Issues: Whether, after approval of the resolution plan under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, pending industrial dispute proceedings and the employee's claim for reinstatement and related dues could continue against the successful resolution applicant.

Analysis: The resolution plan expressly provided that employee and workmen claims not forming part of the approved plan would stand written off and permanently extinguished. The Court applied the settled position that once a resolution plan is approved under Section 31(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, all claims not included in the plan cease to survive and no person can continue proceedings in respect of such claims. The Court relied on the overriding effect of the Code and the clean slate principle to hold that a successful resolution applicant cannot be burdened with undecided or excluded liabilities of the erstwhile management. On that basis, the pending industrial reference could not be adjudicated further and the claim for reinstatement also could not be entertained.

Conclusion: The industrial dispute proceedings and the employee's claims did not survive after approval of the resolution plan and could not be continued against the petitioner.

Issues: (i) Whether the first appeal abated on non-substitution of the legal representatives of one deceased legal heir of the vendor? (ii) Whether the prior order that the vendor's interest was sufficiently represented barred a subsequent abatement declaration by res judicata? (iii) Whether impleading that deceased heir's representatives as pro forma respondents effectively set aside any abatement? (iv) Whether delayed impleadment required condonation and setting aside of abatement?

Issue (i): Whether the first appeal abated on non-substitution of the legal representatives of one deceased legal heir of the vendor?

Analysis: Under Order XXII Rules 4 and 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, substitution is necessary where the death of a necessary party leaves the estate unrepresented. In a specific-performance action, the vendor remains a necessary party despite a transfer pendente lite, because the decree may require performance of contractual covenants by the vendor; the transferee's title remains subservient to the eventual decree under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Here, however, the vendor's estate was represented by three of four legal heirs already on record, in addition to the transferees pendente lite. Non-substitution of one heir did not leave the estate unrepresented or render effective adjudication impossible. The direction purporting to delete the original vendor rather than the deceased heir was a clerical or typographical error capable of correction under Sections 151 and 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Conclusion: The first appeal did not abate on account of non-substitution of the legal representatives of one heir. In favour of the appellants.

Issue (ii): Whether the prior order that the vendor's interest was sufficiently represented barred a subsequent abatement declaration by res judicata?

Analysis: Res judicata applies between successive stages of the same proceeding. The earlier orders expressly found that the vendor's interest was sufficiently represented by the remaining heirs and transferees and that no abatement had occurred. Those determinations could not be reopened at a later stage by the same court. The reference to action being taken at the appellants' risk in the earlier deletion order did not displace the later express findings on abatement.

Conclusion: The prior determination that no abatement occurred barred the subsequent contrary declaration by res judicata. In favour of the appellants.

Issue (iii): Whether impleading that deceased heir's representatives as pro forma respondents effectively set aside any abatement?

Analysis: Since the appeal had not abated, no revival of proceedings was required. Impleadment of the deceased heir's representatives as pro forma respondents was within the jurisdiction under Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Conclusion: There was no abatement to be set aside, and the impleadment was valid. In favour of the appellants.

Issue (iv): Whether delayed impleadment required condonation and setting aside of abatement?

Analysis: Delay condonation and an application to set aside abatement were unnecessary because the vendor's estate continued to be sufficiently represented and the appeal had not abated.

Conclusion: Delayed impleadment did not require condonation of delay or setting aside of abatement. In favour of the appellants.

Final Conclusion: The asserted procedural bar of abatement does not prevent merits adjudication of the connected property disputes.

Ratio Decidendi: An appeal does not abate upon non-substitution of one among several legal representatives of a necessary party where the estate remains sufficiently represented by the others, and a prior finding of no abatement binds later stages of the same proceeding under res judicata.

Issues: Whether the acquittal recorded in the cheque dishonour prosecution was liable to be set aside, in particular whether the statutory presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 were rebutted by the accused.

Analysis: The cheque and signature were admitted, attracting the statutory presumptions that the cheque was issued for consideration and in discharge of a debt or liability. The accused's plea that the cheque was a security cheque and that the complainant lacked financial capacity was not supported by cogent evidence. The defence version regarding repayment was not proved, and the fact that the cheque particulars were filled in a different ink did not displace the presumption, since a signed cheque handed over voluntarily remains effective unless the drawer rebuts the presumption by evidence. The complainant's evidence remained substantially unshaken in cross-examination.

