Foreign Tax Credit - filing of Form No. 67 - certificate under Rule 128(8)(ii) - Rule 128(9) of the Income-tax Rules - retrospective amendment - return under section 139(1) or section 139(4)Foreign Tax Credit - Rule 128(9) of the Income-tax Rules - retrospective amendment - return under section 139(1) or section 139(4) - Interpretation and applicability of substituted Rule 128(9) to assessment year 2022-23 and the conditions for claiming FTC. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that the substitution of sub rule (9) of Rule 128 by the Income tax (27th Amendment) Rules, 2022 operates with retrospective effect from 01 04 2022 and therefore governs assessment year 2022 23. Under the substituted provision an assessee claiming credit must satisfy two conditions: (i) furnish the Statement in Form No. 67 and the certificate or statement specified in Rule 128(8)(ii) on or before the end of the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the income is offered to tax in India; and (ii) furnish the return for such assessment year within the time specified under section 139(1) or section 139(4). Applying this test the Tribunal found that the assessment year 2022 23 is governed by the new rule and that the requirement is a conjunctive twofold condition of timing for both Form No. 67 and the certificate and of the return filing within the statutory time under section 139(1) or 139(4). [Paras 5]Substituted Rule 128(9) applies to AY 2022 23; the claimant must satisfy both the timing condition for Form No. 67 and the certificate and the requirement of furnishing the return within time under section 139(1) or section 139(4).Filing of Form No. 67 - certificate under Rule 128(8)(ii) - Foreign Tax Credit - Whether the assessee complied with the procedural conditions for claiming FTC for AY 2022 23. - HELD THAT: - On the material before it the Tribunal recorded that the assessee, a resident, had included the foreign salary in return and had filed the return on 30 12 2022 (a belated return under section 139(4)), thereby satisfying the return filing limb of Rule 128(9). The Tribunal also found documentary evidence of uploading Form No. 67 on 29 12 2022, which meets the timing requirement for Form No. 67. However, the assessee could not authentically prove before the Tribunal that the certificate or statement required by Rule 128(8)(ii) was furnished along with Form No. 67 before the end of the assessment year. Given this lacuna the Tribunal declined to decide the FTC claim on the merits and instead set aside the impugned order and remanded the matter to the assessing officer to examine whether the certificate or statement under Rule 128(8)(ii) was in fact furnished within the stipulated time; the assessee is to be given a reasonable opportunity of hearing and, if the certificate is found to have been furnished, the FTC should be allowed. [Paras 4, 5]Return and Form No. 67 were filed within the timings required by the substituted Rule 128(9); the presence of the certificate under Rule 128(8)(ii) was not proved before the Tribunal and the matter is remanded to the AO for verification and consequential relief if the certificate is found to have been furnished.Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed for statistical purposes; substituted Rule 128(9) applies to AY 2022 23, the assessee satisfied the return filing and Form No. 67 timing requirements, and the case is remanded to the assessing officer to verify whether the certificate under Rule 128(8)(ii) was furnished-if so, the FTC shall be permitted after giving the assessee a reasonable opportunity of hearing.

Right to raise a fresh ground as respondent in an appeal - power of the Tribunal to permit additional grounds not taken below where no further factual investigation is required - CBDT Circular No. 19/2019 - mandatory requirement of computer-generated Document Identification Number (DIN) in communications - deemed invalidity of communications issued without DIN except as regularised under specified exceptions - regularisation procedure for manual communications issued under exceptional circumstances - binding effect of administrative circulars on tax administration and purposive interpretationRight to raise a fresh ground as respondent in an appeal - power of the Tribunal to permit additional grounds not taken below where no further factual investigation is required - Assessee may raise an additional ground in an appeal filed by the Revenue where such ground does not require further investigation of facts and the Revenue has an opportunity to be heard. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that established authorities permit a respondent to urge a fresh ground in an appeal preferred by the Revenue where allowing that ground does not place the respondent in a worse position than if he were an appellant and does not necessitate additional factual inquiry. Reliance was placed on precedents distinguishing pleas that would worsen the appellant's position and on rules permitting amendment of grounds; the only condition is that the additional ground should not call for further investigation and the adversely affected party must be afforded an opportunity to be heard. Applying these principles, the Tribunal found it legitimate to consider the assessee's additional ground challenging the validity of the impugned order for absence of DIN. [Paras 7, 8, 9, 10]The assessee was permitted to raise and the Tribunal considered the additional ground in the Revenue's appeal.CBDT Circular No. 19/2019 - mandatory requirement of computer-generated Document Identification Number (DIN) in communications - deemed invalidity of communications issued without DIN except as regularised under specified exceptions - regularisation procedure for manual communications issued under exceptional circumstances - binding effect of administrative circulars on tax administration and purposive interpretation - Assessment order dated 20/12/2019 passed under section 143(3) read with section 263 of the Act without quoting a computer-generated DIN is invalid and shall be treated as never having been issued. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal examined CBDT Circular No.19/2019 which mandates that communications issued on or after 01/10/2019 must contain a computer-generated DIN and provides limited, prescribed exceptions with specified regularisation procedures. Paragraph 4 of the circular declares any communication not in conformity with paragraphs 2 and 3 to be invalid and deemed never issued. The impugned order contained no reference to generation or non-generation of DIN, nor did it state any of the exceptional circumstances or follow the prescribed regularisation. Subsequent communication purportedly indicating a DIN did not supply reasons or the requisite format contemplated by the circular. Applying the circular and the reasoning in the cited High Court decision, the Tribunal concluded that absence of DIN and failure to comply with the circular's exception/regularisation mechanism rendered the order nullity, obviating the need to examine the merits. [Paras 14, 15, 16, 17, 18]Impugned assessment order of 20/12/2019 is invalid for want of DIN and is to be treated as never having been issued.Final Conclusion: The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeal: the assessee was permitted to raise the additional DIN-ground in the Revenue's appeal, and on that ground the assessment order dated 20/12/2019 lacking the mandated DIN was held invalid and deemed never issued.

