Issues: Whether proceedings in a statutory appeal under Section 37(1)(b) against rejection of interim relief under Section 9 can, after constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal and by consent, be remitted to that Tribunal for treatment as an application under Section 17.

Analysis: Appellate jurisdiction under Section 37(1)(b) is vested exclusively in the competent Court contemplated by Section 2(1)(e). The Tribunal's power to grant interim measures under Section 17 is distinct in nature and source from the appellate power exercised over a Section 9 order. Remitting the appeal and requiring it to be treated as a Section 17 application would impermissibly transfer statutory appellate jurisdiction to the Tribunal. Following constitution of the Tribunal, liberty could instead be granted to independently seek available interim measures under Section 17, assessed on subsequent events and the relief then sought.

Conclusion: Statutory appellate proceedings under Section 37(1)(b) cannot be remitted to the Arbitral Tribunal or treated as an application under Section 17; the direction to that effect was set aside.

Issues: (i) Whether the arbitrators were disqualified on account of prior service in a related maritime arbitration and inadequate disclosure; (ii) Whether Clause 62 of the Contract of Affreightment permitted unilateral termination for non-issuance of shipment nominations; (iii) Whether the award of damages and interest was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the arbitrators were disqualified on account of prior service in a related maritime arbitration and inadequate disclosure.

Analysis: The award arose from an international commercial arbitration, for which review under Section 34 is confined to the limited public-policy grounds; patent illegality is unavailable. Section 12 and Item 24 of the Fifth Schedule identify circumstances capable of giving rise to justifiable doubts as to independence or impartiality, while Explanation 3 recognises that maritime arbitrations may draw from a small pool of specialised arbitrators. The applicable maritime rules and Section 13 required a challenge within fifteen days. The appellant had knowledge of the arbitrators' participation in the related arbitration but did not raise its challenge within the prescribed period, resulting in waiver. Prior adjudication of a similar contractual issue, without material showing a closed mind, partiality, or lack of objective judgment, did not establish disqualification.

Conclusion: The arbitrators were not disqualified, and the award was not vitiated by conflict of interest or any deficiency in disclosure.

Issue (ii): Whether Clause 62 of the Contract of Affreightment permitted unilateral termination for non-issuance of shipment nominations.

Analysis: Clause 62 was required to be read with the agreement as a whole and alongside the force-majeure mechanism in Clause 61. The clause addressed a supplier's failure or inability to supply cargo, resulting in frustration of performance; it did not authorise termination because of the charterer's own failure to issue shipment nominations. The force-majeure provision was not invoked. The proposed construction would permit a party to benefit from its own breach and would undermine the binding shipment obligations under the contract.

Conclusion: Clause 62 did not permit unilateral termination for the appellant's own non-performance, and the termination was unjustified.

Issue (iii): Whether the award of damages and interest was sustainable.

Analysis: The damages calculation adopted the difference between the contractual freight rate and the relevant spot rate, applied to the affected tonnage, after notice of mitigation. This was a rational measure of contractual loss. The assessment did not violate the restricted public-policy standard applicable to review of an international commercial arbitral award, and the interest award was also within the arbitral determination.

Conclusion: The award of damages and interest was sustained.

Final Conclusion: The limited public-policy review furnished no basis to disturb the arbitral determination on liability, compensation, or interest.

Ratio Decidendi: Prior service by arbitrators in a related specialised arbitration does not, without material establishing a real likelihood of closed-mindedness or partiality, create justifiable doubts as to their independence or impartiality; an objection to their appointment must also be raised within the prescribed period.

Issues: Whether a cheque drawn on an account with a bank that subsequently merged with another bank becomes invalid, thereby warranting quashing of proceedings for dishonour under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Analysis: A bank merger transfers the merged bank's assets, liabilities, and customer accounts to the successor bank. Consequently, the account on which the cheque was drawn does not vanish merely because the original bank ceases to exist. An endorsement stating that there was no such bank could not, by itself, render the cheque invalid where the successor bank had taken over the account. The allegation that the cheque was misplaced and the circumstances concerning closure of the account are matters requiring proof in trial.