Conclusion: The presumption of legally enforceable liability was not rebutted. The acquittal was unsustainable and the accused was held guilty under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Ratio Decidendi: Once execution of the cheque and signature are admitted, the law raises a rebuttable presumption of liability, and the accused must displace it by a probable defence supported by evidence; mere denial, security-cheque pleas, or reliance on the complainant's alleged lack of funds is insufficient without proof.

Issues: (i) Whether the petitioner could be treated as a promoter of the borrower-company for the purpose of wilful defaulter classification; (ii) Whether the petitioner, as a non-whole time director, could be brought within Clause 3(d) of the RBI Master Circular on Wilful Defaulters and whether the Review Committee's declaration could stand without consideration of the jurisdictional objection and supporting material.

Issue (i): Whether the petitioner could be treated as a promoter of the borrower-company for the purpose of wilful defaulter classification.

Analysis: The materials relied upon did not establish that the petitioner was an original subscriber or promoter of the company. The references in the reply and in the subsequent communication were read in context and were not treated as admissions of promoter status. The record instead showed the petitioner as a non-executive director, and the bank failed to produce any independent document showing that he was a promoter.

Conclusion: The petitioner was not proved to be a promoter and had to be assessed as a non-executive director.

Issue (ii): Whether the petitioner, as a non-whole time director, could be brought within Clause 3(d) of the RBI Master Circular on Wilful Defaulters and whether the Review Committee's declaration could stand without consideration of the jurisdictional objection and supporting material.

Analysis: Clause 3(d) required a rare case showing awareness of wilful default from board minutes, non-recording of objection, or consent or connivance. No board or committee minutes, no material of awareness, and no proof of consent or connivance were shown. The Review Committee also failed to deal with the petitioner's jurisdictional objection and gave no meaningful reasons or incriminating material to sustain the declaration. The petitioner was not shown to be on the audit committee, and the parity issue reinforced the absence of any differentiated basis for the adverse finding.

Conclusion: The declaration of the petitioner as a wilful defaulter could not be sustained.

Final Conclusion: The impugned wilful defaulter declaration was set aside and the petitioner's name was directed to be removed from the CIC list, with consequential steps for reversal of the adverse action.

Ratio Decidendi: A non-whole time director cannot be branded a wilful defaulter unless the exceptional conditions in Clause 3(d) of the RBI Master Circular are affirmatively established on the record by reasoned consideration and supporting material.

Issues: (i) whether criminal proceedings could be quashed merely because the dispute also had a civil dimension and civil proceedings concerning the same settlement deeds had been decided; (ii) whether, at the stage of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the High Court could assess the complainant's conduct, delay in filing the complaint, and the credibility of disputed factual allegations.

Issue (i): Whether criminal proceedings could be quashed merely because the dispute also had a civil dimension and civil proceedings concerning the same settlement deeds had been decided.

Analysis: The existence of civil proceedings on the same subject matter does not by itself bar a criminal prosecution where the allegations disclose ingredients of cognizable offences. Civil adjudication proceeds on a different footing and does not determine criminal intent, forgery, cheating, or use of forged documents. At the quashment stage, the Court is required to see whether the allegations, if accepted at face value, disclose a cognizable offence. Where the complaint alleges dishonest inducement, fabrication, and wrongful use of documents, the matter cannot be terminated only because a civil suit has also been filed or decided.

Conclusion: The quashing of the criminal proceedings on the ground of civil dispute was not justified and was set aside.

Issue (ii): Whether, at the stage of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the High Court could assess the complainant's conduct, delay in filing the complaint, and the credibility of disputed factual allegations.

Analysis: The inherent power under Section 482 is to be exercised sparingly and with circumspection. The High Court cannot conduct a mini-trial, embark upon a roving inquiry into disputed facts, or pronounce on the reliability of allegations. Questions such as the complainant's state of mind, the alleged delay, suppression, and the truthfulness of the prosecution version are matters for trial and appreciation of evidence. Delay by itself is not a ground to quash proceedings at the threshold when the complaint otherwise discloses a factual foundation for prosecution.

Conclusion: The High Court erred in relying on disputed factual aspects and delay to quash the proceedings.

Final Conclusion: The criminal case was directed to proceed to trial, and the accused were not entitled to quashing at the threshold.

