Issues: (i) Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for the alleged short reversal of CENVAT credit; (ii) Whether proportionate reversal under Rule 6(3A) was to be computed with reference to total CENVAT credit or only common CENVAT credit; and (iii) Whether trading or services in the negative list could be treated as exempted services for Rule 6.

Issue (i): Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for the alleged short reversal of CENVAT credit.

Analysis: The reversals were disclosed in filed returns and the Revenue could have verified the computation by scrutiny or by seeking further information. Failure to undertake such verification does not establish deliberate concealment. Invocation of the extended period requires fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, suppression of facts, or contravention with intent to evade; mens rea cannot be presumed from a bona fide interpretative position or an audit detection.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was not invocable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether proportionate reversal under Rule 6(3A) was to be computed with reference to total CENVAT credit or only common CENVAT credit.

Analysis: Read harmoniously, Rule 6 permits proportionate reversal only of credit attributable to common inputs or input services used for taxable and exempted activities. Credit exclusively used for taxable output services or dutiable goods cannot be included in the reversal formula. The substitution of the Rule 6(3A) formula by Notification No. 13/2016-C.E. (N.T.) was clarificatory and consequently applied retrospectively.

Conclusion: Only common CENVAT credit was relevant for proportionate reversal; computation on total CENVAT credit was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether trading or services in the negative list could be treated as exempted services for Rule 6.

Analysis: Rule 2(e) does not classify services listed in Section 66D as exempted services. Transfer of title in goods through trading is excluded from the definition of service; it is a sale transaction subject to the distinct taxing field applicable to goods and cannot be deemed to be a service merely for the purpose of the negative list.

Conclusion: Trading is not a service and cannot be treated as an exempted service for Rule 6, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The demand founded on the alleged short reversal of credit was legally unsustainable.

Issues: (i) Whether construction of residential flats by a builder before 01.07.2010 was taxable in the absence of the deeming provision; (ii) Whether construction of a building or independently identifiable project having twelve or fewer residential units was taxable as a residential complex service or works contract service; (iii) Whether consideration received under separate agreements with individual purchasers for completion of residential units intended for personal use was taxable; (iv) Whether a separate levy could be sustained on flats allotted to landowners under a development agreement; (v) Whether abatement and cum-tax valuation were available for any consideration otherwise found taxable; and (vi) Whether the extended limitation period and penalties were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether construction of residential flats by a builder before 01.07.2010 was taxable in the absence of the deeming provision.

Analysis: The explanation deeming construction by a builder to be taxable where consideration was received from a prospective buyer before completion certification came into force only from 01.07.2010. That deeming fiction could not operate retrospectively for the earlier period.

Conclusion: The demand for the period before 01.07.2010 was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether construction of a building or independently identifiable project having twelve or fewer residential units was taxable as a residential complex service or works contract service.

Analysis: Although indivisible contracts involving goods and construction services are works contracts, taxability of residential construction still depends on satisfaction of the statutory definition of a residential complex. A project or independently identifiable building having twelve or fewer residential units does not meet that definition, and the works contract entry cannot enlarge it.

Conclusion: Construction of such buildings or projects was outside the taxable scope, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether consideration received under separate agreements with individual purchasers for completion of residential units intended for personal use was taxable.

Analysis: The statutory exclusion covered construction undertaken under individual agreements for residential units intended for the purchasers' personal use, including use by another person as a residence with or without rent. Separate agreements for completion and finishing of individual flats fell within that exclusion, absent material showing commercial exploitation or non-residential use.

Conclusion: Service tax on consideration under the individual purchaser agreements was not payable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether a separate levy could be sustained on flats allotted to landowners under a development agreement.

Analysis: A further levy on the landowners' share would constitute double taxation where the value of land or development rights was embedded in the assessable value of the developer's share on which tax had been discharged. No evidence established that consideration received in kind from landowners had escaped tax despite such inclusion.

Conclusion: The separate demand on the landowners' share was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (v): Whether abatement and cum-tax valuation were available for any consideration otherwise found taxable.

Analysis: Any residual taxable consideration was entitled to statutory abatement on fulfilment of prescribed conditions. Where service tax had not been separately collected, the gross amount charged had to be treated as inclusive of service tax for valuation.

Conclusion: Applicable abatement and cum-tax benefit under Section 67(2) were required to be extended for any amount otherwise found taxable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (vi): Whether the extended limitation period and penalties were sustainable.

