Issues: (i) Whether further investigation could be undertaken after closure reports had been filed without express permission of the Magistrate; (ii) Whether the dispute was essentially civil in nature so as to render criminal prosecution an abuse of process of law.

Issue (i): Whether further investigation could be undertaken after closure reports had been filed without express permission of the Magistrate.

Analysis: The text of Section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 does not expressly require prior leave, but the settled judicial understanding has read such permission into the provision as a necessary implication. Where further investigation is sought after earlier closure and the record does not disclose any order granting permission, the investigation cannot be sustained on the basis that leave is unnecessary.

Conclusion: Further investigation without the Magistrate's approval was impermissible and the resulting criminal proceedings were liable to be quashed.

Issue (ii): Whether the dispute was essentially civil in nature so as to render criminal prosecution an abuse of process of law.

Analysis: The controversy arose from a business arrangement concerning investment, supply of goods and sharing of profits, which disclosed a commercial disagreement over the existence and terms of a joint venture. The allegations of forgery were also found to be suspect in light of their timing and the earlier civil proceedings, and the criminal process could not be used to convert a civil dispute into a prosecution.

Conclusion: The dispute was civil in character and the criminal case amounted to an abuse of process of law.

Final Conclusion: The FIR, chargesheet and ensuing proceedings were set aside, and the appeal succeeded.

Ratio Decidendi: Further investigation after closure of the police case requires judicial leave as a necessary implication of Section 173(8) CrPC, and a predominantly civil commercial dispute cannot be pursued through criminal prosecution when the criminal allegations do not independently sustain.

Issues: (i) whether the complaint disclosed sufficient foundational averments and material to proceed against respondents 1, 2 and 4 under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; (ii) whether respondent 3 could be proceeded against on the basis of a mere office-bearer designation without specific factual linkage to the transaction.

Issue (i): Whether the complaint disclosed sufficient foundational averments and material to proceed against respondents 1, 2 and 4 under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

Analysis: Vicarious liability under Section 141 requires specific averments that the accused was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business at the relevant time. The complaint must be read as a whole, and the absence of mechanical reproduction of statutory language is not fatal if the factual foundation is otherwise discernible. Here, the complaint and accompanying documents referred to antecedent borrowings, promissory notes, the memorandum of understanding, and the cheque transaction. The material prima facie showed participation of respondents 1, 2 and 4 in the underlying financial dealings, which was sufficient at the quashing stage.

Conclusion: The proceedings were rightly maintainable against respondents 1, 2 and 4.

Issue (ii): Whether respondent 3 could be proceeded against on the basis of a mere office-bearer designation without specific factual linkage to the transaction

Analysis: Mere designation as an office bearer does not by itself attract liability under Section 141. The complaint did not attribute any specific role to respondent 3, nor did any document show his participation in the transaction. In the absence of a factual foundation connecting him with the dishonoured cheque transaction, prosecution could not be sustained against him.

Conclusion: The proceedings against respondent 3 were liable to remain quashed.

Final Conclusion: The impugned quashing order was interfered with only to the extent of respondents 1, 2 and 4, while the quashing in favour of respondent 3 was affirmed, and the complaint stood revived against respondents 1, 2 and 4 alone.

Ratio Decidendi: For prosecution under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the complaint must disclose specific foundational facts showing that each accused was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business; however, where the complaint read as a whole and the supporting documents prima facie show participation in the transaction, threshold quashing is unwarranted, while a bare office-bearer designation without factual linkage is insufficient.

Issues: Whether the complaint proceedings and summoning order could be quashed where the dispute arising from dishonour of cheque did not disclose the applicant's prima facie involvement in the alleged offences.

Analysis: The complaint and the statements recorded under Sections 200 and 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 showed that the grievance was essentially confined to dishonour of a cheque. The materials did not indicate that the applicant was involved in the alleged transaction in the manner alleged, and the complaint itself referred to another person as the bank manager at the relevant time. In such circumstances, the invocation of criminal process was held to be unwarranted, especially when the grievance, if any, lay in the realm of cheque dishonour.