Ratio Decidendi: At the stage of quashing, civil proceedings on the same facts do not bar criminal prosecution if the complaint discloses a prima facie cognizable offence, and the High Court cannot decide disputed facts, credibility, or delay as if conducting a trial.

Issues: (i) Whether heavy earth moving machinery and similar construction equipment vehicles used only within factory or enclosed premises are "motor vehicles" under Section 2(28) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. (ii) Whether such vehicles are liable to tax under Section 3(1) of the Gujarat Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1958 having regard to Entry 57 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India.

Issue (i): Whether heavy earth moving machinery and similar construction equipment vehicles used only within factory or enclosed premises are "motor vehicles" under Section 2(28) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

Analysis: The definition of "motor vehicle" is inclusive, but it expressly excludes a vehicle of a special type adapted for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises. The vehicles in question were shown by the material on record to be off-road construction equipment designed for use inside industrial or enclosed premises, transported on trailers, and not ordinarily meant for road use. The statutory definition therefore accommodates such vehicles within the exclusionary part of Section 2(28).

Conclusion: The vehicles are excluded from the definition of "motor vehicle" for the purposes of the Act.

Issue (ii): Whether such vehicles are liable to tax under Section 3(1) of the Gujarat Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1958 having regard to Entry 57 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: The constitutional source of taxing power under Entry 57 extends only to vehicles suitable for use on roads. Although Section 3(1) of the Gujarat Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1958 levies tax on all motor vehicles used or kept for use in the State, that provision cannot be read to enlarge the State's power beyond the constitutional limit. The relevant schedule also did not provide a rate applicable to such construction equipment vehicles. In these circumstances, off-road vehicles used only within industrial premises were outside the taxable field.

Conclusion: The vehicles are not liable to road tax under the Gujarat Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1958.

Final Conclusion: The impugned levy and the High Court's contrary view were unsustainable because the vehicles were special-purpose off-road equipment meant for enclosed premises and not vehicles suitable for road taxation.

Ratio Decidendi: A vehicle specially adapted for use only in a factory or enclosed premises is excluded from the statutory definition of motor vehicle, and a State can levy motor vehicle tax only on vehicles suitable for use on roads.

Issues: (i) Whether quashing of Complaint Case No. 3298 of 2019 on the ground that it related to the same underlying liability as an earlier complaint, and therefore amounted to parallel prosecution, was justified under the inherent jurisdiction; (ii) Whether the refusal to quash the remaining complaints arising from later dishonoured cheques was justified.

Issue (i): Whether quashing of Complaint Case No. 3298 of 2019 on the ground that it related to the same underlying liability as an earlier complaint, and therefore amounted to parallel prosecution, was justified under the inherent jurisdiction.

Analysis: The power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is to be used sparingly and cannot be employed to resolve disputed questions of fact or to conduct a mini trial. In proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, each dishonour that satisfies the statutory sequence of presentation, dishonour, notice, and failure to pay gives rise to a distinct cause of action. The cheques in the two complaints were separate instruments drawn on different accounts, presented on different dates, and dishonoured independently. Whether they were alternative or substitutionary securities was a matter for evidence and not for summary adjudication.

Conclusion: The quashing of Complaint Case No. 3298 of 2019 was not justified and the complaint had to be restored for trial.

Issue (ii): Whether the refusal to quash the remaining complaints arising from later dishonoured cheques was justified.

Analysis: The later complaints were based on distinct cheques issued and dishonoured on separate dates, each followed by statutory notice. The ingredients of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 were prima facie satisfied. The statutory presumption under Section 139 operated in favour of the complainant, and the respondents' defence that no liability subsisted raised questions requiring trial. Such defences could not justify quashing at the threshold.

Conclusion: The refusal to quash the remaining complaints was justified.

Final Conclusion: The complaint quashed by the High Court was restored, while the challenge to the other complaints failed, leaving the matters to be decided on evidence before the trial court.

Ratio Decidendi: In prosecutions under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, separate dishonoured cheques can generate separate causes of action, and disputed questions concerning the nature of the cheques or the existence of liability cannot be decided in quashing proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Issues: Whether complaints by numerous victims alleging cheating pursuant to a criminal conspiracy may be investigated through a single FIR, and whether the alleged offences may be jointly charged and tried as part of the same transaction.