Analysis: The dispute arose from interpretation of composite construction contracts, the subsequently introduced deeming provision, the personal-use exclusion, valuation, and taxability of the landowners' share. Divergent views and the absence of any identified fraud, collusion, or deliberate suppression with intent to evade precluded invocation of the extended period. The same interpretational circumstances did not support penalties.

Conclusion: The extended period was not invocable and all penalties were unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The disputed residential-construction levy was governed by the pre-2010 non-taxability, statutory residential-complex and personal-use exclusions, protection against double taxation, applicable valuation relief, and the normal limitation period.

Issues: (i) Whether the extended period of limitation under the proviso to Section 11A(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 was invocable in the absence of established deliberate suppression, where the Department had contemporaneous knowledge of the stock position and the demand rested on statutory records; (ii) Whether penalty under Section 11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944 was imposable.

Issue (i): Whether the extended period of limitation under the proviso to Section 11A(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 was invocable in the absence of established deliberate suppression, where the Department had contemporaneous knowledge of the stock position and the demand rested on statutory records.

Analysis: The proviso requires the Revenue to establish that the non-levy or short-levy resulted from fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, suppression of facts, or contravention with intent to evade duty. This jurisdictional enquiry is distinct from computation of the limitation period from the relevant date. Departmental knowledge cannot alter the statutory relevant date after the proviso is attracted, but contemporaneous knowledge is material evidence in deciding whether suppression existed at all.

Analysis: The stock verification was conducted in the presence of departmental officers after their invitation, and the demand was founded exclusively on the Cost Audit Report, a statutory record required to be maintained and producible to the Department. The prescribed returns did not require disclosure of the shortages or excesses. The notices neither identified a suppressed fact nor pleaded a breached disclosure obligation, deliberate concealment, or intent to evade duty. In the absence of a positive and deliberate act of withholding material information, mere non-reporting or discovery of a discrepancy cannot constitute suppression. The notices issued beyond the ordinary one-year period were therefore time-barred.

Conclusion: The extended period was not available; the demand was barred by limitation in its entirety, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether penalty under Section 11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944 was imposable.

Analysis: Penalty under Section 11AC is conditional upon satisfaction of the ingredients that permit invocation of the proviso to Section 11A(1). Since no fraud, wilful suppression, or intent to evade duty was established, that condition failed.

Conclusion: Penalty under Section 11AC was not imposable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The extended-period duty demand and consequential interest and penalty liabilities could not be sustained; no finding was required on the merits of the underlying demand.

Ratio Decidendi: The extended limitation period under the proviso to Section 11A(1) is available only upon proof of deliberate suppression or other specified culpable conduct with intent to evade duty; departmental possession of statutory records and contemporaneous knowledge may demonstrate the absence of such suppression.

Issues: (i) Whether dolochar, fly ash, iron ore fines and other incidental waste materials arising during manufacture of sponge iron are liable to Central Excise duty merely because they are marketable and tariff-listed; (ii) Whether dolochar was alternatively covered by unconditional exemption notifications applicable to waste arising from manufacture of iron or steel; (iii) Whether the extended period of limitation, interest and penalties could be sustained.

Issue (i): Whether dolochar, fly ash, iron ore fines and other incidental waste materials arising during manufacture of sponge iron are liable to Central Excise duty merely because they are marketable and tariff-listed.

Analysis: Levy under Section 3 requires that goods be manufactured or produced. Marketability under the explanation to Section 2(d), sale value, or tariff coverage does not dispense with the independent requirement of manufacture. Dolochar and fly ash arose inevitably as residues from coal use, while iron ore fines arose from handling, screening or segregation; no independent process producing a new and distinct commodity with a separate name, character or use was established. The burden to establish manufacture remained unmet.

Conclusion: The disputed residues and waste materials were not excisable goods liable to duty; this finding is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether dolochar was alternatively covered by unconditional exemption notifications applicable to waste arising from manufacture of iron or steel.

Analysis: The relevant notification entries unconditionally exempt slag, dross, scaling and other waste from manufacture of iron or steel falling under Chapter 26. If dolochar were classified by the Department under that chapter as waste from sponge-iron manufacture, the exemption could not be denied.

Conclusion: On the alternative assumption of excisability and classification under Chapter 26, dolochar attracted unconditional exemption and no effective duty liability arose; this finding is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the extended period of limitation, interest and penalties could be sustained.

Analysis: The dispute concerned the excisability of unavoidable residues and involved divergent administrative views, including a Board circular later rescinded. This demonstrated an interpretational dispute. No fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, suppression of facts, or intent to evade duty was established.

