Issues: Whether excess service tax paid in an earlier period may be adjusted against service-tax liability in a later succeeding month or quarter under Rule 6(4A).

Analysis: Rule 6(4A) permits adjustment of excess service tax against liability for a succeeding month or quarter and does not stipulate that such adjustment must occur in the immediately succeeding period. The provision must be given its plain meaning. Requiring refund where no immediate liability exists, or where the excess exceeds such liability, would unjustifiably retain tax already paid, contrary to the requirement that tax be collected only under authority of law.

Conclusion: Adjustment of the excess service tax against the liability for March 2009 was valid; the demand, interest and penalty could not be sustained, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the appeal against the Tribunal's order of remand raised any substantial question of law warranting interference.

Analysis: The Tribunal had relied on its earlier decision in the same assessee's case for prior assessment years, and the present impugned order was found to be based on factual appreciation. The remand made by the Tribunal was treated as a factual order, and such remand was held not to give rise to a question of law, much less a substantial question of law.

Conclusion: No substantial question of law arose for consideration, and the appeal was not maintainable on that basis.

Issues: (i) Whether a consolidated challenge could be maintained where the original authority had appended multiple decisions to one assessment order for different bills of entry without separate speaking orders; (ii) whether the first appellate authority ought to have remanded all connected appeals for fresh orders in accordance with law.

Issue (i): Whether a consolidated challenge could be maintained where the original authority had appended multiple decisions to one assessment order for different bills of entry without separate speaking orders.

Analysis: The assessment framework under section 17 of the Customs Act, 1962 requires proper assessment and a speaking order where the assessment is disputed. Where the original authority issued only one assessment order covering multiple imports by merely appending decisions, the statutory requirement was not satisfied. In such a situation, separate challenge in the ordinary form could not be effectively insisted upon without ensuring that the assessments themselves were drawn up in accordance with law.

Conclusion: The single composite assessment arrangement was not in accord with the mandate of section 17(5) of the Customs Act, 1962.

Issue (ii): Whether the first appellate authority ought to have remanded all connected appeals for fresh orders in accordance with law.

Analysis: Since the defect related to the manner in which the assessments were framed and the challenge was connected to the same composite exercise, the appeals could not be split for selective disposal. The proper course was to send the matters back so that the original authority could pass appropriate orders in compliance with law and settled judicial requirements.

Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and all the appeals were remanded to the original authority.

Final Conclusion: The appellants obtained relief by way of remand, with the assessment process required to be redone in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a composite assessment order does not conform to the statutory assessment procedure, the appellate forum should ensure lawful reassessment rather than sustain a selective disposal of connected challenges.

1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED

The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:

• Whether the appellate order rejecting the appeal due to delay was justified under the provisions of the Bihar Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (BGST Act).
• Whether the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can be invoked to challenge the appellate order when alternate remedies were available but not diligently pursued by the petitioner.
• The impact of the GST Council's recommendation for an amnesty scheme on the petitioner's ability to restore or file a fresh appeal.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue 1: Justification of the Appellate Order under BGST Act

• Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The BGST Act, specifically Section 107, allows an appeal to be filed within three months from the date of the order, with a possible extension of one month for delay condonation if satisfactory reasons are provided. The Supreme Court's order in Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) No. 3 of 2020 extended limitation periods due to the pandemic.
• Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The court noted that the appeal should have been filed by 12.08.2022, with an extended deadline for delay until 12.09.2022. The appeal was filed on 19.01.2023, well beyond the permissible period, leading to its rejection.
• Key Evidence and Findings: The appellate order and the petitioner's failure to file within the extended timeframe were central to the court's decision.
• Application of Law to Facts: The court applied the statutory timelines under Section 107 and the Supreme Court's extension to conclude that the appeal was not filed within the allowable period.
• Treatment of Competing Arguments: The petitioner did not provide sufficient justification for the delay, and the court found no grounds to deviate from the statutory requirements.
• Conclusions: The appellate order was justified in rejecting the appeal due to the petitioner's failure to adhere to the prescribed timelines.

