Issues: Whether the summoning order under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 was sustainable in the absence of material disclosing dishonest intention at the inception of the transaction.

Analysis: The allegations and the investigative material were examined on their face value. The record showed that the complainant had invested through the proprietorship concern of the petitioner's father, that the disputed cheques were credited to the complainant's margin account with that concern, and that trading activity had in fact taken place, resulting in losses and withheld shares. In a prosecution for cheating, the essential ingredients are deception, fraudulent or dishonest inducement, and dishonest intention at the very inception. Mere business loss, a civil dispute, or possible regulatory lapses do not by themselves establish cheating. The impugned summoning order also did not disclose a conscious application of mind to the material before differing from the cancellation report.

Conclusion: The material did not disclose the ingredients of cheating, and the summoning order was unsustainable. The petitioner was entitled to relief.

Ratio Decidendi: A summoning order for cheating cannot stand unless the material, taken at face value, prima facie shows dishonest intention from the inception of the transaction and a reasoned application of mind by the Magistrate to the material on record.

Issues: Whether the challenge to the criminal proceedings on the ground of absence of sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 warranted interference at the stage of the special leave petitions, and whether liberty could be given to seek exemption from personal attendance.

Analysis: The sanction question under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was treated as one that may be examined by the trial court at an appropriate stage depending on the evidence led during trial. In the circumstances, no interference was considered necessary with the High Court's order at this stage. The petitioner was left at liberty to seek exemption from personal attendance before the trial court under the provisions corresponding to Sections 205 and 317 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and Sections 228 and 355 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.

Conclusion: The petition was not entertained on merits at this stage, and the petitioner's remedy on sanction was left open before the trial court. Liberty to seek exemption from personal attendance was preserved.

Issues: Whether the High Court, in review jurisdiction under Section 114 and Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, could reopen the earlier order by reappreciating the merits and remitting the matter for fresh consideration.

Analysis: Review is not an appeal in disguise and must remain confined to the limited grounds recognised by the Code, namely discovery of new matter, error apparent on the face of the record, or an analogous sufficient reason. An error that requires re-examination of rival contentions and fresh assessment of the case on merits does not fall within the permissible scope of review. The impugned order did not identify an apparent error; instead, it undertook a broader reappreciation of the controversy and travelled beyond the bounds of review jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The High Court exceeded its review jurisdiction. The order in review was liable to be set aside and the earlier order was restored, in favour of the Appellant.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded and the review order was annulled, leaving the earlier order operative and the parties to proceed before the Trial Court in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Review jurisdiction under the Code of Civil Procedure can correct only an apparent error or other legally confined ground and cannot be used to re-decide the matter on merits as if exercising appellate power.

Issues: (i) Whether the petitioner, having registered its security interest with CERSAI prior to the revenue authorities' attachment and registration, had priority under section 26E of the SARFAESI Act over the respondent's charge for sales tax dues; (ii) Whether the respondent's attachment could prevail in the absence of a proclamation in the manner required by section 192 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code and rule 11(2) of the Maharashtra Realization of Land Revenue Rules, 1967.

Issue (i): Whether the petitioner, having registered its security interest with CERSAI prior to the revenue authorities' attachment and registration, had priority under section 26E of the SARFAESI Act over the respondent's charge for sales tax dues.

Analysis: The petitioner's charge was registered with CERSAI in 2019, whereas the respondent's attachment was issued in 2022 and its CERSAI registration followed in 2023. Section 26E gives priority to the secured creditor in enforcement of the security interest, and the rights of other first-charge holders yield to that statutory priority once the security interest is duly registered. On these facts, the petitioner's registration preceded the respondent's claim and the petitioner was entitled to priority.

Conclusion: The issue is answered in favour of the petitioner. The petitioner's security interest had priority over the respondent's charge.

Issue (ii): Whether the respondent's attachment could prevail in the absence of a proclamation in the manner required by section 192 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code and rule 11(2) of the Maharashtra Realization of Land Revenue Rules, 1967.

Analysis: The governing revenue procedure required an attachment to be followed by a proclamation in the prescribed form. No material was produced to show compliance with that mandatory procedure. In the absence of such compliance, the respondent could not displace the statutory priority available to the secured creditor under section 26E of the SARFAESI Act.

Conclusion: The issue is answered in favour of the petitioner. The respondent's attachment could not prevail.

Final Conclusion: The petitioner's secured creditor rights were held to prevail over the revenue recovery claim, and the attachment, lien and charges recorded by the respondent were directed to be removed.