Conclusion: The extended period was unavailable, and consequential interest and penalties, including personal penalties, could not survive; this finding is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: No Central Excise duty, consequential interest, or penalties were sustainable in respect of the disputed clearances.

Ratio Decidendi: Marketability, saleability, or tariff classification cannot render an incidental waste or residue dutiable unless it emerges through a process amounting to manufacture or production.

Issues: (i) Whether C&F services rendered at depots/warehouses qualify as input services. (ii) Whether credit for transportation, delivery and unloading at customers' premises is admissible. (iii) Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked. (iv) Whether equivalent penalty was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether C&F services rendered at depots/warehouses qualify as input services.

Analysis: Section 4(3)(C) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 includes a depot or consignment agent's premises, from which goods are sold after factory clearance, within the place of removal. Receipt, unloading, storage, handling and loading at depots from which cement was sold had a direct nexus with manufacture and sale and were performed up to the place of removal.

Conclusion: Credit for C&F services performed at the depots/warehouses is admissible, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether credit for transportation, delivery and unloading at customers' premises is admissible.

Analysis: For FOR-destination sales, the place of removal cannot be inferred merely from that description. It depends on the contractual terms concerning transfer of title and risk, responsibility for freight and insurance, inclusion of freight in assessable value, and whether delivery at the customer's premises was an essential condition of sale. If ownership and risk remained with the assessee until delivery, the customer's premises would be the place of removal; otherwise, post-depot services would not qualify.

Conclusion: Eligibility of credit for post-depot transportation, delivery and unloading must be determined upon factual verification of the relevant contractual and transaction documents.

Issue (iii): Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked.

Analysis: The credit was disclosed in statutory records and returns and the records had been subjected to departmental audit. The dispute involved interpretation of input service and place of removal, with divergent views on FOR-destination transactions. No fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement or deliberate suppression with intent to evade duty was established.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was not invocable, and the demand beyond the normal period is set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether equivalent penalty was sustainable.

Analysis: As the requisite deliberate suppression or intent to evade duty was not established, the ingredients for penalty under Rule 15(2) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 read with Section 11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944 were absent.

Conclusion: The equivalent penalty is set aside in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Depot-level C&F credit stands admissible, while post-depot credit requires application of the contractual place-of-removal test; only any credit within the normal limitation period remains to be quantified.

Ratio Decidendi: In FOR-destination transactions, post-clearance service credit depends on the actual place of removal, determined from the contractual transfer of title and risk and the obligations governing delivery, freight and insurance.

Issues: (i) Whether Section 147A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, retrospectively validating issuance of reassessment notices by jurisdictional Assessing Officers, is constitutionally valid; (ii) Whether notices under Section 148 issued by jurisdictional Assessing Officers without randomized automated allocation and faceless procedure are valid under Section 151A and the e-Assessment of Income Escaping Assessment Scheme, 2022.

Issue (i): Whether Section 147A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, retrospectively validating issuance of reassessment notices by jurisdictional Assessing Officers, is constitutionally valid.

Analysis: A retrospective validating enactment may neutralise a judicial decision only by curing the defect or removing the statutory foundation on which that decision rests; it cannot merely declare a contrary legal position or directly override judicial determinations. Section 147A purported to exclude faceless assessment units from the meaning of Assessing Officer for Sections 148 and 148A, but left Section 151A, the scheme framed thereunder, and the scheme under Section 130 unamended. It neither addressed the mandatory randomized automated allocation requirement nor removed the basis of the decisions holding that reassessment notices could be issued only through the faceless mechanism. The provision consequently conflicted with the continuing statutory scheme and amounted to legislative encroachment upon judicial power, contrary to the rule of law and the constitutional principle of separation of powers.

Conclusion: Section 147A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is unconstitutional and struck down, in favour of the assessees.

Issue (ii): Whether notices under Section 148 issued by jurisdictional Assessing Officers without randomized automated allocation and faceless procedure are valid under Section 151A and the e-Assessment of Income Escaping Assessment Scheme, 2022.

Analysis: Section 151A and Clause 3(b) of the e-Assessment of Income Escaping Assessment Scheme, 2022 expressly cover issuance of notices under Section 148 and require issuance through randomized automated allocation and in a faceless manner. The qualification referring to Section 144B applies to assessment or reassessment under Section 147 and cannot exclude issuance of notices under Section 148; such an interpretation would render the scheme ineffective. Notifications or executive instructions conferring concurrent jurisdiction cannot override the statutory scheme. Where the law prescribes a particular mode, the prescribed mode alone must be followed.

