Issues: (i) Whether the concurrent conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act called for interference in revision; (ii) Whether the sentence of simple imprisonment and compensation awarded to the accused required reduction or interference.

Issue (i): Whether the concurrent conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act called for interference in revision.

Analysis: The revision was examined on the settled principle that revisional jurisdiction is narrow and does not permit reappreciation of evidence unless the findings are perverse, illegal, or based on no evidence. The cheque issuance, dishonour for insufficiency of funds, and deemed service of notice were proved. The accused's version that the cheque was only a blank security cheque for a transaction with a third party was found to be an afterthought and unsupported by evidence. The presumption attached to the cheque was not rebutted, and the plea regarding difference in signatures did not displace liability when the dishonour was in fact for insufficient funds.

Conclusion: The concurrent finding of guilt under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was upheld and no revisional interference was warranted.

Issue (ii): Whether the sentence of simple imprisonment and compensation awarded to the accused required reduction or interference.

Analysis: The sentence was tested against the deterrent object of Section 138 proceedings and the compensatory character of the remedy. The period of default, the cheque amount, and the loss suffered by the complainant justified the compensation awarded. The sentence of simple imprisonment for one year was not found excessive, and the compensation was held to be within permissible limits.

Conclusion: The sentence of simple imprisonment and the compensation award were sustained.

Final Conclusion: The revision failed in its entirety, and the conviction as well as the sentence imposed by the courts below remained undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: In revisional jurisdiction, concurrent findings of guilt will not be interfered with unless they are perverse, illegal, or based on no evidence, and the statutory presumptions under cheque dishonour law remain operative unless rebutted by credible evidence.

The core legal questions considered by the Court are:

• Whether the tendering authority's declaration of certain bids as technically responsive, despite non-compliance with essential conditions of the tender document, amounted to an arbitrary and illegal act.
• Whether the relaxation of essential conditions of the tender document was uniformly applied to all bidders or selectively to some, thereby causing discrimination and arbitrariness.
• Whether the acceptance of documents not prescribed by the tender conditions (such as Income Tax Returns for an incorrect financial year) was permissible and valid.
• The extent and limits of judicial review in tender evaluation processes, particularly regarding adherence to essential eligibility conditions and the permissibility of relaxation thereof.
• The appropriate remedy in case of non-uniform application of tender conditions and procedural irregularities in the tender evaluation.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue 1: Validity of declaring bids as technically responsive despite non-compliance with essential tender conditions

The relevant legal framework includes the specific clauses of the tender document, notably Clause 1.9 (minimum annual turnover for the last three financial years), Clause 1.10 (submission of up-to-date Income Tax Returns for specified financial years), and Clause 2.6 (submission of hard copies of technical bids and supporting documents). The Supreme Court precedents in Poddar Steel Corporation vs. Ganesh Engineering Works and B.S.N. Joshi & Sons Ltd. vs. Nair Coal Services Ltd. emphasize that essential conditions of a tender must be rigidly enforced, though relaxation may be permissible if applied equally to all bidders.

The Court noted that respondent no.4 failed to submit the Annual Turnover certificate for the financial year 2022-2023, and respondent no.3 did not upload the Income Tax Return for the required year 2021-2022 but instead submitted the return for 2022-2023, which was not prescribed in the tender document. Despite these non-compliances, both respondents' technical bids were declared responsive by the tendering authority.

The scrutiny and supervisory committees had observed these discrepancies but recommended qualification of these bids based on submission of hard copies and other supporting documents. However, other bidders, such as Monu Enterprise and Marami Enterprise, were disqualified on similar grounds of non-submission of required documents.

The Court found that the acceptance of incomplete or incorrect document submissions by the respondent nos. 3 and 4 was inconsistent with the tender conditions and was not uniformly applied to all bidders, amounting to arbitrariness.

Issue 2: Uniformity and non-discrimination in relaxation of tender conditions

The Court examined whether the relaxation of essential tender conditions was applied uniformly to all bidders. While the tender conditions mandated strict compliance, the tendering authority purportedly relaxed these conditions for respondent nos. 3 and 4 but not for other similarly situated bidders such as Monu Enterprise and Marami Enterprise.

Drawing upon the Supreme Court's guidance in B.S.N. Joshi & Sons Ltd. and Bakshi Security and Personnel Services Private Limited vs. Devkishan Computed Private Limited, the Court emphasized that relaxation of essential conditions is permissible only if applied equally to all bidders. Selective relaxation leads to discrimination and arbitrariness, which is impermissible.

The Court found that the tendering authority's selective relaxation violated the principle of fairness and equality among bidders, undermining the integrity of the tender process.

Issue 3: Consideration of documents not prescribed in the tender conditions

The tender document specifically required Income Tax Returns for the financial years 2019-2020, 2020-2021, and 2021-2022. Respondent no.3 submitted the Income Tax Return for 2022-2023, which was not a required document. The tendering authority accepted this submission as sufficient for technical qualification.

The Court held that accepting documents not prescribed in the tender conditions amounted to a procedural irregularity and was not justified. The tender conditions are explicit, and deviation undermines the tender process's transparency and predictability.

Issue 4: Scope of judicial review in tender evaluation and award of contracts

The Court relied heavily on the Supreme Court's ruling in Bakshi Security and Personnel Services, which underscores that judicial review in tender matters is limited to preventing arbitrariness, mala fides, irrationality, and bias. Courts do not substitute their commercial judgment for that of the tendering authority unless the decision is so unreasonable that no responsible authority could have made it.

The Court applied this principle to assess whether the tendering authority's decision was bona fide and in public interest. It concluded that the selective relaxation and acceptance of incorrect documents were arbitrary and irrational, justifying judicial intervention.

Issue 5: Appropriate remedy in case of procedural irregularities and discrimination

The Court found the tender committee's resolution dated 27.06.2023, which declared the technical bids of respondent nos. 3 and 4 as responsive, unsustainable. It held that the bids should have been disqualified in consonance with the tender conditions.

