Issues: Whether criminal proceedings for dishonour of cheque should be quashed on the grounds of disputed service of statutory notice, the applicant's incarceration, repeated presentation of the cheque, and impleadment of a proprietorship concern instead of its proprietor.

Analysis: The questions regarding the applicant's incarceration, service of notice, and circumstances of presentation and dishonour of the cheque require evidentiary consideration at trial and constitute matters of defence. The statutory presumption applicable to cheque dishonour proceedings remains available at this stage. A proprietorship concern and its proprietor are not distinct in the manner of a company; therefore, impleadment of the proprietorship concern did not invalidate the complaint.

Conclusion: Quashing was declined; the applicant may contest the proceedings at trial by raising all legal and factual defences.

Issues: Whether the spouse of a deceased cheque payee, without an endorsement or authority establishing entitlement, can issue a statutory demand notice and maintain a complaint for cheque dishonour.

Analysis: The statutory scheme confines the demand and complaint for cheque dishonour to the payee or holder in due course. A holder must be entitled in their own name both to possess the cheque and to recover its amount. The complainant was not named as payee, had no endorsement in her favour, and did not establish authority through a succession certificate, probate, letters of administration, or other judicial determination enabling her to give the drawer a full discharge. The Magistrate issued process on the incorrect premise that the cheques had been issued to the complainant, without determining whether she satisfied the statutory eligibility requirement. This constituted an express legal bar to cognizance and warranted exercise of inherent jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The deceased payee's spouse was neither the payee nor a holder in due course and could not maintain the cheque-dishonour complaints without lawful authority establishing her entitlement.

Issues: Whether accused persons in cheque-dishonour proceedings may obtain expert analysis of cheque entries where the complainant specifically asserts that those entries were written by the accused in the complainant's presence.

Analysis: Although the identity of the person who filled in cheque entries is ordinarily immaterial once execution is established and the statutory presumption operates, it becomes materially relevant where the complainant's case specifically rests on an assertion that the accused personally wrote the entries. Proof that the handwriting is not that of the accused would directly affect the credibility and acceptability of the complainant's evidence concerning execution and issuance of the cheques. The accused must therefore be afforded an opportunity to obtain expert evidence on that factual assertion.

Conclusion: The accused are entitled to have the impugned cheques sent for expert analysis of the entries, in their favour.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a complainant specifically attributes the writing of cheque entries to the accused, handwriting comparison is relevant to test the credibility of that assertion and cannot be denied merely because a statutory presumption arises upon execution of the cheque.

Issues: Whether the promissory note and allied documents were forged or fabricated, whether the plaintiff proved advancement of the loan and receipt of consideration, and whether the plaintiff's alleged omission to reflect the transaction in income tax returns negatived enforceability of the claim.

Analysis: The plaintiff produced the promissory note, voucher, cheque, notice and reply letter, and the 1st defendant did not deny the signatures on the promissory note and voucher. The reply letter written by the 1st defendant amounted to an admission of the borrowing and of the undertaking to repay. Once execution of the negotiable instrument was proved, the presumption under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 operated in favour of consideration, and the defendant led no rebuttal evidence sufficient to displace it. The plaintiff also examined an attesting witness who supported execution and passing of consideration. The Court further held that non-reflection of the transaction in income tax returns did not, by itself, render the debt unenforceable or defeat the suit, and that the defendant could not rely on such an objection in the absence of a specific pleading and rebuttal proof.

Conclusion: The promissory note was held to be genuine, the plaintiff was held to have proved the loan transaction and receipt of consideration, and the decree in favour of the plaintiff was sustained.

Issues: Whether the acquittal under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 called for interference on the ground that the statutory presumption under Section 139 stood unrebutted and the cheque was issued in discharge of a legally enforceable debt.

Analysis: The offence under Section 138 requires proof that the cheque was issued towards a legally enforceable debt or liability and that the statutory demand requirements were satisfied. Section 139 raises a rebuttable presumption in favour of the holder once the foundational facts are shown, but the presumption can be displaced on a preponderance of probabilities. The complainant's evidence on the alleged loan was found deficient, as no contemporaneous financial records, receipts, or reliable particulars of disbursement were produced, while the defence raised a probable explanation regarding the blank signed cheque and created doubt about the existence of the transaction. In an appeal against acquittal, interference is warranted only where the trial court's view is perverse, illegal, or a misreading of evidence.

Conclusion: The acquittal was upheld because the finding that a legally enforceable debt was not proved was a plausible view and the statutory presumption stood rebutted.

Final Conclusion: The criminal appeal was dismissed and the order of acquittal was affirmed.

