Issues: (i) whether the appellate tribunal acted in wilful defiance of the Supreme Court's order by pronouncing judgment despite being apprised of the earlier direction; (ii) whether the conduct of the judicial member, the technical member, and the scrutiniser warranted contempt consequences and what relief should follow; (iii) whether the pronouncement delivered in breach of the Supreme Court's direction should stand and whether the underlying appeal should be reheard.

Issue (i): whether the appellate tribunal acted in wilful defiance of the Supreme Court's order by pronouncing judgment despite being apprised of the earlier direction.

Analysis: The record, including the transcript and CCTV footage, showed that the Bench was informed of the Supreme Court's morning order and of the direction that judgment should be delivered only after the AGM result was declared. The Bench nevertheless proceeded to pronounce judgment. The later explanation that the order was not formally placed on record did not answer the fact that the direction had been conveyed and understood.

Conclusion: The tribunal acted in wilful defiance of the Supreme Court's order.

Issue (ii): whether the conduct of the judicial member, the technical member, and the scrutiniser warranted contempt consequences and what relief should follow.

Analysis: The technical member tendered an unconditional apology, which was accepted. The judicial member's explanation was found to be contrary to the record and the conduct was censured. The scrutiniser was found to have acted in concert with the concerned private respondent to delay declaration of the AGM result, contrary to the Supreme Court's earlier direction, and monetary costs were imposed on both.

Conclusion: The technical member's apology was accepted, the judicial member was censured, and costs were imposed on the scrutiniser and the concerned private respondent.

Issue (iii): whether the pronouncement delivered in breach of the Supreme Court's direction should stand and whether the underlying appeal should be reheard.

Analysis: Since the appellate tribunal delivered judgment in disregard of the Supreme Court's direction, the impugned judgment could not be sustained. The Supreme Court exercised its constitutional power to preserve the dignity of its process and directed that the appeal be heard afresh by a Bench presided over by the Chairperson of the appellate tribunal.

Conclusion: The judgment was set aside and the appeal was directed to be reheard afresh.

Final Conclusion: The contempt proceedings were brought to an end with censure and costs, while the impugned appellate judgment was annulled and the matter was remitted for fresh hearing without any determination on the merits of the corporate dispute.

Ratio Decidendi: A judicial or quasi-judicial body must comply with an express superior court direction once apprised of it, and a judgment delivered in wilful disregard of that direction cannot be sustained.

Issues: Whether the applicant was entitled to anticipatory bail and protection from arrest in the circumstances of the investigation.

Analysis: The application was considered in the context of the pending investigation, the allegation that the applicant was absconding, and the claim that there were other cases against him. The Court noted that no document was produced to show that the applicant had been convicted in any of those matters. On that basis, the Court held that the mere existence of cases could not justify treating the applicant as a serial law breaker. The Court therefore found that the applicant deserved protection from arrest.

Conclusion: The applicant was held entitled to anticipatory bail and interim protection from arrest was confirmed.

Ratio Decidendi: Anticipatory bail may be granted where the record does not establish prior conviction and the circumstances do not justify denial of protection from arrest.

Issues: Whether cash deposits made in specified bank notes before the appointed day could be treated as unexplained income under section 69A merely because the notes had lost legal tender character, and whether the matter required fresh examination of the source of the deposits.

Analysis: The addition was made and sustained only on the premise that acceptance of specified bank notes after demonetisation was impermissible. The material on record showed that the assessee explained the deposits as sale realisations and debtor recoveries, and the legal bar under the Specified Bank Notes (Cessation of Liabilities) Act, 2017 operated from the appointed day, namely 31.12.2016. On that footing, acceptance of specified bank notes prior to the appointed day could not by itself justify an addition under section 69A. At the same time, the factual source of the deposits had not been independently verified by the lower authorities.

Conclusion: The addition under section 69A could not be upheld solely on the ground that the deposits were in demonetised currency, but the source of the deposits had to be examined by the Assessing Officer.

Ratio Decidendi: Receipt of specified bank notes before the appointed day is not, by itself, a ground to treat the corresponding bank deposits as unexplained income without examining the actual source of the receipts.

Issues: (i) Whether receipts from the Industrial Liaison Program and Co-ordination Membership Agreement were taxable in India as Fees for Included Services under Article 12 of the India-USA DTAA; (ii) Whether receipts from Sponsorship Assignment were taxable in India as Fees for Included Services under Article 12 of the India-USA DTAA; (iii) Whether credit of tax deducted at source was to be granted.

Issue (i): Whether receipts from the Industrial Liaison Program and Co-ordination Membership Agreement were taxable in India as Fees for Included Services under Article 12 of the India-USA DTAA.

Analysis: The Industrial Liaison Program consisted of relationship-building activities, introductions to faculty and research projects, and dissemination of factual information, without rendering technical services or making available technical knowledge, skill, know-how, or a technical plan. The Co-ordination Membership Agreement involved the assessee acting only as a host and coordinator for consortium members, providing administrative support and access to consortium research without undertaking research or transferring a technical design or process. On the settled make available test under Article 12, these receipts did not fall within Fees for Included Services.

Conclusion: The receipts from the Industrial Liaison Program and Co-ordination Membership Agreement were not taxable in India and the additions were deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether receipts from Sponsorship Assignment were taxable in India as Fees for Included Services under Article 12 of the India-USA DTAA.

Analysis: Under the sponsorship arrangements, the assessee undertook specific research for corporate sponsors and provided research reports and related intellectual property rights or joint rights, enabling the sponsor to apply the underlying technology and derive enduring benefit. This amounted to making available technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how, or a technical plan or design within Article 12.