Conclusion: A cheque does not become invalid solely because the drawee bank has merged into a successor bank; such merger does not preclude proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Issues: (i) Whether Article 11 of the loan agreement, authorising repossession and sale of the hypothecated vehicle, conformed to RBI recovery safeguards and the Indian Contract Act, 1872; (ii) Whether the Company's repossession and sale of the vehicle were unlawful and warranted compensation; and (iii) Whether the writ petition could be dismissed on the ground of delay.

Issue (i): Whether Article 11 of the loan agreement, authorising repossession and sale of the hypothecated vehicle, conformed to RBI recovery safeguards and the Indian Contract Act, 1872.

Analysis: Section 35-A of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 gives statutory force to RBI directions. The applicable fair-practice framework prohibits harassment and use of force in recovery, requires lawful seizure, and requires a repossession clause to provide adequate notice, a fair procedure for possession, an opportunity to cure default, and a transparent sale process. Article 11 purported to terminate the borrower's rights without notice, authorised entry wherever the vehicle might be located, did not prescribe a possession or sale procedure, and allowed the Company unilaterally to waive notice.

Conclusion: Article 11 does not conform to the RBI safeguards or the requirement of contractual fairness under the Indian Contract Act, 1872, and does not meet the legal standard of a valid repossession clause to that extent.

Issue (ii): Whether the Company's repossession and sale of the vehicle were unlawful and warranted compensation.

Analysis: No seven-day pre-repossession notice was issued, despite such notice being a contractual precondition to repossession. Possession was taken at night by breaking the steering lock and without a memorandum signed by the borrower, contrary to the requirement of peaceful and lawful recovery. The conduct breached the RBI fair-recovery safeguards and arbitrarily deprived the borrower of the vehicle used for livelihood, attracting Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.

Conclusion: The repossession and consequent sale were unauthorised and arbitrary; the borrower is entitled to restitution and compensation, although the completed sale is not set aside.

Issue (iii): Whether the writ petition could be dismissed on the ground of delay.

Analysis: The borrower promptly reported the incident as theft and pursued remedial proceedings in that bona fide belief. Continuing traffic challans relating to the vehicle after its alleged sale also required explanation. No prejudice from the alleged delay was established.

Conclusion: The writ petition was not liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay.

Final Conclusion: The loan accounts are to be closed, the sale proceeds refunded with interest, and compensation and costs paid to the borrower, while the sale of the vehicle remains undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: A financier's contractual right of self-help repossession is enforceable only through a fair and lawful process complying with binding RBI recovery safeguards, including prior notice, an opportunity to cure, peaceful possession, and a transparent sale procedure.

Issues: Whether a District Magistrate may require a secured creditor to deposit or bear police-assistance expenses for taking possession of a secured asset under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act.

Analysis: Section 14 requires the Magistrate to assist a secured creditor in taking possession of secured assets and permits such steps and force as may be necessary to secure compliance. Police assistance, where necessary, forms part of that statutory mechanism. The provision contains no express authority permitting recovery of police-assistance expenses from the secured creditor or imposing such payment as a condition for implementation.

Conclusion: A condition requiring the secured creditor to deposit police-assistance charges under Section 14 is unauthorised and invalid; the condition was set aside and necessary police assistance was directed.

Issues: (i) Maintainability of a civil revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against a Council notice requiring participation in mediation under Section 18(2) of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006; (ii) Whether the fresh mediation notice amounted to an impermissible review of the Council's earlier decision; (iii) Whether pending commercial civil proceedings bar a supplier's claim before the Council.

Issue (i): Maintainability of a civil revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against a Council notice requiring participation in mediation under Section 18(2) of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006.

Analysis: Section 18 contemplates statutory conciliation before an adversarial dispute arises. A notice confined to calling a party for mediation does not create an adjudicatory lis; the dispute becomes adversarial only upon failure of conciliation. Judicial review under Articles 226 or 227 is therefore premature at the mediation stage.