Ratio Decidendi: A secured creditor with prior CERSAI registration under section 26E of the SARFAESI Act has statutory priority over subsequent revenue attachments, and such priority is not displaced unless the attachment is shown to have been completed in accordance with the mandatory revenue procedure, including the required proclamation.

Issues: (i) Whether delayed interest under Section 18(1) of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 can be granted automatically on admitted delay without a fresh adjudicatory inquiry; (ii) Whether the Appellate Tribunal could grant delayed interest in exercise of its appellate powers without framing separate issues or recording detailed reasons; (iii) Whether the pre-deposit made under Section 43(5) could be directed to be appropriated towards the allottee's entitlement instead of being treated as a mere security deposit; (iv) Whether an appeal could lie on the question of grant of interest where the relevant facts stood admitted.

Issue (i): Whether delayed interest under Section 18(1) of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 can be granted automatically on admitted delay without a fresh adjudicatory inquiry?

Analysis: Section 18(1)(a) provides for interest where the promoter fails to complete the project or fails to give possession by the agreed date. The provision treats interest as a statutory consequence of delay, and the date for commencement is controlled by the agreement and the actual offer of possession. The judgment holds that where the completion date and the offer of possession are undisputed, the award of interest follows as a mathematical and automatic consequence and does not require separate factual adjudication in the manner suggested by the promoter.

Conclusion: The grant of delayed interest was held to be automatic on the admitted facts and was upheld.

Issue (ii): Whether the Appellate Tribunal could grant delayed interest in exercise of its appellate powers without framing separate issues or recording detailed reasons?

Analysis: The Tribunal's powers under Sections 44 and 43 were construed broadly, and the Court held that where the material on record is sufficient and no complex evidentiary inquiry is needed, the Tribunal may finally determine the lis in appeal. The Court further held that, in the context of a statutory scheme designed to protect allottees, the appellate forum is not denuded of the power to grant the statutory consequence of delay merely because the order is passed in appeal and not by the original authority.

Conclusion: The Tribunal was held to have validly exercised its appellate powers in granting delayed interest.

Issue (iii): Whether the pre-deposit made under Section 43(5) could be directed to be appropriated towards the allottee's entitlement instead of being treated as a mere security deposit?

Analysis: The Court treated the pre-deposit as a statutory condition for the entertainment of the appeal and held that such a deposit is not a neutral security lying outside the claim. Relying on the nature of pre-deposit jurisprudence, it held that once the liability is adjudicated, the amount can be adjusted against the amount payable under the order and need not await separate execution proceedings. The deposit may be refunded only to the extent it exceeds the amount ultimately payable.

Conclusion: The direction appropriating the pre-deposit was upheld, subject to refund of any excess amount to the promoter.

Issue (iv): Whether an appeal could lie on the question of grant of interest where the relevant facts stood admitted?

Analysis: The Court read Section 58 of the Act with Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and held that a further appeal lies only on substantial questions of law. Since the factual foundation for delay and the dates of possession were admitted, and statutory interest under Section 18(1) followed as a legal consequence, no substantial question remained to support interference beyond the questions already considered.

Conclusion: No further appellate interference was warranted on the admitted facts.

Final Conclusion: The promoter's appeals failed, while the allottee's challenge to denial of compensation also did not survive, leaving the Tribunal's award of statutory delay interest intact and the matter finally concluded.

Ratio Decidendi: Where delay in handing over possession and the relevant dates are admitted, interest under Section 18(1) of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 follows as a statutory consequence and may be granted by the appellate forum without a fresh evidentiary inquiry; a pre-deposit made to entertain the appeal may be adjusted against the adjudicated liability.

Issues: (i) whether proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 could be quashed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 on the basis of disputed facts regarding presentation of the cheque, alleged termination of the underlying agreement, and alleged part payments; (ii) whether dishonour for stop-payment instructions and the plea of absence of legally enforceable liability rebutted maintainability of the complaint at the threshold; (iii) whether the alleged limitation and condonation aspect vitiated the criminal complaint.

Issue (i): whether proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 could be quashed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 on the basis of disputed facts regarding presentation of the cheque, alleged termination of the underlying agreement, and alleged part payments

Analysis: The controversy turned on competing versions regarding the date of deposit and presentation of the cheque, the effect of the alleged termination of the construction agreement, and the significance of claimed part payments without endorsement. These matters depended on documentary comparison and factual appreciation. The existence or effect of such facts could not be conclusively determined in inherent jurisdiction, where the Court does not conduct a trial or weigh evidence.

Conclusion: The issue was answered against the applicant; the matter was held to be fit for trial and not for quashing at the threshold.

