Issues: Whether regular bail should be granted where the search and seizure process prima facie breached statutory safeguards under the NDPS Act.

Analysis: The appraisal letter inaccurately conveyed the statutory choice concerning search before a Magistrate or Gazetted Officer, indicating prima facie non-compliance with Sections 42 and 50. The alleged contraband was identified without requisite testing, and substances recovered from four separate pouches were mixed before being weighed, indicating a prima facie vitiated seizure. The observations are confined to the bail application and do not determine the merits of the prosecution.

Outcome: Regular bail granted.

Issues: (i) Whether the second application for unilateral assignment of leasehold rights was maintainable in view of the earlier final order and the directions requiring the complications to be resolved first; (ii) whether the competent authority could take a contrary view on the same controversy and grant relief without the earlier findings being set aside.

Issue (i): Whether the second application for unilateral assignment of leasehold rights was maintainable in view of the earlier final order and the directions requiring the complications to be resolved first.

Analysis: The earlier order rejected the first application and permitted a fresh application only after the legal complications arising from the prior transactions were sorted out before the appropriate court or forum. That order was not challenged and attained finality. In those circumstances, the subsequent application could not be entertained as if the earlier determination had no effect, because the earlier decision had already concluded that the relief could not be granted on the existing state of facts.

Conclusion: The second application was not maintainable and ought to have been rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether the competent authority could take a contrary view on the same controversy and grant relief without the earlier findings being set aside.

Analysis: The principles governing finality apply to quasi-judicial authorities. Once such an authority records a finding on law or fact, that determination binds the parties unless it is reversed in accordance with law. A later authority cannot, in effect, disregard or override the earlier final order and reach a contrary conclusion on the same issue in a subsequent round. The grant of relief on the second application therefore suffered from jurisdictional infirmity.

Conclusion: The competent authority could not lawfully take a contrary view or grant the relief on the second application.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order could not be sustained, and the relief granted on the second application was quashed while leaving the earlier conditional liberty intact for future pursuit after resolution of the underlying complications.

Ratio Decidendi: Res judicata and finality bind quasi-judicial authorities, so a subsequent application on the same controversy cannot be entertained or decided contrary to an earlier final order unless that order has been set aside in accordance with law.

The primary legal issues considered in this judgment are:

(i) Whether the Central Consumer Protection Authority (CCPA) can issue the impugned guidelines to hotels and restaurants regarding the collection of service charges.

(ii) Whether hotels and restaurants can levy service charges on customers.

(iii) Whether the service charge can be made compulsorily payable by customers.

(iv) Whether the amount collected can be called 'Service Charge'.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

(i) Authority of CCPA to Issue Guidelines:

- Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The Consumer Protection Act, 2019 (CPA, 2019) establishes the CCPA under Section 10, empowering it to protect consumer rights and prevent unfair trade practices. Section 18(2)(l) authorizes the CCPA to issue guidelines to prevent unfair trade practices and protect consumer interests.

- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court found that the CCPA is empowered to issue guidelines under the CPA, 2019. The guidelines have statutory backing and are enforceable, as they are issued under the authority granted by the Act.

- Conclusions: The guidelines issued by the CCPA are valid and enforceable as they are within the statutory mandate of the CCPA.

(ii) Levying of Service Charges:

- Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The CPA, 2019 defines unfair trade practices and unfair contracts. The Act aims to protect consumers from practices that impose unreasonable charges or conditions.

- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court held that mandatory service charges constitute an unfair trade practice and an unfair contract under Sections 2(46) and 2(47) of the CPA, 2019. The imposition of service charges without consumer consent is misleading and deceptive.

- Key Evidence and Findings: Complaints from consumers indicated coercive and misleading practices by restaurants in collecting service charges. The CCPA's guidelines aim to address these issues.

- Conclusions: Mandatory service charges are contrary to consumer rights and constitute an unfair trade practice.

(iii) Compulsory Payment of Service Charges:

- Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The right to practice any profession or carry on any occupation, trade, or business is subject to reasonable restrictions under Article 19(6) of the Constitution of India.

- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court found that the mandatory collection of service charges impinges on consumer rights and is not a reasonable restriction on the freedom of trade. The guidelines are a proportional measure to protect consumer interests.

- Conclusions: Service charges cannot be made compulsory, and consumers must have the option to decide whether to pay them.

(iv) Nomenclature and Misleading Nature of Service Charges:

- Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The CPA, 2019 defines misleading practices and unfair trade practices. The use of the term 'service charge' can mislead consumers into believing it is a government levy.

- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court held that the term 'service charge' is misleading and deceptive. Alternative terminologies such as 'voluntary contribution' or 'staff welfare fund' should be used to avoid confusion.

- Conclusions: The use of the term 'service charge' is misleading, and restaurants should adopt alternative terminologies that accurately reflect the voluntary nature of the charge.

3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS

- The CCPA is fully empowered to issue guidelines under the CPA, 2019, and these guidelines are enforceable as they have statutory backing.