Conclusion: The proceedings were liable to be quashed against the applicant and the summoning order could not be sustained.

Final Conclusion: The criminal proceedings and the summoning order were set aside against the applicant for want of prima facie material and for amounting to an abuse of the process of law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the complaint materials do not disclose the applicant's prima facie involvement and the dispute is essentially one of cheque dishonour, criminal proceedings may be quashed as an abuse of process.

Issues: (i) Whether concessional electricity charges under Clause 16(a) of the Himachal Pradesh Industrial Policy, 2019, read with Rule 16(i)(a) of the 2019 Rules, were intended for existing industrial enterprises undergoing substantial expansion, and what effect the amendment notification dated 29.04.2022 had on those provisions; (ii) Whether the doctrine of promissory estoppel applied in favour of the respondent company.

Issue (i): Whether concessional electricity charges under Clause 16(a) of the Himachal Pradesh Industrial Policy, 2019, read with Rule 16(i)(a) of the 2019 Rules, were intended for existing industrial enterprises undergoing substantial expansion, and what effect the amendment notification dated 29.04.2022 had on those provisions.

Analysis: The policy scheme classified eligible enterprises into new industrial enterprises and existing industrial enterprises undertaking substantial expansion. Clause 16(a) was read with the contemporaneous tariff orders and the overall structure of the policy, which showed that concessional energy charges at 15% lower rates for three years were meant for new industrial enterprises, while Clause 16(b) separately provided a rebate on additional consumption for existing units undergoing expansion. The amendment dated 29.04.2022, substituting "eligible" with "new" in Clause 16(a) and inserting "substantial expansion" in Clause 16(b), was treated as clarificatory insofar as it corrected the original drafting error and reflected the true intent of the policy. The further change limiting the duration under Clause 16(b) to three years was treated as substantive.

Conclusion: Clause 16(a) and Rule 16(i)(a) were intended only for new industrial enterprises, and the 29.04.2022 amendment was clarificatory and retrospective in that respect.

Issue (ii): Whether the doctrine of promissory estoppel applied in favour of the respondent company.

Analysis: The respondent had undergone substantial expansion and received certification recognising that status, but no sanction or approval of concessional tariff benefit under Clause 16(a) had been granted in accordance with the Rules. The respondent had already received the benefit attached to its class under Clause 16(b). Promissory estoppel could not be used to create an entitlement to a benefit never intended for that class, especially where granting it would result in a double benefit contrary to the policy structure and fiscal discipline. No enforceable equity survived in the respondent's favour.

Conclusion: The doctrine of promissory estoppel did not apply in favour of the respondent company.

Final Conclusion: The policy conferred the concessional tariff benefit only on new industrial enterprises, left existing expanding units to the separate rebate mechanism, and the respondent could not claim an additional concession or rely on promissory estoppel to enlarge that entitlement.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an industrial incentive scheme distinctly separates benefits for new enterprises and existing enterprises undertaking substantial expansion, a clarificatory amendment correcting an inadvertent drafting error will relate back to the original policy, and promissory estoppel cannot be invoked to secure a benefit never intended for the claimant's category.

Issues: Whether the plaint seeking partition, declaration that the mortgage was void, and injunction against SARFAESI action was barred by the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, and was liable to rejection under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Analysis: The plaint itself proceeded on the basis that the property stood in the name of the registered owner and that the loan had been secured by an equitable mortgage, after which measures under Section 13(2) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 were initiated. The Court found the plaint internally inconsistent, since it acknowledged an earlier partition yet sought partition of the entire property and also challenged the mortgage only qua the appellant's share. It held that, in view of the statutory scheme and the bar under Sections 34 and 35, objections to measures taken under the Act must be pursued before the Debt Recovery Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal. The reliance on the later decision dealing with partition suits did not assist the appellant on the facts, because the registered sale deed and ownership of the mortgagor were not challenged.

Conclusion: The civil suit was barred in respect of the challenged SARFAESI measures, the plaint was rightly rejected, and the appellant's challenge failed.