Analysis: A second FIR is impermissible where subsequent information relates to the same cognizable offence, occurrence, or parts of the same transaction; such information may be treated as statements recorded during investigation. Whether a series of acts forms the same transaction depends upon unity of purpose and design, proximity of time and place, and continuity of action, which tests are not cumulative. The investigation disclosed an allegation of criminal conspiracy underlying the multiple acts of cheating. Registration of one FIR and treatment of the other victims' complaints as statements was therefore appropriate at the investigation stage. The Magistrate must determine from the investigation material whether the acts constitute the same transaction for joint charging and trial; if they do not, separate trials are required, subject to the statutory provisions permitting joinder of offences.

Conclusion: A single FIR may validly cover multiple acts of cheating allegedly committed pursuant to one criminal conspiracy where they form part of the same transaction; the Magistrate shall decide whether joint charges and trial are warranted on the investigation material.

Ratio Decidendi: Multiple alleged offences may be investigated under one FIR and jointly tried only where their factual nexus establishes that they are connected acts forming the same transaction; the determination turns on unity of purpose, proximity, and continuity of action.

Issues: Whether the borrowers could challenge the Recovery Officer's order by an interim application in pending SARFAESI proceedings despite the statutory appeal remedy under section 30 of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993, and whether the Tribunal could stay the Recovery Officer's sale proclamation in such proceedings.

Analysis: The appeal arose from parallel recovery steps taken under the SARFAESI Act, 2002 and the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993. The borrowers, instead of availing the appeal provided against an order of the Recovery Officer, invoked the pending SARFAESI securitization application to assail that order and seek restraint on sale proceedings. The governing scheme treats the two recovery mechanisms as separate and distinct, and the statutory appeal under section 30 of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 was the proper remedy against the Recovery Officer's order. Entertaining the application in SARFAESI proceedings amounted to proceeding under the wrong statutory regime and could not sustain a direction affecting the Recovery Officer's process.

Conclusion: The Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to entertain the borrowers' application in the SARFAESI proceedings against the Recovery Officer's order, and the impugned order was unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: The order granting relief to the borrowers was set aside and the bank's challenge succeeded.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a specific statutory appeal lies against an order of the Recovery Officer, the aggrieved party must pursue that remedy and cannot invoke parallel SARFAESI proceedings to restrain or nullify the recovery process.

Issues: (i) Whether the MM Plant unit was a new industrial unit under the industrial policy of 1989 or merely an expansion of an existing unit; (ii) whether the subsidy claims could be rejected on the ground that the overall subsidy limit under earlier industrial policies had already been exhausted; (iii) whether the respondents were estopped from declining disbursal after sanctioning the subsidies and acting on the appellant's subsequent correspondence.

Issue (i): Whether the MM Plant unit was a new industrial unit under the industrial policy of 1989 or merely an expansion of an existing unit.

Analysis: The policy defined a new industrial unit by reference to fixed capital investment made after the effective date, while expansion required additional investment beyond the prescribed threshold and an increase over existing capacity. The unit was separately registered, separately located, separately powered, and commenced commercial production after the policy came into force. The investment, licences, physical setup, and production profile showed a distinct industrial undertaking rather than a continuation of the earlier business. The judicial tests for identifying a new undertaking also supported this conclusion, namely fresh capital outlay, physical separateness, functional independence, and the existence of an identifiable unit capable of operating on its own.

Conclusion: The MM Plant unit was a new industrial unit and not an expansion of the existing unit.

Issue (ii): Whether the subsidy claims could be rejected on the ground that the overall subsidy limit under earlier industrial policies had already been exhausted.

Analysis: The overall-limit restriction introduced through later operational instructions and the subsequent amendment was directed to claims arising in expansion, modernisation, or diversification of existing units. A new industrial unit governed by the incentive provisions for fresh units was not controlled by that restriction. Since the MM Plant unit was found to be a new unit, the earlier subsidies availed under previous policies by the predecessor and the appellant could not be used to deny the fresh entitlements sanctioned for the MM Plant unit.

Conclusion: The rejection on the ground of exhaustion of the overall subsidy limit was unjustified.

Issue (iii): Whether the respondents were estopped from declining disbursal after sanctioning the subsidies and acting on the appellant's subsequent correspondence.

Analysis: The respondents repeatedly treated the unit as eligible, sanctioned the subsidies, acknowledged the amalgamation, and later recommended release of the amounts. The appellant continued to act on those assurances and maintained the unit on that basis. In such circumstances, the State and its instrumentalities were bound by the representations made, and their later refusal was inconsistent with fair, non-arbitrary public administration. The case also attracted the doctrine of legitimate expectation, because the appellant had a reasonable expectation of disbursal arising from clear official communications and repeated confirmations.