- The mandatory collection of service charges by restaurants is an unfair trade practice and constitutes an unfair contract under the CPA, 2019.

- Service charges cannot be made compulsory, and consumers must have the discretion to decide whether to pay them.

- The term 'service charge' is misleading, and restaurants should use alternative terminologies that accurately reflect the voluntary nature of the charge.

- The guidelines issued by the CCPA are valid and in the interest of consumers, and all restaurant establishments must adhere to them.

- The writ petitions are dismissed with costs, and the CCPA is free to enforce its guidelines in accordance with the law.

1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED

(i) Whether the Court, in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, could adjudicate the petitioner's grievance that it was prevented from participating effectively in the reverse auction due to an alleged "technical glitch" on the e-portal, and consequently grant directions to reconduct/cancel the tender and restrain implementation of the award.

(ii) Whether the nature of the controversy-turning on disputed technical facts, portal logs, and electronic evidence-rendered the writ petition non-maintainable/unsuitable for determination on affidavits, particularly in the absence of any pleaded mala fides against the portal authority or its officials.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue (i) & (ii): Maintainability and adjudicability of the "technical glitch" tender dispute under Article 226

Legal framework: The Court proceeded on the basis of the limits of writ jurisdiction under Article 226, specifically that such jurisdiction is not suited for resolution of disputes requiring evaluation of contested facts and detailed technical/electronic material on the basis of affidavits alone.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court considered that the petitioner's case depended entirely on establishing that the reverse auction portal became unresponsive and prevented submission/modification of bids. Given the "highly technical" nature of the allegation, the Court had earlier sought an independent expert assessment through an expert committee. The expert committee's conclusion did not provide definitive support to either side, stating there was no conclusive evidence to confidently affirm portal unresponsiveness or to declare the petitioner's claim false. The Court treated this inconclusive outcome as reinforcing that the controversy was factual and technical, requiring scrutiny of records, logs, and electronic evidence. The Court held that such an exercise is not within the proper domain or scope of a writ court and could not be satisfactorily adjudicated "on mere affidavits." The Court additionally noted that no mala fides were alleged against the portal authority or its officials, which further weighed against writ intervention in the tender outcome based on an unresolved technical-factual dispute.

Conclusions: The Court held that, in these circumstances, the writ petition could not be entertained. Consequently, the request to reconduct the reverse auction/bidding process, cancel the tender, and restrain effect to the award was not granted, and the writ petition was dismissed.

Issues: (i) Whether the poem recited in the background of the appellant's social media post disclosed offences under Sections 196, 197, 299, 302 and 57 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023; (ii) whether the police were bound to register the FIR and whether the High Court was justified in refusing quashing at the nascent stage of investigation.

Issue (i): Whether the poem recited in the background of the appellant's social media post disclosed offences under Sections 196, 197, 299, 302 and 57 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

Analysis: The poem, read on its plain meaning and in context, was held to be a protest against injustice and a message of non-violence. It did not refer to any religion, caste, community, race, language or regional group, and did not promote disharmony, hatred, ill-will, public disorder or impairment of national integrity. The essential ingredients of the invoked penal provisions were held absent, and mens rea was found impossible to attribute to the appellant. Section 57 was also found inapplicable on the face of the record.

Conclusion: The offences alleged under Sections 196, 197, 299, 302 and 57 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 were not made out against the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the police were bound to register the FIR and whether the High Court was justified in refusing quashing at the nascent stage of investigation.

Analysis: Section 173 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 was held to require registration of an FIR only where cognizable offence is disclosed, but sub-section (3) creates an exception permitting a preliminary inquiry in offences punishable with imprisonment of three years or more but less than seven years. The Court held that, in cases founded on spoken or written words and implicating free speech, the meaning of the words must be assessed to determine whether a cognizable offence is even disclosed, and such exercise does not amount to an impermissible inquiry. It further held that there is no absolute bar on quashing merely because investigation is at a nascent stage where no offence is made out on the face of the record.

Conclusion: The FIR ought not to have been registered on the facts, and the High Court erred in declining to quash the proceedings.

Final Conclusion: The appellant's social media post was held to be protected speech and not a criminal incitement, and the criminal proceedings based on the FIR were found unsustainable in law.

Ratio Decidendi: In cases alleging offences based on spoken, written, or expressive words, the police and constitutional courts must evaluate the content and context to determine whether the statutory ingredients are disclosed, and where no cognizable offence is made out, criminal process cannot be sustained merely because investigation has begun.

Issues: Whether the applicant was entitled to regular bail in a prosecution under the NDPS Act despite the bar under Section 37, in view of the nature of the alleged material, the stage of the trial, and the period of custody.