Conclusion: Notices under Section 148 issued by jurisdictional Assessing Officers otherwise than through randomized automated allocation and the faceless mechanism are invalid and liable to be set aside, in favour of the assessees.

Final Conclusion: The statutory faceless reassessment regime mandates that reassessment notices be issued only through the automated and faceless process prescribed under Section 151A and the applicable scheme.

Ratio Decidendi: A retrospective validating law is unconstitutional where it merely negates judicial rulings without curing the statutory defect underlying them; a reassessment notice must be issued in the mandatory faceless and randomized automated-allocation manner prescribed by the governing statutory scheme.

Issues: (i) Whether gold is a prohibited item within the meaning of the Customs Act, 1962; (ii) Whether the adjudicating authority was correct in imposing penalty under Section 112(i) of the Customs Act, 1962.

Issue (i): Whether gold is a prohibited item within the meaning of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: Section 2(33) includes goods whose import or export is subject to a prohibition under the Customs Act, 1962 or any other law in force; it is not confined to goods prohibited through a notification under Section 11. Import of gold was regulated by Reserve Bank of India notifications and circulars, and bulk import was restricted to authorised agencies, while passenger import was governed by the Baggage Rules. The persons concerned did not fall within either permitted category, and the gold was brought through an unauthorised land route.

Conclusion: Gold imported in contravention of applicable import restrictions is prohibited goods within Section 2(33) of the Customs Act, 1962, in favour of the Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether the adjudicating authority was correct in imposing penalty under Section 112(i) of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: Once the seized gold was prohibited goods, Section 112(i) governed the applicable penalty. The adjudicating order identified the goods as prohibited and imposed penalty on that basis. Failure to expressly specify the invoked clause does not invalidate an order where the authority possessed the statutory power and the order disclosed the basis for its exercise.

Conclusion: The adjudicating authority validly imposed penalty under Section 112(i) of the Customs Act, 1962, in favour of the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The modification of the penalties was unsustainable, and the original confiscation and penalty adjudication remains operative.

Ratio Decidendi: Goods subject to import restrictions under any law in force are prohibited goods under Section 2(33) of the Customs Act, 1962, and their improper importation attracts the penalty regime under Section 112(i).

Issues: (i) Whether the seized board resolutions, legal notes, valuation reports and related documents constituted incriminating material for assessment under Section 153A of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (ii) Whether the firm's prior asset sale and alteration of partners' capital interests violated the conditions for succession under Section 47(xiii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Whether the seized board resolutions, legal notes, valuation reports and related documents constituted incriminating material for assessment under Section 153A of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: In a search assessment of the concluded assessment, additions require incriminating material found during the search. The seized records concerned the ordinary course of the firm's conversion, its legal constitution, valuation and prior transactions; they did not disclose any undisclosed income or evidence warranting the impugned addition.

Conclusion: The documents were not incriminating material, and the assessment proceedings under Section 153A were not maintainable. This issue is decided in favour of the Assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the firm's prior asset sale and alteration of partners' capital interests violated the conditions for succession under Section 47(xiii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The conditions under provisos (a) and (c) to Section 47(xiii) require that the firm's business assets and liabilities immediately before succession become those of the company, and that partners receive no consideration or benefit other than shares in the company. The assets and liabilities existing immediately before succession passed unchanged to the company, and the partners received shares corresponding to their pre-succession interests. A sale of assets and changes in capital-sharing ratios effected before succession neither altered the assets and liabilities immediately before succession nor amounted to prohibited consideration on conversion.

Conclusion: The conditions of Section 47(xiii) were satisfied; the succession was not rendered a taxable transfer, and the Section 80-IA deduction could not be denied on that basis. This issue is decided in favour of the Assessee.

Final Conclusion: The additions founded on the search assessment and on treating the firm's succession as a taxable transfer lack legal basis.

Issues: (i) Whether exemption under Section 10(23FB) is available to a SEBI-registered venture capital fund when its separately maintained contributory schemes lack individual SEBI registration; (ii) Whether shares held by trustees in their fiduciary capacity for the fund are includible in determining whether a venture capital undertaking is an associated company.

Issue (i): Whether exemption under Section 10(23FB) is available to a SEBI-registered venture capital fund when its separately maintained contributory schemes lack individual SEBI registration.