Conclusion: The respondents were estopped from refusing disbursal and were bound to honour the sanctioned subsidies.

Final Conclusion: The denial of subsidy was set aside, the appellant was held entitled to the sanctioned amounts, and the respondents were directed to release the subsidy with interest.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a policy grants incentives to new industrial units, a physically and functionally distinct unit set up with fresh capital after the effective date cannot be denied the sanctioned subsidy on the basis of limits meant for expansion claims, and the State cannot resile from clear and repeated representations inducing reliance by the beneficiary.

Issues: Whether the complaint disclosed the essential ingredients of criminal breach of trust under Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 so as to justify the summoning order and the consequential warrants, and whether the proceedings were liable to be quashed.

Analysis: Criminal breach of trust requires entrustment of property and dishonest misappropriation or conversion in violation of the trust reposed. For Section 409, the foundational requirements under Section 405 must first be satisfied, and the accused must be shown to have been entrusted with property in a fiduciary capacity and thereafter to have breached that trust. A security cheque issued under a commercial loan arrangement, where the terms of the agreement contemplated its use for recovery upon default, does not by itself create entrustment in the criminal sense or a fiduciary relationship. On the admitted facts, the cheque was part of the contractual security mechanism and was presented in terms of the loan documents. The complaint did not plead specific facts showing dishonest intention at the inception of the transaction or any criminal misappropriation distinct from a civil or contractual dispute. The allegations, at best, raised a defence in the connected proceedings under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, but did not disclose a prima facie offence under Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Conclusion: The complaint did not disclose the offence of criminal breach of trust under Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and the summoning order and warrants were liable to be set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: A security cheque issued in a commercial loan transaction, when presented in accordance with the contractual security arrangement, does not amount to entrustment or dishonest misappropriation so as to attract Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 in the absence of a fiduciary relationship and specific allegations of criminal intent.

1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED

(i) Whether, under the proviso to Section 142(1)(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, a Court can validly take cognisance of a complaint presented beyond the prescribed period before recording satisfaction of "sufficient cause" and condoning the delay.

(ii) Whether subsequent condonation of delay cures the prior act of taking cognisance on a time-barred complaint so as to sustain the proceedings.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue (i): Requirement that condonation of delay must precede taking cognisance

Legal framework: The Court examined the proviso to Section 142(1)(b), which permits cognisance after the prescribed period only if the complainant satisfies the Court that there was "sufficient cause" for not filing within time. The Court treated this proviso as controlling the Court's power to take cognisance of a belated complaint.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court held that the proviso's language makes the power to take cognisance of a belated complaint conditional upon the complainant first satisfying the Court regarding "sufficient cause." This satisfaction, resulting in condonation, must precede the act of taking cognisance. The Court rejected the view that condonation and cognisance are interchangeable steps. It reasoned that limitation-linked delay prevents a proceeding from being treated as a regular matter on the file until delay is condoned, and therefore taking cognisance first is contrary to the proviso's mandate.

Conclusion: Taking cognisance of a belated complaint without first condoning delay is impermissible; the Magistrate erred in taking cognisance before condoning the two-day delay.

Issue (ii): Whether later condonation cures earlier improper cognisance

Legal framework: The Court applied the same proviso to Section 142(1)(b) to assess whether subsequent condonation could validate cognisance taken earlier.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court disagreed with the approach that the defect is merely curable by later condonation. It held that, because the statutory condition requires prior satisfaction and condonation, subsequent condonation cannot retrospectively legitimise cognisance already taken in breach of that condition. The Court also held that earlier non-challenge to intermediate orders did not matter, since condonation occurred much later and the core illegality concerned cognisance having been taken before delay was condoned.

Conclusion: Subsequent condonation does not cure the illegality of cognisance taken prior to condonation; the High Court's refusal to quash was incorrect, and the complaint was quashed as a consequence.

Issues: (i) Whether the special leave petition became infructuous on account of the petitioner's acquittal by the Trial Court; (ii) whether prolonged custody and delay in commencement or conclusion of trial justified bail; (iii) whether bail should be granted subject to conditions in view of the volume of prosecution evidence and anticipated delay.