Characterisation of payment as deemed dividend under section 2(22)(d) - treatment of opening retained earnings on migration from Indian GAAP to Ind AS - exemption under section 10(34) read with section 115 O for deemed dividend - Most Favoured Nation clause in tax treaty and applicability of lower treaty rate - taxation of capital gains under Article 13(5) of the India-Netherlands DTAA - treaty rate being inclusive of surcharge and education cess - initiation of penalty proceedings under section 270ACharacterisation of payment as deemed dividend under section 2(22)(d) - treatment of opening retained earnings on migration from Indian GAAP to Ind AS - Whether part of the consideration on capital reduction was correctly treated as deemed dividend under section 2(22)(d) by reference to accumulated profits computed using Ind AS opening balances. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found that adoption of Ind AS and the reinstatement of opening balances under Ind AS 101 changed the assets/liabilities and retained earnings in a manner that reflects the company's financial position under the new accounting framework. The reassessed opening retained earnings as presented in the Ind AS compliant financial statements were held to be the proper basis for computing accumulated profits as on the date of capital reduction. The Tribunal rejected the assessee's contention that figures restated for comparative purposes under Ind AS are 'sacrosanct' historical figures and not to be relied upon; it treated the reinstated retained earnings as the actual position under the accounting regime the company adopted going forward. On that basis the Assessing Officer's division of the consideration into an amount attributable to accumulated profits (treated as deemed dividend under section 2(22)(d)) and the balance as capital gains was sustained. [Paras 13, 14, 15]Determination of accumulated profit based on Ind AS opening balances upheld and the characterization of the relevant portion as deemed dividend under section 2(22)(d) sustained.Exemption under section 10(34) read with section 115 O for deemed dividend - Whether the deemed dividend under section 2(22)(d) is exempt in the hands of the recipient under section 10(34) by virtue of Chapter XII D (section 115 O), notwithstanding that Dividend Distribution Tax was not paid by the payer. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal analysed the Explanation to section 115 Q (as it existed prior to omission) and the decision relied upon by the assessee, but distinguished the present facts. It accepted that, as a general principle, an exemption available to a recipient under the statute cannot be denied merely because the payer failed to discharge a statutory tax liability; recovery mechanisms against the company exist. However, on the facts the Tribunal found that the assessee effectively controlled the Indian company and management default in paying DDT was attributable to the same management; therefore the assessee could not claim the benefit while benefiting from the company's failure to pay DDT. Accordingly the plea for exemption under section 10(34) was rejected. [Paras 15, 16, 19, 22, 23]Claim of exemption under section 10(34) in respect of deemed dividend under section 2(22)(d) rejected.Most Favoured Nation clause in tax treaty and applicability of lower treaty rate - Whether the assessee could invoke the MFN clause in the India-Netherlands protocol to claim a lower dividend withholding rate (5% instead of 10%). - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that, although the protocol contains an MFN clause, the assessee's claim to import a lower rate is affected by multiple factors: (a) the requirement of governmental notification/implementation under section 90(2) and the CBDT position raising conditions and reservations; (b) the application for refund of excess tax is subject to a three year limitation under the protocol; and (c) in the present case the period for claiming excess tax had elapsed. On these bases the Tribunal refused to entertain the MFN based claim and dismissed the ground as time barred and not properly implementable without the requisite notifications. [Paras 24, 31, 32, 33, 35]MFN based claim for 5% treaty rate dismissed as not admissible in the circumstances (time bar/implementation issues).Taxation of capital gains under Article 13(5) of the India-Netherlands DTAA - Whether the capital gain on cancellation of shares pursuant to capital reduction was taxable only in the Netherlands under Article 13(5) or was taxable in India. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal parsed paragraph 5 of Article 13 into its limbs and held that the exception permitting India to tax gains on alienation of shares (where shares forming at least 10% are alienated to a resident of India) applied. The Tribunal found that the capital reduction, effected under NCLT approval with payment of consideration by the Indian company, amounted to an alienation resulting in gain taxable in India under the treaty's exception. It rejected the assessee's argument that cancellation did not constitute alienation to an Indian resident or that the transaction necessarily amounted to a 'reorganisation' within the third limb; consequently India's right to tax was upheld. [Paras 36, 38, 41, 52, 53]Claim that capital gain is taxable only in the Netherlands under Article 13(5) rejected; India's taxation upheld under the treaty exception.Treaty rate being inclusive of surcharge and education cess - Whether surcharge and education cess can be levied in addition to the treaty withholding rate on dividend. - HELD THAT: - Following precedent of the Tribunal, the Bench held that the tax rate specified in the treaty is inclusive of surcharge and education cess; accordingly additional surcharge/cess should not be levied over and above the treaty rate. The Assessing Officer was directed to apply the treaty rate without adding surcharge or education cess. [Paras 54, 56, 57]Directed that the applicable treaty rate be treated as inclusive of surcharge and education cess; AO to not levy additional surcharge/cess.Initiation of penalty proceedings under section 270A - Whether penalty proceedings under section 270A should be adjudicated at this stage. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal considered the assessee's plea to drop penalty proceedings but treated the matter as premature for adjudication at the present appellate stage and declined to adjudicate the penalty question in the appeal. [Paras 58, 59]Penalty ground dismissed as premature for adjudication in the present appeal.Final Conclusion: The appeal is partly allowed. The Tribunal upheld the Assessing Officer/DRP's treatment of a portion of the capital reduction consideration as deemed dividend by reference to Ind AS restated retained earnings, refused the assessee's claim to exemption under section 10(34) in the circumstances, and rejected the MFN and Article 13(5) pleas; however the Tribunal directed that the treaty withholding rate be applied as inclusive of surcharge and education cess. Penalty proceedings under section 270A were held premature.

Treatment of rental receipts as income from business or profession and grant of depreciation on building - application and retrospective effect of the second proviso to section 40(a)(ia) and verification of recipients' returns - disallowance under section 40(a)(ia) where tax has not been deducted - business expediency test for deduction of foreign travel expenses - addition under section 68 in absence of confirmation of capital contribution by a partner - remand for fresh verification and adjudication by Assessing OfficerTreatment of rental receipts as income from business or profession and grant of depreciation on building - Whether the rental receipts from lease of building should be treated as income from business or profession and depreciation allowed on the building - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal recorded that the CIT(A) followed earlier Tribunal decisions in the assessee's own appeals for AY 2008-09 and 2009-10, which treated the rental receipts as income from business or profession and directed grant of depreciation on the building. The assessee's counsel accepted that the Tribunal's view in those appeals is against the assessee. In the absence of any distinguishing material or valid reason to interfere, the Tribunal declined to disturb the CIT(A)'s finding which followed that precedent. [Paras 6]Findings of the CIT(A) upheld; rental receipts treated as income from business or profession and depreciation to be granted as directed earlier.Application and retrospective effect of the second proviso to section 40(a)(ia) and verification of recipients' returns - remand for fresh verification and adjudication by Assessing Officer - Whether the disallowance under section 40(a)(ia) in respect of payments to transporters should be sustained or the matter remanded for verification under the second proviso - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal noted that the second proviso to section 40(a)(ia) has been held to operate retrospectively from 1.4.2005 by the Delhi High Court. Once entitlement to the proviso is found, the proper course is for the AO to verify whether the recipients included the receipts in their returns and paid tax thereon. If recipient cooperation is lacking, the AO should obtain information under section 133(6) or section 131. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) ought to have directed such verification and therefore set aside the CIT(A)'s sustaining of the disallowance and remanded the issue to the AO for verification and fresh adjudication with opportunity to the assessee. [Paras 11, 12]Disallowance set aside and matter remanded to Assessing Officer to verify recipients' inclusion of receipts in returns and tax payment; adjudicate afresh after verification and hearing.Business expediency test for deduction of foreign travel expenses - Whether foreign travel expenses claimed by the assessee were wholly and exclusively for business and therefore deductible - HELD THAT: - The CIT(A) examined the vouchers and noted that travellers included the partner and his spouse and son. The assessee failed to discharge the primary onus of proving business expediency and that the expenses were wholly and exclusively for business either at assessment or on appeal. On that factual record, the Tribunal found no reason to interfere with the concurrent finding of the authorities that the expenses were personal and not allowable. [Paras 15, 16]Addition upheld; foreign travel expenses disallowed for lack of proof of business expediency.Addition under section 68 in absence of confirmation of capital contribution by a partner - remand for fresh verification and adjudication by Assessing Officer - Whether the capital contribution credited by a partner could be added to the firm's income under section 68 in absence of partner's confirmation - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal noted that the firm received capital from the partner but the assessee did not produce a confirmation from the contributing partner. While precedent indicates that once a partner confirms the introduction as capital or loan any addition should be in the hands of the partner and not the firm, the Assessing Officer and the CIT(A) confirmed the addition without having afforded the assessee an opportunity to produce documentary evidence or a confirmation. In view of the absence of such confirmation and opportunity, the Tribunal restored the issue to the file of the AO for readjudication after allowing the assessee to file relevant material and hearing, without being influenced by earlier orders. [Paras 19]Issue restored to Assessing Officer for readjudication after permitting the assessee to produce confirmation and supporting evidence; addition not sustained at this stage (allowed for statistical purposes).Final Conclusion: The appeal is partly allowed for statistical purposes: the classification of rental income and grant of depreciation and the disallowance of foreign travel expenses are upheld; disallowance under section 40(a)(ia) (payments to transporters) and the addition under section 68 (capital contribution by partner) are set aside and remitted to the Assessing Officer for verification and fresh adjudication after giving the assessee an opportunity to produce evidence.