Issue (ii): whether dishonour for stop-payment instructions and the plea of absence of legally enforceable liability rebutted maintainability of the complaint at the threshold

Analysis: The statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 operate in favour of the holder of the cheque, and a stop-payment dishonour does not by itself extinguish liability under Section 138. Whether the drawer had sufficient defence, whether the liability had ceased, and whether any endorsement was required for part payments were all matters requiring evidence. The Court treated the accused's defences as rebuttal contentions to be tested at trial, not as grounds for immediate quashing.

Conclusion: The issue was answered against the applicant; the complaint remained maintainable despite the stop-payment defence and the plea of no subsisting liability.

Issue (iii): whether the alleged limitation and condonation aspect vitiated the criminal complaint

Analysis: The limitation objection was not accepted as a ground for interference under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Court proceeded on the footing that the delay had been dealt with by the Magistrate and that no jurisdictional error or abuse of process was shown on that score.

Conclusion: The issue was answered against the applicant.

Final Conclusion: The inherent jurisdiction was not invoked because the complaint disclosed a triable prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and the applicant failed to show any legal infirmity warranting interference at the pre-trial stage.

Ratio Decidendi: In a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, disputed facts, stop-payment dishonour, and rebuttal contentions relating to liability or part payment ordinarily must be examined at trial, and they do not justify quashing in inherent jurisdiction unless a clear abuse of process or legal bar is shown.

Issues: Whether refund of stamp duty could be denied merely because the refund application was filed beyond the period mentioned in the Stamp Act, where the underlying share purchase transaction failed on rejection of mandatory governmental approval and the application had been made under a possibly inapplicable provision.

Analysis: The stamp duty had been paid for execution of a share purchase agreement that did not fructify because the required governmental approval was rejected later. The delay in seeking refund was caused by the pendency of that approval process and was beyond the petitioner's control. The Court held that the substance of the claim was for refund of duty paid on a transaction that became unenforceable, and that a mere incorrect reference to a statutory provision could not defeat a legitimate refund claim. It further held that rigid reliance on limitation would result in the State retaining duty for a failed transaction, which would offend equity, justice and fairness. The Court applied the principle that limitation may bar the remedy but not the underlying right, and accepted that the refund claim could not be rejected solely on limitation in these facts.

Conclusion: The refund could not be denied on limitation alone and the petitioner was entitled to refund of the stamp duty.

Ratio Decidendi: Where stamp duty is paid for a transaction that fails for reasons beyond the payer's control, a refund claim cannot be defeated merely by an incorrect statutory label or by rigid application of limitation if doing so would unjustly permit the State to retain the duty despite the failure of the underlying transaction.

Issues: Whether clause 18.1 of the contract barred the arbitral tribunal from awarding pendente lite interest on the amount awarded under the invoices.

Analysis: Section 31(7) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 permits an arbitral tribunal to award interest for the period between accrual of the cause of action and the award, but that power is subject to party agreement. A contractual bar must be express or arise by necessary implication to exclude pendente lite interest. A clause merely stating that no interest is payable on delayed payment or disputed claims does not, by itself, take away the tribunal's power to award pendente lite interest, especially where the clause does not bar interest in comprehensive terms or exclude interest "in any respect whatsoever". Clause 18.1, read as a whole, did not expressly or impliedly prohibit pendente lite interest.

Conclusion: The contractual clause did not bar pendente lite interest, and the award of interest was not illegal. The appeal failed.

Issues: (i) Whether, in complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, a Magistrate can recall summons and discharge the accused at the threshold; (ii) whether a restraint order issued by the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction under Section 22A of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 bars prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Issue (i): Whether, in complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, a Magistrate can recall summons and discharge the accused at the threshold.

Analysis: The governing principle is that trial courts do not possess an inherent power to recall summons in a complaint case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. A recall application cannot be used to short-circuit the criminal process, and the correctness of the summoning order is not to be re-opened in that manner. The revisional court, therefore, ought not to have set aside the summoning order by entertaining a recall-based challenge.

Conclusion: The recall of summons was not maintainable, and the interference by the revisional court was unsustainable.

Issue (ii): Whether a restraint order issued by the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction under Section 22A of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 bars prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Analysis: Section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 does not create a legal bar to instituting or proceeding with a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. A Section 22A restraint order has to be examined on its own terms and in the facts of the case; it is not an automatic or absolute shield. Where the order itself permits use of current assets for day-to-day operations, whether the cheques were issued for such operations is a matter to be tested on evidence, and the issue should ordinarily be decided at the trial stage after the parties lead evidence. The presumption as to the date on a negotiable instrument also militates against treating the cheques as post-dated at the threshold without evidence.