Conclusion: The civil revision petition was not maintainable against the mediation notice, in favour of the respondent.

Issue (ii): Whether the fresh mediation notice amounted to an impermissible review of the Council's earlier decision.

Analysis: The earlier challenge was withdrawn after the Council indicated that it would entertain a fresh claim. The subsequent notice was consequently not an exercise of review of the previous decision.

Conclusion: The fresh mediation notice did not amount to an impermissible review, in favour of the respondent.

Issue (iii): Whether pending commercial civil proceedings bar a supplier's claim before the Council.

Analysis: The statutory remedy under the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 is an independent right available to a registered supplier. Parallel proceedings before a commercial court do not create a legal bar to the Council dealing with the statutory claim.

Conclusion: The pending commercial proceedings did not bar the supplier's claim before the Council, in favour of the respondent.

Final Conclusion: The statutory mediation process may continue, and the Council may entertain the supplier's claim notwithstanding the parallel commercial proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi: A notice initiating statutory conciliation under the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 creates no adjudicatory lis amenable to Article 227 review before conciliation fails, and the statutory remedy is not displaced by parallel civil proceedings.

Issues: Whether regular bail could be granted in a commercial-quantity narcotics case where the accused had undergone prolonged custody, the trial had progressed slowly, and the material did not credibly connect him with the seized contraband beyond his presence in the vehicle.

Analysis: Bail for an offence involving commercial quantity remains subject to the twin conditions under Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, notwithstanding long incarceration. The accused had remained in custody for over three and a half years, was a first-time offender, and the trial had made little progress. The charge-sheet contained no credible material, apart from his presence as a passenger in the vehicle, to link him with the contraband or ownership of the vehicle. The presumption of culpable mental state under Section 35 was rebuttable. These circumstances furnished grounds to satisfy the statutory conditions for bail.

Conclusion: The twin conditions under Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 were satisfied, and regular bail was granted.

Issues: Whether the direction requiring repayment of the amount released to the complainant under Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was liable to be set aside because it was made by the trial court rather than the appellate court.

Analysis: The proviso to Section 148(3) mandates repayment, with stipulated interest, of an amount released to the complainant where the appellant is acquitted. The complainant had also undertaken before the appellate court to repay the amount subject to disposal of the appeal. Although the refund direction ought ordinarily to have been made by the appellate court, the subsequent deposit of the amount pursuant to court directions and the complainant's failure to comply promptly did not justify interference with the refund direction.

Conclusion: Upon acquittal of the accused, the complainant was bound to repay the released amount, and the refund direction was sustained against the petitioner.

Issues: Whether the appellant, whose writ petition concerning forfeiture of earnest money deposit was relegated to the statutory remedy, should be permitted to approach the Debts Recovery Tribunal notwithstanding the expiry of the ordinary limitation period.

Analysis: Section 17(1) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 provides an efficacious remedy before the Debts Recovery Tribunal against measures taken by the secured creditor. Rule 8(7)(f) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 requires disclosure of facts necessary for a purchaser to know the nature and value of the property; whether non-disclosure of a subsisting attachment falls within that requirement, and whether it was material to the auction purchaser, are matters for the Tribunal. The appellant had pursued the writ remedy diligently after refusal of refund, the Bank had objected only on the ground of alternative remedy, and the challenge disclosed an arguable case.

Conclusion: The appellant may file an application before the Debts Recovery Tribunal within three weeks, which shall be accepted without requiring an application for condonation of delay; the Tribunal shall decide the matter on merits in accordance with law.

Issues: Whether the power under Section 47-A of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 can be invoked only upon material indicating wilful undervaluation with fraudulent intent to evade stamp duty; and whether the prior decisions imposing that requirement state the correct law.