Issue (i): Whether the special leave petition became infructuous on account of the petitioner's acquittal by the Trial Court.

Analysis: The petitioner's acquittal by the Trial Court eliminated the live controversy in the matter. Once the underlying criminal case no longer survived against the petitioner, no adjudication on merits remained necessary.

Conclusion: The petition became infructuous and stood disposed of as such.

Issue (ii): Whether prolonged custody and delay in commencement or conclusion of trial justified bail.

Analysis: The petitioner had remained in custody since October 2022, the trial had not formally commenced, the charge-framing stage was still continuing, and the prosecution case involved examination of a very large number of witnesses. The delay was treated as sufficiently inordinate to justify consideration of release on bail, though the matter was kept pending for further hearing to explore a special-court arrangement.

Conclusion: The prayer was not finally decided on that date and the matter was posted for further hearing.

Issue (iii): Whether bail should be granted subject to conditions in view of the volume of prosecution evidence and anticipated delay.

Analysis: The petitioner had spent a long period in custody, had no criminal antecedents, and the trial was likely to take a considerable time. The Court considered that release on bail could be ordered if suitable safeguards were imposed to ensure attendance, prevent delay, and avoid contact with witnesses or associates.

Conclusion: Bail was granted subject to stringent conditions and liberty to seek cancellation upon breach.

Final Conclusion: The common order disposed of one petition as infructuous, kept one matter pending for further hearing, and granted conditional bail in the other matter.

Issues: (i) Whether the plaintiff was entitled to vacant possession and rent arrears on the basis of the lease agreement and termination notice; (ii) Whether the defendant was liable to pay damages, GST, future interest and mesne profits for continued occupation after termination; (iii) Whether costs and any further reliefs were payable.

Issue (i): Whether the plaintiff was entitled to vacant possession and rent arrears on the basis of the lease agreement and termination notice.

Analysis: The lease was for a fixed term commencing on 07.03.2019 and ending on 07.03.2025. The defendant admitted default in payment of rent from August 2021, and there was no reliable material to establish payment of arrears. The termination notice was held to have been duly served, and the defendant's challenge to the claim of arrears was rejected. The objection based on the unregistered agreement was not accepted as barring relief on the facts proved.

Conclusion: The issue was answered in favour of the plaintiff.

Issue (ii): Whether the defendant was liable to pay damages, GST, future interest and mesne profits for continued occupation after termination.

Analysis: After termination of the tenancy, the defendant continued in occupation and carried on business without clearing arrears or handing over possession. The continued occupation was treated as unlawful, justifying liability for arrears, damages, GST and interest. The claim for future mesne profits at the specified monthly rate was, however, found to have no basis and was rejected.

Conclusion: The issue was answered in favour of the plaintiff, except that the claim for future mesne profits was rejected.

Issue (iii): Whether costs and any further reliefs were payable.

Analysis: In view of the partial rejection of the claim and the overall circumstances, the Court declined to grant costs and held that no further relief was warranted.

Conclusion: The issue was answered against the plaintiff as to costs and further reliefs.

Final Conclusion: The suit was decreed with directions for delivery of vacant possession and payment of arrears, damages, GST and interest, but the claim for future mesne profits and costs was declined.

Ratio Decidendi: A tenant who remains in occupation after valid termination of tenancy and fails to prove payment of rent is liable for arrears and damages for unlawful occupation, while an unregistered lease objection does not by itself defeat such relief where the tenancy and default are otherwise proved.

Issues: Whether the acquittal in a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was liable to be set aside, and whether the accused had rebutted the statutory presumptions arising under Sections 118(a) and 139 of the Act by establishing a probable defence.

Analysis: The cheque and signatures were admitted, so the statutory presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 operated in favour of the complainant. Those presumptions were rebuttable, and the accused were required only to establish a probable defence on the standard of preponderance of probabilities. On the evidence, the Court found material inconsistencies in the complainant's version regarding the loan transaction, the absence of supporting loan records and account particulars, the conflicting stand regarding the earlier property transactions, and the circumstances surrounding the cheque and stop-payment instruction. The Court held that these circumstances were sufficient to rebut the presumption and shift the burden back to the complainant, who failed to prove that the cheque had been issued towards a legally enforceable debt or liability.

Conclusion: The accused successfully rebutted the statutory presumption, and the complainant failed to establish the alleged debt and cheque liability. The acquittal was upheld.