Conclusion: The restraint order did not justify quashing or stalling the complaints at the threshold.

Final Conclusion: The impugned orders were set aside and the complaint proceedings were restored to the Magistrate for decision in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: A complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 cannot be terminated at the threshold on the basis of a BIFR restraint order unless the effect of that order on the alleged default is established on evidence, and a Magistrate has no inherent power to recall summons in such proceedings.

Issues: Whether the appellants were entitled to regular bail under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 on the basis of alleged delay in trial and prolonged incarceration; whether the material collected by the prosecution disclosed a prima facie case of conspiracy and terrorist activity; whether the plea of parity with co-accused and the asserted right to protest warranted release on bail.

Issue: Whether the appellants were entitled to regular bail under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 on the basis of alleged delay in trial and prolonged incarceration.

Analysis: The Court held that the right to speedy trial and personal liberty remain important considerations, but long incarceration by itself does not mandate bail in every case, especially where the prosecution alleges a large-scale, coordinated conspiracy involving serious offences. The Court found that the trial was progressing, the record was voluminous, and the allegations were of such gravity that the passage of time did not, by itself, outweigh the prosecution case at the bail stage.

Conclusion: The plea for bail on the ground of delay and prolonged incarceration was rejected and the finding was against the appellants.

Issue: Whether the material collected by the prosecution disclosed a prima facie case of conspiracy and terrorist activity.

Analysis: Applying the restrictive bail standard under Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, the Court held that it had to proceed on a surface assessment of broad probabilities and not conduct a mini-trial. On the material placed, including witness statements, electronic evidence, WhatsApp groups, speeches, pamphlets, meetings, coordination among protest sites, and alleged funding, the Court found prima facie indications of an organised conspiracy and held that the accusation appeared prima facie true for bail purposes.

Conclusion: The Court held that the prosecution material disclosed a prima facie case attracting the statutory bar on bail under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, and this issue was decided against the appellants.

Issue: Whether the plea of parity with co-accused and the asserted right to protest warranted release on bail.

Analysis: The Court held that parity was not established because the appellants' alleged roles were materially distinct and graver than those of the co-accused who had been enlarged on bail. The Court also held that the right to protest protects peaceful and orderly dissent, but does not extend to conspiratorial violence, disruption, or conduct alleged to have been used as a cover for unlawful mobilisation.

Conclusion: The plea of parity failed and the asserted right to protest did not entitle the appellants to bail.

Final Conclusion: The Court found no ground to interfere with the refusal of bail. The appeals were dismissed and the appellants were not enlarged on regular bail.

Ratio Decidendi: In bail matters under Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, the Court must assess only whether the prosecution material shows reasonable grounds to believe that the accusation is prima facie true on a broad-probabilities review, and where such material discloses an organised conspiracy, prolonged incarceration, parity, or the right to protest do not by themselves override the statutory bail embargo.

Issues: (i) Whether an interim bail application in a case governed by the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 lies directly before the High Court without first approaching the Special Court; (ii) Whether bail under Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 can be granted solely on the ground of delay in trial.

Issue (i): Whether an interim bail application in a case governed by the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 lies directly before the High Court without first approaching the Special Court.

Analysis: Section 21 of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 makes an appeal to the High Court lie from an order of the Special Court, and the original bail application has to be moved before the Special Court in the first instance. The statutory scheme and the binding clarification relied upon by the Court distinguish between the forum for the original bail request and the forum for the appeal. Since the application was moved directly before the High Court without exhausting the remedy before the Special Court, the application did not satisfy the statutory route.

Conclusion: The interim bail application was not maintainable before the High Court and was rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether bail under Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 can be granted solely on the ground of delay in trial.

Analysis: Section 43D(5) imposes a special bail restriction and requires the Court to examine whether the accusation is prima facie true on the basis of the case diary and the report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Court applied the settled principle that the embargo under the provision cannot be bypassed merely by pointing to delay or long incarceration; the constitutional right to speedy trial may be relevant, but only in a case where the delay is not attributable to the accused and the material on record otherwise justifies release. On the facts, the Court found that the delay in the trial was substantially occasioned by adjournments and conduct attributable to the accused side, and the appellant had not pressed the merits of the accusation so as to enable a prima facie assessment in his favour.

Conclusion: Bail could not be granted solely on the ground of delay in trial, and the rejection of bail was upheld.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed because the interim bail request was not maintainable and, in any event, the delay-based plea did not displace the statutory embargo governing bail under the UAPA on the facts of the case.

Ratio Decidendi: In proceedings under Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, delay in trial by itself does not justify bail unless the Court can also conclude, on the material in the case diary and charge-sheet, that the accusation is not prima facie true and the constitutional delay is not substantially attributable to the accused.