Analysis: The competence of the statutory authority to issue a notice was distinguished from the alleged impropriety in setting its jurisdiction in motion. Section 47-A(1), on its plain terms, requires reason to believe that the market value or consideration has not been truly set forth, without expressly requiring proof of a culpable mindset. Importing fraudulent intention as an independent jurisdictional condition was considered inconsistent with literal construction of a taxing statute and capable of defeating a valuation-based enquiry. However, the contrary view had been expressed in binding three-Judge Bench decisions. Judicial discipline therefore required referral rather than departure from that precedent.

Outcome: The questions concerning the correctness of the precedent requiring wilful undervaluation and fraudulent intent were referred for consideration by a larger Bench; no final determination of stamp-duty liability or validity of the notice was made.

Issues: Whether the statutory presumption of a legally enforceable debt arising from an admitted cheque signature stood rebutted, rendering the concurrent conviction for cheque dishonour unsustainable.

Analysis: Sections 118(a) and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 raise presumptions of consideration and discharge of debt, but those presumptions are rebuttable on a preponderance of probabilities. A probable defence may arise from deficiencies in the complainant's evidence as well as defence evidence. Once the financial capacity to advance the alleged cash loan was specifically challenged, the absence of bank records, receipts, or any financial trail required affirmative proof of capacity and of the underlying transaction. Although a voluntarily delivered signed blank cheque may attract the presumption under Section 139, it does not dispense with proof of a genuine underlying liability after a probable defence is raised. The withholding of a cited eyewitness to the alleged loan and delivery of the cheque warranted an adverse inference under Section 114(g) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The consistent defence evidence, together with these deficiencies, rebutted the presumption; summary answers under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 could not cure the complainant's evidentiary gaps.

Conclusion: The statutory presumption stood rebutted and the alleged legally enforceable debt was not proved; the concurrent findings of conviction were perverse and legally unsustainable.

Issues: (i) Whether the power of the RBI to supersede the BoD of a multi-State co-operative bank under Section 36AAA(1) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 is circumscribed by the six-month limit prescribed under Article 243ZL(1) of the Constitution of India; (ii) Whether an order of supersession passed under Section 36AAA(1) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 can be extended beyond the term of office for which the BoD of a multi-State co-operative bank had originally been elected.

Issue (i): Whether the power of the RBI to supersede the BoD of a multi-State co-operative bank under Section 36AAA(1) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 is circumscribed by the six-month limit prescribed under Article 243ZL(1) of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: Article 243ZL(1) prescribes a general six-month limit for supersession of co-operative boards, but its third proviso provides that the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 shall also apply to co-operative societies carrying on banking business. The expression "shall also apply" incorporates the banking regulatory regime into the constitutional scheme for multi-State co-operative banks and operates as an independent substantive provision. Section 36AAA(1) authorises supersession and extension from time to time up to an aggregate maximum of five years. This construction accords with the specialised regulatory role of the RBI in protecting depositors and preserving banking stability.

Conclusion: The RBI's power under Section 36AAA(1) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 is not restricted by the six-month limit in Article 243ZL(1) of the Constitution of India; the issue is decided against the appellants.

Issue (ii): Whether an order of supersession passed under Section 36AAA(1) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 can be extended beyond the term of office for which the BoD of a multi-State co-operative bank had originally been elected.

Analysis: Upon supersession, the Board ceases to function and its powers vest in the Administrator. Section 36AAA(1) expressly permits extensions of supersession within the aggregate five-year ceiling, while Section 36AAA(7) requires the Administrator to convene a general meeting for election of new directors on or before expiry of the supersession period specified by the RBI. The tenure of the erstwhile Board does not limit the continuing supersession where the original order was made during its subsisting term.

Conclusion: An order of supersession validly passed under Section 36AAA(1) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 may be extended beyond the elected term of the erstwhile Board, subject to the aggregate five-year limit; the issue is decided against the appellants.

Final Conclusion: The Banking Regulation Act, 1949 validly governs the duration and extension of RBI-supervised supersession of the Board of a multi-State co-operative bank, and consultation with a State Government is not required for such a bank.

Ratio Decidendi: The third proviso to Article 243ZL(1) of the Constitution of India incorporates and preserves the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 as the governing regime for supersession of multi-State co-operative banks, including the extended duration permitted by Section 36AAA.