Issue 2: Invocation of Extraordinary Jurisdiction under Article 226

• Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: Article 226 of the Constitution allows for the issuance of writs by High Courts. However, it is generally not invoked when alternate remedies are available.
• Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The court emphasized that Article 226 is not a substitute for statutory remedies, particularly when the petitioner has not been diligent in pursuing those remedies.
• Key Evidence and Findings: The petitioner's lack of diligence in filing the appeal within the extended period was a critical factor.
• Application of Law to Facts: The court applied principles governing the use of Article 226 to conclude that its invocation was unwarranted in this case.
• Treatment of Competing Arguments: The petitioner did not demonstrate exceptional circumstances justifying the invocation of Article 226.
• Conclusions: The court declined to invoke extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, given the availability of alternate remedies.

Issue 3: Impact of GST Council's Amnesty Scheme Recommendation

• Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The GST Council recommended an amnesty scheme, allowing appeals to be filed until 31st January 2024, subject to conditions.
• Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The court acknowledged the potential impact of the GST Council's recommendation but noted that it had not yet been given legal effect through notifications or amendments.
• Key Evidence and Findings: The court considered the press release and the conditions outlined for availing the amnesty scheme.
• Application of Law to Facts: The court recognized that the petitioner could benefit from the amnesty scheme if it became legally effective.
• Treatment of Competing Arguments: The court reserved the petitioner's right to seek restoration of the appeal if the recommendation is implemented.
• Conclusions: The writ petition was dismissed, but the petitioner was granted liberty to pursue restoration or a fresh appeal if the amnesty scheme is enacted.

3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS

• Preserve Verbatim Quotes of Crucial Legal Reasoning: "We find no reason to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, especially since it is not a measure to be employed where there are alternate remedies available and the assessee has not been diligent in availing such alternate remedies within the stipulated time."
• Core Principles Established: The court reinforced the principle that statutory timelines must be adhered to and that extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 is not a substitute for statutory remedies.
• Final Determinations on Each Issue: The appellate order's rejection of the appeal was upheld due to the petitioner's failure to file within the allowable period. The court declined to invoke Article 226 but noted the potential impact of the GST Council's amnesty scheme if implemented.

1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED

The following core legal questions were presented and considered in this judgment:

• Whether the assessment order passed under Section 147 read with Sections 144 and 144B of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was valid, given that notices were sent to a deceased representative of the petitioner.
• Whether the petitioner was entitled to an opportunity for a personal hearing before the assessment order was finalized.
• Whether the calculation of capital gains tax on the sale of rural agricultural land was correctly assessed, considering the petitioner's claims regarding the nature of the asset and the sale consideration.
• Whether the petitioner is entitled to a refund of the tax amount deposited following the setting aside of the impugned order.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue 1: Validity of the Assessment Order

• Relevant legal framework and precedents: The assessment order was issued under Section 147, along with Sections 144 and 144B of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Section 147 deals with income escaping assessment, while Section 144 pertains to best judgment assessment, and Section 144B outlines the procedure for faceless assessment.
• Court's interpretation and reasoning: The court noted that the notices were sent to the petitioner's tax consultant, who had passed away, and the petitioner was unaware of these notices. This procedural lapse affected the validity of the assessment order.
• Key evidence and findings: The petitioner did not receive the notices due to the death of her representative, and the assessment order was passed without her knowledge or response.
• Application of law to facts: The court found that the procedural requirement of notifying the petitioner directly was not fulfilled, impacting the fairness of the assessment process.
• Treatment of competing arguments: The respondent argued that the petitioner failed to reply to the notices, justifying the assessment order. However, the court prioritized the petitioner's lack of awareness due to the death of her representative.
• Conclusions: The court set aside the assessment order due to the failure to provide proper notice to the petitioner.

Issue 2: Opportunity for Personal Hearing

• Relevant legal framework and precedents: The principles of natural justice require that parties be given an opportunity to be heard before any adverse order is passed.
• Court's interpretation and reasoning: The court emphasized the importance of a personal hearing, especially when the petitioner was unaware of the ongoing proceedings due to the death of her representative.
• Key evidence and findings: The petitioner was not granted a personal hearing before the assessment order was finalized.
• Application of law to facts: The court applied the principles of natural justice, concluding that the lack of a personal hearing rendered the assessment order procedurally flawed.
• Treatment of competing arguments: The respondent did not adequately address the lack of a personal hearing, focusing instead on the petitioner's failure to respond to notices.
• Conclusions: The court remanded the matter for reconsideration, directing that the petitioner be given an opportunity for a personal hearing.