Analysis: The application was considered against the stringent bail regime under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which requires the Court to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty and is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. The prosecution case rested primarily on alleged financial links, disclosure statements, and claimed involvement in a drug-trafficking conspiracy, while no contraband or incriminating recovery was made from the applicant. The Court found that the alleged monetary transactions and their nexus with the contraband were matters for trial and did not, at the bail stage, establish tainted proceeds or proximate involvement with the seizure. The applicant had remained in custody since 05.05.2022, charges had not yet been framed, and the trial was likely to take considerable time. The constitutional value of personal liberty and the principle against prolonged pre-trial incarceration were also considered relevant in the exercise of bail discretion.

Conclusion: The applicant was held entitled to regular bail and the bail application was allowed.

Issues: Whether leave to appeal against the acquittal under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 should be granted when the accused admitted his signature on the cheque but the complainant failed to prove the loan transaction and financial capacity.

Analysis: In a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the presumptions under Section 118(a) and Section 139 operate once the execution of the cheque is admitted, but those presumptions remain rebuttable. The accused is not required to prove his defence beyond reasonable doubt and may rebut the presumption by showing a probable defence on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities, including by relying on inconsistencies and deficiencies in the complainant's evidence. On the record, the complainant's version about the source and mode of advancement of the alleged loan was found inconsistent and unsupported by corroborative material. The complainant failed to substantiate the alleged payment through bank records or income tax returns, and the claimed mortgage security also remained unproved. The accused's explanation that the cheque was issued as security, coupled with the contradictions in the complainant's evidence, was held sufficient to rebut the statutory presumption.

Conclusion: The acquittal was found to be well-reasoned and free from perversity or legal infirmity, and leave to appeal was declined.

Issues: Whether the constitution of the Selection Committee for appointment of the Vice-Chancellor was in accordance with Section 24 of the governing Act, and whether any action taken pursuant to a constituted in breach of that provision was valid.

Analysis: Section 24 required the Vice-Chancellor to be appointed by the Chancellor on the recommendation of a Selection Committee consisting of a nominee of the Chancellor, the Director General, Indian Council of Agricultural Research, and the Chairman, University Grants Commission or his nominee. The statutory scheme made the composition of the Committee mandatory, and the Committee had to be constituted in the manner prescribed by the Act. The Committee notified in the present matter did not conform to that composition, as the mandatory participation of the Director General, ICAR, was not reflected in the manner required by the statute. Once the constitution of the Committee was contrary to the Act, every action taken by such body in furtherance of the selection process lacked legal validity.

Conclusion: The constitution of the Selection Committee was illegal and any process initiated by it was void and unenforceable.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition succeeded and the selection process based on the impugned Committee was set aside, with all consequential action also falling.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statute prescribes the composition and mode of constitution of a selection body in mandatory terms, the authority must act strictly in that manner, and any action taken by a committee constituted in deviation from the statute is a nullity.

Issues: (i) Whether criminal proceedings could be quashed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 after dismissal of the discharge application and the revision petition on the same factual grounds. (ii) Whether the alleged invalidity and delay in granting sanction to prosecute furnished a ground to quash the proceedings at the threshold.

Issue (i): Whether criminal proceedings could be quashed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 after dismissal of the discharge application and the revision petition on the same factual grounds.

Analysis: The material had already been examined by the Special Court at the discharge stage and by the High Court in revision, and both had found a prima facie case for trial. The later petition under Section 482 raised substantially the same grounds without any material change in facts. The permissible scope of inherent jurisdiction does not extend to reappreciating evidence, assessing whether conviction is likely, or conducting a mini trial when the matter is only at the stage of proceeding against the accused.

Conclusion: The quashing of the prosecution on this ground was unjustified and the proceedings ought not to have been interdicted under Section 482.

Issue (ii): Whether the alleged invalidity and delay in granting sanction to prosecute furnished a ground to quash the proceedings at the threshold.

Analysis: The validity of a sanction order, including questions of competence, application of mind, delay, or alleged irregularity, is ordinarily a matter for examination during trial when the relevant file and evidence can be tested. A mere delay in the grant of sanction does not, by itself, warrant quashing of the prosecution, particularly where the alleged discrepancy could be explained by evidence at trial.

Conclusion: The sanction-related objections did not justify quashing the criminal proceedings at the threshold.

Final Conclusion: The order quashing the prosecution was set aside and the criminal case was restored to the trial court for continuation of trial from the stage at which it was interrupted.

Ratio Decidendi: The inherent power to quash cannot be used to revisit the merits of a prosecution already found to disclose a prima facie case, and objections to the validity or delay of sanction for prosecution ordinarily remain matters for determination at trial rather than at the quashing stage.

Issues: Whether the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 could validly proceed before the Bidhannagar court despite the transfer directions flowing from the territorial jurisdiction ruling in Dasharath, and whether the proceeding had already crossed the stage at which the complaint could be retained because evidence had commenced under Section 145(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Analysis: The complaint had been taken cognizance of, summons had been issued, the accused had appeared, sought bail, and pleaded not guilty. The proceeding had progressed beyond the initial stage, and the record showed that the matter had been fixed for evidence. The jurisdictional return of the complaint was therefore examined against the governing principle that only those cheque dishonour matters in which post-summoning evidence had commenced could continue at the same place, while other complaints were to be returned for filing before the court of proper territorial jurisdiction. On the facts placed before the Court, the finding of the Magistrate that the stage under Section 145(2) had not been reached was held to be an incorrect application of the governing law.