Applicability of an Advance Pricing Agreement to non covered assessment years where functions, assets and risks are same - computation of arm's length margin in accordance with agreed APA methodology - comparability analysis for transfer pricing - exclusion and inclusion of comparables - remand for verification of comparable company data - depreciation on goodwill as an intangible asset eligible under section 32 in light of precedent - tribunal's power to direct reassessment/verification of claims raised during assessment proceedingsApplicability of an Advance Pricing Agreement to non covered assessment years where functions, assets and risks are same - computation of arm's length margin in accordance with agreed APA methodology - Application of APA methodology (entered for AYs. 2013 14 to 2020 21) to determine transfer pricing for AY 2011 12 - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal admitted the additional ground and, on considering the APA entered into by the assessee with the CBDT for subsequent years, directed that the margin computation for services rendered under the ITeS segment for AY 2011 12 be carried out in accordance with the terms agreed in the APA. The AO/TPO was directed to determine the arm's length price under section 92CA in accordance with the APA, as the methodology and FAR were noted to be consistent between the year under consideration and the APA period. Consequently, transfer pricing grounds (Grounds 1-2) were allowed for statistical purposes. [Paras 2]APA methodology to be applied for computation of arm's length margin for the ITeS segment for AY 2011 12; AO/TPO to determine ALP in accordance with the APA.Comparability analysis for transfer pricing - exclusion and inclusion of comparables - comparability filters and functional dissimilarity - Exclusion of ICRA Online Ltd. as a comparable and inclusion of Cosmic Global Ltd.; treatment of other comparables - HELD THAT: - On comparability, the Tribunal found ICRA Online Ltd. functionally dissimilar to the assessee (providing higher end KPO/consultancy services versus the assessee's routine back office ITeS) and directed exclusion of ICRA Online from the final comparable list. Cosmic Global Ltd., which the TPO had retained as functionally similar and which was suo motu excluded by the DRP on an unutilised working model filter not applied by the TPO, was directed to be included. For Informed Technologies India Ltd. and Inhouse Production Ltd., the Tribunal observed that the details relied upon for exclusion are verifiable from annual reports and therefore remanded these comparables to the AO/TPO for verification and reconsideration of functional dissimilarities. [Paras 6, 7]ICRA Online Ltd. excluded; Cosmic Global Ltd. included; Informed Technologies India Ltd. and Inhouse Production Ltd. remanded to AO/TPO for verification.Depreciation on goodwill as an intangible asset eligible under section 32 in light of precedent - tribunal's power to direct reassessment/verification of claims raised during assessment proceedings - Claim for depreciation on goodwill (balance goodwill) - direction to AO to consider the claim in light of Smifs Securities Ltd. - HELD THAT: - The assessee sought depreciation on balance goodwill for AY 2011 12 (not claimed in original return). The Tribunal noted the Supreme Court decision in CIT v. Smifs Securities Ltd. that goodwill is an intangible asset eligible for depreciation and observed the Tribunal's power to direct verification by the AO. Reliance was also placed on precedents concerning the tribunal's power to entertain legal points premised on existing facts. The Tribunal directed the AO to consider the assessee's claim in accordance with the law and the Smifs decision and allowed Ground No. 5 for statistical purposes. [Paras 8]AO directed to consider the depreciation claim on goodwill in accordance with Smifs Securities Ltd. and law; ground allowed for statistical purposes for AY 2011 12.Depreciation on goodwill as an intangible asset eligible under section 32 in light of precedent - remand for verification of comparable company data - Treatment of depreciation on goodwill for AYs. 2012 13 and 2014 15 - HELD THAT: - Applying the same reasoning and directions given for AY 2011 12, the Tribunal remanded the issue of depreciation on goodwill in appeals concerning AY 2012 13 (assessee's appeal) and AY 2014 15 (revenue's appeal) to the AO for verification and consideration in line with the Smifs decision and applicable law. These matters were allowed for statistical purposes pending verification. [Paras 9]Depreciation on goodwill issues for AY 2012 13 and AY 2014 15 remanded to AO for verification and consideration in accordance with Smifs; allowed for statistical purposes.Final Conclusion: The Tribunal directed application of the APA methodology to compute the arm's length margin for the ITeS segment for AY 2011 12 and remitted certain comparables for verification; ICRA Online Ltd. was excluded and Cosmic Global Ltd. included as comparable. The Tribunal further directed the AO to consider the assessee's claim for depreciation on goodwill in AY 2011 12 (and remanded similar claims for AYs 2012 13 and 2014 15) in accordance with the Smifs Securities Ltd. decision, allowing the stated grounds for statistical purposes and ordering verification by the AO/TPO.