Issue 3: Calculation of Capital Gains Tax

• Relevant legal framework and precedents: Section 2(14) of the Income Tax Act defines "capital asset," and the petitioner argued that rural agricultural land does not fall within this definition.
• Court's interpretation and reasoning: The court did not delve into the merits of the capital gains tax calculation, as the procedural issues were deemed sufficient to set aside the assessment order.
• Key evidence and findings: The petitioner's claim of receiving a lower sale consideration than assessed was noted, but not resolved in this judgment.
• Application of law to facts: The court focused on procedural fairness rather than the substantive tax calculation.
• Treatment of competing arguments: The petitioner's argument about the nature of the asset and sale consideration was not addressed in detail due to the procedural setting aside of the order.
• Conclusions: The court did not make a final determination on the capital gains tax issue, leaving it open for reconsideration.

Issue 4: Refund of Deposited Tax Amount

• Relevant legal framework and precedents: The court did not express an opinion on the refund, leaving it to be addressed by the tax authorities.
• Court's interpretation and reasoning: The court indicated that the petitioner should approach the authorities for a refund, as the impugned order was set aside.
• Key evidence and findings: The petitioner had deposited 20% of the tax amount, which she sought to have refunded.
• Application of law to facts: The court deferred the issue of refund to the tax authorities, following standard procedures.
• Treatment of competing arguments: The court did not engage with arguments regarding the refund, focusing instead on the procedural setting aside of the order.
• Conclusions: The petitioner must pursue the refund through the appropriate administrative channels.

3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS

• Preserve verbatim quotes of crucial legal reasoning: "This Court feels that the impugned order appears to have been passed without providing an opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner and therefore, this Court is inclined to set aside the impugned order dated 24.09.2021."
• Core principles established: The judgment underscores the necessity of adhering to procedural fairness, including proper notification and the opportunity for a personal hearing, in tax assessment proceedings.
• Final determinations on each issue: The assessment order was set aside due to procedural deficiencies, and the matter was remanded for reconsideration with a directive to provide the petitioner a personal hearing. The issue of tax refund was left to the tax authorities for resolution.

Outcome: The application seeking release of seized imported goods was disposed of with a direction to release the goods on furnishing of personal bond and surety to the satisfaction of the Commissioner of Customs.

Issues: Whether the claimed non-invasive in vitro method for measuring sequence imbalance in a biological sample from a pregnant female subject is a diagnostic process falling within the patent exclusion under Section 3(i) of the Patents Act, 1970.

Analysis: Section 3(i) excludes processes for diagnostic treatment of human beings, and the expression "diagnostic" is not confined to in vivo methods. The statutory text, read in context, does not support limiting the exclusion to diagnosis practised on the human body, nor does it warrant excluding in vitro methods merely because they are performed outside the body. The language of Article 27(3)(a) of the TRIPS Agreement and the contrasting wording of Article 52(4) of the European Patents Convention, 1973 were considered, but they did not justify reading a bodily-practice limitation into the Indian provision. The complete specification and amended claims showed that the method uses size-based analysis of nucleic acid fragments from maternal blood to identify sequence imbalance and enable diagnosis of fetal chromosomal aneuploidy; the embodiments disclosed that a diagnosis can be made from the claimed process, even if it is not definitive or comprehensive. The method was therefore capable, per se, of uncovering pathology for treatment and was not saved by the disclaimers or by the fact that some earlier patent manuals appeared narrower.

Conclusion: The claimed invention is a diagnostic method excluded by Section 3(i) of the Patents Act, 1970, and the refusal of the patent application was upheld.

Ratio Decidendi: A process is patent-ineligible as diagnostic under Section 3(i) when, on the claims read with the complete specification, it is inherently capable of making a diagnosis for treatment of human beings, and the exclusion is not limited to in vivo methods or to definitive diagnosis.

The captioned appeals concern the assessee, involved in the hotel business, challenging the orders of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)-5, Ludhiana, regarding additions made based on a DVO's report following a search and seizure operation under section 132 of the Income Tax Act.