Issues: (i) Whether the non-impleadment of the firm in a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was a curable defect permitting amendment of the complaint after summoning; (ii) Whether the typographical error in the date of the legal notice rendered the proceedings non est or otherwise vitiated the complaint.

Issue (i): Whether the non-impleadment of the firm in a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was a curable defect permitting amendment of the complaint after summoning.

Analysis: Vicarious liability for an offence involving a firm or company is attracted only when the principal offender is properly before the court, and the complaint as filed was inconsistent with the admitted factual matrix because the cheque-related liability was sought to be fastened on the petitioner in an individual capacity while the material suggested a partnership concern. At the same time, the proceedings had not advanced to effective trial, summons had remained unserved for long, and no prejudice was shown to be caused by correcting the description of the accused entity. In such circumstances, the defect was of a formal and curable nature and could be rectified by amendment without altering the basic nature of the complaint.

Conclusion: The non-impleadment of the firm was a curable infirmity and amendment of the complaint was permissible.

Issue (ii): Whether the typographical error in the date of the legal notice rendered the proceedings non est or otherwise vitiated the complaint.

Analysis: The notice record showed an obvious mismatch between the written date and the chronology of dishonour, since the notice itself referred to dishonoured cheques and return memos from a later period. The discrepancy was therefore treated as a typographical error and not as a substantive defect affecting the statutory notice requirement.

Conclusion: The error in the date of the legal notice did not invalidate the complaint.

Final Conclusion: The petition failed, but the complainant was given liberty to seek amendment of the complaint to correct the description of the accused entity, with the matter to proceed on payment of compensatory costs if the application was filed within the stipulated time.

Ratio Decidendi: A complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 may be amended to cure a formal defect in the description or arraignment of parties, provided the defect is curable, the basic nature of the complaint remains unchanged, and no prejudice is caused to the accused.

Issues: (i) Whether the documents comprising agreement to sell, general power of attorney, receipt, affidavit and registered will conferred valid title over the immovable property; (ii) Whether the plaintiff could claim protection under section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

Issue (i): Whether the documents comprising agreement to sell, general power of attorney, receipt, affidavit and registered will conferred valid title over the immovable property.

Analysis: A sale of immovable property of the requisite value can be effected only by a registered deed of conveyance. An agreement to sell does not by itself create any interest or charge in the property, and a general power of attorney is only an instrument of agency and not a transfer of title. A will operates only after the death of the testator and must be proved in accordance with law by compliance with the statutory requirements of attestation and proof. The will relied upon was not proved as required by law, and the surrounding circumstances remained suspicious and unexplained. The affidavit and receipt also did not amount to conveyance of title.

Conclusion: The documents did not confer valid title on the plaintiff.

Issue (ii): Whether the plaintiff could claim protection under section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

Analysis: Protection under the doctrine of part performance is available only when the transferee has taken or continued possession in part performance of a written contract and satisfies the other statutory conditions. Since the plaintiff himself had sought possession, the record did not establish that he was in possession of the whole suit property so as to attract the doctrine.

Conclusion: The plaintiff was not entitled to the benefit of section 53A.

Final Conclusion: The impugned judgment was set aside, the appeal was allowed, and the plaintiff's suit stood dismissed, while the rights of the second defendant were left protected to the extent indicated in the judgment.

Ratio Decidendi: Title in immovable property passes only by a registered conveyance, a power of attorney does not transfer title, and statutory protection under part performance is unavailable without the requisite possession and compliance with the governing requirements for that defence.

Issues: (i) Whether the appellants were entitled to contend that the occupancy certificate stood deemed granted so as to displace the applicability of the Real Estate (Regulation & Development) Act, 2016. (ii) Whether the appeals before the Real Estate Appellate Tribunal could be entertained without compliance with the pre-deposit condition under Section 43(5) of the Real Estate (Regulation & Development) Act, 2016.

Issue (i): Whether the appellants were entitled to contend that the occupancy certificate stood deemed granted so as to displace the applicability of the Real Estate (Regulation & Development) Act, 2016.

Analysis: The record showed that the application for occupancy/completion was not supported by timely and complete compliance, including the fee receipt and fire safety certificate. The application was later processed under the Unified Building Bye-Laws for Delhi, 2016, shortcomings were not cured, and the application was ultimately rejected. In these circumstances, the asserted deemed grant of occupancy certificate could not be accepted, and the absence of a valid occupancy certificate meant that the statutory regime under RERA continued to apply.

Conclusion: The contention of deemed grant of occupancy certificate was rejected and the appellants were not relieved from the applicability of RERA.