Transfer pricing adjustments - comparability analysis under TNMM - application of functional and qualitative filters - treatment of assets received free of cost - working capital adjustment - characterisation of outstanding receivables as international transaction - remand for verification in accordance with DRP directions - exclusion of non comparable entities on turnover and functional dissimilarity groundsRemand for verification in accordance with DRP directions - transfer pricing adjustments - Verification of margin computation in accordance with DRP directions remitted to AO/TPO - HELD THAT: - The DRP had directed verification and adoption of figures as per the annual reports and requested detailed segregation workings from the assessee. The Tribunal found the DRP direction unimplemented in the final order and, in the interest of justice, remitted the issue to the AO to verify the assessee's margin computation and adopt figures from annual reports or rectify errors, allowing the ground for statistical purposes. [Paras 5]Issue remitted to AO/TPO for verification and rectification as per DRP; ground allowed for statistical purposes.Treatment of assets received free of cost - transfer pricing adjustments - Capitalisation and depreciation of free of cost assets; deletion of disallowance u/s.28(iv) - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that assets received free of cost from AEs which have not been returned and provide enduring benefit must be capitalised in assessee's hands; granting depreciation was correct. However, the TPO's approach of adding notional depreciation across all segments to inflate operating cost was unsound. The Tribunal directed that depreciation as per Companies Act schedule be included in operating cost for computing ALP, and any difference in depreciation rates vis a vis comparables be adjusted as per Rule 10B(e). Consequently the AO was directed to delete the disallowance made u/s.28(iv) since the matter is considered in transfer pricing adjustment. [Paras 6]Assets to be capitalised; depreciation included in operating cost for ALP computation; disallowance u/s.28(iv) deleted; grounds partly allowed/dismissed as specified.Exclusion of non comparable entities on turnover grounds - comparability analysis under TNMM - Exclusion of Tech Mahindra Business Services Ltd. and Infosys BPM Services Pvt. Ltd. from comparable set on turnover grounds - HELD THAT: - Relying on coordinate bench precedent, the Tribunal held that entities with exceptionally high turnover compared to the assessee may be excluded as not comparable. In the facts before it (assessee turnover ~56.67 crores versus comparables' turnovers in thousands of crores), the Tribunal directed exclusion of the two companies from the final comparable set. [Paras 7]Tech Mahindra Business Services Ltd. and Infosys BPM Services Pvt. Ltd. to be excluded from the comparable set; grounds allowed.Working capital adjustment - transfer pricing adjustments - Direction to compute Working Capital Adjustment on actuals - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal directed the AO/TPO to compute the working capital adjustment on actuals for determination of ALP, observing that WCA was not granted by the TPO and must be calculated to ensure correct benchmarking under TNMM. [Paras 8]WCA to be computed on actuals by AO/TPO; ground allowed for statistical purposes.Application of functional and qualitative filters - comparability analysis under TNMM - Remand for fresh consideration of R&D filter and selection of comparables under SWD segment - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found that the R&D filter had been applied without giving a specific opportunity on SWD comparables (notice did not specifically address R&D filter for SWD). Consequently, it remitted the selection of comparables under the Software Development segment to the TPO for fresh consideration using filters consistently applied in preceding and subsequent years. [Paras 9]Selection of comparables under SWD segment remitted to AO/TPO for fresh consideration; grounds allowed for statistical purposes.Functional dissimilarity as ground for exclusion - comparability analysis under TNMM - Treatment of Datamatics Business Solutions Ltd.: remitted for verification - HELD THAT: - Assessee challenged Datamatics as functionally dissimilar (BPM/KPO characteristics). Relying on coordinate bench decisions, the Tribunal noted divergent functional indications in annual reports and website material and remitted the matter to AO/TPO to re examine the functional profile and investments disclosed in audited records. [Paras 10]Datamatics Business Solutions Ltd. remitted to AO/TPO for verification of functional comparability.Functional dissimilarity as ground for exclusion - comparability analysis under TNMM - Exclusion of Manipal Digital Systems Pvt. Ltd. from comparable set - HELD THAT: - Considering coordinate bench authority and the company's diversified activities and issues about segmental disclosures, the Tribunal directed exclusion of Manipal Digital Systems Pvt. Ltd. from the final list of comparables for the assessee. [Paras 10]Manipal Digital Systems Pvt. Ltd. to be excluded from the comparable set.Functional dissimilarity as ground for exclusion - comparability analysis under TNMM - Exclusion of Inteq BPO Services Pvt. Ltd. from comparable set - HELD THAT: - Following coordinate bench precedents that a BPM/BPO entity with the specific profile of Inteq cannot be treated as comparable to the assessee's ITeS transactions, the Tribunal directed AO/TPO to exclude Inteq BPO Services Pvt. Ltd. from the final set. [Paras 10]Inteq BPO Services Pvt. Ltd. to be excluded from the comparable set; ground partly allowed.Verification of comparables using annual reports - comparability analysis under TNMM - Remand to verify inclusion/exclusion of Informed Technologies Ltd., Cosmic Global Ltd. and Allsec Technologies Ltd. based on annual reports/filters - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal directed that the assessee furnish annual reports and that the AO/TPO verify the filters (service revenue, export income etc.) applied to these comparables; since there was no dispute that verification was required, the matter was remitted for fresh consideration. [Paras 11]Comparables referred to AO/TPO for verification against annual reports; grounds allowed for statistical purposes.Functional dissimilarity as ground for exclusion - comparability analysis under TNMM - Exclusion of Pressman Advertising Ltd., Scarecrow Communications Ltd. and Majestic Research Services & Solutions Ltd. from comparables for MSS segment - HELD THAT: - Relying on coordinate bench findings on the nature of services (advertising, intermediary/reseller model, market research/KPO activities) and absence of segmental clarity, the Tribunal held these entities not functionally comparable to the assessee's marketing support services and directed their exclusion. [Paras 12]Pressman Advertising Ltd., Scarecrow Communications Ltd. and Majestic Research Services & Solutions Ltd. excluded from final comparable set; ground allowed.Characterisation of outstanding receivables as international transaction - working capital adjustment - Remand to AO/TPO to examine interest on delayed receivables and interaction with WCA; rate guidance where applicable - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal referred to precedents requiring case by case inquiry to determine if receivables amount to an international transaction or are subsumed in WCA. It set aside the impugned conclusion and remitted the issue to AO/TPO to study impact on working capital; directed that receivables subsumed by WCA not be separately characterized, and for receivables outside WCA the interest rate to be LIBOR + 300 basis points with 90 days credit, permitting opportunity to be heard. [Paras 13]Issue remitted to AO/TPO for fresh examination; directions on interaction with WCA and applicable rate provided; ground partly allowed.Reimbursement and secondment of employees - evidentiary verification and remand - Remand to AO to verify salaries paid and reimbursements for seconded employees in light of evidence and coordinate bench decisions - HELD THAT: - Assessee alleged TDS and reimbursements were properly made and relevant evidence was filed but not considered. Tribunal remitted the matter to AO to consider the claim with reference to coordinate bench authority (Toyota Boshoku; Goldman Sachs) and the evidence, granting opportunity to be heard. [Paras 14]Issue remitted to AO for verification and decision in accordance with law and precedent; ground allowed for statistical purposes.Capital expenditure: bonding and debonding charges - evidentiary verification and remand - Remand to AO to verify bonding and debonding charges and consider alternative depreciation claim - HELD THAT: - Since bonding/debonding expenses relate to capital assets and assessee sought depreciation but had not filed supporting evidence, Tribunal remitted the issue to AO to verify any evidence and consider depreciation allowance under law after granting proper opportunity. [Paras 15]Issue remitted to AO for verification and adjudication; ground allowed for statistical purposes.Computation of total income - verification and correction - Direction to verify and correct computation of total income where incorrectly considered by AO - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal noted the AO's computation of total income required verification and directed the AO to examine and make necessary corrections. [Paras 16]AO directed to verify and correct total income computation.Final Conclusion: The appeal is partly allowed. Multiple aspects of the transfer pricing and assessment- including verification of margin computations per DRP directions, treatment of free of cost assets (capitalisation and depreciation treatment with deletion of u/s.28(iv) disallowance), exclusion of specified comparables on turnover or functional grounds, computation of working capital adjustment, and several comparability and evidentiary issues-are either finally decided as directed or remitted to the AO/TPO for fresh consideration in accordance with the Tribunal's directions and applicable precedents; the assessee's appeal is accordingly partly allowed in the terms stated.

