method (RPM) is ordinarily the most appropriate method under the transfer pricing framework. Applying these legal principles to the Tribunal's factual findings, the Court held that RPM, and not TNMM, was the most appropriate method to determine ALP in the present cases.

Conclusion: The Tribunal did not misdirect itself; TNMM was rightly rejected and RPM is the most appropriate method on the facts. The question of law is answered against the appellant/revenue and in favour of the respondent/assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an Indian enterprise merely resells goods imported from associated enterprises without making value addition, the Resale Price Method is the most appropriate method to determine the arm's length price.

Issues: Whether an assessment order passed without dealing with the assessee's reply and objections is vitiated and liable to be set aside with a remand for fresh consideration.

Analysis: The assessee had filed replies to the show-cause notices and had also been heard in person, but the assessment order did not address the replies or the objections raised. The appellate remedy was noticed, but the Court held that the Assessing Officer must first discharge the duty of considering the explanation, affording a proper opportunity, and passing a reasoned order. A cryptic order that merely reproduces portions of the notice without meeting the defence deprives the assessee of a meaningful adjudication at the first tier and is inconsistent with natural justice.

Conclusion: The non-speaking assessment order was held unsustainable, was set aside, and the matter was remitted for fresh consideration after taking the reply into account.

Ratio Decidendi: An assessment order under the GST regime must be a speaking order that addresses the assessee's reply and objections; failure to do so violates natural justice and justifies setting aside the order and remand.

ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED

1. Whether a notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 is validly served where the notice server's endorsement indicates the assessee no longer resides at the address where service was attempted, but the assessee's income-tax returns for the relevant and subsequent years consistently show a different address available on the Assessing Officer's record.

2. Whether reassessment proceedings and an assessment order under Section 148/144 can be sustained where the Assessing Officer was informed or otherwise aware that the Section 148 notice had not been served on the assessee.

3. Whether reliance on address details in the PAN database (as compared to address in filed ITRs and AO's record) renders a notice under Section 148 valid where the AO or investigation branch had or could have had the correct address.

4. Whether the factual findings on service/non-service of the Section 148 notice by the first appellate authority and the Tribunal raise any substantial question of law warranting interference by the High Court.

ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS - Issue 1: Validity of Section 148 notice where notice-server endorsed that the property was sold and ITRs show a different address

Legal framework: Section 148 permits issuance of notice for reopening assessment; reassessment can be lawfully initiated only upon a valid notice being issued and served on the assessee.

Precedent Treatment: The Supreme Court authority relied upon by the revenue held that service at an old address does not automatically render proceedings invalid where the assessee has participated in proceedings despite service at the old address (fact-specific application).

Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal and the CIT(A) examined the AO's record and remand report and recorded that the notice dated 25.03.2013 was returned with an endorsement that the person had sold the house three years earlier. Concurrently, the assessee's ITRs from the relevant year through 2013-14 consistently showed a different, ascertainable address which was available with the AO. Those facts indicate non-service at the correct residence and availability of an alternative address on record.

Ratio vs. Obiter: The Court treats the finding that service was not effected as a binding factual determination (ratio on facts) for the statutory requirement of valid notice under Section 148; distinction from the cited precedent is expressly made on factual differences rather than overruling the precedent.

Conclusions: Where the notice-server's endorsement negates presence at the served address and the AO's records/ITRs show a different address, the Section 148 notice was not validly served on the assessee.

ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS - Issue 2: Validity of reassessment/assessment where AO proceeded despite awareness of non-service

Legal framework: Reassessment proceedings and an assessment order premised on such proceedings require that the statutory notice under Section 148 be served; absence of service is a foundational defect vitiating the reassessment.

Precedent Treatment: The Court distinguishes cases where the assessee participated despite defective or old-address service from the present factual matrix where AO had contemporaneous indication of non-service.

Interpretation and reasoning: The AO, despite being made aware (via returned notice endorsement and communications seeking investigation wing assistance) that the assessee was not available at the served address, proceeded to pass the assessment order on 20.03.2014 under Section 148/144. The CIT(A) and Tribunal examined these facts and concluded that service had not been effected; this is a factual finding that undermines the legitimacy of the reassessment.