Issues: Whether the appellate pre-deposit requirement under Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 applied to a convicted company director who was not the signatory or drawer of the cheque.

Analysis: Section 148 authorises an appellate court to direct a deposit pending an appeal by the drawer against conviction under Section 138. The record showed that another accused was the cheque signatory and drawer on behalf of the company, while the petitioner, arraigned as another director, had not signed the cheque and was not directly implicated by specific allegations in the complaint. The discretionary pre-deposit provision was therefore inapplicable to the petitioner.

Conclusion: The Section 148 pre-deposit condition could not be imposed upon the petitioner, who was not the drawer of the cheque.

Issues: (i) Whether the statutory presumptions arising from admitted execution of the cheque and money receipt were rebutted by the challenge to the complainant's financial capacity and alleged breach of loan-acceptance restrictions; (ii) Whether the conviction was vitiated because a successor Magistrate decided the case on evidence recorded by a predecessor.

Issue (i): Whether the statutory presumptions arising from admitted execution of the cheque and money receipt were rebutted by the challenge to the complainant's financial capacity and alleged breach of loan-acceptance restrictions.

Analysis: Admission of the petitioner's signatures on the cheque and money receipt attracted the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The challenge based on the complainant's financial capacity and the alleged violation of Section 269SS of the Income-tax Act did not displace those presumptions, as no cogent and reliable rebuttal evidence was produced.

Conclusion: The statutory presumptions remained unrebutted; the issue is decided against the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether the conviction was vitiated because a successor Magistrate decided the case on evidence recorded by a predecessor.

Analysis: The trial record showed that the proceeding was conducted as a summons trial and not as a summary trial. Consequently, the restriction invoked under Section 326(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 did not establish prejudice or illegality.

Conclusion: The conviction was not vitiated on account of the successor Magistrate deciding the case; the issue is decided against the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The concurrent findings of guilt under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act disclose no perversity, material illegality, impropriety, or jurisdictional error warranting revisional interference.

Ratio Decidendi: Once execution of a cheque is admitted, the statutory presumptions of consideration and legally enforceable liability operate unless rebutted by cogent and reliable evidence; an unsubstantiated challenge to the payee's financial capacity does not suffice.

Issues: (i) Applicable Guidelines and sanction of professional fees exceeding prescribed ceilings for distinct valuation assignments; (ii) Entitlement to interest on delayed professional fees and inflation-linked enhancement; (iii) Source of recovery of the sanctioned fees and personal liability of third parties; (iv) Discharge of the Court Receiver and closure of the suit account.

Issue (i): Applicable Guidelines and sanction of professional fees exceeding prescribed ceilings for distinct valuation assignments.

Analysis: The assignment, undertaken in 2004, concerned inspection and valuation of immovable properties for their proposed sale. It was consequently governed by the Guidelines dated 1 February 1994, rather than the 1999 Guidelines relating to royalty or compensation or the subsequently issued 2007 Guidelines. Clause 9 required prior sanction before payment of fees exceeding the prescribed ceiling, not before appointment of the Valuer. The ceiling was ordinarily applicable separately to each distinct valuation exercise. The reports were accepted, the work was neither disputed nor found deficient, and the prolonged non-payment was not attributable to the Valuer.

Conclusion: The revised professional fees of Rs. 6,51,062 were sanctioned in full, including fees exceeding the ordinary ceilings and the higher charge for inspection and the status report.

Issue (ii): Entitlement to interest on delayed professional fees and inflation-linked enhancement.

Analysis: Although the 1994 Guidelines did not expressly provide for interest, reasonable compensation for deprivation of legitimately earned fees could be awarded in exceptional circumstances. Interest compensated for the time value of money during the delay. Granting a further inflation-linked multiplier, particularly on both principal and interest, would amount to double compensation for the same delay period.