Addition to income based on third-party declaration before Settlement Commission - evidentiary value of a fund-flow statement of a third party - requirement of independent proof to attribute unexplained investment to the assessee - principles of natural justice and opportunity to cross-examine third-party statements - deletion of reassessment addition under reopened assessment proceedingsAddition to income based on third-party declaration before Settlement Commission - evidentiary value of a fund-flow statement of a third party - requirement of independent proof to attribute unexplained investment to the assessee - principles of natural justice and opportunity to cross-examine third-party statements - Deletion of the addition of Rs. 1.64 crores made in reassessment on the basis of M/s. Dev Procon Ltd.'s fund-flow/Settlement Commission material. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal concluded that the Assessing Officer's addition rested solely on a fund-flow statement and related materials of M/s. Dev Procon Ltd. produced in Settlement Commission proceedings, without any direct or clinching evidence linking the alleged cash payment to the assessee. The fund-flow statement filed by the developer did not contain a breakup identifying the assessee or any contemporaneous vouchers, receipts or corroborative material showing payment by the assessee; the assessee's admitted payments were by bank loan/cheque for the purchase. The Settlement Commission's declaration and third-party materials cannot, by themselves, bind or substitute for independent proof against a non-party; reliance on such material without providing the assessee the relevant documents or an opportunity to test or cross-examine the third-party statements defeats the principles of natural justice. In these circumstances, and following the judicial precedents relied upon, the deletion of the addition by the Commissioner (Appeals) was upheld and the reassessment addition was found unsustainable. [Paras 8, 10, 11]The addition of Rs. 1.64 crores was deleted; the reassessment addition is not sustainable in the absence of independent evidence linking the payment to the assessee and proper opportunity to test third-party statements.Final Conclusion: The Revenue's appeal is dismissed and the Commissioner (Appeals)'s order deleting the addition of Rs. 1.64 crores for A.Y. 2013-14 is upheld.

Appellate review of factual findings - evaluation of seized documents in assessment proceedings - weight of handwritten/dumb documents recovered in search - reliance on registered sale deed versus seized notings - summons under section 131 for examination of third party - powers and duties of Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) under section 251 - remand for fresh enquiryEvaluation of seized documents in assessment proceedings - weight of handwritten/dumb documents recovered in search - reliance on registered sale deed versus seized notings - summons under section 131 for examination of third party - Whether the deletion by the CIT(A) of the addition made by the Assessing Officer on account of alleged understatement of sale consideration was sustainable in view of seized documents and the material on record. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found the issue to be essentially factual and dependent on examination of seized material. The Assessing Officer relied on a handwritten loose paper (document no.15) seized from the purchaser showing a higher sale consideration and also confronted the assessee with that document and another seized paper (document no.54). Summons under section 131 issued to the purchaser remained uncomplied. The CIT(A) accepted the assessee's case by preferring the seized document no.54 (which tallied with the registered sale deed) over document no.15 without discussing why the handwritten notings showing part payments, outstanding balance and other indicia of reliability were unworthy of reliance, and without making or obtaining further enquiries from the AO or the purchaser. The Tribunal held that the CIT(A), vested with powers co-extensive with the AO under section 251, was obliged to appreciate and adjudicate the seized material rather than dismiss the AO's findings in a perfunctory manner. Because the first appellate order did not traverse or discredit the tangible features of document no.15 or address non-compliance with the summons, the CIT(A)'s order lacked adequate reasoning and comprehension. Accordingly, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A) order and remitted the matter to the CIT(A) for fresh determination after making or causing appropriate enquiries (including through the AO) and after giving the assessee opportunity to produce evidence and explanations. [Paras 8, 9, 11, 12, 13]The CIT(A)'s deletion of the addition is set aside and the matter is remitted to the CIT(A) for fresh determination in accordance with law after making necessary enquiries and affording the assessee an opportunity to adduce evidence.Final Conclusion: The Tribunal allowed the Revenue's appeal for statistical purposes by setting aside the first appellate order and restoring the matter to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication after appropriate enquiries and opportunity to the assessee.

Approval under Section 153D - non-application of mind by the approving authority - quashing of assessment orders passed under Section 153A consequent to invalid approvalApproval under Section 153D - non-application of mind by the approving authority - quashing of assessment orders passed under Section 153A consequent to invalid approval - Assessment orders framed under Section 153A r.w.s. 143(3) are vitiated and liable to be quashed where the approval under Section 153D was a mere technical or last minute approval given without application of mind. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that the approval memos placed before it showed that draft orders for multiple assessees and multiple assessment years were forwarded together on the last date, and that the competent authority (JCIT) himself described the approval as merely "technical" and recorded he had very little or no time to peruse records or seized material. Following its reasoning in M.G. Metalloy Pvt. Ltd. and having regard to the view of the Delhi High Court in PCIT v. Anuj Bansal, the Tribunal observed that Section 153D imposes a supervisory onus on the designated authority to apply independent mind to draft assessment orders in search cases. An approval given without appraisal of the assessment records, seized material or appraisal report, or granted as a consolidated, hurried clearance, amounts to non application of mind and is not a meaningful exercise of the statutory power. Such cosmetic approval therefore fails to satisfy the statutory requirement and renders the consequential assessment orders a nullity which must be quashed. The Tribunal applied that conclusion to the present assessee since the approval memo naming the assessee was of the same character, and accordingly quashed the assessment orders for the stated assessment years. [Paras 9, 11]Cross objection of the assessee allowing quashing of the assessment orders for AYs 2011 12, 2012 13, 2013 14 and 2015 16 on the ground that the approval under Section 153D was a mechanical/technical approval given without application of mind.Final Conclusion: The Tribunal allowed the assessee's cross objection and quashed the reassessment orders for the stated assessment years because the approval under Section 153D was given in a cursory/technical manner without application of mind, rendering the consequent Section 153A assessments unenforceable; the Revenue's appeals were not adjudicated.

Allowability of business expenditure under Section 37 - Explanation 1 to Section 37 - expenditure incurred for an offence or which is prohibited by law - wholly and exclusively for the purpose of businessAllowability of business expenditure under Section 37 - Explanation 1 to Section 37 - expenditure incurred for an offence or which is prohibited by law - wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business - Deletion of addition made by disallowing expenditure of Rs. 1,00,00,000/- paid to principal; whether the payment is hit by Explanation 1 to Section 37 - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal examined the scope of Section 37 as a residuary provision permitting deduction of expenditures incurred wholly and exclusively for business, subject to exclusions under Sections 30 to 36 and capital expenditure. Explanation 1 to Section 37 excludes from deduction any expenditure incurred for an offence or which is prohibited by law. The Tribunal found that the payment by the assessee to M/s. JK Tyre & Industries Limited arose from a commercial contractual dispute in the course of job-work manufacture - a negotiated settlement/compensation to resolve alleged technical shortcomings and avoid cancellation of the agreement. The payment was thus a by-product of commercial activity to redress quality/contractual non-fulfilment and not an expenditure for committing an offence or for any purpose prohibited by law. Accordingly, the expenditure satisfied the "wholly and exclusively" test and did not fall within Explanation 1, so the disallowance under that Explanation was incorrect. On that basis the Tribunal allowed the appeal and deleted the addition. [Paras 6, 7, 8]Addition deleted; appeal allowed.Final Conclusion: The Tribunal held that the Rs. 1,00,00,000/- payment was a commercial settlement arising from contractual job-work disputes and not an expenditure for an offence or prohibited by law under Explanation 1 to Section 37; therefore the disallowance was set aside and the appeal allowed for A.Y. 2013-14.