Consequently, the Court set aside the resolution and any consequential orders passed by the tendering authority. The matter was remanded to the Tender Committee to reconsider the bids of the remaining valid tenderers in accordance with the tender conditions and principles of fairness.

3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS

The Court established the following core principles and determinations:

"The essential conditions of a tender have to be rigidly implemented. However, if the same is to be relaxed, the relaxation of the essential condition of a tender has to be made applicable to all the tenderers."

"The decision to declare the technical bids of the respondent no.3 and respondent no.4 is arbitrary, inasmuch as, not only has there been violation of the essential conditions of the tender notice which has not been relaxed for all, but the respondents have taken into consideration documents which were not to be considered, i.e. the respondent no.3's Income Tax Return for the year 2022- 2023."

"Attempts by unsuccessful tenderers with imaginary grievances, wounded pride and business rivalry, to make mountains out of molehills of some technical/procedural violation or some prejudice to self, and persuade courts to interfere by exercising power of judicial review, should be resisted. Such interferences... may increase the project cost manifold." (quoting Bakshi Security)

Final determinations on each issue were:

• The tendering authority's acceptance of incomplete and non-compliant bids of respondent nos. 3 and 4 was illegal and arbitrary.
• The relaxation of essential tender conditions was not uniformly applied, resulting in discrimination and violation of the principle of fairness.
• The acceptance of documents not prescribed by the tender conditions was impermissible.
• The writ petition challenging the tender committee's resolution was allowed, the resolution was set aside, and the matter was remanded for fresh consideration consistent with the tender conditions and legal principles.

Issues: (i) Whether the revenue authorities could invoke the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act, 2008 against land covered by an exemption under Section 81(3) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963. (ii) Whether the statutory schemes of the two enactments had to be harmoniously construed so as to avoid defeat of the exemption granted under the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963.

Issue (i): Whether the revenue authorities could invoke the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act, 2008 against land covered by an exemption under Section 81(3) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963.

Analysis: The land in question stood exempted from the ceiling provisions under Section 81(3) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 on the condition that it be used for commercial or industrial purposes. The Court held that if the 2008 Act were applied so as to restrain the petitioner from using the land for the very purpose for which the exemption was granted, the benefit of the ceiling exemption would stand defeated. In the peculiar facts of the case, the exemption under the land reforms enactment and the regulatory scheme under the 2008 Act were treated as requiring harmonised operation.

Conclusion: The provisions of the 2008 Act were held not to be attracted to the extent of land covered by the exemption under Section 81(3) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963.

Issue (ii): Whether the statutory schemes of the two enactments had to be harmoniously construed so as to avoid defeat of the exemption granted under the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963.

Analysis: The Court reasoned that statutes enacted for different purposes must be read harmoniously where possible. Since the petitioner was obliged to use the land for commercial or industrial purposes to retain the benefit of exemption, strict application of the 2008 Act would undermine the earlier exemption. The Court therefore treated the discretion under Section 10 of the 2008 Act as having been effectively exercised in favour of the same land, in order to preserve both statutory benefits coherently.

Conclusion: A harmonious construction was adopted, and the land was deemed exempt from the 2008 Act so long as it remained covered by the exemption under Section 81(3) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963.

Final Conclusion: The common judgment left the State's challenge unsuccessful and granted relief in the connected appeals by protecting the exempted extent of land from action under the 2008 Act for so long as the land retained the benefit of the land reforms exemption.

Ratio Decidendi: Where application of a later regulatory statute would defeat a conditional exemption granted under an earlier enactment for the same land, the provisions must be harmoniously construed and the later statute treated as inapplicable to the extent necessary to preserve the earlier exemption.

Issues: Whether the criminal proceedings alleging cheating in the course of a business transaction, including the plea of liquidation and delay, were liable to be quashed.

Analysis: The complaint alleged that the accused entered into business dealings by suppressing the company's liquidation status and by making false representations about its financial position, resulting in a substantial unpaid liability. The question whether the business transactions continued after liquidation and whether the ingredients of cheating were made out depended on evidence and could not be finally determined at the quashing stage. The existence of pending proceedings under the Negotiable Instruments Act also showed that the dispute required fuller adjudication. The Court therefore declined to interfere at the threshold and left the factual controversy to be tried.

Conclusion: The criminal original petition was not liable to be quashed and the proceedings were sustained.

Issues: Whether the notice issued to the petitioner as a witness under Section 179 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 could be quashed, and whether any violation of fundamental rights under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was made out.

Analysis: The notice was issued in aid of investigation in a registered criminal case and was directed to the petitioner in the capacity of a witness. The record indicated that the investigating agency was empowered to summon the witness for the purpose of inquiry and investigation. The Court also noted non-response to the summons and observed that the investigation had been stalled due to lack of cooperation. In these circumstances, no ground was shown for judicial interference in the notice.

Conclusion: The challenge to the witness summons was rejected and no violation of fundamental rights was found.

Issues: (i) Whether a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 filed by a director in his individual name, without authorization or power of attorney from the company, was maintainable; (ii) Whether the cheque was proved to have been issued in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability.

Issue (i): Whether a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 filed by a director in his individual name, without authorization or power of attorney from the company, was maintainable.

Analysis: The agreement and the underlying transaction were between the petitioner's company and the complainant company, while the complaint was instituted by one director in his personal capacity. No board resolution or power of attorney was produced to show authority to initiate proceedings in his own name. The defect was not cured at any later stage by the company, and the complaint was not presented as one by the company through an authorized representative.

Conclusion: The complaint was not maintainable in the form in which it was filed, and the issue is decided in favour of the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether the cheque was proved to have been issued in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability.

Analysis: The agreement contained corrections in the payment terms, the cheque was dated within a short span of the agreement, and the evidence did not satisfactorily establish completion of work or the subsistence of a liability payable to the complainant personally. The circumstances created serious doubt about the transaction and did not establish that the cheque represented a legally enforceable debt or liability owed to the complainant in his individual capacity.