Final Conclusion: The appeal did not succeed, and the trial court's rejection of the plaint was maintained.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the substance of the suit is a challenge to measures taken under Section 13(4) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, civil court jurisdiction is barred and the aggrieved party must pursue the statutory remedy before the Debt Recovery Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal.

Issues: Whether the appellant was entitled to regular bail in a prosecution under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, having regard to the period of custody, the stage of trial, and parity with co-accused.

Analysis: The appellant had remained in custody since 20.10.2021. The witnesses whose safety required protection had substantially been examined, while the remaining protected witnesses were stated to relate mainly to the role attributed to co-accused. Some co-accused had already been enlarged on bail. The Court considered the length of incarceration, the likelihood of further delay in conclusion of the trial, and the plea of parity, while making it clear that no opinion was being expressed on the gravity of the alleged offence.

Conclusion: The appellant was granted regular bail, subject to furnishing bail bonds and complying with the conditions imposed by the NIA Court, including weekly presence before the jurisdictional police station and cooperation with the trial.

Issues: (i) Whether the constitutional power to grant bail survives the statutory restraint under Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 when prolonged incarceration and delay in trial are relied upon under Article 21 of the Constitution of India; (ii) whether the perceived divergence between coordinate Benches on the application of the binding three-Judge Bench decision in K.A. Najeeb warrants reference to a Bench of appropriate strength; and (iii) whether interim bail should be granted pending authoritative resolution of the legal issue.

Issue (i): Whether the constitutional power to grant bail survives the statutory restraint under Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 when prolonged incarceration and delay in trial are relied upon under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: The order treats the three-Judge Bench ruling in K.A. Najeeb as preserving the constitutional force of Article 21 while recognising the legislative policy behind restrictive bail provisions in special statutes. It holds that Section 43D(5) does not wholly exclude bail where continued detention becomes constitutionally unjustifiable, but equally rejects a mechanical rule that delay alone must automatically result in release. The proper approach is contextual and must account for the nature of allegations, role attributed, prima facie material, stage and trajectory of trial, causes of delay, and the competing concerns of liberty, fair trial, societal security, and statutory restraint.

Conclusion: The constitutional power to grant bail survives the statutory embargo and must be applied in a structured, case-specific manner; prolonged incarceration is a relevant but not solitary factor.

Issue (ii): Whether the perceived divergence between coordinate Benches on the application of the binding three-Judge Bench decision in K.A. Najeeb warrants reference to a Bench of appropriate strength.

Analysis: The order records that reservations expressed by a coordinate Bench about another coordinate Bench's understanding of a binding three-Judge Bench ruling cannot be resolved through counter-observations of equal strength. Judicial discipline requires that where the issue goes to the root of the legal principle and affects pending cases under the special statute, the matter should be placed before the Chief Justice of India for constitution of an appropriate Bench. This is presented as necessary to secure clarity, consistency, and institutional fidelity in the administration of bail jurisprudence.

Conclusion: A reference to a Bench of appropriate strength was warranted.

Issue (iii): Whether interim bail should be granted pending authoritative resolution of the legal issue.

Analysis: The order notes substantial incarceration, the likelihood that trial will not conclude immediately, and the need to avoid continued detention merely because an important legal question requires settlement. Without expressing any opinion on the merits, and subject to stringent safeguards, the Court considered interim release appropriate pending further orders.

Conclusion: Interim bail was granted for six months on specified conditions.

Final Conclusion: The matter was referred for authoritative resolution of the legal controversy, while the appellants were enlarged on interim bail pending further orders and subject to conditions, without any adjudication on the merits of the prosecution case.

Ratio Decidendi: Statutory restrictions on bail under a special law do not extinguish constitutional liberty under Article 21, and the effect of prolonged incarceration must be assessed contextually rather than mechanically, with judicial discipline requiring reference where coordinate Benches perceive conflict on a binding larger-Bench ruling.

Issues: Whether the impugned discharge order warranted interference in revision and whether the material on record disclosed grave suspicion sufficient to sustain the charges, including in relation to sanction and the evidentiary value of the CCTV footage and medical material.