The assessee argued that no incriminating material was found during the search at their premises, making the reference to the DVO invalid. The counsel for the assessee cited the Supreme Court decision in PCIT vs. Abhisar Buildwell Pvt. Ltd., asserting that without incriminating material, the DVO's reference was unlawful. The Tribunal agreed, noting that the DVO's report was based purely on estimation without any corroborating evidence from the search.

The Assessing Officer had made substantive additions in the hands of the directors and protective additions in the hands of the assessee company. The CIT(A) converted these protective additions into substantive additions in the company's hands, which the assessee contested. The Tribunal found this conversion unjustified, especially since the company had not commenced business operations and had no income source, thus no undisclosed income could be presumed.

The Tribunal noted that the document found from M/s Royal Builders, which was not confronted to the assessee, could not be used as a basis for additions. The CIT(A) had acknowledged that the additions were based on the DVO's report rather than the third-party document, which was merely a trigger for the valuation reference.

The DVO's report, based on CPWD rates, was challenged by the assessee as these rates were higher than State PWD rates. The Tribunal agreed with the assessee's contention that CPWD rates include a higher profit margin and do not account for self-supervision and discounted material purchases, making the DVO's estimation unreliable.

The Tribunal found that since the assessee company had not commenced business and the construction was funded by shareholders' capital, there was no basis for substantive additions in the company's hands. The Tribunal cited various judicial precedents, including the Supreme Court's decision in CIT vs. Bharat Engineering & Construction Co., to support this conclusion.

In conclusion, the Tribunal allowed the appeals, deleting the additions made by the Assessing Officer and confirmed by the CIT(A), and pronounced the order in the Open Court on 12th October, 2023.

Issues: (i) Whether receipts from business consultancy services and reimbursement of expenses were taxable as fee for included services under Article 12(4)(b) of the India-USA Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement and under section 9(1)(vii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. (ii) Whether receipts from provision of support services were taxable as fee for included services under Article 12(4)(b) of the India-USA Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement.

Issue (i): Whether receipts from business consultancy services and reimbursement of expenses were taxable as fee for included services under Article 12(4)(b) of the India-USA Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement and under section 9(1)(vii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The receipts were held to be covered by the same factual matrix as in the assessee's earlier year, where identical consultancy and reimbursement receipts were found not to constitute fee for included services. The services were not shown to be technical services in the relevant sense, and the material did not establish that any technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how or processes were made available to the Indian entity so that it could independently apply them. The reimbursement also did not acquire a taxable character merely by being routed through the service arrangement.

Conclusion: The receipts from business consultancy services and reimbursement of expenses were not taxable as fee for included services, and the addition was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether receipts from provision of support services were taxable as fee for included services under Article 12(4)(b) of the India-USA Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement.

Analysis: The support services agreement showed a range of administrative, financial, personnel, professional, marketing, computer and information-related support functions. Even assuming that some activities could be characterised as technical or consultancy services, the decisive question was whether the service provider made available technical knowledge, skill, know-how or processes to the recipient. Continuous availing of the services since 2010 showed dependence on the service provider rather than transfer of a self-sustaining capability. The revenue failed to establish satisfaction of the make available condition, and the cited authority on different facts was found inapplicable.

Conclusion: The receipts from support services were not taxable as fee for included services, and the addition was directed to be deleted in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The disputed receipts were held not taxable as fee for included services, and the assessment additions on these issues could not survive.

Ratio Decidendi: Under Article 12(4)(b) of the India-USA DTAA, consultancy or technical receipts become taxable as fee for included services only if the services are technical or consultancy in nature and the provider makes available technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how or processes to the recipient so that the recipient can apply them independently.

Issues: Whether the assessee was entitled to claim deduction under section 80P(2)(d) on interest and dividend income earned from investments, and whether the matter required fresh examination of the nature of the recipient co-operative bank/society.

Analysis: The dispute turned on the applicability of section 80P(2)(d) and the exclusion in section 80P(4) in the context of a co-operative bank earning income from investments in co-operative societies and other co-operative banks. The earlier orders and the Supreme Court's pronouncement on the distinction between a co-operative bank and a co-operative credit society were noted, but the factual foundation necessary to determine the exact status of the recipient institutions had not been properly ascertained by the revenue authorities. In the absence of clear findings on that foundational aspect, the issue could not be finally adjudicated on the existing record.

Conclusion: The matter was remanded to the first appellate authority for fresh determination after ascertaining the relevant facts and affording the assessee a reasonable opportunity.