Conclusion: The receipts from Sponsorship Assignment were taxable in India as Fees for Included Services and the addition was sustained against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether credit of tax deducted at source was to be granted.

Analysis: The Assessing Officer was directed to verify the records and allow the credit in accordance with law.

Conclusion: The claim for TDS credit was allowed for statistical purposes in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded partly, with relief granted on the Industrial Liaison Program, Co-ordination Membership Agreement, and TDS credit, while the addition on Sponsorship Assignment was upheld.

Ratio Decidendi: For Article 12 of the India-USA DTAA, a payment is taxable as Fees for Included Services only if the technical or consultancy service makes available technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how, processes, or a technical plan or design to the recipient.

Issues: Whether SEBI could continue proceedings and issue directions against the statutory auditors, including advisory and referral directions to ICAI and NFRA, after recording no evidence of fraud, connivance, or manipulation with fraudulent intent.

Analysis: The scope of SEBI's inquiry against auditors is confined to whether there is material showing manipulation of accounts, connivance, collusion, or fraudulent intent in relation to the securities market. Where the recorded finding is that there is no evidence of fraud, no meeting of minds, and no tangible material showing manipulation with knowledge or fraudulent intention, SEBI cannot proceed further on an adjudicatory basis. In such a situation, directions that effectively address professional negligence or dereliction in audit fall outside SEBI's jurisdiction, because SEBI cannot regulate the profession of chartered accountants. At most, only administrative intimation to the professional bodies could be considered, not binding directions on professional conduct.

Conclusion: SEBI lacked jurisdiction to sustain the impugned directions once fraud and connivance were negatived, and the directions to be careful and the referrals for action were unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: The order under challenge was set aside and the appellants succeeded because the proceeding could not be used to impose SEBI's view on professional negligence in the absence of proved fraud or collusion.

Ratio Decidendi: SEBI may act against auditors only where the evidence shows connivance, collusion, manipulation, or fraudulent intent affecting the securities market; absent such material, SEBI cannot issue adjudicatory directions on professional negligence or regulate the audit profession.

Issues: Whether the complaint under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was liable to be quashed for want of territorial jurisdiction and whether the alleged defect in taking up the matter as a summary trial vitiated the proceedings.

Analysis: The complaint was founded on cheques presented through the payee's bank branch at Kilpauk, while the drawer contended that the account transfer from Nanganallur to Kilpauk had not become effective on the presentation date. The statutory scheme under section 142(2)(a) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, including its explanation, was applied to the facts. The Court held that the request for transfer had been made before presentation, the cheques were in fact presented at Kilpauk Branch, and the explanation to section 142 supported treating that branch as the relevant branch for territorial jurisdiction. On the plea based on section 461(m) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the Court held that Magistrates are empowered to try complaints under section 138 summarily, and therefore clause (m) was inapplicable. At most, any defect in taking cognizance could amount only to an irregularity of the kind covered by section 460(e) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which would not vitiate the trial.

Conclusion: The challenge to territorial jurisdiction failed, the summary trial objection did not vitiate the proceedings, and the petition was rejected.

Issues: (i) Whether the payment made after the original and extended timelines under the Sabka Vishwas Legacy Dispute Resolution Scheme could still be treated as payment under the Scheme; (ii) Whether the time prescription for payment under the Scheme was mandatory or directory.

Issue (i): Whether the payment made after the original and extended timelines under the Sabka Vishwas Legacy Dispute Resolution Scheme could still be treated as payment under the Scheme?

Analysis: The declaration under the Scheme had been accepted and Form SVLDRS-3 had already been issued. The amount determined under that form was remitted during the pandemic period, and the Court noted that the Scheme had been extended from time to time through notifications in view of the prevailing situation. The payment, though made beyond the originally stipulated date, was linked to the quantified amount under the Scheme and had been accepted by the Department.

Conclusion: The payment made by the petitioner was to be treated as payment under the Scheme, and the Department was bound to issue the discharge certificate.

Issue (ii): Whether the time prescription for payment under the Scheme was mandatory or directory?

Analysis: The Court held that the statutory design of the Scheme vested power in the Central Government to fix and extend the time limits by notification, which indicated that the time prescription was not rigidly mandatory. The pandemic situation and the Supreme Court's extension of limitation periods were treated as relevant circumstances supporting a liberal construction of the Scheme's timelines.

Conclusion: The time limit for payment under the Scheme was held to be directory, not mandatory.

Final Conclusion: The petitioner was entitled to the benefit of the Scheme on the facts found, and the respondents were directed to recognise the payment and complete the discharge process.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statutory settlement scheme empowers the authority to extend payment timelines by notification and the declaration has already been accepted, the time prescription may be construed as directory, permitting acceptance of belated payment made during extraordinary circumstances such as a pandemic.

Issues: Whether the appellant's composite contract for supplying, installation, testing and commissioning of HVAC systems was classifiable as works contract service or as erection, commissioning or installation service, and whether non-payment of VAT on the goods element could be a ground to deny such classification.

Analysis: The contract involved both transfer of property in goods and rendition of services, and its true character had to be determined from the nature of the work performed. Classification did not depend on whether VAT had been discharged on the goods portion. In light of the Supreme Court's ruling in Larsen & Toubro and the Tribunal's later view in Jambeshwar Construction Co., composite contracts of this kind fall within works contract service from the date such service was introduced.

Conclusion: The service rendered by the appellant was classifiable as works contract service and not under erection, commissioning or installation service. The reasoning based on non-payment of VAT was unsustainable, and the demand could not be upheld on that basis.