Conclusion: The complaint was held to be maintainable before the Bidhannagar court, and the court was directed to proceed with the case in accordance with law.

Issues: (i) Whether leave to appeal should be granted against the acquittal of accused No. 4 on the question of vicarious liability under the Negotiable Instruments Act. (ii) Whether leave to appeal should be granted against the acquittal of accused No. 2 on the issue of existence of legally enforceable debt and liability under the cheque transaction.

Issue (i): Whether leave to appeal should be granted against the acquittal of accused No. 4 on the question of vicarious liability under the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Analysis: Liability of a director or officer of a company in a prosecution for dishonour of cheque can arise only if the complaint and evidence show that the person was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company, or that the ingredients of consent, connivance or neglect are established. Mere correspondence or general awareness of some transaction is not enough. The material on record showed only that accused No. 4 had participated in earlier correspondence regarding previous cheques, without proof that he was connected with issuance of the present cheques or with the day-to-day conduct of the company's business.

Conclusion: Leave to appeal was rightly refused against accused No. 4, and the challenge to his acquittal was rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether leave to appeal should be granted against the acquittal of accused No. 2 on the issue of existence of legally enforceable debt and liability under the cheque transaction.

Analysis: The record contained the signed cheques, the agreement between the parties, the recovery certificates, the dishonour memos, the statutory notice, and oral evidence supporting the complainant's version. The question whether the debt was not proved, and whether omission to reflect the amount in income-tax returns or absence of some further documents destroyed the claim, required closer scrutiny of the evidence in appeal. At the stage of leave, the Court found that the appellate findings on non-proof of liability needed examination on merits.

Conclusion: Leave to appeal was granted against accused No. 2, and the challenge to his acquittal was entertained.

Final Conclusion: The application failed insofar as accused No. 4 was concerned, but succeeded insofar as accused No. 2 was concerned, resulting in a partial grant of leave and partial refusal of leave.

Ratio Decidendi: In a prosecution under Sections 138, 141 and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, vicarious liability of company officers must be supported by material showing their role in the conduct of business or their consent, connivance or neglect, whereas the sufficiency of proof of the underlying debt and cheque liability may warrant appellate scrutiny where the record contains substantive evidence supporting the complainant's claim.

Issues: (i) Whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the NCDRC order and enhancing the rate of interest from 9% p.a. to 15% p.a. and awarding enhanced compensation; and (ii) Whether the compensatory award of Rs. 10,00,000/- should be maintained.

Issue (i): Whether the High Court was justified in enhancing the rate of interest from 9% p.a. (as awarded by NCDRC) to 15% p.a.

Analysis: The question required assessment of whether interference by the High Court under Article 227 was warranted in modifying a fact-sensitive, reasoned determination made by the NCDRC which had considered delay, option for refund by the allottee, and the circumstances of the allotment. Precedent establishes that where possession is not delivered within specified time, the allottee is entitled to refund with reasonable interest; the appropriate rate depends on the facts and equitable balancing. The NCDRC's award of 9% p.a. followed evaluation of evidence and choice of refund by the complainant. The High Court's enhancement to 15% p.a. was not shown to be compelled by the factual matrix or legal standards applicable to such consumer disputes.

Conclusion: The High Court's enhancement of interest to 15% p.a. was not justified; the NCDRC's award of interest at 9% p.a. is restored.

Issue (ii): Whether the compensation awarded of Rs. 10,00,000/- should be sustained.

Analysis: Consideration was given to the nature of the respondent (an instrumentality of the State), the course of conduct, and proportionality of the compensatory sum relative to ends of justice. The Court found that a reduction would adequately meet justice without unduly penalising the public authority, having regard to deposits already made and the factual circumstances.

Conclusion: The compensation is reduced from Rs. 10,00,000/- to Rs. 7,50,000/-.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is partly allowed by setting aside the High Court's enhancement of interest to 15% p.a., restoring the NCDRC's award of interest at 9% p.a., and reducing the compensation awarded to Rs. 7,50,000/-. The remainder of the NCDRC order as to refund with interest is maintained.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a specialised forum has made a reasoned, fact-based determination of refund and a reasonable rate of interest for delay, supervisory interference is improper unless the rate or compensation is shown to be legally unsupportable or manifestly excessive; courts should restore a fact-based reasonable award and may moderate excessive compensation in the interest of proportionality.

Issues: Whether a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was liable to be quashed where the complainant suppressed material letters and documents relevant to the defence and to the reply to the statutory notice.