Conclusion: The existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability was not proved, and the issue is decided in favour of the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The concurrent conviction and appellate affirmation were found unsustainable, and the revisional challenge succeeded on the twin grounds of want of authority and failure to prove the essential ingredients of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Ratio Decidendi: A prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 must be instituted by the payee or a duly authorized representative, and the cheque must be shown to have been issued against a subsisting legally enforceable debt or liability.

Issues: (i) Whether an ex-director could be fastened with vicarious liability for an offence under section 138 read with section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 when the company had already gone into liquidation and the cheque was issued after liquidation; (ii) Whether the prosecution proved service of the statutory demand notice required for an offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Issue (i): Whether an ex-director could be fastened with vicarious liability for an offence under section 138 read with section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 when the company had already gone into liquidation and the cheque was issued after liquidation.

Analysis: Liability of a director under section 141 depends on whether, at the time the offence was committed, the person was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the company's business. The evidence accepted that the company had gone into liquidation before the cheque date and that control had shifted to the official liquidator. The respondent's evidence that he ceased to be a director from the liquidation date remained unshaken, while the complaint and evidence did not establish any specific role of the respondent in issuing the cheque or in conducting the company's affairs at the relevant time.

Conclusion: The respondent could not be held vicariously liable under section 141, and the finding on this issue is against the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the prosecution proved service of the statutory demand notice required for an offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Analysis: Service of a written demand notice within the statutory time is an essential ingredient of section 138. The trial record did not establish that the alleged notice was proved or that its service on the respondent was shown by reliable evidence. In the absence of proof of service, the statutory requirement remained unfulfilled, and the accused was entitled to the benefit of doubt.

Conclusion: The statutory notice requirement was not proved, and this issue is also against the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The acquittal was sustained because the foundational ingredients of the cheque dishonour prosecution were not proved against the respondent.

Ratio Decidendi: For liability under section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the complaint and evidence must specifically show that the accused was in charge of and responsible for the company's business at the time of the offence; if the company had already gone into liquidation and statutory notice is also not proved, conviction cannot follow.

Issues: (i) Whether grandchildren acquired a vested right by birth in property inherited by their father from the grandfather after the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and whether the suit property could be treated as ancestral or coparcenary property; (ii) Whether the plaint was liable to be rejected for want of cause of action and as barred by limitation.

Issue (i): Whether grandchildren acquired a vested right by birth in property inherited by their father from the grandfather after the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and whether the suit property could be treated as ancestral or coparcenary property.

Analysis: The applicable legal framework distinguishes between pre-1956 Mitakshara succession and post-1956 statutory succession. After the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, property inherited by a male Hindu from his paternal ancestor does not automatically become coparcenary property in the hands of his son or grandson. A coparcenary can arise only where there is a pre-existing coparcenary or where separate property is deliberately blended into an existing joint family hotchpotch. In the absence of specific pleadings and proof showing that the suit property had the character of coparcenary property, the grandchildren could not claim a birthright merely because the property was inherited through the paternal line. The Court also noted that the proviso and deeming fiction under the unamended Section 6, read with Section 8, operated against the claimed birthright in the facts of the case.

Conclusion: The grandchildren had no vested birthright in the suit property, and the property could not be treated as coparcenary property on the pleaded facts.

Issue (ii): Whether the plaint was liable to be rejected for want of cause of action and as barred by limitation.

Analysis: The plaint contained no material particulars showing how the property became joint family or coparcenary property, and therefore did not disclose a sustainable cause of action for cancellation of the sale deeds or partition. In addition, the challenge was brought many years after the registered sale transactions, and the claim for cancellation was barred by limitation under Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The consequential reliefs could not survive once the main relief itself was not maintainable. On these admitted and pleaded facts, rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was justified.

Conclusion: The plaint was rightly rejected for non-disclosure of a cause of action and for being time-barred.

Final Conclusion: The second appeal failed because the claimed coparcenary right was not established and the suit was not maintainable in law.

Ratio Decidendi: After the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, inheritance of paternal property does not, by itself, create coparcenary rights in grandchildren; absent specific pleadings and proof of a pre-existing coparcenary or valid blending, a plaint seeking partition or cancellation of alienation can be rejected where the claim is also barred by limitation.

The core legal questions considered by the Court were:

• Whether the accused issued the cheque in question in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability towards the complainant;
• Whether the complainant complied with the procedural requirements under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, including presentation of the cheque within the prescribed period and issuance of a valid demand notice;
• Whether the accused failed to rebut the statutory presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act by adducing cogent evidence;
• Whether the trial court and the appellate court correctly applied the law and appreciated the evidence in convicting the accused under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act;
• Whether the examination of the accused under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code was conducted in accordance with law and whether any irregularity in this regard vitiated the proceedings.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis

1. Whether the cheque was issued in discharge of a legally enforceable debt

The relevant legal framework is Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, which criminalizes the dishonor of a cheque issued for discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability. The presumption under Section 139 places the burden on the accused to rebut the presumption that the cheque was issued for such debt or liability.

The Court analyzed the evidence, including the complainant's testimony (PW1), who established that the accused was entrusted with Rs. 6,95,000 for company use but utilized the money for personal purposes. The accused issued cheque No. 199456 dated 16.04.2014 for Rs. 5,00,000 in favor of the complainant. The cheque was dishonored due to insufficient funds, as per Exhibit 3 (cheque return memo).

During cross-examination, PW1 confirmed that the accused acknowledged indebtedness to the company and no suggestion was given to deny this. The accused, examined as DW1, admitted receiving advances from the company and acknowledged his signature on the cheque, but claimed to have learned about the cheque only after receiving the demand notice.

The Court found no evidence that the cheque was issued for any reason other than repayment of debt. The accused did not dispute the debt or issue of the cheque in discharge of such debt. Thus, the Court concluded that the cheque was issued in discharge of a legally enforceable debt.

2. Compliance with procedural requirements under Section 138 N.I. Act

The complainant presented the cheque within the prescribed period and the cheque was dishonored with the remark "Fund insufficient" (Exhibit 3). The demand notice dated 04.05.2014 was sent to the accused and was duly served as per the report from Kolkata GPO, Customer Care Centre dated 06.06.2014 (Exhibits 4 and 5).