Analysis: The scope of revisional interference was confined to legality, propriety and correctness, and the Court reiterated that at the stage of charge the material is to be tested only for a prima facie case and grave suspicion, without conducting a roving inquiry. On the facts, the allegations were found to be materially weakened by significant improvements and inconsistencies in the complainant's version, uncertainty regarding the injuries reflected in the medical documents, absence of reliable corroboration before the Magistrate, and the failure to establish the CCTV footage through the requirements governing electronic evidence. The Court also found no perversity in the Sessions Court's view that the record did not justify proceeding against the accused officers, and considered it unnecessary to decide the sanction issue separately once the case on merits failed.

Conclusion: The discharge of the accused was upheld and no ground for revisional interference was made out.

Final Conclusion: The complaint-based prosecution was not restored, and the revisional challenge to the discharge order failed.

Ratio Decidendi: At the stage of framing charge, interference in revision is unwarranted unless the record discloses grave suspicion supported by reliable material; where the complainant's case is materially inconsistent and the corroborative evidence is inadmissible or unreliable, discharge is justified.

Issues: Whether the conviction for dishonour of cheque under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was liable to be interfered with in revision, and whether the defence of the cheque being a security cheque rebutted the statutory presumptions.

Analysis: The cheque and signatures thereon were not disputed. The accused admitted the loan transaction and default, but led no evidence to probabilise the defence. The complainant proved presentation, dishonour, statutory notice and non-payment, thereby establishing the ingredients of the offence. The presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act operated in favour of the holder of the cheque, and the accused failed to rebut them on a preponderance of probabilities. The Court also noted that a security cheque issued in a financial transaction can attract Section 138 when the liability remains unpaid, and that revisional jurisdiction is narrow and does not permit re-appreciation of evidence absent perversity or miscarriage of justice.

Conclusion: The conviction and sentence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act were upheld, and no interference was warranted in revision.

Issues: Whether a writ appeal challenging SARFAESI recovery steps and sale certificate could be entertained despite the availability of an efficacious statutory remedy before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, and whether the pleaded dispute concerning the nature of the sale deeds and mortgage presented exceptional circumstances warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: The appellants had already invoked the statutory remedy before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, and the dispute raised by them turned on contested facts, namely whether the sale deeds were nominal transactions and whether the mortgage was fraudulent. The governing law restricts writ interference in SARFAESI matters where the statute provides a specific remedial mechanism, and such interference is confined to exceptional cases such as violation of statutory provisions, fundamental procedural irregularity, use of repealed provisions, or breach of natural justice. The pleaded case did not establish any of those exceptional grounds.

Conclusion: The writ petition was not maintainable in view of the alternative statutory remedy, and the dismissal by the Single Judge called for no interference; the challenge failed.

Issues: Whether the writ petition challenging the SARFAESI notice was maintainable in view of the available statutory remedy before the Debts Recovery Tribunal.

Analysis: The petitioner invoked writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to challenge a notice issued in recovery proceedings under the SARFAESI framework. The Court noted that proceedings under the Debts Recovery Tribunal had already commenced through an original application and that the SARFAESI Act, 2002 and the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 provide efficacious statutory remedies. Relying on the settled principle of self-imposed restraint in writ jurisdiction, the Court held that such petitions are ordinarily not entertained where an effective alternative remedy exists, save in exceptional situations such as lack of jurisdiction, violation of fundamental judicial procedure, reliance on repealed provisions, or breach of natural justice.

Conclusion: The writ petition was not maintainable and could not be entertained at this stage.

Ratio Decidendi: Writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is ordinarily not to be exercised against SARFAESI or debt-recovery proceedings when an effective statutory remedy is available, unless exceptional jurisdictional or procedural grounds are shown.

Issues: Whether the operative direction concerning clubbing and transfer of the two FIRs required correction to conform to the judgment's reasoning.

Analysis: The earlier judgment found that both FIRs arose from the same allegations and formed part of the same transaction, making parallel investigation improper. Its operative portion, however, reversed the intended transfer by directing the earlier FIR to be transferred to the location of the later FIR. The clarification did not permit selection of an investigating agency; it corrected that inconsistency.