Analysis: In a complaint under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the Magistrate must examine the complainant on oath to ascertain whether there are sufficient grounds to proceed. The complaint in question was founded on a statutory notice that relied on documents said to have been executed by the accused, yet the complaint and the supporting statement on oath did not disclose the accused's reply seeking copies of those very documents or the subsequent letter repeating that grievance. The suppressed material was directly relevant to whether the accused had been given a fair opportunity to answer the demand notice and whether the complaint disclosed the full and true factual basis for criminal process. A complainant who withholds such material facts and documents cannot invoke criminal process and the omission amounts to abuse of the process of law.

Conclusion: The complaint was rightly held to be liable to be quashed, and the challenge to the issuance of process succeeded.

Final Conclusion: The prosecution could not be sustained because criminal law had been set in motion on a materially incomplete and misleading presentation of facts, and the complaint and cognizance order were set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: A complaint founded on suppression of material facts or documents relevant to the statutory notice and the accused's reply is an abuse of the criminal process and may be quashed at the threshold.

Issues: Whether non-compliance with the safeguards under Section 52A of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 and Standing Order No. 1/89, together with the manner in which the seized contraband was handled, vitiated the prosecution case and entitled the appellants to acquittal.

Analysis: The seized contraband remained in the custody of the investigating officer for about fifteen days before being produced in Court, and the record showed that it was not properly sealed. The procedure prescribed for sampling, storage and disposal under Standing Order No. 1/89 was not substantially complied with, and the investigating officer was unaware of the standing order. The evidence also disclosed clear non-compliance with Section 52A. In these circumstances, the possibility of tampering could not be ruled out, and the prosecution failed to discharge the burden of showing that the non-compliance did not prejudice its case.

Conclusion: The conviction could not be sustained, and the appellants were entitled to the benefit of doubt.

Ratio Decidendi: In prosecutions under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, substantial compliance with the statutory safeguards governing seizure, sealing, storage and sampling of contraband is essential; where material non-compliance leaves a real possibility of tampering and the prosecution does not dispel that prejudice, the conviction cannot stand.

(a) Whether the Petitioners are entitled to the benefit of the One Time Settlement (OTS) Scheme offered by HUDCO in respect of the outstanding loan dues.

(b) The applicability and interpretation of the recovery certificate issued by the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) and the modification thereof by the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal (DRAT), particularly concerning the rate of interest and default clauses.

(c) Whether the Petitioners can challenge the rate of interest stipulated in the recovery certificate and seek reduction of the same under the writ jurisdiction of the High Court.

(d) The maintainability of the writ petition in light of alternate remedies available before the Debt Recovery Tribunal and other forums.

(e) The effect of the Petitioners' defaults on their entitlement to any concession or settlement, including the impact of non-renewal of lease and auction proceedings.

(f) The permissibility of HUDCO initiating precipitative steps under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) during the pendency of settlement negotiations and writ proceedings.

(g) The quantum of outstanding dues payable by the Petitioners, including principal, interest, and costs, and the applicable rate of interest during pendency of litigation.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

(a) Entitlement to OTS Scheme and Settlement Proposals

The legal framework involves HUDCO's OTS Scheme of 2014 and 2019, which set out conditions under which borrowers may settle dues. The Petitioners sought directions to compel HUDCO to accept their OTS offer, asserting that their case did not fall under the exclusion clause (Clause 6.4.1 of 2014 Scheme, Clause 6.5 of 2019 Scheme) that barred decreed cases from availing the scheme.

The Court examined the factual matrix showing the Petitioners' repeated defaults and the history of litigation. HUDCO consistently rejected the OTS proposals on grounds of erroneous calculations and entitlement to recover the full amount under the recovery certificate. The Court noted that the Petitioners had approached various forums, including the DRT, DRAT, NCLAT, and this Court, seeking relief and settlement.

The Court directed HUDCO to consider the fresh settlement proposal dispassionately but did not express any opinion on its merits. Ultimately, HUDCO rejected the OTS proposal, leading to adjudication on merits.

(b) Interpretation and Effect of Recovery Certificate and Interest Rate

The recovery certificate dated 12th August 2015, and its modification by DRAT on 1st April 2016, formed the core legal document defining the amount recoverable, interest rate, and default consequences. The DRAT had allowed four months' time to the Petitioners to pay the dues with simple interest @14% p.a., with a default clause that failure would entitle HUDCO to recover at contractual interest of 15.5% p.a. with quarterly rests.

The Court held that the recovery certificate and its modification are binding and final. It is not open to the Court in writ jurisdiction to reinterpret or go behind the recovery certificate to alter contractual terms. The Petitioners' failure to pay within the stipulated period disentitles them from claiming concessional interest rates thereafter.

HUDCO's Board had fixed the base rate at 15.5% as of 1st April 2013, with subsequent increases, which when applied with contractual terms, resulted in a significantly higher amount due. The Petitioners' contention that RBI circulars and fair practice codes should influence interest calculation was considered, but the Court noted that such circulars do not apply to decreed cases where recovery certificates have been issued.