The Court emphasized that the complainant complied with all procedural requirements mandated under the Negotiable Instruments Act, including timely presentation of the cheque and service of demand notice within the statutory period.

3. Whether accused failed to rebut presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act

Section 139 creates a presumption that the cheque was issued for discharge of debt. The accused bears the burden to rebut this presumption by adducing credible evidence.

The Court noted that the accused did not provide any cogent evidence to rebut this presumption. He neither disputed his signature nor the issuance of the cheque in discharge of debt. The accused also failed to reply to the demand notice denying liability or offering any other explanation.

Hence, the Court held that the accused failed to rebut the statutory presumption under Section 139.

4. Validity of trial court's and appellate court's judgments

The trial court framed eight points for consideration and after evaluating the evidence, concluded that the accused was liable under Section 138. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's findings, holding that the complainant proved the case beyond reasonable doubt and that the debt was legally enforceable.

The petitioner argued that the courts below failed to consider materials on record and did not conduct the Section 313 Cr.P.C. examination properly, leading to a failure of justice.

However, the High Court found that the trial court and appellate court's judgments were well reasoned and based on evidence. The examination under Section 313 was not shown to have been conducted improperly to the extent of vitiating the proceedings.

The Court found no illegality, perversity, or gross miscarriage of justice in the impugned judgments.

5. Examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C.

The petitioner contended that the examination of the accused under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. was not conducted in accordance with law, which vitiated the entire proceeding.

The Court examined this contention and found no merit. The accused was examined and given an opportunity to explain the evidence against him. No substantial procedural irregularity was demonstrated that would invalidate the trial or appeal.

Significant Holdings

The Court held:

"It has been clearly established during trial that the cheque has been issued by the accused in favour of the complainant in discharge of his legally enforceable debt. The demand notice was served upon the accused persons within the statutory period and considering all these there is nothing to interfere with the observation made by the trial court as well as made by the court below because the judgments impugned have not resulted in any gross or manifest failure of justice, nor has there been any illegality or perversity committed by the courts below while passing the impugned judgments."

Core principles established include:

• The presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is a significant evidentiary burden on the accused to rebut the issuance of cheque for discharge of debt;
• Compliance with procedural requirements such as presentation of cheque and service of demand notice is essential for prosecution under Section 138;
• Failure to reply to the demand notice or produce cogent evidence to rebut the presumption results in conviction;
• Proper examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. is necessary but mere procedural lapses without prejudice do not vitiate the trial;
• Appellate courts will not interfere with well-reasoned judgments based on evidence and proper application of law.

Final determinations:

• The accused was rightly convicted under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act;
• The sentence of imprisonment till rising of the court and compensation of Rs. 6,50,000/- was upheld;
• The appeal was dismissed and the accused was directed to serve the sentence as ordered.

Issues: (i) Whether the plaintiff had locus standi and a cause of action to challenge the notice inviting expression of interest without participating in the process; (ii) whether the auction process was vitiated by lack of transparency or non-compliance with the RBI Master Direction governing transfer of loan exposures; (iii) whether the grant of ad interim injunction was justified on the facts.

Issue (i): Whether the plaintiff had locus standi and a cause of action to challenge the notice inviting expression of interest without participating in the process.

Analysis: A distinction was drawn between a challenge to the breach of tender terms and a challenge to the validity of the tender terms themselves. While prior participation is not invariably necessary where the terms of the process are attacked, a challenger must still show a real interest in participating and prima facie eligibility to do so. The plaint did not contain sufficient pleading that the plaintiff satisfied the eligibility conditions for submission of an expression of interest, and the immediate challenge on the very day of publication of the notice cast doubt on bona fides.

Conclusion: The challenge was not maintainable at the instance of the plaintiff, and locus standi and cause of action were prima facie absent.

Issue (ii): Whether the auction process was vitiated by lack of transparency or non-compliance with the RBI Master Direction governing transfer of loan exposures.

Analysis: The Swiss Challenge method was treated as a legally recognised mode of bidding, including in government tenders, and the RBI framework contemplated a base bid, counter-bids, and disclosure of the essential elements of the base bid. The notice and deal summary disclosed the reserve price, mark-up price, and access to further materials for shortlisted eligible bidders. The allegations regarding inadequate due diligence time, absence of external valuation, and non-disclosure of essential elements were found to be premature or unsupported at the stage of the notice inviting expression of interest.

Conclusion: No prima facie illegality, opacity, or violation of the RBI framework was made out.

Issue (iii): Whether the grant of ad interim injunction was justified on the facts.

Analysis: In view of the absence of a prima facie maintainable challenge, the insufficiency of pleadings on eligibility, and the lack of demonstrable violation of the governing circulars, the basis for injunctive relief was found to be erroneous. The order under appeal proceeded on considerations that were inconsistent with the legal nature of the Swiss Challenge process and did not properly apply the governing tests for interim relief.

Conclusion: The ad interim injunction was not justified and was liable to be set aside.

Final Conclusion: The appellate court held that the suit challenge was prima facie untenable and that the interim restraint on the auction process could not stand, thereby restoring the appellants' freedom to proceed in accordance with the notice and governing circulars.

Ratio Decidendi: A party challenging the validity of a tender or auction process must still demonstrate prima facie eligibility and a genuine interest in participating, and a court will not sustain interim restraint where the alleged irregularities are unsupported or premature under the governing bidding framework.

Issues: Whether the acquittal under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 called for interference, in view of the alleged defect in the demand notice and the accused persons' rebuttal of the statutory presumptions.

Analysis: The demand notice under Section 138(b) must make a clear demand for the cheque amount, and an omnibus demand for all dues without specifying the amount payable under the dishonoured cheques does not satisfy the statutory requirement. In the present case, the notice demanded payment of the entire outstanding dues rather than the cheque amount, rendering it invalid for the purpose of Section 138. Separately, once execution of the cheques was not in dispute, the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 arose, but they were rebuttable. The accused persons raised a probable defence by pointing to discrepancies in the accounts, including double or incorrect billing and an unexplained mismatch between the amount claimed in the notice and the amount reflected in the documents produced by the complainant. On that showing, the evidential burden shifted back, and the complainant failed to establish the debt liability as a matter of fact.