Conclusion: The later FIR registered at Gurugram shall be clubbed and transferred to the earlier FIR registered with the Economic Offences Wing, Delhi.

Issues: (i) whether the secured creditor was bound to disclose known encumbrances and the undivided nature of the auctioned property, and whether failure to do so entitled the auction purchaser to cancellation of the sale and refund of the consideration; (ii) whether the writ petition was maintainable notwithstanding the plea of alternative remedy.

Issue (i): whether the secured creditor was bound to disclose known encumbrances and the undivided nature of the auctioned property, and whether failure to do so entitled the auction purchaser to cancellation of the sale and refund of the consideration

Analysis: The sale notice and sale certificate were found not to have disclosed that the property formed only an undivided and undemarcated portion of a larger plot. The statutory scheme under the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 requires disclosure of the description of the property and the encumbrances known to the secured creditor, and also obliges delivery of the secured asset free from encumbrance. The Court held that the secured creditor is not a passive seller, must exercise due diligence, and cannot rely on an as is where is or caveat emptor position where material defects, encumbrances, or title issues were within its knowledge or ought to have been ascertained.

Conclusion: The bank breached its statutory obligations, and the auction purchaser was entitled to refund of the sale consideration in lieu of delivery of unencumbered title and possession.

Issue (ii): whether the writ petition was maintainable notwithstanding the plea of alternative remedy

Analysis: The petitioner was a third party auction purchaser complaining of the bank's failure to deliver possession and of non-disclosure of material defects in the auction process. In the absence of disputed questions of fact and in view of the alleged clear statutory violation, the existence of an alternative remedy was held not to bar writ relief.

Conclusion: The plea of alternative remedy was rejected.

Final Conclusion: The auction sale was cancelled and the bank was directed to refund the full consideration amount to the auction purchaser.

Ratio Decidendi: A secured creditor conducting a SARFAESI auction must disclose known encumbrances and material title defects, and where it fails to do so and cannot deliver unencumbered possession, the auction purchaser may seek cancellation of the sale and refund notwithstanding the plea of alternative remedy.

Issues: Whether the refusal to permit compounding of the offence under Section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 in a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 called for interference.

Analysis: The complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 had remained pending for several years and the accused had earlier proposed a repayment schedule but failed to honour it. The application for compounding was moved at a belated stage after the matter had substantially progressed, and the complainant had expressly opposed compounding. The conduct of the accused, including repeated defaults and procedural delays, supported the finding that the application was not moved with genuine intent to settle the dispute. The principle that cheque dishonour matters are compensatory and settlement should ordinarily be encouraged does not create an indefeasible right to compounding where the complainant does not consent and the accused has acted without bona fides.

Conclusion: The refusal to compound was upheld and no interference was warranted in the exercise of inherent jurisdiction.

Ratio Decidendi: Compounding of an offence under Section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is not an absolute right and may be declined where the application is belated, the complainant objects, and the accused's conduct shows delay and lack of bona fides.

Issues: (i) Whether the statutory restrictions on bail under Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 and Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 could continue to operate where the accused had undergone prolonged incarceration and the trial was unlikely to conclude within a reasonable time; (ii) whether, on the material placed, the appellant had made out a case for grant of bail pending trial.

Issue (i): Whether the statutory restrictions on bail under Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 and Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 could continue to operate where the accused had undergone prolonged incarceration and the trial was unlikely to conclude within a reasonable time.

Analysis: The statutory embargo on bail under special enactments was held to be subordinate to the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The earlier three-Judge Bench ruling in K.A. Najeeb was treated as binding, and it was held that where timely conclusion of trial is not realistically possible and incarceration has become unduly prolonged, the rigour of Section 43D(5) of the UAPA melts down. The narrower reading of K.A. Najeeb in later two-Judge decisions was not accepted as controlling law. The principle that bail remains the norm and jail the exception was reiterated even in prosecutions under stringent special statutes.

Conclusion: The statutory restrictions did not bar grant of bail in the facts of the case, and the constitutional court could intervene in favour of the accused.