(c) Power of the Court to Reduce Rate of Interest under Writ Jurisdiction

The Petitioners relied on Supreme Court and High Court precedents that courts can exercise discretion under writ jurisdiction to reduce interest rates, especially considering hardships such as the COVID-19 pandemic and RBI guidelines encouraging OTS and remission for MSMEs.

The Court acknowledged these precedents but emphasized the unique facts of the case, including the long delay, repeated defaults, and the public money involved. The Court balanced these factors by allowing a concessional simple interest rate of 14% p.a. on the amount due up to the date of issuance of the writ petition notice (23rd January 2020), while affirming that the contractual rate of 15.5% p.a. with quarterly rests applies thereafter if payment is not made by the stipulated deadline.

(d) Maintainability of the Writ Petition

HUDCO and an intervenor argued that the writ petition was not maintainable as alternate efficacious remedies existed before the DRT, especially in light of the Supreme Court judgment in South Indian Bank Ltd. vs. Naveen Mathew Philip, which restricts writ jurisdiction in matters where statutory remedies are available.

The Court, while noting these submissions, proceeded to hear the matter on merits, given the complex factual and procedural history and the ongoing litigation in multiple fora. The Court also clarified that the parties remain free to place the order before other forums for appropriate directions.

(e) Effect of Defaults, Non-renewal of Lease, and Auction Proceedings

The Petitioners' failure to renew the lease of the Noida property led to its termination by the Noida Authority, which was a material factor affecting the status of the property and the Petitioners' rights. The Court made it clear that unless the lease was restored, it would not entertain applications related to the property.

The auction notice issued by HUDCO was stayed by the Supreme Court and this Court during pendency of the writ petition and settlement negotiations. However, the Court observed that the Petitioners' repeated defaults and failure to comply with lease obligations undermined their position.

The Court directed the Petitioners to deposit substantial sums as a demonstration of bona fide and restrained HUDCO from initiating precipitative proceedings under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code while settlement offers were under consideration.

(f) Initiation of Precipitative Steps under IBC

The Court held that once it granted time to HUDCO to consider the Petitioners' settlement proposal, HUDCO ought not to have initiated precipitative steps under IBC. The Court directed the Petitioners to deposit Rs. 20 crores in two installments as a condition to HUDCO's continued forbearance and to demonstrate bona fide intent to settle.

HUDCO's rejection of the OTS proposal after such consideration led the Court to proceed with adjudication on merits.

(g) Quantum of Outstanding Dues and Interest Calculation

The Court directed both parties to place on record the statement of accounts reflecting disbursements, payments, and outstanding dues as per the recovery certificate and loan agreement.

The Petitioners contended that they had paid Rs. 135.38 crores against the disbursed Rs. 62.38 crores and sought interest calculation based on RBI base rates plus 1%, resulting in a lower outstanding amount.

HUDCO contended that applying the contractual rate of 15.5% p.a. with quarterly rests resulted in dues exceeding Rs. 200 crores.

Balancing these contentions, the Court held that the amount due as on 31st March 2025 was Rs. 150.18 crores, comprising principal of approximately Rs. 86.99 crores and interest of Rs. 63.19 crores at 14% p.a. till 23rd January 2020. The Rs. 20.61 crores deposited with the Court was to be released to HUDCO, leaving a net outstanding of Rs. 130.07 crores to be paid by 30th September 2025, including litigation costs of Rs. 50 lakhs.

The Court further directed that if the Petitioners failed to pay by the deadline, the full contractual interest rate of 15.5% p.a. with quarterly rests and costs would apply.

3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS

"The final recovery certificate, which is still valid and has not been challenged by the Petitioners, is the order dated 1st April, 2016 along with the default clause as recognized by the recovery certificate dated 20th February, 2019."

"In terms of the said recovery certificate, in fact, the Petitioners are liable to pay the contractual rate of interest, which is 15.5% per annum with quarterly rests. The recovery certificate has clearly captured the contractual rate of interest itself and therefore, this Court is of the opinion that the Court cannot go behind the recovery certificate and look at the contractual clauses and interpret the same in this writ petition."

"The initial period of four months, which was granted for accepting the settlement under the OTS proposal has also lapsed. Thus, the Petitioners cannot in fact, claim any benefit after having defaulted and not paid within the four month period."

"Keeping in mind the prevalent rates of interest, the high rate of 15.5% with quarterly rests ought not be payable pendente lite, i.e., during the time when the present writ petition was pending. Some benefit in interest amount can be extended to the Petitioners to bring the matter to a closure."

"Accordingly, it is directed that on the due amount, which is calculated in terms of the recovery certificate till the date of issuance of notice in this writ petition, interest @14% per annum shall be paid by the Petitioners."

"If the amounts are not paid by 30th September, 2025, the Petitioners would then be liable to pay the entire amount in terms of the recovery certificate that would be @15.5% per annum with quarterly rests for the entire period along with the costs imposed today."

"Once this Court had, on 16.07.2024 acceded to the respondents' request for time to consider the petitioners' offer for settlement and had consequently given a short date with the hope that the parties will at least endeavour to explore the possibility of a settlement, the respondents ought to have restrained from initiating precipitative steps against the petitioners."