Ratio Decidendi: In a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the presumption under Section 139 is rebuttable, and an appellate court will not interfere with an acquittal if the accused has raised a probable defence and the complainant has failed to prove the legally enforceable debt.

Issues: Whether the plaintiff had proved the supply of goods and the subsisting outstanding liability so as to justify a decree for recovery.

Analysis: The recovery claim rested on invoices, delivery challans and a statement of account. The evidence showed that the invoices and challans were proved, and the defendant did not adduce cogent material to disprove the transactions or the supply of goods. However, the statement of account was incomplete and did not reflect later payments, including amounts paid after the date covered by the accounts. Entries in books of account are relevant, but they cannot by themselves fasten liability without supporting proof of the transaction and the complete payment history. In these circumstances, the plaintiff failed to establish the exact outstanding amount with sufficient certainty.

Conclusion: The plaintiff did not prove entitlement to the claimed recovery amount. The dismissal of the suit was .

Issues: (i) Whether an MSME Council award made by a Council comprising eight members, contrary to the statutory maximum of five members, is void ab initio; (ii) Whether the writ petitions challenging such an award are maintainable despite the remedy of setting aside under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Issue (i): Whether an MSME Council award made by a Council comprising eight members, contrary to the statutory maximum of five members, is void ab initio.

Analysis: Section 21 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 mandates a Council of not fewer than three and not more than five members. Rule 4 of the Jharkhand Micro, Small & Medium Enterprises Facilitation Council Rules, 2007, which permitted a larger composition, was contrary to the parent statute and had already been treated as invalid. The Council that issued the award comprised eight members, rendering its constitution contrary to the statutory mandate. A decision by a forum lacking inherent jurisdiction is a nullity and may be challenged at any stage.

Conclusion: The award issued by the eight-member Council was without jurisdiction and void ab initio, in favour of the petitioners.

Issue (ii): Whether the writ petitions challenging such an award are maintainable despite the remedy of setting aside under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Analysis: Although an award under Section 18(3) ordinarily attracts the remedy under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the alternative-remedy rule is self-imposed and does not bar constitutional jurisdiction where the impugned action is wholly without jurisdiction. The challenge concerned the statutory competence and composition of the adjudicating Council, rather than a mixed factual and legal objection capable of ordinary arbitral review. The Section 34 remedy was therefore not an effective bar to writ jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The writ petitions were maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in favour of the petitioners.

Final Conclusion: The invalid award and consequential review order cannot stand; the dispute requires fresh adjudication by a lawfully constituted MSME Council.

Ratio Decidendi: An award of a Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council constituted beyond the member-limit mandated by Section 21 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 is a jurisdictional nullity, for which the alternative remedy under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 does not preclude writ jurisdiction.

Issues: Whether interim protection under Section 9 was warranted for securing the lender's outstanding loan where the agreed mortgage had not been created and the borrower had not created the Debt Service Reserve.

Analysis: The loan remained unsecured to the extent that the agreed mortgage over the financed project had not been created. Although creation and perfection of mortgage under the amended agreement was linked to receipt of a no-objection certificate, the borrower remained independently obliged to create and maintain the Debt Service Reserve under the loan agreement. The arbitral tribunal had not been constituted, and pending insolvency proceedings did not bar the application for interim protection. The absence of mortgage established a prima facie case; the balance of convenience and risk of prejudice also supported protective relief.

Conclusion: Interim protection was warranted in favour of the appellant; the respondent was directed to create the Debt Service Reserve upon the appellant's requirement within the stipulated period.

Issues: (i) Whether the petitioner was disqualified under Clause XIV of the e-auction notice because provident fund dues of the tea estate manager, who was also its director, remained unpaid on the auction date; (ii) Whether the cancellation could be sustained on the recorded circumstances of collusion between the two bidders, although collusion was not stated in the cancellation communication.

Issue (i): Whether the petitioner was disqualified under Clause XIV of the e-auction notice because provident fund dues of the tea estate manager, who was also its director, remained unpaid on the auction date.

Analysis: Clause XIV barred a bidder who was a defaulter with any provident fund organisation. The manager was contractually liable for statutory dues and had defaulted in provident fund contributions until 22.03.2023, after the auction held on 14.03.2023. The petitioner's own letter, issued through that director, represented that the company had invested in, managed and maintained accounts for the tea estate, and the company made payments connected with the estate. These facts established that the company was in substance managing the estate through its director; the separate legal personality of the company could not be invoked to avoid the default for purposes of the auction condition.

Conclusion: The petitioner was a defaulter under Clause XIV on the auction date, and cancellation of its bid was valid. The issue is against the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether the cancellation could be sustained on the recorded circumstances of collusion between the two bidders, although collusion was not stated in the cancellation communication.