Issue (ii): Whether, on the material placed, the appellant had made out a case for grant of bail pending trial.

Analysis: The appellant had been in custody since 11.06.2020, more than 350 witnesses were still to be examined, and early conclusion of the trial was found to be well-nigh impossible. The Court also noted the absence of recovery from the appellant or from premises under his use, the essentially police-statement-based nature of the incriminating material, the absence of prior antecedents shown on record, and the fact that the appellant had not misused the earlier medical interim bail. These circumstances, taken together, were found sufficient to justify release on bail during pendency of the trial.

Conclusion: The appellant was entitled to bail pending trial.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded and the appellant was directed to be released on bail on terms to be fixed by the Special NIA Court, with ancillary conditions including deposit of passport and periodic appearance before the local police station.

Ratio Decidendi: In prosecutions under special anti-terror and narcotics statutes, statutory bail restrictions cannot override Article 21 where prolonged incarceration and unrealistic prospects of trial completion would make continued detention constitutionally unjustifiable; in such cases, a constitutional court may grant bail on the facts and material before it.

Issues: (i) Whether, in an appeal against acquittal under Section 378(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the acquittal could be interfered with for misapplication of law and perversity in appreciation of evidence; (ii) Whether dishonour of cheques with the endorsement "Stop Payment", in the facts proved, attracted liability under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 in the light of the statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of that Act.

Issue (i): Whether, in an appeal against acquittal under Section 378(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the acquittal could be interfered with for misapplication of law and perversity in appreciation of evidence?

Analysis: An appellate court is required to exercise restraint in an appeal against acquittal, but interference is warranted where the trial court's findings suffer from manifest illegality, non-consideration of material evidence, or misapplication of settled legal principles. The impugned judgment was found to have approached the matter on an erroneous footing by ignoring the governing burden framework and by appreciating the evidence in a manner inconsistent with the statutory scheme applicable to cheque dishonour prosecutions.

Conclusion: The acquittal was liable to be interfered with and set aside.

Issue (ii): Whether dishonour of cheques with the endorsement "Stop Payment", in the facts proved, attracted liability under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 in the light of the statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of that Act?

Analysis: Once issuance of the cheque and signatures thereon stood admitted or proved, a mandatory presumption arose that the cheque was issued towards discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability. The burden then shifted to the drawer to rebut that presumption by a probable defence. The court held that stop-payment dishonour does not, by itself, negate liability under Section 138 where the foundational ingredients are established. The record did not show a rebuttal of the statutory presumption by cogent evidence, and the presumptions were not properly appreciated by the trial court.

Conclusion: Dishonour on stop-payment instructions was within the ambit of Section 138, and the trial court's contrary approach was unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded to the extent that the acquittal was annulled and the complaint proceedings were sent back for reconsideration on the correct statutory footing, especially the reverse onus and the legal effect of stop-payment dishonour.

Ratio Decidendi: In a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, once execution of the cheque is admitted or proved, the statutory presumption of a legally enforceable debt arises and dishonour on stop-payment instructions remains actionable unless the drawer rebuts that presumption by a probable defence.

Issues: (i) Whether the conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was liable to be reversed on the ground that the complaint filed by the power of attorney holder did not specifically plead her direct personal knowledge of the transaction; (ii) whether the sentence of simple imprisonment for six months required modification.

Issue (i): Whether the conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was liable to be reversed on the ground that the complaint filed by the power of attorney holder did not specifically plead her direct personal knowledge of the transaction.

Analysis: The absence of a specific averment in the complaint regarding the power of attorney holder's direct personal knowledge did not, in the facts of the case, occasion a failure of justice. The complainant himself entered the witness box and testified about the transaction, the accused had the opportunity to cross-examine him, and the objection was not raised at the earlier stage when cognizance was taken. In revision, interference with a conviction is not warranted for such an irregularity unless prejudice amounting to failure of justice is shown.

Conclusion: The conviction was not liable to be set aside on this ground and was upheld.

Issue (ii): Whether the sentence of simple imprisonment for six months required modification.