Core principles established include the binding nature of recovery certificates and appellate modifications thereof, the limited scope of writ jurisdiction in interfering with contractual interest rates where alternate remedies exist, and the Court's discretion to grant interim relief on interest rates to facilitate settlement and closure in long-drawn financial disputes involving public funds.

The final determinations include the dismissal of the Petitioners' claim to the OTS benefit post-default, affirmation of the contractual interest rate for dues post-notice date, directions for payment of outstanding amounts with adjusted interest, imposition of litigation costs, and conditional restraint on HUDCO's recovery actions pending payment and settlement efforts.

The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:

1. Whether the loan recall notice issued by the Bank constituted unfair trade practices and a violation of Reserve Bank of India (RBI) guidelines.

2. The terms and conditions for the settlement of outstanding loan amounts and pre-EMI payments between the borrowers, the builder, and the Bank.

3. The procedural requirements for the closure of the loan accounts and the issuance of No Objection Certificates (NOCs) by the Bank.

4. The obligations of the builder to complete minor works and hand over possession of the apartments to the appellants.

5. The removal of the term 'settlement' from the loan account statements to avoid impacting future loan facilities for the appellants.

ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

1. Loan Recall Notice and Alleged Unfair Trade Practices

- Legal Framework and Precedents: The Consumer Protection Act, 1986, under which the appellants filed complaints against the Bank, alleging unfair trade practices and violation of RBI guidelines.

- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court facilitated an amicable settlement between the parties, thereby rendering the specific allegations moot as the parties agreed to terms that resolved their disputes.

- Key Evidence and Findings: The settlement terms included the waiver of certain charges and adjustments in the pre-EMI payments, indicating a mutual resolution of the grievances initially raised.

- Application of Law to Facts: The Court applied principles of equity and fairness, encouraging the parties to settle their disputes amicably, thus avoiding a protracted legal battle.

- Conclusions: The issue was effectively resolved through the settlement, with no further legal determination needed on the allegations of unfair trade practices.

2. Settlement Terms for Loan and Pre-EMI Payments

- Legal Framework and Precedents: The settlement was facilitated under the supervisory role of the Court, with reference to the contractual obligations of the parties.

- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court endorsed a settlement where the Bank waived certain charges and provided discounts on pre-EMI payments, contingent on the upfront settlement of the principal amounts by the appellants.

- Key Evidence and Findings: Detailed charts were presented, outlining the outstanding amounts and the agreed settlement terms, including the Bank's waiver and the builder's contribution to the pre-EMI payments.

- Application of Law to Facts: The Court ensured that the settlement terms were fair and reasonable, taking into account the obligations and defaults of each party.

- Treatment of Competing Arguments: The Court addressed concerns from both the appellants and the Bank, ensuring that the settlement terms were equitable.

- Conclusions: The Court approved the settlement terms, directing compliance by the parties and setting timelines for payments and issuance of NOCs.

3. Closure of Loan Accounts and Issuance of NOCs

- Legal Framework and Precedents: The Court's supervisory role in ensuring the closure of loan accounts upon settlement of dues.

- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court directed the Bank to issue NOCs upon receipt of the agreed payments, ensuring that the appellants' loan accounts were marked as fully paid.

- Conclusions: The Bank was directed to issue NOCs and make necessary changes in their records to reflect the full repayment of loans.

4. Builder's Obligations for Completion and Possession

- Legal Framework and Precedents: Contractual obligations of the builder to complete construction and hand over possession.

- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court directed the builder to complete any minor works and hand over possession by a specified date, ensuring compliance with the settlement terms.

- Conclusions: The builder was directed to complete the necessary work and transfer possession by the stipulated deadline.

5. Removal of 'Settlement' from Loan Account Statements

- Legal Framework and Precedents: The appellants' concern about the impact of the term 'settlement' on future creditworthiness.

- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court considered the appellants' request reasonable and directed the Bank to amend the loan account statements to reflect 're-paid' instead of 'settlement.'

- Conclusions: The Bank was instructed to make the necessary amendments to the loan account statements.

SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS

- The Court facilitated a comprehensive settlement between the parties, resolving the disputes amicably.

- The Court established principles of fairness and equity in encouraging settlements and ensuring compliance with agreed terms.

- Final determinations included the issuance of NOCs by the Bank, completion of construction by the builder, and amendments to loan account statements to reflect full repayment.

- The appeals were disposed of with all matters between the parties resolved, bringing a complete quietus to the litigation.

Issues: Whether the appellant's arrest and consequential remand were liable to be set aside for non-furnishing of the grounds of arrest as required by law.

Analysis: The material supplied to the appellant was only an arrest memo in a prescribed format, containing basic particulars such as the name of the appellant, place of arrest, and a reference to the statement of a co-accused. It did not convey the grounds of arrest with any meaningful particulars. Such a memo could not be treated as compliance with the statutory requirement to inform the arrested person of the grounds of arrest. This deficiency amounted to clear non-compliance with the mandate under Section 50 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which gives effect to Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India.