Issue (ii): Whether the appeals before the Real Estate Appellate Tribunal could be entertained without compliance with the pre-deposit condition under Section 43(5) of the Real Estate (Regulation & Development) Act, 2016.

Analysis: The proviso to Section 43(5) makes pre-deposit a condition precedent for a promoter's appeal, and the Court treated the requirement as mandatory and not onerous. Relying on the governing Supreme Court exposition, it held that the appellate tribunal could not entertain the promoter's appeal unless the prescribed deposit was made. There was also no statutory basis to substitute immovable-property security for the mandated deposit.

Conclusion: Non-compliance with the pre-deposit requirement justified dismissal of the appeals by the tribunal.

Final Conclusion: The appellate challenge failed, and the dismissal by the tribunal was upheld, leaving the appellants to revive the appeals only upon compliance with the statutory deposit requirement, if otherwise permissible in law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a promoter's appeal is governed by a mandatory statutory pre-deposit clause, the appellate forum cannot entertain the appeal without compliance, and an asserted deemed occupancy certificate will not defeat the statutory regime where the underlying occupancy process stands rejected or remains unestablished.

Issues: Whether motor vehicles used exclusively within the restricted central dispatch yard of a steel plant were used or kept for use in a public place and were consequently liable to motor vehicle tax.

Analysis: Section 3(1) makes use or intended use in a public place the taxable event. A public place under Section 2(34) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 requires a right of public access. The restricted premises, controlled through guarded entry and inaccessible to the public without authorization, did not satisfy that requirement. Rule 12A of the Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles Taxation Rules, 1963 operates for giving effect to Section 3 and could not enlarge the charging provision by treating vehicles confined to a non-public place as liable to tax merely because no stoppage intimation was furnished. The requirement of such intimation was inapplicable where the vehicles were not used or kept for use in a public place.

Conclusion: The vehicles were not liable to motor vehicle tax for the period during which they were exclusively used or kept within the restricted premises; this issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 stood subsumed in the alleged settlement so as to warrant quashing of the proceedings; (ii) Whether the petitioner, claimed to be a sleeping partner, could be proceeded against under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Issue (i): Whether the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 stood subsumed in the alleged settlement so as to warrant quashing of the proceedings.

Analysis: A private settlement by itself does not terminate a prosecution unless the compromise is brought before the court, the parties affirm its voluntary and binding character, and the court accepts it in accordance with law. The record showed no concluded settlement placed before the trial court, no statement of the parties recording acceptance of the compromise, and no order compounding the offence. The later conduct before the trial court also did not establish that the complaint had been finally resolved by settlement. The complaint therefore could not be treated as extinguished merely on the basis of the private agreement relied upon by the petitioner.

Conclusion: The settlement did not subsume the complaint, and quashing on that ground was not justified.

Issue (ii): Whether the petitioner, claimed to be a sleeping partner, could be proceeded against under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Analysis: Vicarious liability under Section 141 extends to persons who, at the relevant time, were in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the firm, and the essence of the allegations is more important than a verbatim recital of statutory words. The complaint and demand notice contained specific assertions that the firm and its partners were involved in the transaction. No material was produced to establish that the petitioner was only a sleeping partner, and the plea of non-involvement in the business was a matter for trial. In the context of partnership law, a partner is an agent of the firm and is jointly and severally liable for acts done while a partner, supporting a prima facie inference of responsibility at this stage.

Conclusion: The petitioner was prima facie liable and could not be discharged at the quashing stage.

Final Conclusion: The petition for quashing failed, as neither the alleged settlement nor the plea of sleeping partnership warranted interference with the prosecution at this stage.

Ratio Decidendi: A private settlement does not defeat a Section 138 prosecution unless it is duly brought before and accepted by the court in accordance with law, and a partner cannot avoid Section 141 liability at the quashing stage merely by asserting sleeping-partner status without material to displace prima facie allegations of responsibility for the firm's business.

Issues: (i) Whether officers of a company can be prosecuted for offences under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 on a theory of vicarious liability when the company itself is not arraigned as an accused; (ii) Whether the complaint and the order issuing process disclosed sufficient individual role, culpability, or material against the officers to sustain prosecution; (iii) Whether the acts complained of were protected by Section 32 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 as acts done in good faith in the discharge of statutory duties.

Issue (i): Whether officers of a company can be prosecuted for offences under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 on a theory of vicarious liability when the company itself is not arraigned as an accused.