Analysis: Considering the nature and gravity of the offence, the custodial sentence was found capable of being reduced while retaining the compensatory and default directions imposed by the courts below.

Conclusion: The sentence of simple imprisonment for six months was modified to imprisonment till the rising of the Court, while the compensation and default clause were maintained.

Final Conclusion: The revision succeeded only to the extent of sentence modification, and the conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act otherwise remained intact.

Ratio Decidendi: A procedural irregularity in the institution of a complaint will not vitiate a conviction in revision unless it is shown to have caused a real failure of justice, particularly where the complainant has later deposed and been subjected to cross-examination.

Issues: (i) Whether service of the statutory notice under the Negotiable Instruments Act was duly proved. (ii) Whether the cheques were issued in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability and the statutory presumption stood rebutted.

Issue (i): Whether service of the statutory notice under the Negotiable Instruments Act was duly proved.

Analysis: The notice was returned with an endorsement of absence. The evidence accepted by the Court showed that the drawer was away for about fifteen days and the endorsement did not establish deliberate avoidance of service. In the absence of further steps to secure service, the Court accepted the finding that due service was not established beyond doubt.

Conclusion: Service of the statutory notice was not proved against the respondent.

Issue (ii): Whether the cheques were issued in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability and the statutory presumption stood rebutted.

Analysis: Under Section 138 and the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139, the holder must establish the foundational facts, after which the drawer may rebut the presumption on a preponderance of probabilities. The Court found that the complainant failed to prove the alleged loan with specificity, there was no supporting agreement, the evidence did not satisfactorily show payment of the alleged loan amount, and the surrounding circumstances supported the defence version that the cheques were linked to business dealings rather than an enforceable debt. On that basis, the presumption was treated as rebutted.

Conclusion: The cheques were not proved to have been issued in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability, and the presumption stood rebutted.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed and the acquittal was left undisturbed because the essential ingredients of the offence under Section 138 were not established.

Ratio Decidendi: For an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the complainant must prove that the cheque was issued towards a legally enforceable debt or liability and the accused may rebut the statutory presumption by showing a probable defence on the preponderance of probabilities.

Issues: (i) Whether the Delhi and Haryana FIRs arising from the Brahma City/Krrish World transactions should be consolidated for a single investigation; (ii) Whether a blanket restraint against coercive action in respect of future FIRs based on the same transactions should be granted.

Issue (i): Whether the Delhi and Haryana FIRs arising from the Brahma City/Krrish World transactions should be consolidated for a single investigation.

Analysis: The FIRs disclosed a common thread of allegations concerning acceptance of money from homebuyers, failure to deliver promised properties, and related alleged diversion of funds. The prohibition on a second FIR in respect of the same occurrence or transaction requires a single comprehensive investigation; further material may be addressed through further investigation and supplementary reports rather than overlapping investigations in separate jurisdictions. Parallel investigations would cause multiplicity, potential conflicting findings, and prejudice to the petitioners. The subsequent Haryana FIR was found to arise from the same transaction as the Delhi EOW FIR.

Conclusion: FIR No. 30/2019 registered at the Economic Offences Wing, Delhi shall be transferred and clubbed with FIR No. 439/2024 registered at Police Station Sector-65, Gurugram, Haryana for investigation in accordance with law. This issue is in favour of the petitioners.

Issue (ii): Whether a blanket restraint against coercive action in respect of future FIRs based on the same transactions should be granted.

Analysis: A general prospective restraint against coercive action concerning FIRs that may be registered in future is neither appropriate nor legally permissible. The petitioners may pursue remedies available in law if any such FIR is registered.

Conclusion: The request for a blanket prospective restraint against coercive action is declined. This issue is against the petitioners.

Final Conclusion: The same-transaction allegations are required to be investigated in one coordinated proceeding, while future complaints remain subject to ordinary legal remedies.

Ratio Decidendi: Multiple FIRs and parallel investigations cannot be maintained for the same occurrence or transaction; subsequent information must be dealt with through a comprehensive investigation and, where necessary, further investigation or supplementary reports.