Analysis: The records showed that the earnest money deposits of both bidders originated from the same bank account; this was recorded by the Recovery Officer before cancellation of the bids. The petitioner did not deny that fact. Where public interest is involved, an alternative ground traceable to the contemporaneous record may be considered in judicial review, provided fairness is maintained. The recorded circumstances supported an inference of collusion and could not be disregarded merely because they were omitted from the cancellation communication.

Conclusion: The apparent collusion independently supported rejection of the petitioner's bid. The issue is against the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The petitioner acquired no enforceable entitlement to confirmation of the auction sale or restoration of possession of the tea estate.

Ratio Decidendi: A bidder cannot rely on separate corporate personality to evade an auction disqualification where the record demonstrates that the company and its director operated the subject enterprise in substance as one, and a contemporaneously recorded ground affecting public interest may support the administrative action.

Issues: Whether the revisional court was justified in setting aside the order of attachment passed under section 107 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 on the ground that the satisfaction recorded by the Magistrate was based on assumption or suspicion rather than "reason to believe", and whether the absence of notice to a lessor or other claimant vitiated the attachment proceedings.

Analysis: The statutory scheme under section 107 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 requires a genuine formation of "reason to believe" on the basis of material, and not a mere assumption that property is proceeds of crime. The expression must be understood as an objective standard requiring rational connection between the material and the belief formed, with a live link between the facts and the conclusion. The Court also noted that the attachment procedure must be followed strictly, including notice to persons having an interest in the property, and that the statutory safeguards cannot be bypassed on the basis of non-response to notice alone. At the same time, the matter ought not to have ended with merely setting aside the attachment if the defect was procedural and capable of correction through a fresh lawful request.

Conclusion: The revisional court was correct in holding that the original attachment order could not stand, and the challenge to that view failed. The dismissal of the revision was maintained, while liberty remained to seek fresh attachment in accordance with law.

Issues: (i) Whether the conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 could be sustained when the complainant failed to establish the source of funds and financial capacity to advance the alleged loan. (ii) Whether the statutory demand notice required by clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was duly served on the drawer of the cheque.

Issue (i): Whether the conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 could be sustained when the complainant failed to establish the source of funds and financial capacity to advance the alleged loan.

Analysis: The evidence showed that the complainant did not produce bank statements, income-tax returns, or other material to explain the source from which the alleged loan amount was arranged. The Court found that the complainant failed to satisfactorily demonstrate the financial capacity required to advance the money, and that this omission undermined the foundation for invoking the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Conclusion: The finding of guilt could not be sustained on the basis of the evidence relating to source of funds and financial capacity, and this issue was decided in favour of the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether the statutory demand notice required by clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was duly served on the drawer of the cheque.

Analysis: The material on record, including the postal correspondence and the complainant's evidence, indicated that the notice was received by another person and not by the petitioner. Applying the governing requirement that notice must be given to the drawer within the prescribed period, the Court found non-compliance with the mandatory notice requirement.

Conclusion: The statutory notice was not duly served on the petitioner, and this issue was decided in favour of the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The concurrent conviction and sentence were held unsustainable, and the petitioner was acquitted of the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Ratio Decidendi: In a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the complainant must establish both compliance with the mandatory notice requirement and a credible basis for the alleged loan, including the financial capacity and source of funds, failing which the presumption in favour of the cheque holder cannot sustain the conviction.

Issues: Whether the arbitral award, insofar as it treated the value of non-tendered items as exclusive of GST and computed GST thereon, suffered from patent illegality for ignoring material evidence.

Analysis: The appeal was confined to the narrow question whether the figure attributed to non-tendered items included GST. The Court noted that interference under Section 34 and Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is limited and that an award based on no evidence or by ignoring vital evidence may be set aside for patent illegality. The arbitral tribunal had relied mainly on the final bill to conclude that the amount was exclusive of GST, but the record also contained RA bills and tabulated statements showing that at least some of the non-tendered item values expressly included GST. The tribunal did not consider this material and instead proceeded on the basis that the opposite party had not proved inclusion of GST. The Court held that such omission rendered the finding vulnerable, though the exact quantum of GST embedded in the figure was not finally determined on the record before it.

Conclusion: The finding that the value of non-tendered items was Rs. 9,65,91,596/- exclusive of GST was set aside, and the GST and interest components were required to be recomputed.

Issues: Whether the concurrent conviction and sentence for dishonour of cheque under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 deserved interference in revision, and whether the compensation awarded was excessive.