Conclusion: The acquittal was upheld, and interference was declined.

Ratio Decidendi: In a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the demand notice must specifically demand the cheque amount, and the statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 stand rebutted once the accused raises a probable defence showing non-existence of debt or liability on a preponderance of probabilities.

Issues: (i) Whether, in revisional jurisdiction, interference with concurrent findings of conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was warranted. (ii) Whether the accused successfully rebutted the statutory presumptions arising from admitted issuance of the cheque by pleading that it was a blank security cheque. (iii) Whether dishonour, service of notice, and non-payment established the ingredients of the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Issue (i): Whether, in revisional jurisdiction, interference with concurrent findings of conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was warranted.

Analysis: Revisional interference is confined to patent illegality, jurisdictional error, perversity, or gross miscarriage of justice. Concurrent findings recorded by the trial court and the appellate court are not to be reappreciated merely because another view is possible. The scope under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is supervisory and not appellate.

Conclusion: Interference was not warranted.

Issue (ii): Whether the accused successfully rebutted the statutory presumptions arising from admitted issuance of the cheque by pleading that it was a blank security cheque.

Analysis: Once execution of the cheque is admitted, presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 arise in favour of the holder. The accused must rebut them by raising a probable defence on a preponderance of probabilities. A mere denial under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is insufficient. A cheque issued as security does not cease to attract Section 138 when the underlying liability has matured, and a signed blank cheque voluntarily handed over may still found liability. The accused led no defence evidence and failed to dislodge the presumption.

Conclusion: The presumption was not rebutted and the security cheque defence failed.

Issue (iii): Whether dishonour, service of notice, and non-payment established the ingredients of the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Analysis: The cheque dishonour memo carried the endorsement of insufficient funds and attracted the statutory presumption under Section 146 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. Notice sent to the correct address gave rise to deemed service under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, and no rebuttal evidence was produced. The accused did not make payment within the statutory period. These circumstances satisfied the ingredients of the offence.

Conclusion: The ingredients of the offence were duly established.

Final Conclusion: The conviction and sentence were sustained, and no interference was called for in revision.

Ratio Decidendi: In a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, admission of the cheque and signature activates the statutory presumptions, which can be displaced only by a probable defence supported by evidence; a blank or security cheque remains enforceable when liability exists and the accused does not rebut the presumption or the statutory service and dishonour requirements.

Issues: (i) Whether the cheque was issued in discharge of a legally enforceable debt and whether the statutory presumption under the Negotiable Instruments Act stood rebutted; (ii) Whether the requirement of notice under Section 138 was satisfied when the notice was returned as unclaimed.

Issue (i): Whether the cheque was issued in discharge of a legally enforceable debt and whether the statutory presumption under the Negotiable Instruments Act stood rebutted.

Analysis: The accused admitted his signature on the cheque and the bank memo established dishonour for insufficiency of funds. Once execution of the cheque was established, the presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act operated in favour of the complainant. Those presumptions were rebuttable, but the accused failed to produce material to show that the cheque was only a security cheque or that no debt existed. The complainant's evidence was accepted as proving the loan transaction and issuance of the cheque in discharge of liability.

Conclusion: The presumption was not rebutted and the cheque was held to have been issued in discharge of a legally enforceable debt, against the accused.

Issue (ii): Whether the requirement of notice under Section 138 was satisfied when the notice was returned as unclaimed.

Analysis: The notice was sent to the accused's address after dishonour of the cheque and was returned with endorsements such as addressee absent, intimation served, and unclaimed. Such endorsement attracted the principle of deemed service, and the burden shifted to the accused to prove that the address was incorrect or that service was otherwise ineffective. No contrary evidence was adduced. The requirement of notice was therefore treated as complied with.

Conclusion: The notice requirement was satisfied, and the accused's challenge on service failed.

Final Conclusion: The conviction and sentence under Section 138 were sustained, and the revision was found to be without merit.

Ratio Decidendi: Once execution of a cheque is admitted, the presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act arise in favour of the holder and can be displaced only by probable evidence from the drawer; a notice returned unclaimed at the correct address satisfies the statutory notice requirement unless the drawer proves otherwise.

Issues: Whether the appellate court was justified in reversing the conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act on the ground that the complainant failed to prove the transaction and execution of the cheque and agreement, and whether interference with the acquittal was warranted.

Analysis: The complainant's evidence, including the transaction, the agreement, the cheque, the dishonour memo, notice, and reply notice, was not subjected to effective cross-examination on the material aspects. The plea that the cheque was filled up by someone other than the drawer did not, by itself, negate liability. The legal position governing Sections 118, 139, 20 and 87 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is that a signed cheque, even if blank or written by another person, attracts presumptions in favour of the holder, and the burden rests on the accused to rebut those presumptions by cogent evidence. The accused did not adduce any defence evidence or establish a credible explanation to displace the statutory presumptions.

Conclusion: The appellate court's view was unsustainable, interference was warranted, and the conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was restored with modified sentence and compensation.

Issues: (i) Whether the Railway Administration could raise a demand for misdeclaration of goods under Section 66 of the Railways Act, 1989 after delivery of the goods, or whether such recovery was confined to the pre-delivery stage under Sections 73 and 78 of the Railways Act, 1989. (ii) Whether the challenge to the genuineness of the demand notices was substantiated.

Issue (i): Whether the Railway Administration could raise a demand for misdeclaration of goods under Section 66 of the Railways Act, 1989 after delivery of the goods, or whether such recovery was confined to the pre-delivery stage under Sections 73 and 78 of the Railways Act, 1989.