Ratio Decidendi: In a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, once the accused admits the cheque and signature, the presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 arise, but they may be rebutted by a probable defence proved on a preponderance of probabilities from the complainant's own evidence and surrounding circumstances; if rebutted, the complainant must then independently prove the legally enforceable debt or liability.

Issues: Whether the appeal order dismissing the petitioner's appeal as time-barred was sustainable where the ex parte order was stated to have been communicated only later.

Analysis: The petitioner challenged the appellate order on the ground that the appeal authority had treated the appeal as barred by limitation despite the ex parte order having been communicated subsequently. The Court found, prima facie, that the impugned order appeared to run contrary to the law laid down in the cited precedent on computation of limitation from the date of communication.

Conclusion: The ex parte order was set aside and the matter was remitted to the appellate authority to pass fresh orders in accordance with law.

Outcome: The Special Leave Petition was dismissed, and the time granted by the High Court for hearing of the appeal was extended by six weeks.

1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED

(i) Whether the statutory demand notice under Section 138(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was issued within the prescribed time so as to crystallize a valid cause of action.

(ii) Whether the complaint was filed within limitation under Section 142(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 as extended during the COVID-19 period, and whether cognizance could be taken without an application/order for condonation of delay.

(iii) Whether the court in which the complaint was instituted had territorial jurisdiction under Section 142(2)(a) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, based on the location of the payee's bank branch where the account is maintained.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue (i): Validity of statutory demand notice under Section 138(b) NI Act

Legal framework: The Court examined the requirement under Section 138(b) that a written demand notice must be issued "within thirty days" of receipt of information from the bank regarding dishonour.

Interpretation and reasoning: The dishonour memo was dated 03.05.2021, whereas the demand notice was issued on 30.12.2021, i.e., nearly seven months later. The complaint contained no averment of any subsequent presentation of the cheque that could have renewed the cause of action. On the pleaded facts, the notice was therefore outside the statutory timeline and was treated as invalid for the dishonour in May 2021.

Conclusion: In the absence of a valid notice within the prescribed period, the cause of action under Section 138 did not crystallize on the complaint's own showing; the complaint did not satisfy the statutory pre-condition.

Issue (ii): Limitation for filing the complaint under Section 142(b) NI Act and effect of COVID extension; necessity of condonation

Legal framework: The Court applied Section 142(b), under which a complaint must be filed within one month of the cause of action, and also considered the proviso permitting cognizance beyond time only upon the complainant showing "sufficient cause" and the court condoning delay. The Court also applied the COVID-related extension directions referenced in the judgment, which granted 90 days from 01.03.2022 where limitation expired between 15.03.2020 and 28.02.2022.

Interpretation and reasoning: On the complaint's own dates, service of notice was stated as 31.12.2021; the 15-day period expired on 15.01.2022; and cause of action arose on 16.01.2022. Ordinary limitation would have run till 15.02.2022, which fell within the pandemic-extension bracket. Applying the extension, the complaint could be filed within 90 days from 01.03.2022, i.e., by 29.05.2022. The record reflected physical filing on 24.06.2022, beyond the extended deadline. No application for condonation of delay was filed, and the summoning order took cognizance without recording satisfaction regarding delay or condoning it.

Conclusion: The complaint was time-barred even after applying the extended limitation, and cognizance taken without an application/order condoning delay was held bad in law. This limitation defect was decisive and required rejection/quashing.

Issue (iii): Territorial jurisdiction under Section 142(2)(a) NI Act

Legal framework: The Court examined Section 142(2)(a), which fixes jurisdiction where the cheque is delivered for collection through an account at the branch of the bank where the payee/holder maintains the account.

Interpretation and reasoning: Although it was argued that the cheque was presented at another branch, the complaint stated that the payee's "Home Branch" (where the account is maintained) was located within the relevant district. On that pleaded basis, the Court held that the chosen forum satisfied Section 142(2)(a).

Conclusion: The territorial jurisdiction objection was rejected; however, despite jurisdiction being found proper, the complaint and summoning order were quashed because the proceedings were barred by limitation and did not comply with the statutory timeline requirements.

Issues: (i) whether prolonged pre-trial incarceration in a prosecution under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 justified bail on Article 21 grounds notwithstanding Section 43D(5); (ii) whether the prosecution material, taken at face value, satisfied the prima facie true standard under Section 43D(5) qua each accused; and (iii) whether the role attributed to each appellant, including parity claims, warranted a uniform result.