Analysis: The accused admitted issuance and signature on the cheque, dishonour for insufficient funds, and receipt of statutory notice, but led no evidence to rebut the presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. Mere denial in the statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and the plea that the cheque was issued as security, did not displace the statutory presumption of a legally enforceable debt. The revisional court's scope was limited to correcting patent illegality, jurisdictional error, or perversity, and there was no basis to reappreciate evidence or upset the concurrent findings. The compensation awarded was also found to be within permissible limits and not excessive in the circumstances.

Conclusion: The conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and the sentence including compensation were upheld, and no revisional interference was warranted.

Ratio Decidendi: In revision against concurrent findings in a cheque dishonour case, the High Court will not reappreciate evidence unless there is perversity or patent illegality, and once issuance and signature on the cheque are admitted, the statutory presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 operate until rebutted by defence evidence.

Issues: (i) Whether the proceedings in a cheque dishonour prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 should be stayed on the ground of pendency of a civil appeal arising from the same transaction; (ii) Whether the complaint deserved to be quashed after long delay on the pleas relating to marking of documents, financial capacity, and liability.

Issue (i): Whether the proceedings in a cheque dishonour prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 should be stayed on the ground of pendency of a civil appeal arising from the same transaction.

Analysis: The legal position is that civil and criminal proceedings arising from the same transaction may proceed simultaneously and independently. The pendency of an appeal against the civil decree does not bar continuation of the prosecution, and the challenge based on the alleged reason for seeking stay was found to be untenable.

Conclusion: The request to stay the prosecution was rightly rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether the complaint deserved to be quashed after long delay on the pleas relating to marking of documents, financial capacity, and liability.

Analysis: The complaint disclosed the essential ingredients of the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The presumption under Section 139 includes the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, and disputed factual defences cannot be examined in depth at the quashing stage. The long pendency of the case did not furnish a ground to quash the prosecution, and the challenge to the marking of documents was also found to be without merit.

Conclusion: The complaint was not liable to be quashed.

Final Conclusion: The criminal miscellaneous case failed in its entirety, while the trial court was directed to conclude the cheque dishonour case expeditiously in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: A prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 cannot be stayed or quashed merely because a connected civil dispute or appeal is pending, and the statutory presumption under Section 139 precludes pre-trial adjudication of disputed factual defences.

Issues: Whether the acquittal under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was liable to be interfered with in view of the proved dishonour of the cheque, the returned demand notice marked as unclaimed, and the presumption under Section 139.

Analysis: The complainant's evidence established the loan transaction, issuance of the cheque, its dishonour for insufficiency of funds, and dispatch of the statutory notice to the drawer's known address. The return of the notice with the endorsement 'unclaimed' was treated as sufficient compliance with the notice requirement, and the presumption of service was applied on the basis that notice sent to the correct address is deemed served. The accused adduced no evidence to rebut the complainant's version or to prove the alleged alternative transaction and discharge. The discrepancy between describing the accused as a person known to the complainant and as a friend was held immaterial. The initial burden to prove the transaction and execution of the cheque was found to have been discharged, thereby attracting the statutory presumption, which remained unrebutted.

Conclusion: The acquittal was set aside and the accused was found guilty under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Issues: Whether suspension of the administrative classification of the borrower account as fraud under the RBI framework barred the CBI from registering an FIR, continuing criminal investigation, and conducting searches pursuant to judicial warrants.

Analysis: The interim order concerning fraud classification was confined to its regulatory and administrative consequences. A criminal investigation into cognizable offences proceeds under an independent statutory regime; overlap between the factual basis of bank action and the FIR does not make the investigation a merely consequential administrative action. No express restraint against the investigating agency or criminal proceedings had been issued. The searches were conducted pursuant to warrants issued by the competent criminal court, and disputed allegations concerning their execution were not suitable for adjudication under Article 226 on competing affidavits. In the absence of patent lack of jurisdiction, manifest mala fides, or clear abuse of process, extraordinary writ jurisdiction could not be used to halt an investigation into serious allegations involving diversion of public funds.

Conclusion: Suspension of the fraud classification did not prohibit the FIR, criminal investigation, or search and seizure operations; no ground for interference with the ongoing investigation was established.

Issues: Whether the orders rejecting the applications seeking acquittal in the cheque dishonour appeals were liable to be quashed and the applications restored for reconsideration in the light of the Supreme Court's guidelines on compounding and allied reliefs.