Analysis: The prosecution was founded on the allegation that the impugned possession notice was issued on behalf of the bank. The bank, being the juristic person on whose behalf the notice was issued, was not made an accused. For offences under the Indian Penal Code, 1860, vicarious liability of directors or officers is not presumed in the absence of a specific statutory provision creating such liability. The legal position applied is that prosecution of officers alone, without impleading the company or body corporate, is impermissible where the alleged act is attributable to the institution.

Conclusion: The prosecution of the officers alone was impermissible and could not be sustained.

Issue (ii): Whether the complaint and the order issuing process disclosed sufficient individual role, culpability, or material against the officers to sustain prosecution.

Analysis: The complaint proceeded largely on the basis of designation and general assertions that the appellants were in charge of the bank's affairs. The record did not disclose concrete material showing active participation, authorization, or personal conduct linking each appellant to the alleged defamatory act. Issuance of process requires application of mind to whether the complaint, if taken at face value, makes out personal criminal liability. Mere official status or bald averments are insufficient to justify criminal process against officers for an offence under the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Conclusion: The allegations were insufficient to justify continuation of criminal proceedings against the appellants.

Issue (iii): Whether the acts complained of were protected by Section 32 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 as acts done in good faith in the discharge of statutory duties.

Analysis: The possession notice was issued under the statutory enforcement mechanism after default in repayment. The wrong figure in the notice was treated as a clerical error, and the bank promptly issued a clarificatory letter correcting the mistake. On these facts, the notice and the related action were held to be bona fide steps taken in the course of enforcement proceedings. Section 32 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 protects secured creditors and their officers from proceedings for acts done in good faith under the Act.

Conclusion: The officers were entitled to statutory protection and the prosecution was not maintainable.

Final Conclusion: The criminal proceedings and the orders taking cognizance and issuing process were quashed as an abuse of process, and the appellants were granted relief.

Ratio Decidendi: In the absence of a statute creating vicarious criminal liability, officers of a juristic person cannot be prosecuted for an offence allegedly committed on behalf of that entity unless the entity itself is arraigned and the complaint contains specific material showing their individual role and culpability.

Issues: Whether the foreign arbitral award, granting compensatory damages to the award-holders, could be recognized and enforced in India without any legal impediment and whether prior RBI approval was required before enforcement.

Analysis: The award was for compensatory damages arising from breach of the share purchase arrangements and did not direct transfer of shares or payment of consideration for any equity transfer. The RBI's affidavit clarified that payment of damages of this nature is a current account transaction under the foreign exchange framework and does not require any specific approval or permission. In that view, the Court found no contravention that would bar enforcement under the enforcement provisions of the arbitration law.

Conclusion: The foreign award was held enforceable in India, and RBI approval was not treated as a precondition to enforcement on the facts presented.

Final Conclusion: The award-holder's enforcement rights were upheld and the matter was disposed of with directions for the execution proceedings to continue expeditiously.

Ratio Decidendi: A foreign award granting compensatory damages, where no transfer of shares is ordered and the RBI states that such payment is a current account transaction not requiring specific approval, is not ed from enforcement in India on RBI-approval grounds.

ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED

1. Whether statutory notice as contemplated under Section 138(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act was validly served on the drawer.

2. Whether the accused rebutted the statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, and if so, whether on a preponderance of probabilities the complaint failed.

3. Whether documentary and oral evidence adduced by the defence (agreement and witness) could be relied upon without the accused or the third party named in the agreement being examined.

ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue 1 - Validity of statutory notice under Section 138(b) (service and proof of receipt)

Legal framework: Section 138(b) requires that the drawer be given a statutory notice demanding payment and that the notice be received to sustain prosecution; service and receipt are questions of fact to be proved by the complainant.

Precedent Treatment: The Court relied on authoritative higher-court authority that holds that giving notice is mandatory and that where notice is returned with endorsements such as "absent" or "premises locked", the complainant may nevertheless prove actual knowledge or fraudulent refusal of service; the question of fraudulent refusal is a factual one.

Interpretation and reasoning: The returned notice (endorsed "absent-intimated") coupled with the postman's own admission that no direct intimation was given to the drawer and absence of evidence showing who was informed or that the drawer had knowledge of the notice, leaves a lacuna in proof of receipt. There was no evidence that the drawer fraudulently refused service or deliberately evaded receipt. The complainant made no attempt to rebut the inference that the statutory notice was not actually received.

Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - service of statutory notice was not proved; absence of evidence of actual receipt or fraudulent refusal undermines statutory compliance. Obiter - the court's restatement of the factual nature of fraudulent refusal follows existing authority.

Conclusion: Proper service of the statutory notice, as required by Section 138(b), was not established; therefore the foundational statutory prerequisite for prosecution was not satisfied in this case.