Ratio vs. Obiter: The holding that an assessment passed despite known non-service is invalid is treated as the operative ratio on the facts; remarks about AO's conduct and investigatory communications are supportive factual observations.

Conclusions: Reassessment and the resulting assessment cannot be sustained where the AO proceeded after being aware that the Section 148 notice had not been served.

ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS - Issue 3: Reliance on PAN database address versus ITR/AO record

Legal framework: Valid service depends on actual service on the assessee; reliance on any database (including PAN) must be viewed against the totality of available, contemporaneous information in AO's record and filed ITRs.

Precedent Treatment: The revenue relied on authority supporting validity of proceedings where an old address (e.g., in PAN) was used but the assessee participated; that precedent applies where factual participation or other indicia negate prejudice.

Interpretation and reasoning: The present facts show that the ITRs from 2007-08 to 2013-14 consistently showed the assessee's address as 100 Pitampura, and that the ITR was available with the AO. The revenue did not sufficiently lay the foundation (and failed to place on record before the High Court) for the assertion that PAN database retained the old address, nor did it show that the AO was unaware of the correct address. Given this, reliance solely on PAN-address to validate service is misplaced.

Ratio vs. Obiter: The Court's distinction of the precedent is ratio as applied to the facts - validity of notice cannot be premised merely on PAN data where AO has or could have had correct address information in ITRs or other records.

Conclusions: Where filed returns and AO records contain a correct address and the AO was or could have been informed of non-availability at the served address, reliance on PAN database alone does not validate a Section 148 notice.

ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS - Issue 4: Whether the factual findings on service raise a substantial question of law

Legal framework: High Court interference is warranted where substantial questions of law arise; concurrent or primary factual findings by the Tribunal/CIT(A) attracting no substantial legal question are generally not to be interfered with.

Precedent Treatment: The Court applies the established principle that findings of fact by the Tribunal are not ordinarily disturbed unless there is a substantial question of law.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal and CIT(A) recorded a definitive factual conclusion that the Section 148 notice was not served on the assessee. The High Court found those factual findings undisputed on the record and observed that the revenue failed to place before the Court the material it had promised to supply to challenge those findings. In those circumstances, no substantial question of law arises from the established facts warranting interference.

Ratio vs. Obiter: The determination that no substantial question of law arises from the Tribunal's factual findings is ratio as applied to the proceedings; commentary on the absence of record production by the revenue is factual and consequential.

Conclusions: The Tribunal's finding of non-service being a factual finding, with no disputed material before the High Court, does not raise a substantial question of law; no interference with the impugned order is warranted.

OVERALL CONCLUSION

The Tribunal's and CIT(A)'s finding that the Section 148 notice was not served on the assessee is a definitive finding of fact based on returned notice endorsement and available ITR/AO records; reassessment and assessment passed thereafter are unsustainable. The revenue failed to produce the record it relied upon, the relied Supreme Court authority is fact-distinguishable, and no substantial question of law arises to justify interference. The appeal is therefore closed without disturbing the impugned order.

Issues: Whether an application filed for revival of an appeal, after withdrawal in view of the Vivad Se Vishwas scheme, could be rejected by applying the limitation prescribed for rectification under Section 254(2) of the Income-tax Act, and whether the Tribunal ought to have restored the appeal.

Analysis: The writ petition arose from the Tribunal's refusal to entertain an application seeking restoration of the withdrawn appeal. The Tribunal had earlier granted liberty to seek reinstatement if the scheme application failed. The impugned order proceeded on the footing that Section 254(2) governed the application and that the six-month period for rectification had expired. The Court held that rectification of an order and revival of an appeal are distinct remedies and cannot be equated. Since the earlier order itself contemplated reinstatement and the petitioner otherwise would be left without a remedy, the Tribunal ought to have treated the application as one for revival of the appeal rather than rejecting it on the basis of Section 254(2).

Conclusion: Section 254(2) did not bar the revival application, and the Tribunal's order refusing restoration was unsustainable. The appeal was directed to be restored and decided on merits.