Conclusion: The arrest and the consequential remand order were set aside, and the appellant was directed to be released unless required in any other case.

Ratio Decidendi: A mere arrest memo without meaningful particulars does not satisfy the legal requirement of communicating the grounds of arrest, and non-compliance vitiates the arrest and consequential remand.

Issues: (i) Whether the plaintiff was entitled to an injunction restraining the bank from recovering its dues or taking action on the security arrangements pending the insurance claim. (ii) Whether the pledge agreement and related contractual terms excluded the bank's liability for loss of the pledged goods by fire and made the plaintiff's reliance on agency and pledge principles sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the plaintiff was entitled to an injunction restraining the bank from recovering its dues or taking action on the security arrangements pending the insurance claim.

Analysis: The credit facility was governed by the contractual terms agreed between the parties, and the borrower remained bound to repay the outstanding amount. The Court found no legal bar on the bank taking steps to recover public money, and held that the bank was entitled to proceed in accordance with law. The pendency or reopening of the insurance claim did not justify a restraint on recovery, though any insurance proceeds, if received, were to be adjusted against the bank's claim.

Conclusion: The plaintiff was not entitled to the injunction sought against the bank's recovery action.

Issue (ii): Whether the pledge agreement and related contractual terms excluded the bank's liability for loss of the pledged goods by fire and made the plaintiff's reliance on agency and pledge principles sustainable.

Analysis: The Court treated the relationship as one governed by contract and the pledge agreement, which contained clauses placing the risk of loss on the pledger. It held that the bank had validly contracted out of liability for loss or damage to the pledged goods, that the bank was not an insurer of the goods, and that the authority relied upon by the plaintiff on return of pledged goods did not assist it on the facts. The plea based on agency was also rejected.

Conclusion: The bank was not liable in the manner contended for by the plaintiff, and the contractual risk allocation was upheld.

Final Conclusion: The interlocutory order refusing broader restraint against the bank's recovery measures was upheld, and the appeal failed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a pledge and facility agreement clearly allocates the risk of loss to the pledger and does not prohibit recovery by the lender, the lender may proceed to recover its dues in accordance with law and is not barred from doing so merely because the pledged goods were destroyed or an insurance claim is pending.

Issues: (i) Whether the acquired land's market value was required to be enhanced on the basis of a nearby comparable allotment and, if so, what deductions were appropriate for development and largeness in area. (ii) Whether any additional compensation was payable for the fruit-bearing trees on the acquired land on the basis of alleged income from the trees.

Issue (i): Whether the acquired land's market value was required to be enhanced on the basis of a nearby comparable allotment and, if so, what deductions were appropriate for development and largeness in area.

Analysis: The comparable allotment of nearby land in the industrial estate was treated as the best available exemplar because it was in close proximity and reflected the prevailing premium fixed by the acquiring agency itself. The prior rate was adjusted for the rise in prices over time. Since the acquired land was agricultural and required conversion and development before it could be put to industrial use, deduction for development was warranted. A further deduction was justified because large tracts do not fetch the same rate as small plots.

Conclusion: The market value was enhanced to Rs.95 per sq. mt., and the compensation awarded below was modified accordingly, in favour of the appellants.

Issue (ii): Whether any additional compensation was payable for the fruit-bearing trees on the acquired land on the basis of alleged income from the trees.

Analysis: The record showed the existence of trees, but there was no reliable evidence of annual yield, sale proceeds, or proved income from the trees. In the absence of such proof, no further amount could be awarded beyond the amount already fixed for the trees in the acquisition award.

Conclusion: No additional compensation was granted for tree income, and the amount fixed in the acquisition award was left undisturbed on that aspect.

Final Conclusion: The compensation for the acquired land was substantially enhanced, while the claim for further amount towards tree income was rejected for want of evidence.

Ratio Decidendi: In land acquisition matters, a nearby comparable sale or allotment may serve as the best exemplar for market value, but suitable deductions must be made for development and for the difference between large tracts and small plots, and compensation for trees requires proof of actual yield or income.

Issues: Whether the petitioners, being office bearers of the company and not signatories to the cheque, could be summoned for an offence under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in the absence of specific averments that they were in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company.

Analysis: Liability under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is vicarious and must be strictly pleaded. A complaint must contain clear and specific averments showing that the accused was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time. Mere designation as an office bearer or reproduction of statutory language is insufficient. Where reliance is placed on consent, connivance, or negligence under Section 141(2), the complaint must also plead material particulars showing how such liability arises. On the pleaded facts, the complaint alleged only that the petitioners were office bearers of the management committee, while the cheque was issued and signed by other accused. No adequate averment showed the petitioners' role in the transaction or their control over the business affairs.

Conclusion: The petitioners could not be validly summoned on the basis of the complaint as framed, and the proceedings qua them were liable to be quashed.