Analysis: The cheque amount in each matter had already been substantially deposited, and the petitioner offered to deposit additional sums. The governing principles in cheque dishonour matters were traced to the Supreme Court's guidelines on compounding, as modified, under which payment before the Sessions Court or High Court in appeal may justify compounding on payment of 7.5% of the cheque amount. The later guidance also recognised that, where the complainant does not consent to compounding, the court may consider the alternatives of permitting a plea of guilt, invoking the power corresponding to Section 255(2) and Section 255(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or Section 278 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, and extending the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. These directions were held applicable at the appellate stage as well.

Conclusion: The impugned orders were quashed and set aside, and the applications were restored to the appellate court for fresh consideration after deposit of the additional amount, with directions to decide them in the light of the Supreme Court's guidelines.

Issues: Whether the Delhi High Court was justified in declining to entertain the writ petition on the ground of forum non conveniens despite the respondents' offices being situated in Delhi and the Court having jurisdiction under Article 226.

Analysis: The writ petition could be maintained before more than one High Court on different jurisdictional bases. Where jurisdiction is attracted under Article 226 by reason of the situs of the respondents' office, the doctrine of forum non conveniens has a limited role and should be applied sparingly. In a challenge to dismissal from BSF service, the relevant records would ordinarily be available with the respondents, and the choice of a forum convenient to the respondents cannot be treated as self-defeating. The Delhi High Court, therefore, ought not to have declined to entertain the petition merely because other fora were also available.

Conclusion: The refusal to exercise jurisdiction on the ground of forum non conveniens was unsustainable and the writ petition ought to be heard on merits.

Issues: (i) whether continuation of arbitration against the petitioners despite interim moratorium under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code was sustainable; (ii) whether refusal to permit cross-examination of the Bank's witness vitiated the awards; (iii) whether the arbitral findings on proof of claim, stamp duty, membership and discharge of guarantor called for interference under Section 34; and (iv) whether the directions enforcing mortgage-related reliefs were arbitrable.

Issue (i): whether continuation of arbitration against the petitioners despite interim moratorium under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code was sustainable.

Analysis: The interim moratorium under Section 96 operates in respect of the debt and not merely against the individual applicant. Once the moratorium came into force on the applications filed by some guarantors, the debt itself was kept in abeyance. Continuation of the arbitral proceedings against the remaining guarantors, while the same debt was under statutory interdiction, disregarded binding legal principles and amounted to enforcement of an unenforceable debt.

Conclusion: The continuation of the proceedings against the petitioners was unsustainable and the awards were liable to be set aside on this ground.

Issue (ii): whether refusal to permit cross-examination of the Bank's witness vitiated the awards.

Analysis: The Bank led evidence by affidavit and the arbitral tribunal relied upon that evidence to hold the claim proved. The petitioners had disputed execution of the guarantee and related documents and sought cross-examination of the witness. In such a contested factual situation, denial of cross-examination impaired the equal treatment of parties and the full opportunity to present the case, offending the requirements of natural justice under Sections 18 and 24.

Conclusion: The refusal to permit cross-examination constituted a breach of natural justice and furnished a ground for setting aside the awards.

Issue (iii): whether the arbitral findings on proof of claim, stamp duty, membership and discharge of guarantor called for interference under Section 34.

Analysis: The challenge regarding sufficiency of stamp duty, the principal instrument, the petitioners' membership of the Bank, and the effect of contractual clauses on the guarantor's liability involved factual appraisal and scrutiny of the terms of the instruments. Those matters did not justify re-appreciation of evidence in Section 34 proceedings. The finding that the guarantee permitted variation and restructuring, and the finding that the petitioners were members of the Bank, were not interfered with on merits. However, the finding that the Bank's claim stood proved was rendered vulnerable because it rested on evidence that ought to have been tested by cross-examination.

Conclusion: No interference was warranted on the stamp duty, membership and contractual discharge issues, but the finding on proof of claim could not be sustained in view of the procedural infirmity.

Issue (iv): whether the directions enforcing mortgage-related reliefs were arbitrable.

Analysis: The award contained directions declaring the Bank's charge, permitting disposal of mortgaged property, restraining third-party rights and directing attachment till sale and realisation. Such reliefs amount to enforcement of a mortgage, which is a right in rem and falls outside arbitral jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The mortgage-enforcement directions were non-arbitrable and could not be sustained.

Final Conclusion: The awards were set aside on substantive and procedural grounds, namely the statutory moratorium, denial of cross-examination, patent illegality in the proof of claim, and the grant of non-arbitrable mortgage-enforcement reliefs.

Ratio Decidendi: Interim moratorium under Section 96 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code stays the debt itself, refusal of cross-examination in a contested evidentiary arbitration violates natural justice, and mortgage enforcement remains outside arbitral jurisdiction as a right in rem.