Analysis: Section 10(23FB) exempts income of a qualifying venture capital fund from investments in venture capital undertakings. The regulatory scheme requires registration of the trust as the venture capital fund; Regulations 3(1) and 7 do not require each scheme operated by that registered fund to obtain a separate registration. Scheme-specific submission of the private placement memorandum to SEBI does not convert each scheme into an independently registrable fund.

Conclusion: Separate SEBI registration for each contributory scheme is not required, and the assessee is eligible for exemption under Section 10(23FB) on this ground.

Issue (ii): Whether shares held by trustees in their fiduciary capacity for the fund are includible in determining whether a venture capital undertaking is an associated company.

Analysis: Regulation 12(c) prohibits a venture capital fund from investing in an associated company, which is identified by reference to shareholding exceeding 15% held by trustees, settlors, sponsors or directors. That test concerns their personal shareholding and addresses conflicts arising from their own interest. Shares acquired and held by trustees solely for and on behalf of the fund are held in a fiduciary capacity and cannot be aggregated with their personal holdings. A subsisting SEBI registration satisfies the statutory definition of a venture capital fund, absent any regulatory action for breach of the governing regulations.

Conclusion: Shares held by trustees on behalf of the fund are excluded from the associated-company test; the investments did not disentitle the assessee to exemption under Section 10(23FB).

Final Conclusion: The registered fund's scheme structure and its investments, assessed by reference to trustees' personal rather than fiduciary holdings, preserve the claimed statutory exemption.

Ratio Decidendi: Where SEBI registration is granted to a trust as a venture capital fund, separate schemes need not be independently registered, and fiduciary shareholding held for the fund cannot be treated as trustees' personal holding for the associated-company restriction.

Issues: (i) Whether penalty for the claim of deduction under Section 80G in respect of CSR expenditure was sustainable; (ii) Whether penalty could be levied on deduction of education cess claimed under binding precedent when the return was filed but subsequently disclaimed following a retrospective amendment; and (iii) Whether penalty could be levied on a transfer-pricing royalty adjustment after an Advance Pricing Agreement was finalised and a timely modified return was furnished.

Issue (i): Whether penalty for the claim of deduction under Section 80G in respect of CSR expenditure was sustainable.

Analysis: The underlying addition had been deleted by the Tribunal. Further, the claim was supported by binding Tribunal decisions, and initiation or levy of penalty contrary to such binding decisions was impermissible.

Conclusion: Penalty on the CSR deduction claim was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether penalty could be levied on deduction of education cess claimed under binding precedent when the return was filed but subsequently disclaimed following a retrospective amendment.

Analysis: The claim was made when it was supported by a binding jurisdictional precedent. The retrospective amendment and reversal of that precedent occurred after the return had been furnished. A claim so made and later relinquished could not attract penal consequences for under-reporting or misreporting.

Conclusion: Penalty on the education cess claim was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether penalty could be levied on a transfer-pricing royalty adjustment after an Advance Pricing Agreement was finalised and a timely modified return was furnished.

Analysis: Upon execution of the Advance Pricing Agreement and filing of the modified return within the prescribed period, Section 92CD required modification of total income in accordance with that agreement. The royalty deduction in the return and the assessment would consequently align. The conditions for under-reporting under Section 270A(2) were not attracted, and complete disclosure of the royalty transaction excluded misrepresentation or suppression under Section 270A(9). Penalty based on an adjustment resolved under the statutory APA framework would defeat that framework's object of reducing litigation.

Conclusion: Penalty on the transfer-pricing royalty adjustment was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The statutory requirements for imposing penalty for under-reporting or misreporting were absent in respect of all three adjustments.

Ratio Decidendi: Penalty for under-reporting or misreporting cannot be imposed where the claim was fully disclosed and legally supported when made, including where a subsequent Advance Pricing Agreement and timely modified return govern the relevant adjustment.

Issues: Whether additional evidence comprising a Departmental Valuation Officer's valuation report for the jointly purchased property should be admitted and the addition under section 56(2)(x) remitted for fresh adjudication.

Analysis: The additional valuation report determined the fair market value of the same property and had a direct bearing on the difference between the purchase consideration and stamp duty value forming the basis of the addition. Its verification was required at the assessment stage, and its admission was not opposed by the Revenue.

Conclusion: The additional evidence is admitted, and the issue concerning the addition is restored to the Assessing Officer for verification and fresh adjudication after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing; all merits contentions remain open.

Issues: Whether a bona fide purchaser of property under provisional attachment is entitled to its release where the sale consideration remains available for substitution.