Analysis: Section 66 deals with false or incorrect description of goods and empowers the railway administration to charge the appropriate rate where the statement is materially false or where the description differs on examination. The provision does not fix the point of time at which such charge must be raised. By contrast, Sections 73 and 78 specifically govern overloading and empower pre-delivery action in that distinct context. The demand notices in question related to misdeclaration, not overloading, and the reliance on the overloading line of authority was therefore misplaced. The earlier decision concerning penal charges was also distinguished as it arose in the context of Section 54 and did not control the present statutory setting.

Conclusion: The demand for misdeclaration was correctly held to fall under Section 66, and it was not restricted to being raised only before delivery; the contrary view was rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether the challenge to the genuineness of the demand notices was substantiated.

Analysis: The record contained no evidence to support the allegation that the notices were not genuine, and the claim petitions did not contain material pleading to that effect. In the absence of proof to the contrary, the notices were accepted as genuine.

Conclusion: The objection to the genuineness of the demand notices failed.

Final Conclusion: The orders of the Tribunal and the High Court were set aside, and the railway authorities were held entitled to proceed on the basis of the misdeclaration demands.

Ratio Decidendi: A demand for misdeclaration of goods under Section 66 of the Railways Act, 1989 is not confined to the pre-delivery stage, and provisions governing overloading cannot be used to limit its operation where the facts disclose a distinct misdeclaration claim.

The core legal questions considered by the Court were:

• Whether the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act) is attracted when the drawer's bank account is provisionally attached or frozen by a statutory authority prior to the presentation of the cheque, thereby rendering the account inoperable;
• Whether a bank account subject to a statutory attachment can be considered as "maintained" by the drawer for the purpose of Section 138 NI Act;
• Whether the drawer's prior knowledge of the attachment and subsequent issuance of cheques from the frozen account amounts to culpable conduct attracting penal consequences under Section 138;
• Whether the trial court erred in summoning the petitioners without appreciating the effect of the statutory attachment and the petitioners' communication to the respondent regarding the freezing of the account;
• Whether the dishonour of the cheque due to account freezing constitutes a willful default or insufficient funds within the meaning of Section 138 NI Act.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue 1: Applicability of Section 138 NI Act when the drawer's bank account is frozen by statutory authorities prior to cheque presentation

The Court examined the legal framework under Section 138 NI Act, which penalizes the drawer of a cheque if it is returned unpaid due to insufficient funds or exceeding the arranged amount in the account maintained by the drawer. The essential ingredient is that the cheque must be drawn on an account "maintained" by the drawer and dishonoured due to the drawer's failure to maintain sufficient funds.

Precedents such as Deepinder Singh Bedi v. State and Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Pennar Peterson Securities Ltd. were relied upon, which held that dishonour caused by freezing or attachment of the bank account by statutory authorities is beyond the drawer's control and does not constitute an offence under Section 138. The Court reasoned that when an account is attached, the drawer loses the ability to operate it or instruct the bank, thereby negating the condition of "maintaining" the account for the purpose of Section 138.

The Court noted that the attachment under Section 83 of the CGST Act, 2017, prohibited any debit transactions from the petitioners' account from 22.01.2024, before the cheques were presented on 08.02.2024. The bank's confirmation of the stop on the account reinforced that the account was not operable at the time of cheque presentation.

Thus, the Court concluded that the offence under Section 138 could not be invoked when the dishonour resulted from statutory attachment rather than insufficiency of funds or willful default.

Issue 2: Whether a bank account frozen by statutory attachment can be considered "maintained" by the drawer

The Court analyzed the concept of an account being "maintained" within the meaning of Section 138 NI Act. Citing Vijay Chaudhary v. Gyan Chand Jain, it was emphasized that for an account to be maintained, the drawer must be able to operate it by depositing or withdrawing funds and issuing instructions to the bank.

Once an account is attached by a statutory authority, the drawer cannot operate it or give binding instructions to the bank. The bank is legally obliged to comply with the attachment and cannot honour any transactions without departmental approval. Hence, the account ceases to be "maintained" by the drawer in the operative sense required under the NI Act.

Accordingly, the Court held that the petitioners' account, being under provisional attachment by the CGST Department, was not "maintained" at the time the cheques were presented.

Issue 3: Effect of the drawer's prior knowledge of attachment and issuance of cheques from the frozen account

The respondent contended that the petitioners had knowledge of the attachment from 22.01.2024 and yet issued cheques which were dishonoured, amounting to negligence or culpable conduct under Section 138.

The Court examined the petitioners' communication and found that the cheques were issued in November-December 2023 before the attachment occurred. Upon learning of the attachment in January 2024, the petitioners promptly informed the respondent and requested that the cheques not be presented without consent. This mutual understanding was not honored by the respondent, who presented the cheques on 08.02.2024 despite knowledge of the attachment.

The Court distinguished between willful default and inability to operate the account due to statutory attachment. Mere knowledge of attachment does not translate into culpable conduct if the drawer had no control over the account at the time of presentation. Therefore, the Court rejected the argument that prior knowledge alone attracts penal consequences under Section 138.

Issue 4: Whether the trial court erred in summoning the petitioners without appreciating the effect of statutory attachment and communications

The petitioners argued that the trial court failed to consider the material facts and legal principles, including the petitioners' reply to the legal notice enclosing the attachment order and communications with the respondent.

The Court agreed, observing that the trial court summoning order dated 18.09.2024 did not adequately appreciate that the account was frozen and the petitioners had no capacity to operate it. The trial court's order was therefore legally unsustainable.

Issue 5: Whether dishonour due to account freezing constitutes willful default or insufficient funds under Section 138 NI Act

The Court reiterated that Section 138 requires dishonour due to insufficiency of funds or failure to maintain arranged amount. Dishonour caused by statutory freezing of the account is fundamentally different.

Reliance was placed on precedents such as Sachin Jain v. Rajesh Jain and Ceasefire Industries Ltd. v. State, which held that dishonour beyond the drawer's control does not satisfy the core ingredients of Section 138.

The Court noted that even though the bank memo stated "insufficient funds", the actual cause was the CGST attachment, making the dishonour involuntary and not attributable to the drawer's default.