The appeals concern the reopening of assessments beyond six years but not later than ten years under Section 153A of the Income Tax Act. The Assessing Officer (AO) issued notices for AYs 2009-10, 2010-11, and 2011-12, based on a search and seizure operation conducted on 25.10.2017, which revealed substantial unexplained investments. The AO relied on a Departmental Valuation Officer (DVO) report to estimate the value of these investments. However, the reopening beyond six years is permissible only if the AO possesses tangible evidence revealing escapement of income amounting to Rs. 50 lakhs or more. The Tribunal noted that the AO's satisfaction was based on the DVO's valuation report and a loose receipt, which indicated an unexplained investment of Rs. 45,00,000/-.

The Tribunal emphasized that the DVO's report alone does not constitute incriminating material. It cited various judicial precedents, including the Supreme Court's decision in PCIT vs. Abhisar Buildwell P. Ltd., which held that no addition can be made in assessments under Section 153A in the absence of incriminating material found during the search. The Tribunal further noted that the DVO's report is an estimation and not conclusive evidence of investment. The AO's reliance on the DVO's report without corroborating evidence was deemed insufficient to justify the additions.

The AO's additions were based on differences in property valuations and a loose receipt indicating an investment in a property. The Tribunal found that the AO had wrongly attributed investments to the assessee in properties owned by the assessee's father. It also highlighted discrepancies in the DVO's valuation methods, such as using CPWD rates instead of State PWD rates, and the lack of evidence for certain additions made by the DVO. The Tribunal concluded that the only tangible evidence was the loose receipt indicating an investment of Rs. 45,00,000/-, which was below the Rs. 50,00,000/- threshold required for reopening assessments beyond six years.

The Tribunal quashed the reopening of assessments for the relevant years, deeming it illegal due to the lack of tangible evidence of income escapement exceeding Rs. 50 lakhs. It allowed the appeals, holding that the additions made solely on the basis of the DVO's report were unsustainable without corroborating evidence.

Issues: (i) Whether the offence under the Negotiable Instruments Act could be compounded after conviction on the basis of a settlement between the parties. (ii) Whether the compounding fee could be reduced having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case.

Issue (i): Whether the offence under the Negotiable Instruments Act could be compounded after conviction on the basis of a settlement between the parties.

Analysis: Section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act makes offences under the Act compoundable and overrides the scheme of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to that extent. Where the parties have settled the dispute and the complainant has received the cheque amount in full and final settlement, compounding may be permitted even after conviction.

Conclusion: The offence was permitted to be compounded after conviction, and the conviction and sentence were quashed.

Issue (ii): Whether the compounding fee could be reduced having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case.

Analysis: The graded scheme for compounding costs is intended to encourage early settlement, but the competent court may reduce the cost in appropriate cases for recorded reasons. Considering the financial condition of the petitioner, the Court exercised discretion to reduce the fee.

Conclusion: The compounding fee was reduced to 5% of the cheque amount.

Final Conclusion: The revision petition was allowed on settlement, the offence stood compounded, the conviction and sentence were set aside, and the petitioner was treated as acquitted, subject to deposit of the reduced compounding fee.

Ratio Decidendi: An offence under the Negotiable Instruments Act may be compounded even after conviction if the parties settle the dispute, and the court may reduce the compounding fee in an appropriate case for reasons recorded.

Issues: Whether the appellant, having retired from the partnership firm and having the retirement deed received by the Department, could still be proceeded against for recovery of the firm's sales tax dues for the assessment year 2002-2003, and whether the writ court ought to have relegated him to the statutory alternative remedy.

Analysis: The retirement deed showing the appellant's retirement in 2000 had been received by the Department well before the relevant assessment year. The Department's own conduct in the connected penalty proceedings and assessment proceedings also reflected that it was aware that the appellant was no longer a partner. In those circumstances, the object of Rule 5(8) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Rules was held to have been met on the facts, notwithstanding non-submission of the prescribed form. Since the factual position was not in dispute, there was no need to drive the appellant to the alternative statutory remedy.

Conclusion: The appellant could not be made liable for the firm's tax dues for the assessment year 2002-2003, and the writ court's refusal to examine the merits on the ground of alternative remedy was unwarranted.