Conclusion: The Valuer was entitled to interest of Rs. 8,20,338 up to May 2025 and further simple interest at 6% per annum on Rs. 6,51,062 from 1 June 2025 until payment; the inflation-linked enhancement claim was rejected.

Issue (iii): Source of recovery of the sanctioned fees and personal liability of third parties.

Analysis: Clause 8 of the 1994 Guidelines confined the Valuer's recourse to funds available in the concerned proceedings or with the appropriate insolvency authority. No fund or asset under the Court Receiver's control was available, and payment could not be ordered from the Receiver's general account or public funds. No substantive material established personal liability of an individual associated with the company or liability of separate corporate entities; mere association could not displace separate corporate personality.

Conclusion: The Valuer may lodge the sanctioned claim before the competent Official Liquidator, with the Court Receiver required to forward the relevant material; relief seeking personal liability and freezing of third-party corporate assets was rejected.

Issue (iv): Discharge of the Court Receiver and closure of the suit account.

Analysis: The Court Receiver had substantially completed the assigned functions, the underlying writ proceedings had ended, no funds remained in the suit account, and no further recovery action by the Receiver was warranted after the Valuer was permitted to pursue its claim in liquidation.

Conclusion: The Court Receiver was discharged without passing accounts, and the suit account was permitted to be closed without further costs, charges or expenses.

Final Conclusion: The Valuer's determined dues are enforceable only through the appropriate liquidation process, while no personal or public-fund liability arises merely from the Court-authorised engagement.

Ratio Decidendi: A Court-appointed Valuer may receive post facto sanction for reasonable fees exceeding guideline ceilings where the accepted work was properly performed, but interest for delayed payment precludes overlapping inflation-based compensation for the same period.

Issues: Whether an SEZ unit was entitled to exemption and refund of stamp duty and registration fee on a lease deed executed before promulgation of the Gujarat Special Economic Zone Ordinance, 2004, where the State's SEZ policy had already promised those fiscal benefits.

Analysis: The State policy dated 19.07.2002 extended complete exemption from stamp duty and registration fee to SEZ units and induced investment for industrial development. The Ordinance promulgated on 10.02.2004 gave formal statutory shape to that pre-existing policy. Denial of the promised fiscal benefit solely because the lease deed pre-dated the Ordinance would defeat the policy's object and differentiate without justification between similarly placed SEZ units based only on the date of execution. A lease transfers an interest in land and falls within the policy's intended fiscal benefit.

Conclusion: The exemption and consequential refund of stamp duty and registration fee were rightly available to the SEZ unit notwithstanding that the lease deed was executed before 10.02.2004.

Issues: (i) Whether proceedings for cheque dishonour could continue against a person described as a Joint Managing Director where uncontroverted corporate records established that he was never a director or officer of the accused company and the complaint disclosed no independent role; (ii) Whether corporate complainants in future complaints under Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 must furnish documents verifying the accused company and the status of persons sought to be made vicariously liable.

Issue (i): Whether proceedings for cheque dishonour could continue against a person described as a Joint Managing Director where uncontroverted corporate records established that he was never a director or officer of the accused company and the complaint disclosed no independent role.

Analysis: Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 imposes vicarious criminal liability only on persons who were in charge of and responsible for the company's business at the relevant time, or whose consent, connivance, or negligence in relation to the dishonoured cheque is specifically disclosed. A Managing Director or Joint Managing Director may be proceeded against by virtue of that office, but the premise fails where reliable corporate records establish that the person never held such office in the accused company. Inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 may be exercised on unimpeachable evidence beyond doubt where continuation of prosecution would amount to abuse of process. The Ministry of Corporate Affairs records showed that the person was never a director of the accused company; this remained uncontroverted, and neither the complaint nor the material before the Court attributed any actual role in its business or in issuance and dishonour of the cheque.

Conclusion: The complaint and consequential proceedings were unsustainable against the petitioner and were quashed only as against him.

Issue (ii): Whether corporate complainants in future complaints under Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 must furnish documents verifying the accused company and the status of persons sought to be made vicariously liable.