Admissibility of input tax credit - blocked credit under Section 17(5)(c) and (d) - apportionment of input tax credit under Section 17(2) - exempted supply of electricity - definition of "plant and machinery" for input tax credit - scope of advance ruling under Section 97(2)(d)Blocked credit under Section 17(5)(c) and (d) - definition of "plant and machinery" for input tax credit - Applicability of Section 17(5)(c) and (d) to the claim for ITC on solar power panels - HELD THAT: - The Appellant sought a ruling whether ITC on solar power panels is blocked under Section 17(5)(c) or (d). The Authority found Section 17(5)(c) relates to works contract services for construction of immovable property and Section 17(5)(d) to goods/services for construction of immovable property on own account; neither provision applies to the appellant's claim concerning capital goods (solar panels) used for generation/supply of electricity. The non-applicability of these clauses, however, does not imply that ITC is admissible, because other provisions (notably Section 17(2)) may independently render the ITC inadmissible. [Paras 8]Section 17(5)(c) and (d) are not attracted to the appellant's claim for ITC on solar panels; the question of blocked credit under those clauses does not arise.Apportionment of input tax credit under Section 17(2) - exempted supply of electricity - Whether ITC on solar panels is admissible in view of Section 17(2) because the electricity generated was supplied as exempted goods - HELD THAT: - The Authority examined the factual matrix and contractual arrangements showing that electricity generated by the appellant's solar panels was supplied to the electricity board (TANGEDCO) and that such supply is exempt under the relevant notification. Where inputs or capital goods are used exclusively in making exempt supplies, Section 17(2) read with Rule 43(1)(a) disentitles the taxable person from claiming ITC. The Authority further explained that supply of electricity by TANGEDCO and the appellant's supply to TANGEDCO being exempt causes the input chain to be 'snapped' and precludes ITC, irrespective of separate invoicing or recovery from tenants. [Paras 7, 9, 10]ITC on the solar panels is not admissible under Section 17(2) read with Rule 43(1)(a) because the panels were used exclusively for making exempt supplies of electricity.Scope of advance ruling under Section 97(2)(d) - admissibility of input tax credit - Whether the AAR exceeded its jurisdiction by addressing apportionment under Section 17(2) instead of restricting itself to the specific subsection of blocking provisions queried by the applicant - HELD THAT: - The Authority analysed Section 97(2)(d) which permits advance rulings on the admissibility of input tax credit generally and does not confine the AAR to opine only on a particular subsection. Since the appellant's question related to admissibility of ITC on solar panels, the AAR was entitled to examine any provision determinative of admissibility, including apportionment under Section 17(2). Consequently, the AAR did not exceed its jurisdiction in considering Section 17(2) while answering the admissibility question. [Paras 7]The AAR acted within its jurisdiction in addressing apportionment under Section 17(2) while ruling on the admissibility of ITC under Section 97(2)(d).Admissibility of input tax credit - Whether the legal distinction between the partnership firm and its partners (different PANs) affects the availability of ITC - HELD THAT: - The Authority noted that under GST law the owners of the property and the appellant firm, possessing separate PANs, are distinct taxable persons. Civil law observations about partnership were held not to alter GST treatment: separate PANs indicate separate legal entities for GST purposes, and therefore relevant GST conclusions must treat them as distinct persons. [Paras 10]Separate PANs of the owners and the partnership firm establish distinct taxable persons under GST; the appellant's civil-law arguments do not negate this distinction for ITC purposes.Final Conclusion: The Appellate Authority upholds the AAR Order No. 33/AAR/2022 dated 31.08.2022 and dismisses the appeal: ITC on the solar panels is not admissible because the panels were used exclusively for exempt supply of electricity (Section 17(2) read with Rule 43(1)(a)), Section 17(5)(c)/(d) are inapplicable, and the AAR did not exceed its jurisdiction in deciding admissibility.

Presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act - offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act - burden to rebut statutory presumption - rebuttal requires cogent and credible evidence - restoration of conviction and sentence on reversal of acquittalPresumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act - offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act - burden to rebut statutory presumption - rebuttal requires cogent and credible evidence - Whether the accused had rebutted the statutory presumption of liability arising from the dishonour of the cheque and whether the conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was sustainable - HELD THAT: - The Court found that the complainant proved issuance and presentation of the cheque and its return, thereby attracting the statutory presumption under Section 139. Examination of the defence evidence disclosed contradictory and implausible assertions: the accused's claim that the cheque was handed over in 2000 as security was negatived by bank evidence showing the account was opened only in 2011. The accused failed to reply to the statutory/legal notice in time, did not take steps to recover the cheque, and produced no cogent documentary proof to demonstrate that the cheque was delivered only as security. The courts below were correct in applying the presumption but the appellate court's reversal of conviction was vacated because the accused did not discharge the burden to rebut the presumption by credible evidence. Reliance was placed on the settled principle that mere doubt or probable defence is insufficient to rebut the presumption under Section 139; rebuttal must be by cogent and credible evidence. In view of these findings, the trial court's conviction and sentence were restored. [Paras 15, 16, 17, 18, 19]The accused failed to rebut the statutory presumption; conviction and sentence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act restored and the appellate order of acquittal set aside; compensation awarded by the trial court restored.Final Conclusion: Criminal Appeal allowed; the order of acquittal is set aside, and the conviction, sentence and compensation awarded by the trial Court under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and Section 357 Cr.P.C. are restored.

Jurisdiction to entertain belated appeal beyond statutory limitation - condonation of delay in statutory appeals - finality of period of limitation and absence of judicial exception - binding precedent of the Supreme Court under Article 141 - exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 to extend limitationJurisdiction to entertain belated appeal beyond statutory limitation - condonation of delay in statutory appeals - Appellate authority lacked jurisdiction to entertain an appeal filed beyond the statutory period of 60 days plus the further 30 days condonable period specified under Section 107. - HELD THAT: - The Court found that Section 107 prescribes a primary period of 60 days for filing an appeal and an additional discretionary period of 30 days which the appellate authority may condone on sufficient reasons. Where an appeal is filed after the combined period of 60 + 30 days, the statutory scheme leaves no power in the appellate authority to condone further delay. Reliance on the Apex Court decision in National Spot Exchange Limited demonstrating that courts cannot carve out exceptions to statutory limitation periods reinforced the conclusion that the appellate authority was justified in refusing to entertain the belated appeal. Consequently, the appellate authority's decision declining to admit the appeal on the ground of delay was affirmed on the question of jurisdiction. [Paras 4, 6, 7, 11]Appeal filed after expiry of 60+30 days could not be condoned and the appellate authority rightly refused to entertain the belated appeal.Finality of period of limitation and absence of judicial exception - binding precedent of the Supreme Court under Article 141 - exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 to extend limitation - High Court could not follow an unreported Division Bench decision to permit condonation contrary to the Supreme Court's binding law; Article 226 cannot be used to override the statutory limitation prescribed under Section 107. - HELD THAT: - The Court held that where the Supreme Court has laid down a clear rule regarding the non-existence of judicially created exceptions to statutory limitation, High Courts must follow that precedent. The Division Bench's unreported decision in Simplex Infrastructures, which allowed condonation in its peculiar facts, did not lay down a binding ratio applicable against the Apex Court's pronouncement. Moreover, the Constitutional supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226 does not permit the High Court to extend or contravene the statutory period of limitation prescribed for appeals under Section 107. Therefore, the petitioner could not rely on the Division Bench direction to condone delay when it conflicted with the binding Supreme Court precedent. [Paras 5, 9, 10, 11]The High Court will not follow the unreported Division Bench direction where it conflicts with binding Supreme Court authority; Article 226 cannot be invoked to condone the statutory limitation under Section 107.Final Conclusion: Writ petition dismissed; the appellate authority's refusal to entertain the belated appeal was upheld and the petitioner was not entitled to condonation of delay beyond the statutory 60+30 days.