Analysis: The provisional attachment pre-dated the agreement for sale, but the seller suppressed that attachment despite publication of a public notice and during proceedings culminating in a court-directed conveyance. The purchaser acquired registered title after paying the agreed consideration, while the unpaid balance of Rs. 6,95,62,552 remained with the court-appointed receiver. These peculiar circumstances established the purchaser's bona fides and preserved an identifiable amount capable of being attached in substitution for the property.

Conclusion: The bona fide purchaser is entitled to release of the property, with liberty to the Enforcement Directorate to seek attachment of the sale consideration lying with the court-appointed receiver as substituted property.

Issues: (i) Whether the proposed transfer of the entire proprietorship business to an LLP without consideration constitutes a supply under GST; (ii) Whether such transfer is a supply of goods or services; (iii) Whether the transfer is exempt as a transfer of a going concern under Entry No. 2 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017; and (iv) Whether GST applies to stock and assets if the business does not qualify as a going concern.

Issue (i): Whether the proposed transfer of the entire proprietorship business to an LLP without consideration constitutes a supply under GST.

Analysis: Section 7 has an inclusive scope, and includes activities specified in Schedule I even when made without consideration. The proposed arrangement involves transfer of the entire business, including its assets, liabilities, employees, rights and customer relationships, to enable its uninterrupted continuation by the transferee.

Conclusion: The proposed transfer of the business constitutes a supply under GST.

Issue (ii): Whether such transfer is a supply of goods or services.

Analysis: A business transferred as a going concern is not treated as a supply of goods under Entry No. 4(c) of Schedule II. Since the transfer of the business as a whole is not a transfer of goods, it falls within the residual definition of services under Section 2(102).

Conclusion: The transaction is a supply of services.

Issue (iii): Whether the transfer is exempt as a transfer of a going concern under Entry No. 2 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017.

Analysis: Entry No. 2 grants a nil-rate exemption for services by way of transfer of a going concern as a whole or an independent part thereof. Although the proposed arrangement contemplates transfer of the complete operational business, the material furnished did not establish that the business satisfies the requisite going-concern status.

Conclusion: The exemption under Entry No. 2 is available only if the business qualifies as a going concern by all applicable standards.

Issue (iv): Whether GST applies to stock and assets if the business does not qualify as a going concern.

Analysis: Where the business is not transferred as a going concern, Entry No. 4(c) of Schedule II treats goods forming part of the business assets as deemed supplies upon cessation as a taxable person.

Conclusion: If the business does not qualify as a going concern, the transferred stock and assets constitute a supply of goods taxable at the rates applicable to the respective goods.

Final Conclusion: The business transfer is classified as a service, but the nil-rate treatment depends upon substantiation that the transferred business is a going concern; failing that status, goods forming part of the transfer attract GST at their applicable rates.

Ratio Decidendi: Transfer of an entire business as a going concern is a supply of services, and the exemption for such transfer applies only where the going-concern character of the business is established.

Issues: (i) Whether battery-operated e-rickshaws, e-carts, hydraulic e-carts and e-scooters, supplied with or without batteries, are classifiable under tariff headings 8703 and 8711 respectively and taxable at 5 per cent GST; (ii) Whether the question concerning refund of accumulated input tax credit arising from inverted duty structure falls within the scope of advance ruling.

Issue (i): Whether battery-operated e-rickshaws, e-carts, hydraulic e-carts and e-scooters, supplied with or without batteries, are classifiable under tariff headings 8703 and 8711 respectively and taxable at 5 per cent GST.

Analysis: Three-wheeled e-rickshaws, e-carts and hydraulic e-carts fall under tariff item 87038040, while electrically propelled e-scooters fall under tariff item 87116020. An electrically operated vehicle derives traction solely from electrical energy and has no alternate source of propulsion. Where the motor, inverter, control module, drivetrain and vehicle body are fitted, the absence of a battery at the time of supply does not alter its essential character as an electrically operated vehicle. Serial No. 441 of Schedule I of Notification No. 09/2025-Central Tax (Rate) dated 17.09.2025 covers electrically operated two- and three-wheeled vehicles.

Conclusion: The specified three-wheeled vehicles are classifiable under tariff heading 8703 and the e-scooter under tariff heading 8711, whether supplied with or without batteries, and all are taxable at 5 per cent GST.

Issue (ii): Whether the question concerning refund of accumulated input tax credit arising from inverted duty structure falls within the scope of advance ruling.