3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS

The Court held:

"For an account to be maintained by an account holder, it is essential that he is in a position to operate the said account by either depositing monies therein or by withdrawing money therefrom. He should be in a position to give effective instructions to his banker with whom the account is maintained. However, in the present case, once the account has been attached by an order of the Court, the said account could not be operated by the petitioner. He could not have issued any binding instructions to his banker, and the banker was not obliged to honour any of his instructions in relation to the said account, so long as the attachment under the court orders continued."

The Court concluded that the petitioners' bank account was not "maintained" in the operative sense at the time of cheque presentation due to the CGST attachment, and therefore the essential ingredients of Section 138 NI Act were not fulfilled.

Accordingly, the summoning order dated 18.09.2024 was quashed, and the proceedings under CC No. 4878/2024 were set aside.

Issues: Whether the High Court was justified in quashing the proceedings under Section 387 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 on the ground that no property or money had been delivered, and whether delivery of property is an essential ingredient of the offence under Section 387.

Analysis: The offence of extortion under Section 383 differs from the offences under Sections 385, 387 and 389, which punish the stage of putting a person in fear for the purpose of extortion even where extortion is not completed. Section 387 covers putting or attempting to put a person in fear of death or grievous hurt in order to commit extortion, and the delivery of property is not a necessary ingredient. Penal statutes must be strictly construed, but the provision cannot be narrowed by importing an ingredient that the text does not require. The complaint disclosed prima facie allegations that the complainant was threatened at gunpoint to compel payment, which was sufficient to attract Section 387 and made the quashing order unsustainable.

Conclusion: The order quashing the proceedings was erroneous, and the complaint was not liable to be quashed on the ground that no money was actually delivered.

Ratio Decidendi: For an offence under Section 387 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, actual delivery of property is not required; it is sufficient if a person is put or attempted to be put in fear of death or grievous hurt in order to commit extortion.

Issues: (i) Whether the arrest was vitiated for non-furnishing of the grounds of arrest to the arrested persons and their relatives or nominated persons under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India and Sections 47 and 48 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. (ii) Whether the petitioners were entitled to bail in view of the embargo under Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.

Issue (i): Whether the arrest was vitiated for non-furnishing of the grounds of arrest to the arrested persons and their relatives or nominated persons under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India and Sections 47 and 48 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.

Analysis: The notices served on the petitioners were found to contain not merely intimation of arrest but the basic facts constituting the grounds of arrest, namely possession, transportation and dealing with suspected heroin recovered from the vehicle. The record also showed issuance of notices to relatives or nominated persons and telephonic intimation. In the absence of reliable material showing deliberate or prejudicial delay in communication, the Court held that the constitutional and statutory requirements were substantially complied with.

Conclusion: The arrest was not vitiated for non-compliance with Article 22(1) or Sections 47 and 48 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.

Issue (ii): Whether the petitioners were entitled to bail in view of the embargo under Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.

Analysis: The seizure involved heroin of commercial quantity. Since the petitioners failed to establish non-compliance with the mandatory arrest safeguards, they did not surmount the statutory restrictions governing bail in NDPS matters.

Conclusion: The petitioners were not entitled to bail and the application was rejected.

Final Conclusion: The bail plea failed on both the alleged illegality of arrest and the statutory restrictions applicable to commercial-quantity NDPS offences.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the arrest notice and the notice to relatives or nominated persons disclose the basic facts necessitating arrest, and the record shows substantial compliance with the constitutional and statutory safeguards, the arrest is not rendered illegal merely because the communication is challenged as delayed; in a commercial-quantity NDPS case, bail remains barred unless the statutory conditions are satisfied.

The core legal questions considered by the Court in these appeals include:

- Whether the respondents (allottees) were entitled to refund of the amounts paid to the developer authority (GMADA) along with interest for delay in possession of flats under the residential scheme.

- Whether the consumer forums had jurisdiction to entertain the complaints despite the presence of an arbitration clause in the allotment agreement.

- Whether the compensation awarded by the consumer forums, particularly the payment of interest on the loan taken by the respondents to finance the flat purchase, was legally sustainable.

- The extent and nature of compensation payable for deficiency in service and mental harassment caused by delay in delivery of possession.

- The applicability and interpretation of contractual terms governing refund and compensation in the context of consumer protection laws and precedents.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue 1: Entitlement to Refund and Interest for Delay in Possession

Legal framework and precedents: The allotment agreement (Letter of Intent) stipulated that possession was to be delivered within 36 months from issuance of LOI, failing which the allottee could withdraw and claim refund of the entire amount deposited along with 8% interest compounded annually. The Supreme Court in Bangalore Development Authority v. Syndicate Bank laid down that where possession is not delivered within stipulated or reasonable time, the allottee is entitled to refund with reasonable interest, and may also be entitled to compensation depending on facts.

Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Court noted that the stipulated possession date was 21st May, 2015, but possession was delayed beyond this date. The respondents opted to withdraw and claimed refund along with interest. The consumer forums found no proof that GMADA completed the project within the stipulated time, thus validating the respondents' right to refund and interest as per the contract.

Key evidence and findings: The respondents had paid substantial amounts (over 90% of the total consideration), and the possession was delayed by more than a year. GMADA had also extended refund facility to other allottees in similar circumstances.

Application of law to facts: The contractual clause and precedent supported refund with 8% interest. The Court upheld this entitlement, emphasizing that the refund clause was binding and applicable.

Treatment of competing arguments: GMADA argued that the allotment-cum-possession offer dated 29th June, 2016, negated the respondents' claim. The Court rejected this, holding that delayed possession beyond the stipulated period entitled the respondents to withdraw and claim refund.

Conclusions: The respondents were entitled to refund of the amounts paid along with 8% compounded interest as per the contract.

Issue 2: Jurisdiction of Consumer Forums Despite Arbitration Clause

Legal framework and precedents: The presence of an arbitration clause does not oust the jurisdiction of consumer forums in consumer disputes, as held in National Seeds Corporation Ltd. v. M. Madhusudan Reddy.

Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Court agreed with the consumer forums' view that the arbitration clause did not bar their jurisdiction to entertain the complaints.

Key evidence and findings: The consumer complaints were properly filed and entertained, and the arbitration clause was not a bar.

Application of law to facts: Consumer protection statutes provide for consumer forums' jurisdiction notwithstanding arbitration clauses in contracts.

Treatment of competing arguments: GMADA contended that arbitration should be the forum. The Court rejected this, affirming consumer forums' jurisdiction.

Conclusions: The consumer forums had jurisdiction to adjudicate the complaints despite the arbitration clause.

Issue 3: Award of Interest on Loan Taken by Respondents

Legal framework and precedents: The consumer forums awarded interest on the bank loan taken by the respondents to finance the flat purchase, in addition to the 8% interest on the refund amount. The Court examined precedents including Bangalore Development Authority v. Syndicate Bank and DLF Homes Panchkula (P) Ltd. v. D.S. Dhanda.

Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Court held that while compensation for delay and deficiency in service is permissible, awarding the entire interest paid on the loan to the respondents as a liability on GMADA is not supported by law. The interest awarded on the loan lacked nexus with the default committed by GMADA and was arbitrary. The 8% compounded interest on the refund amount already constituted compensation for deprivation of use of money.

Key evidence and findings: The consumer forums relied on a prior case (Priyanka Nayyar) to justify awarding interest on loan interest, but that case awarded compensation considering the interest rate as a factor, not direct liability for loan interest. There were no exceptional circumstances here warranting such an award.

Application of law to facts: The Court applied the principle that compensation must be just and reasonable, and not a multiplication of damages for the same default. The loan interest paid by respondents is a personal financial arrangement, not a direct consequence of the developer's default.

Treatment of competing arguments: Respondents argued that consumer forums have power to grant compensation beyond contractual terms. The Court agreed in principle but clarified that such power does not extend to saddling the developer with loan interest payments absent exceptional circumstances.

Conclusions: The award of interest on the loan taken by respondents was set aside. The refund with 8% interest sufficed as compensation for delay.

Issue 4: Compensation for Mental Harassment and Litigation Costs

Legal framework and precedents: The consumer forums awarded compensation for mental agony and litigation costs, consistent with precedents recognizing compensation for harassment arising from deficiency in service.

Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Court did not interfere with these awards, recognizing the Commission's authority to grant such compensation based on facts.

Key evidence and findings: The respondents suffered mental tension and incurred litigation expenses due to delay and deficiency in service.

Application of law to facts: Compensation for mental harassment is discretionary and fact-specific. The awards were reasonable and justified.

Treatment of competing arguments: GMADA did not challenge these awards specifically. The Court upheld them.

Conclusions: Compensation for mental harassment and litigation costs was rightly awarded and maintained.

Issue 5: Interpretation of Contractual Terms and Relationship Between Parties

Legal framework and precedents: The contract stipulated refund and interest terms, bar on sale, and ownership conditions. The Court referred to precedents emphasizing that the relationship is that of service provider and consumer, and contractual terms set the framework for remedies.

Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Court emphasized that the contractual clause providing refund with 8% interest was binding and comprehensive, limiting further liability of GMADA.

Key evidence and findings: The contract explicitly stated no other liability beyond refund and interest on withdrawal due to delay.

Application of law to facts: The Court applied the contract terms strictly, rejecting claims beyond those terms without exceptional justification.

Treatment of competing arguments: Respondents argued for broader compensation beyond contract terms. The Court balanced this with the necessity of contractual sanctity and reasoned limits on compensation.

Conclusions: Contractual terms govern the scope of liability and compensation, subject to consumer protection principles.

3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS

"Where the development authority having received the full price, does not deliver possession of the allotted plot/flat/house within the time stipulated or within a reasonable time, or where the allotment is cancelled or possession is refused without any justifiable cause, the allottee is entitled for refund of the amount paid, with reasonable interest thereon from the date of payment to date of refund. In addition, the allottee may also be entitled to compensation, as may be decided with reference to the facts of each case."

"The Commission/Forum must determine that there has been deficiency in service and/or misfeasance in public office which has resulted in loss or injury. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down... compensation cannot be uniform and can best be illustrated by considering cases where possession is being directed to be delivered and cases where only monies are directed to be returned."

"The order to grant interest at the maximum of rate of interest charged by nationalised bank for advancing home loan is arbitrary and has no nexus with the default committed... There cannot be multiple heads to grant of damages and interest when the parties have agreed for payment of damages @ Rs 10 per square foot per month."

"The amount of the interest is the compensation to the beneficiary deprived of the use of the investment made by the complainant. Thus, such interest will take into its ambit, the consequences of delay in not handing over his possession."

"Whether the buyers of the flat do so by utilizing their savings, taking a loan for such purpose or securing the required finances by any other permissible means, is not a consideration that the developer of the project is required to keep in mind."

Final determinations:

- The respondents were entitled to refund of the amounts paid along with 8% compounded interest as per the contract.

- The consumer forums had jurisdiction despite the arbitration clause.

- The award of interest on the loan taken by respondents was not sustainable and was set aside.

- Compensation for mental harassment and litigation costs was upheld.

- Contractual terms govern the scope of compensation and liability, subject to consumer protection principles and absence of exceptional circumstances.

Issues: Whether the acquittal recorded by the first appellate court in a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was liable to be interfered with, and whether the complainant had proved the transaction and issuance of the cheque so as to attract the statutory presumptions.

Analysis: The complainant's version that the accused borrowed the cheque amount was supported by his testimony, the surrounding circumstances, and the bank statement showing availability of funds. Although the complainant could not produce title documents or clearly identify the purchaser of the property said to have been sold to raise funds, the defence witness summoned by the accused supported the fact of such property sale. The mere inability of the complainant to state who filled up the cheque or to identify the handwriting on the cheque did not displace the presumption arising from an admitted signature and issuance of the cheque. Once execution of the cheque was established, the burden remained on the accused to rebut the presumption under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, which was not done.

Conclusion: The acquittal was held unsustainable and the conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was restored.