Issue (i): whether prolonged pre-trial incarceration in a prosecution under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 justified bail on Article 21 grounds notwithstanding Section 43D(5).

Analysis: The Court held that delay and prolonged custody are serious constitutional concerns, but they do not automatically override the statutory restraint in special-statute prosecutions. The inquiry must be contextual and must consider the nature of the allegations, the stage of the proceedings, the causes of delay, the role attributed to the accused, and the legitimacy of continued detention. Prolonged incarceration can justify intervention only where it becomes demonstrably disproportionate and constitutionally impermissible on a cumulative assessment of the record.

Conclusion: Prolonged custody was not, by itself, sufficient to secure bail for all appellants; Article 21 did not mechanically displace Section 43D(5).

Issue (ii): whether the prosecution material, taken at face value, satisfied the prima facie true standard under Section 43D(5) qua each accused.

Analysis: The Court reiterated that Section 43D(5) requires a limited but real threshold inquiry, not a mini-trial. The material must disclose, on its face, a prima facie nexus between the accused and the alleged unlawful activity. The assessment is accused-specific and must be made on a cumulative reading of the prosecution case, without weighing evidence or deciding credibility. The statutory embargo operates where the prosecution material, accepted as it stands, reasonably indicates a prima facie true accusation.

Conclusion: The prima facie threshold was held to be attracted for Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam, but not for the appellants whose roles were found to be operational, facilitative, or local in nature.

Issue (iii): whether the role attributed to each appellant, including parity claims, warranted a uniform result.

Analysis: The Court held that the prosecution itself differentiated between principal conspirators and local or executory participants. Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam were treated as occupying central, formative and strategic roles, while Gulfisha Fatima, Meeran Haider, Shifa-ur-Rehman, Mohd. Saleem Khan and Shadab Ahmed were found to be associated with site-level mobilisation, funding, logistics, or execution. Parity could not be invoked mechanically; it depends on similarity of role and material. On the facts, the latter group was held entitled to bail subject to stringent conditions, while the former group remained within the statutory bar.

Conclusion: Bail was declined to Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam and granted to Gulfisha Fatima, Meeran Haider, Shifa-ur-Rehman, Mohd. Saleem Khan and Shadab Ahmed.

Final Conclusion: The Court applied an accused-specific and cumulative approach under the special bail regime, balancing Article 21 against the statutory restrictions, and ultimately granted bail only to those appellants whose roles were found to be non-central and operational, while refusing bail to the two appellants found to have prima facie central roles in the alleged conspiracy.

Ratio Decidendi: In prosecutions under a special statute, prolonged incarceration is only a trigger for heightened scrutiny and does not by itself displace the statutory bar on bail; the deciding factor remains whether, on a cumulative and accused-specific assessment of the material, the prosecution case is prima facie true.

Issues: Whether removal from service of a judicial officer was justified solely on the basis of four bail orders that did not expressly refer to Section 59-A of the Madhya Pradesh Excise Act, 1915, and whether the findings in the departmental inquiry were sustainable.

Analysis: The charge rested on an inference of corrupt motive or extraneous consideration drawn only from the absence of an express reference to Section 59-A in four bail orders. The complaint was general, the complainant was not examined, the witness supporting the charge did not substantiate it, and the defence evidence, including the public prosecutor's testimony, supported the genuineness of the bail orders. The orders themselves disclosed reasons such as delay in trial, filing of challan, residence of the applicants, and absence of flight risk. Mere omission to cite the statutory provision, without material showing that the decision-making process was tainted by dishonesty, corruption, recklessness, or favouritism, could not justify disciplinary action. A wrong or debatable judicial order, by itself, is not misconduct, and disciplinary findings based only on such an inference are perverse when unsupported by evidence.

Conclusion: The removal order and the appellate order could not be sustained, and interference was warranted in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: Disciplinary action against a judicial officer cannot rest merely on the legal correctness of bail orders or on the non-mention of a statutory provision; there must be cogent material showing misconduct, extraneous influence, or lack of bona fides.

Ratio Decidendi: A judicial officer cannot be subjected to punishment merely because a bail order is arguably erroneous or does not expressly cite the governing provision; disciplinary action is justified only where the record discloses material establishing misconduct, corrupt motive, extraneous consideration, or a finding so unsupported by evidence that it is perverse.