Analysis: Section 97(2) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 specifies the questions that may be raised for advance ruling. Entitlement to refund of accumulated input tax credit under Section 54(3)(ii) does not fall within those specified categories.

Conclusion: The question seeking determination of refund entitlement on account of inverted duty structure is outside the statutory scope of advance ruling and was not admitted.

Final Conclusion: The ruling establishes the applicable classification and concessional GST treatment of the specified electric vehicles, while refund entitlement remains outside the advance-ruling jurisdiction.

Ratio Decidendi: A vehicle designed to run solely on electrical energy retains its character as an electrically operated vehicle notwithstanding that its battery is not fitted at the time of supply.

Issues: (i) Whether the imported IT support services received from the related foreign entity constitute a taxable import of services on which IGST is payable under reverse charge; and (ii) Whether the value declared in the recipient's self-invoice can be deemed the open market value for reverse-charge GST.

Issue (i): Whether the imported IT support services received from the related foreign entity constitute a taxable import of services on which IGST is payable under reverse charge.

Analysis: Import of services for consideration falls within supply, and import from a related person in the course or furtherance of business is also treated as supply. The foreign supplier and Indian recipient were related persons under the common-control test. As the supplier was outside India, the recipient was in India, and the place of supply was India under the recipient-location rule, the transaction satisfied the requirements of import of services. Such imported services are inter-State supplies, and the recipient is liable to pay IGST under reverse charge.

Conclusion: The IT support services are a taxable import of services, with IGST payable by the Indian recipient under reverse charge.

Issue (ii): Whether the value declared in the recipient's self-invoice can be deemed the open market value for reverse-charge GST.

Analysis: Valuation of supplies between related persons is governed by Rule 28. Its second proviso deems the invoice value to be the open market value where the recipient is eligible for full input tax credit. For imported services taxable under reverse charge, the recipient is required to issue a self-invoice. Circular No. 210/4/2024-GST extends the Rule 28 deeming principle to imports of services from related foreign entities and recognises the value declared by the related domestic recipient in its invoice as the open market value where full input tax credit is available.

Conclusion: The value stated in the self-invoice is deemed to be the open market value, provided the recipient is eligible for full input tax credit.

Final Conclusion: The statutory valuation deeming mechanism applies to the reverse-charge import of services where the full input tax credit condition is fulfilled.

Ratio Decidendi: For an import of services from a related foreign person, the recipient's self-invoice value is deemed open market value under the second proviso to Rule 28(1) where the recipient is eligible for full input tax credit.

Issues: (i) The appropriate Service Accounting Codes for setting up a new main water pipeline and revamping a water pipeline distribution network; (ii) Whether the works-contract services qualify for exemption and the applicable GST rate.

Issue (i): The appropriate Service Accounting Codes for setting up a new main water pipeline and revamping a water pipeline distribution network.

Analysis: The contracts involve transfer of goods in the execution of civil works that become part of immovable property and consequently satisfy the definition of a works contract. A works contract is treated as a supply of services. The installation of a new water main is general construction of civil engineering waterworks, whereas revamping an existing distribution network is repair and maintenance of such construction.

Conclusion: Setting up the new main water pipeline is classifiable under SAC 995422, while revamping the water pipeline distribution network is classifiable under SAC 995429. This is against the assessee's proposed classification under SAC 995479.

Issue (ii): Whether the works-contract services qualify for exemption and the applicable GST rate.

Analysis: The exemptions for pure services and composite supplies require, among other conditions, supply to specified governmental recipients and, for composite supplies, a goods component not exceeding 25 per cent. Those conditions are not met because the contracts are works contracts involving goods exceeding 75 per cent of their value. Although the recipient qualifies as a Governmental Authority, the exemption confined to services supplied "by way of" water supply requires direct provision of water supply. Civil engineering and repair works merely connected with water-supply infrastructure do not meet that direct supply requirement. Exemption notifications require strict interpretation.

Conclusion: The services are not exempt under Serial Nos. 3, 3A, or 3B and are taxable at 9 per cent CGST plus 9 per cent SGST under Serial No. 3(ii). This is against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The pipeline installation and revamping are taxable works-contract services under their respective civil-engineering and repair-and-maintenance service classifications.

Ratio Decidendi: An exemption restricted to services supplied "by way of" water supply does not extend to works-contract civil engineering or repair activities merely connected with water-supply infrastructure.

Issues: Whether a successful resolution applicant is required to discharge employees' provident-fund and gratuity dues, including statutory interest, notwithstanding an approved resolution plan.