Issue 2 - Rebuttal of presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 (standard and sufficiency of proof)

Legal framework: Section 139 creates a rebuttable presumption that a cheque admitted to have been executed was issued for discharge of debt or liability; Sections 118 and 139 call for the accused to raise a probable defence, with the standard of proof being preponderance of probabilities (not proof beyond reasonable doubt). The accused may rely on his own evidence or on materials on record; he is not obliged to personally testify.

Precedent Treatment: The Court summarized established principles that (i) once execution/admission is shown, the presumption arises; (ii) the accused must produce materials to probabilise a defence on balance of probabilities; and (iii) non-appearance of the accused as witness does not per se invalidate the defence where evidentiary materials suffice. The Court also noted precedent holding that if the accused questions the complainant's financial capacity, the onus shifts back to the complainant to prove capacity.

Interpretation and reasoning: The defence produced a notarial agreement (documentary evidence) indicating that the cheque in question was one of three cheques handed over as security to a third person on a date antecedent to the cheque's alleged issuance date. The printed ledger/date format on the cheque suggested the cheque form predated 1990, whereas the complainant recorded the date as 25-07-2002 - undermining the complainant's account of the time of execution/issuance. The trial court and appellate Court found the complainant's evidence regarding execution/issuance timing unreliable. Given the documentary admission in the notarial agreement and the surrounding circumstances, the defence probabilised an alternative explanation sufficient to rebut the Section 139 presumption on a preponderance of probabilities.

Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - where defence materials (documentary evidence attested by a notary and witness evidence) create a probable defence on balance of probabilities, the presumption under Section 139 is rebutted even if the accused does not personally testify; the prosecution must then prove the essential ingredients beyond the presumption. Obiter - reference to shifting onus when financial capacity is questioned reiterates prior law.

Conclusion: The accused successfully rebutted the statutory presumptions on the preponderance of probabilities by prima facie evidence (attested agreement and witness account), and the complainant failed to shore up the presumption with reliable proof of cheque execution and liability.

Issue 3 - Reliance on defence documentary evidence and defence witness without calling the accused or the third party in the agreement

Legal framework: The accused is not mandated to personally enter the witness box to discharge the evidentiary burden under Sections 118/139; inference can be drawn from documents and circumstantial evidence. The prosecution may be required to lead further evidence if defence materials raise reasonable doubt about the complainant's case.

Precedent Treatment: The Court followed settled law that an evidentiary burden (not a persuasive burden) is imposed on the accused and that circumstantial/material evidence may suffice to rebut statutory presumptions; absence of examination of third parties does not automatically render documentary evidence inadmissible or ineffectual.

Interpretation and reasoning: The notarial agreement (attested) and defence witness evidence were considered sufficient to probabilise the defence. The complainant's failure to disclose date of execution in the complaint and the unreliability of PW1's evidence further weakened the prosecution's case. The appellate assessment found no legal justification to discredit reliance on Exhibit D1 and DW1 in the absence of the accused's personal testimony or the second party's testimony, since the standard required was preponderance of probabilities and not proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - documentary evidence and witness testimony that probabilise a defence can legitimately rebut statutory presumptions even if the accused and/or other relevant persons are not called; their non-examination does not automatically negate the defence where the materials on record permit drawing of inferences on balance of probabilities. Obiter - the Court's observation that the complainant could have countered by proving receipt of notice or challenging the defence documents is confirmatory of adversarial duties but ancillary to the holding.

Conclusion: Reliance on Exhibit D1 and DW1 was permissible and sufficient to rebut presumptions; absence of direct testimony from the accused or the other signatory did not warrant rejecting the defence where the documentary and circumstantial materials tilted the balance in favour of the accused.

Overall Conclusion

Because statutory notice service was not proved and the defence successfully probabilised an alternative account through documentary and witness evidence (thereby rebutting the statutory presumptions under Sections 118/139 on a preponderance of probabilities), the prosecution did not establish the offence under Section 138. The acquittal was therefore sustained.

Issues: Whether the writ petition should be restored for fresh consideration after impleading the secured creditor and determining the inter se priority between provident fund dues and the secured debt.

Analysis: The dispute involved competing claims between the provident fund authority and secured creditors over the sale proceeds of mortgaged properties. The secured creditor was not impleaded before the High Court, though it was later heard in the appeal. The Court held that the High Court should first examine the rival claims of first charge and priority under the relevant provident fund and securitisation provisions, after all necessary parties are impleaded and given an opportunity to exchange pleadings and be heard.

Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and the writ petition was remanded to the High Court for fresh decision in accordance with law after impleading the secured creditor.