Adjudication of show cause notice - opportunity of personal hearing - expeditious disposal - cancellation of GST registration - blocking of input tax credit - no adjudication on meritsAdjudication of show cause notice - opportunity of personal hearing - expeditious disposal - The adjudicating authority is directed to decide the combined show cause notice (Ext.P1) after giving the petitioners an opportunity to produce evidence and be heard, by concluding the proceedings expeditiously. - HELD THAT: - The Court did not examine or decide the merits of the allegations contained in Ext.P1. Having noted that the petitioners have filed replies (Ext.P2) to the show cause notice and that adjudication is pending, the Court directed the second respondent to afford the petitioners an opportunity to place evidence in support of their claims and to conclude the adjudication in accordance with law. The Court emphasised expedition and prescribed a preferred timeline for finalisation, while refraining from adjudicating the substantive controversy concerning the genuineness of registrations or the correctness of steps taken by investigating authorities. [Paras 6]The second respondent shall finalise the adjudication of Ext.P1 expeditiously, preferably within two months, and grant the petitioners opportunity to lead evidence and be heard.Final Conclusion: Writ petition disposed of by directing the adjudicating authority to decide the show cause notice (Ext.P1) after hearing the petitioners and permitting them to produce evidence, with a direction to endeavour to conclude the proceedings expeditiously (preferably within two months); the court did not rule on the merits of the allegations or grant any stay of the impugned cancellation orders or communications.

Reimbursable expenses not exigible to service tax - consideration for services - board and lodging expenses - travelling, lodging and boarding - penalty for non-payment of service taxReimbursable expenses not exigible to service tax - consideration for services - board and lodging expenses - travelling, lodging and boarding - Whether amounts paid by the appellant to hotels for board and lodging of visiting technical experts constitute consideration for the experts' services and are exigible to service tax. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal accepted the appellant's contention that expenses for board and lodging of overseas technical experts are reimbursable in character and therefore not includable in the gross amount paid as consideration for the services. The Tribunal relied upon the decision of the Delhi High Court in Intercontinental Consultants and Technocrats Pvt. Ltd., as affirmed by the Supreme Court, which specifically held that reimbursable expenses including travelling, lodging and boarding are not exigible to service tax. Applying that precedent to the facts, the Tribunal held that the amounts paid directly to hotels by the appellant for board and lodging could not be treated as consideration for the technical guidance services and therefore could not form the basis for demand of service tax. Having decided the substantive issue against the Department, the Tribunal refrained from adjudicating the invocation of extended limitation. [Paras 6, 7, 8]Demand of service tax raised on board and lodging expenses set aside; consequential penalties also set aside.Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed; the impugned orders confirming demand of service tax and imposing penalties in respect of board and lodging expenses of visiting technical experts are set aside with consequential relief to the appellant.

Natural justice - notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act - service of notice by post and e portal uploads - waiver of right to personal hearing - opportunity of appeal before appellate authority - assessment under Section 144 read with Section 147Natural justice - service of notice by post and e portal uploads - e filing/e portal access - Validity of the assessment order impugned as being passed in violation of the principles of natural justice - HELD THAT: - The Court found on the record that the notice under Section 148 was issued on 31.03.2021 and received by the petitioner on 03.04.2021, notices were uploaded on the e portal and the petitioner had accessed the e portal to file return and audit report for the relevant year. In those circumstances the respondent had taken steps to communicate the proceedings both physically and electronically. The Court concluded that the assessment order was a consequence of the petitioner's failure to file a reply or seek personal hearing and therefore there was no breach of the principles of natural justice. [Paras 6, 7, 8, 9]The challenge to the assessment on the ground of violation of natural justice is rejected and the impugned order is held valid.Waiver of right to personal hearing - opportunity of appeal before appellate authority - Relief to be afforded to the petitioner despite dismissal of the writ - HELD THAT: - Although the petitioner had voluntarily failed to avail the opportunity for filing reply and personal hearing before the Assessing Officer and thus had forfeited that remedy, the Court recognised the statutory scheme which affords a second opportunity before the appellate authority. Exercising its discretionary supervisory jurisdiction, the Court declined to entertain the writ but granted the petitioner a limited procedural relief: a period of 30 days to file an appeal, directing the appellate authority to consider the appeal on its merits and to provide the petitioner an opportunity without insisting on limitation. [Paras 10]Petitioner granted 30 days to file appeal; appellate authority directed to hear on merits and not to press limitation.Final Conclusion: Writ petition dismissed; petitioner permitted 30 days to file appeal and the appellate authority directed to consider the appeal on merits, affording opportunity to the petitioner and not to press limitation.

Propriety of writ jurisdiction vis-a -vis available statutory remedy - Article 226 and supervisory jurisdiction - Appointment of Court Receiver - Effect of prior statutory possession under the SARFAESI Act - Duty to implead mortgagee and disclosure of material facts - Maintainability and territorial jurisdiction of civil suitsPropriety of writ jurisdiction vis-a -vis available statutory remedy - Article 226 and supervisory jurisdiction - Horizontal comity and judicial discipline in entertaining inter-state writs - Whether the Bombay High Court ought to have entertained a petition under Article 226 challenging an order of a Civil Court in another State when a statutory remedy by way of appeal was available to the bank. - HELD THAT: - The Court held that the first respondent had a statutory remedy available against the Civil Court's order under Order XLIII CPC and therefore the Bombay High Court should not have entertained the writ petition under Article 226. While the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 is wide, judicial discipline and principles of comity required relegation to the statutory remedy, subject to any limited protective relief the High Court might consider appropriate. Entertaining inter-state writs of this nature would invite chaotic interference with proceedings in other States. Accordingly, the impugned High Court order was set aside and the writ petition dismissed on that ground. [Paras 9, 14]The impugned order of the Bombay High Court dated 27th September 2023 is set aside and the writ petition dismissed because a statutory remedy was available to the first respondent and the High Court should not have entertained the petition under Article 226.Appointment of Court Receiver - Effect of prior statutory possession under the SARFAESI Act - Duty to implead mortgagee and disclosure of material facts - Maintainability and territorial jurisdiction of civil suits - Whether the Trial Court's order appointing a Court Receiver on 24th January 2023 should be permitted to operate, having regard to prior orders and possession taken under the SARFAESI Act and to alleged suppression/non-disclosure by the appellant. - HELD THAT: - The Court found that the Trial Court had passed a drastic order appointing a Receiver without adequately attending to the fact that the properties were subject to prior proceedings and orders under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, and without impleading the mortgagee (the bank) as a party. The appellant had pressed for the Receiver despite knowledge (or constructive knowledge) of the bank's proceedings, and the Trial Court failed to consider maintainability and territorial jurisdiction. In view of these substantial defects and the existence of prior possession/orders under SARFAESI, the Supreme Court directed that the Trial Court's order of 24th January 2023 shall not be acted upon for the time being, that the status quo as obtaining immediately before that order shall be maintained, and that the matter be placed before the Trial Court for fresh consideration after impleading the bank and hearing it on all contentions including maintainability and jurisdiction. The Trial Court is to pass a fresh order on the Receiver application; any order adverse to the bank shall not be acted upon for one month to enable appropriate remedies. [Paras 6, 8, 10, 14]The order appointing a Court Receiver is to be kept in abeyance; status quo as existing immediately before 24th January 2023 shall continue; the appellant must implead the bank and the Trial Court shall hear the bank and pass a fresh order on the Receiver application, with protective timelines as directed.Final Conclusion: The appeal is partly allowed: the Bombay High Court's order is set aside and its writ petition dismissed for lack of propriety in invoking Article 226 when a statutory remedy existed; the Trial Court's receiver order of 24th January 2023 is held in abeyance with status quo restored, the bank is to be impleaded and heard, and the Trial Court is directed to pass a fresh order on the appointment of a Receiver, subject to the protective measures ordered by this Court.