Analysis: Provident-fund and gratuity dues are excluded from the liquidation estate and cannot be subjected to distribution under the insolvency waterfall. A resolution plan must comply with applicable law, while the statutory first charge for provident-fund dues prevails. Interest under Section 7Q is statutorily payable and is distinct from damages under Section 14B.

Conclusion: A successful resolution applicant must pay provident-fund and gratuity dues in full, together with interest payable under Section 7Q; such dues are not distributable under the insolvency waterfall.

Issues: (i) Whether duty under Rule 6 of the Central Excise Valuation (Determination of Price of Excisable Goods) Rules, 2000 is to be computed on the total sale value or the amortised value of tools, dies and moulds separately sold to customers and used in manufacturing final products; (ii) Whether the captive consumption exemption under Notification No. 67/95-CE applies to tools, dies and moulds separately sold to customers and thereafter used in manufacture; (iii) Whether the extended period of limitation, interest and penalty are sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether duty under Rule 6 of the Central Excise Valuation (Determination of Price of Excisable Goods) Rules, 2000 is to be computed on the total sale value or the amortised value of tools, dies and moulds separately sold to customers and used in manufacturing final products.

Analysis: Tools and dies are used repeatedly for producing final goods; their cost must consequently be spread over the goods produced through amortisation. The appellant had adopted this method where the tooling was customer-supplied, and the same method applies where the tooling was manufactured or procured by the appellant and separately invoiced to customers.

Conclusion: Only the amortised value of the tools, dies and moulds is includible in the assessable value of the final products. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the captive consumption exemption under Notification No. 67/95-CE applies to tools, dies and moulds separately sold to customers and thereafter used in manufacture.

Analysis: The captive consumption exemption applies where goods are not sold and their value is absorbed in the value of the final products. Tools and dies sold to customers under separate invoices and thereafter used in manufacture stand on the same footing as tooling supplied by customers and do not qualify for that exemption.

Conclusion: The captive consumption exemption is unavailable. This issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the extended period of limitation, interest and penalty are sustainable.

Analysis: The appellant had included amortised tooling value in comparable cases involving customer-supplied tools and dies. Its omission to include such value for tooling separately sold to customers could not therefore be attributed to a bona fide belief.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation is invocable; interest and penalty are consequently sustainable, subject to recalculation. This issue is decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The duty liability must be recalculated by adopting the amortised tooling value in the assessable value of the final products, with corresponding recalculation of interest and penalty; the claims to captive-use exemption and limitation protection fail.

Ratio Decidendi: Where tools, dies or moulds sold to customers are subsequently used in manufacture, their amortised value must be included in the assessable value of the final products, and such tooling does not qualify for captive consumption exemption.

Issues: Whether import transactions backed by substantial advance payments made before the restriction on gold imports were entitled to transitional protection under Paragraph 1.05(b) of the Foreign Trade Policy, 2023.

Analysis: Paragraph 1.05(b) protects imports made before a policy restriction and extends protection to pre-existing commitments supported by irrevocable commercial letters of credit. The exception is intended to protect bona fide transactions concluded before the restrictive notification. An irrevocable commercial letter of credit provides payment security through banking arrangements; however, advance payments exceeding 90% of the invoice value provided greater security to the overseas seller. The petitioners established through their business records and prior transactions that they were regular bona fide traders in precious metals and that the impugned transactions were not devised to circumvent the changed import policy. While the restriction itself was a policy decision not warranting interference, its transitional application required a purposive rather than mechanical construction. Notifications issued as delegated legislation ordinarily operate prospectively unless retrospective operation is statutorily authorised.

Conclusion: The petitioners were entitled to the benefit of Paragraph 1.05(b) of the Foreign Trade Policy, 2023 for the identified pre-notification transactions supported by substantial advance payments.

Issues: Whether provisional release of seized betel nuts was warranted under Section 110A of the Customs Act, 1962 in writ jurisdiction.

Analysis: The initial test report identified the representative samples as resembling Indonesian areca nuts and recorded mould infestation. Although a subsequent re-sampled report indicated Indian origin, it did not address mould infestation. A further food laboratory report found the nuts damaged by mould and insects beyond prescribed limits and classified them as sub-standard and unsafe. The evidence therefore did not establish an unequivocal case of Indian origin, and an appellate statutory remedy was available.

Conclusion: Provisional release was not warranted; the petitioner was left to pursue the statutory remedy.