Final Conclusion: The assessee succeeded in obtaining restoration of the tax appeal, with the Tribunal directed to hear and dispose of it afresh in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: An application seeking revival of a withdrawn appeal, especially where liberty to reinstate was earlier reserved, cannot be treated as a mere rectification application governed by the limitation in Section 254(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issues: (i) Whether the orders passed under Vera Samadhan Yojna, 2019 were illegal for not granting the benefit of the scheme in full and for ignoring the later certificate produced in support of the 'C' forms. (ii) Whether the rejection of the rectification application suffered from an error apparent on the face of the record.

Issue (i): Whether the orders passed under Vera Samadhan Yojna, 2019 were illegal for not granting the benefit of the scheme in full and for ignoring the later certificate produced in support of the 'C' forms.

Analysis: The scheme required pending appeals to be processed within the stipulated timetable, with details of 'C' forms to be furnished by the prescribed date and their genuineness to be verified from the prescribed sources. The appellate authority had already verified the available material and passed the order within the outer limit fixed by the scheme. The later certificate dated 17.02.2020 was produced after the cut-off date and could not be used to enlarge the benefit of the scheme beyond the prescribed time frame.

Conclusion: The challenge to the partial grant of benefit under the scheme fails and the order dated 15.02.2020 is sustained.

Issue (ii): Whether the rejection of the rectification application suffered from an error apparent on the face of the record.

Analysis: Rectification was available only for a patent mistake apparent from the record. Since the authority had already considered the material permitted under the scheme and the grievance essentially sought reconsideration on the basis of a subsequent document, no apparent error was shown. The authority was therefore justified in refusing rectification.

Conclusion: The rejection of the rectification application is upheld.

Final Conclusion: The writ petitions fail because the impugned orders were passed in accordance with the time-bound scheme and no rectifiable error was demonstrated.

Ratio Decidendi: A time-bound amnesty scheme must be applied strictly according to its prescribed cut-off dates and verification mechanism, and a later-produced document cannot be relied upon to extend the scheme's benefit or to create an error apparent warranting rectification.

Issues: (i) Whether an interim injunction could be granted to restrain the shareholder from taking a decision in the company meeting that may amount to giving consent or no-objection for handing over possession of the two flats before the DRT proceedings. (ii) Whether the court should restrain or interfere with the holding of the extraordinary general meeting and the connected prayer for interim reliefs concerning the meeting.

Issue (i): Whether an interim injunction could be granted to restrain the shareholder from taking a decision in the company meeting that may amount to giving consent or no-objection for handing over possession of the two flats before the DRT proceedings.

Analysis: The dispute concerning the two flats was not itself the subject of adjudication, but the proposed corporate decision had a direct bearing on the company's position before the DRT. The court found a real risk of conflict of interest if the company, through the shareholder in control, took a stance that could prejudice the company and its shareholders in the pending proceedings. The prayer was considered only to the limited extent necessary to protect the company's interest, without trenching upon the DRT's jurisdiction or the lender's independent rights under the mortgage arrangements.

Conclusion: Interim protection was granted, and the shareholder was restrained from taking any decision that would amount to giving consent or no-objection for handing over possession of the two flats before the DRT.

Issue (ii): Whether the court should restrain or interfere with the holding of the extraordinary general meeting and the connected prayer for interim reliefs concerning the meeting.

Analysis: The court accepted that, as a general rule, it does not restrain the holding of a company meeting and that interference is justified only in limited circumstances such as failure of procedural or numerical requirements. On the facts, the grievance was substantially directed at the consequences of the proposed meeting and not at any defect in the convening process. The court therefore declined to stall the meeting or grant the wider interim prayers sought in relation to it. The earlier interim application had also become infructuous by passage of time.

Conclusion: The prayers for restraining the meeting and the connected interim reliefs were refused, and the earlier interim application was disposed of as infructuous.

Final Conclusion: The court granted only a limited protective injunction concerning the proposed DRT-related decision, while refusing the broader attempt to stop the company meeting and other ancillary interim reliefs.

Ratio Decidendi: A court will not ordinarily restrain a company meeting, but may grant limited interim protection where a proposed corporate decision creates a concrete conflict of interest and may prejudice pending proceedings, without encroaching upon the jurisdiction of another forum.