Intermediate order - revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 Cr.P.C. - non-application of mind - reasonable cause - sanction for prosecution - cognizance and issuance of process - offence under section 276B of the Income Tax Act - section 278B and principal officer liabilityIntermediate order - revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 Cr.P.C. - Maintainability of the Revision challenging the order taking cognizance and issuing summons. - HELD THAT: - The Court applied the test from Girish Kumar Suneja and Madhu Limaye to classify orders as final, interlocutory or intermediate. An order taking cognizance and issuing process, if set aside, would culminate the proceedings and thus is an intermediate order. Such intermediate orders fall within the scope of revisional jurisdiction under Section 397(1) Cr.P.C. and are amenable to revision. The bar in Section 397(2) against revision of interlocutory orders does not preclude revisional interference with intermediate orders. Consequently the objection to maintainability based on interlocutory character is repelled and the Revision is held maintainable. [Paras 13]Revision is maintainable as the impugned order is an intermediate order amenable to revisional jurisdiction.Reasonable cause - non-application of mind - sanction for prosecution - offence under section 276B of the Income Tax Act - cognizance and issuance of process - section 278B and principal officer liability - Whether the order taking cognizance is vitiated by non-application of mind for failing to appreciate the admitted factual plea of reasonable cause arising from the COVID-19 pandemic and by mechanical sanction. - HELD THAT: - The Court examined the material placed before the sanctioning authority and the admitted factual matrix that the delays in depositing TDS (ranging 31 to 214 days) occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic and that the amounts with interest were ultimately deposited. The Court construed 'reasonable cause' as an objective test to be applied liberally and observed legislative intent to protect bona fide situations (section 278AA read with penal provisions). The sanction order was found to have rejected the pandemic-related explanations without adequate consideration and to have proceeded mechanically, emphasising that pandemic measures and contemporaneous governmental steps (including extensions of limitation and reliefs) were material. For these reasons the sanction and the consequent cognizance were held to suffer from non-application of mind; the complaint was vitiated and cognizance could not have been taken. [Paras 29, 30, 31]Sanction for prosecution and the order taking cognizance are quashed for non-application of mind; the impugned cognizance/order is set aside.Final Conclusion: The Revision is allowed. The High Court held the order taking cognizance to be an intermediate, revisable order and concluded that the sanction and cognizance were vitiated by non-application of mind to the admitted plea of reasonable cause arising from the COVID-19 pandemic; the impugned order dated 02.02.2023 is set aside.

Disallowance under Section 14A - Applicability of Rule 8D where no exempt income is earned - Retrospective effect of Finance Act, 2022 - Substantial question of lawDisallowance under Section 14A - Applicability of Rule 8D where no exempt income is earned - Deletion of disallowance under Section 14A read with Rule 8D where the assessee earned no exempt income - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal's deletion of the disallowance was upheld by the High Court on the basis that the question whether Section 14A read with Rule 8D can be invoked where no exempt income was earned is covered by earlier decisions of this Court. The Court noted that in the year under appeal the assessee had not earned any exempt income and relied on the precedent cited in the impugned judgment as dispositive of the point. A prior challenge to the leading decision was rejected by the Supreme Court on delay and merits. In view of these authorities, the Court found no room to entertain the appeal on this issue. [Paras 7, 10, 11, 14]The deletion of the disallowance was not shown to involve a substantial question of law and is not interfered with.Retrospective effect of Finance Act, 2022 - Whether Finance Act, 2022 can be given retrospective effect to alter applicability of Rule 8D in the facts of the case - HELD THAT: - The Court observed that the contention regarding retrospective operation of the Finance Act, 2022 is likewise covered by a coordinate bench decision of this Court. Having regard to that precedent, the Court declined to accept the submission that the Finance Act, 2022 affords a basis to disturb the Tribunal's deletion of the disallowance for the assessment year in question. [Paras 13, 14]The argument based on retrospective effect of the Finance Act, 2022 does not raise a substantial question of law warranting interference.Final Conclusion: Appeal dismissed with the Court concluding that no substantial question of law arises for consideration; delays in filing and re-filing the appeal were condoned.

Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process - moratorium - rights of a financial creditor to initiate CIRP against a subsidiary during CIRP of the holding company - effect of approval of resolution plan on moratorium - reinstatement of Section 7 proceedingsRights of a financial creditor to initiate CIRP against a subsidiary during CIRP of the holding company - Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process - Whether the Section 7 application against the subsidiary (JHL) could be heard despite the holding company (JIL) being under CIRP. - HELD THAT: - Having considered the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jaypee Kensington Boulevard Apartments Welfare Association & Ors. and this Tribunal's earlier decision in Alok Industries, the Tribunal held that there is no bar to entertain the Section 7 application filed by Yes Bank (now pursued by its assignee J.C. Flowers ARC) against the subsidiary merely because the holding company was undergoing CIRP. The Tribunal noted that the resolution plan in respect of the holding company deals with the holding company's assets (including shares in the subsidiary) and that the rights of the subsidiary's lenders to pursue enforcement or insolvency remedies are not foreclosed by the holding company's CIRP. On that basis the Tribunal concluded that the Section 7 petition against the subsidiary can be considered and adjudicated upon. [Paras 11]No bar exists to hear and adjudicate the Section 7 application against the subsidiary despite the holding company being in CIRP.Moratorium - effect of approval of resolution plan on moratorium - reinstatement of Section 7 proceedings - Whether the impugned order keeping the Section 7 petition in abeyance continues to operate and whether proceedings may be restarted. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal observed that, in view of the subsequent developments including approval of a resolution plan for the holding company and the judicial authorities relied upon, the earlier order keeping the petition in abeyance no longer precludes adjudication. The proceedings before the Adjudicating Authority in CP (IB) No. 512/ALD/2019 have been restarted. The Tribunal further recorded that the findings in the impugned order shall not operate as a fetter on the parties and all issues in the Section 7 adjudication remain open for decision by the Adjudicating Authority. [Paras 12, 13]Proceedings before the Adjudicating Authority have been restarted; the impugned abeyance order will not preclude adjudication and all issues remain open.Final Conclusion: The appeal is disposed of as the Adjudicating Authority has restarted the Section 7 proceedings; the Tribunal observed that the impugned order keeping the matter in abeyance shall not prejudice the parties and all issues in the Section 7 petition are left open for decision by the Adjudicating Authority.