Analysis: Incorrect impleadment of persons who were not directors, authorised signatories, or otherwise responsible for the company's affairs causes avoidable harassment and delay. Verification of the company's corporate identity and of the office held by each proposed accused at the relevant time is necessary before criminal process is initiated against persons on a vicarious-liability basis.

Conclusion: Prospectively, every complaint against a corporate accused must annex the company's Corporate Identification Number obtained from Ministry of Corporate Affairs master data and a certified copy of Form DIR-12; registration without these documents is permissible only where their non-availability despite due diligence is specifically affirmed and reasons are recorded before cognizance.

Final Conclusion: Vicarious liability for a corporate cheque-dishonour offence cannot rest on an incorrect designation where incontrovertible corporate material negates the person's connection with the accused company, and future corporate complaints must be supported by verification of corporate status and responsible officers.

Ratio Decidendi: In proceedings under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, uncontroverted corporate records demonstrating that a person never held office in, or responsibility for, the accused company justify quashing under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 where the complaint contains no independent factual basis for liability.

Issues: Whether a bank governed by the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 can invoke that Act to recover a secured loan acquired from a non-banking financial company which was not a notified financial institution when the loan was originated.

Analysis: The statutory scheme enables banks and financial institutions to enforce security interests for recovery of live and owing debts. The definitions of borrower, security arrangement, security interest and secured creditor, construed purposively, apply to existing loan agreements irrespective of whether the original lender was a notified financial institution when the loan was advanced. The principles applicable where an originally non-covered lender subsequently becomes covered by the Act, or where its debt passes to a covered successor-in-interest, equally apply where a bank already covered by the Act acquires the secured debt. Assignment to such bank immediately gives the acquired loan the attributes of a secured debt for purposes of enforcement under the Act.

Conclusion: A bank may invoke the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 to enforce security interests securing a debt acquired from a non-notified non-banking financial company. The unadjudicated objections in the concerned securitisation application remain open for determination on their merits.

Issues: (i) Whether purse-seine vessels may transit State territorial waters to fish in the EEZ under the distinct Union and State regulatory regimes; (ii) Whether pending applications for EEZ Access Passes may be left unprocessed by the State verifying authority.

Issue (i): Whether purse-seine vessels may transit State territorial waters to fish in the EEZ under the distinct Union and State regulatory regimes.

Analysis: Fishing in the EEZ falls within the Union's legislative and executive sphere, whereas fishing in territorial waters is regulated by the State. The EEZ Rules, 2025 provide for Access Passes for EEZ fishing, while the Tamil Nadu Marine Fishing Regulation Rules, 2020 regulate activity within territorial waters. These autonomous regulatory fields do not conflict. Cooperative federalism requires implementation that enables regulated access to the EEZ while preserving the State's power to regulate transit and fishing within territorial waters. The State must designate transit channels under Rules 15(5) and 15(6), with due regard to the Expert Committee's recommendations.

Conclusion: Purse-seine vessels possessing the requisite EEZ permissions may obtain regulated transit access through Tamil Nadu's territorial waters to fish in the EEZ; the State must frame rules or regulations for specified transit channels. This is in favour of the applicants.

Issue (ii): Whether pending applications for EEZ Access Passes may be left unprocessed by the State verifying authority.

Analysis: The Access Pass framework requires coordination between the Union issuing authority and the State verifying authority. Prolonged non-verification of applications defeats the regulatory scheme and, in practical effect, creates an impermissible unwritten prohibition on the pursuit of the applicants' occupation, subject to lawful regulation.

Conclusion: The State must ensure effective, efficient and timely verification and clearance of applications in accordance with the governing rules and regulations. This is in favour of the applicants.

Final Conclusion: The governing Union and State regimes must operate harmoniously to secure lawful, regulated EEZ fishing access and timely regulatory clearances.

Ratio Decidendi: Where Union law regulates fishing in the EEZ and State law regulates territorial waters, their distinct constitutional fields must be implemented cooperatively, and administrative delay cannot operate as an unwritten bar to regulated access.