Issues: (i) Whether the accused was liable to be convicted under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 on the basis of the cheque, dishonour memos, notice, and the presumption under Section 139 of that Act. (ii) Whether additional evidence sought in appeal under Section 391 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 should be allowed. (iii) Whether the sentence required interference to the limited extent of the amount imposed towards defraying expenses of the State.

Issue (i): Whether the accused was liable to be convicted under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 on the basis of the cheque, dishonour memos, notice, and the presumption under Section 139 of that Act.

Analysis: The cheque admittedly belonged to the accused and the signature was not shown to be false. The cheque was dishonoured twice for insufficiency of funds. The complainant produced the invoice, tax documents, delivery-related material, and bank evidence, which was sufficient to raise the statutory presumption under Section 139. The accused did not lead defence evidence or effectively rebut the presumption by cross-examination or by contemporaneous material showing absence of liability. The later material relied upon did not displace the finding that the cheque was issued towards payment for the trailers and that a legally enforceable debt existed.

Conclusion: The conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was upheld and the challenge on merits failed.

Issue (ii): Whether additional evidence sought in appeal under Section 391 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 should be allowed.

Analysis: The additional material was sought after conviction and was substantially subsequent in origin, except for one receipt. The accused had ample opportunity during trial to produce the material but did not show due diligence or any compelling reason for non-production earlier. The material was viewed as an attempt to fill in gaps in the defence rather than as evidence necessary to prevent failure of justice. The appellate court's refusal to admit it did not warrant interference.

Conclusion: The request for additional evidence was rightly rejected.

Issue (iii): Whether the sentence required interference to the limited extent of the amount imposed towards defraying expenses of the State.

Analysis: The dispute was between private parties and no State machinery was involved. The component of Rs. 5,000/- awarded towards defraying expenses of the State was therefore unsustainable, while the compensation component could be maintained within the permissible limit.

Conclusion: The amount of Rs. 5,000/- towards State expenses was set aside and the fine was reduced accordingly.

Final Conclusion: The conviction was maintained, the attempt to introduce additional evidence failed, and only the sentence was modified to the limited extent of deleting the State-expense component and reducing the total fine to the cheque amount.

Ratio Decidendi: In a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, once the complainant proves issuance and dishonour of the cheque and the accused fails to rebut the presumption of liability, conviction can be sustained; additional evidence under Section 391 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is allowed only where due diligence is shown and its absence would cause failure of justice.

Issues: (i) Whether the conviction for dishonour of cheques under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was liable to be interfered with. (ii) Whether the requirements for fastening vicarious liability on the Managing Director of the company under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 were satisfied.

Issue (i): Whether the conviction for dishonour of cheques under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was liable to be interfered with.

Analysis: The cheque transaction, dishonour memos, statutory notice, and reply notice established the issuance of cheques towards partial discharge of liability and their dishonour for insufficiency of funds. The accused admitted the transaction, liability, and the issuance of cheques, and no defence evidence was adduced to dislodge the prosecution case.

Conclusion: The conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was upheld.

Issue (ii): Whether the requirements for fastening vicarious liability on the Managing Director of the company under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 were satisfied.

Analysis: The complaint contained specific averments that the accused was the Managing Director and was in charge of and responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the company at the relevant time. The accused also admitted his role in the company and his involvement in the transaction, and the record showed that he had issued the cheques. On these facts, the statutory conditions for company liability and vicarious liability were met.

Conclusion: Vicarious liability under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was correctly fastened on the accused.

Final Conclusion: The revision failed, and the conviction and sentence, as modified in appeal, were left undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: To fasten liability on an individual for an offence by a company under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the complaint must contain specific averments that the person was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time, and such liability may be sustained where the evidence also shows active involvement in the cheque transaction.

Issues: Whether the writ petition seeking a mandamus to direct issuance of an OTS sanction letter was maintainable when the petitioner disputed the existence of the attachment said to have accompanied the email communication.

Analysis: The relief sought was for issuance of an OTS sanction letter. The communication relied upon by the petitioner stated that the sanction communication was attached, but the petitioner's grievance was that no attachment was found. In such a situation, the dispute was not one for determination in writ jurisdiction, and the appropriate remedy, if the sanction letter was not attached, lay elsewhere.

Conclusion: The writ petition was not maintainable and the relief was declined.

Issues: Whether the criminal proceedings were liable to be quashed on the basis of compromise between the parties.

Analysis: The parties were given an opportunity to settle the dispute before the High Court Legal Services Committee, and the Committee reported that they had been identified and had entered into compromise voluntarily and without coercion. In light of the compromise, the request to quash the proceedings was accepted.

Conclusion: The proceedings were quashed on the basis of compromise, and the petition was allowed.

Issues: Whether the arrest and remand of the arrestee were illegal for failure to disclose the grounds of arrest and comply with the mandatory arrest-memo requirements, and whether habeas corpus relief was maintainable.

Analysis: The arrest memo was tested against the requirements flowing from Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India and the statutory safeguards under Sections 47 and 48 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. The Court found that the memo did not substantially contain the grounds and supporting material required by the prescribed format, and that mere intimation of the offence, sections invoked, and arrest-related formalities did not amount to compliance with the mandate to communicate full particulars of the grounds of arrest. Non-compliance with these requirements was treated as a breach of the constitutional and statutory safeguards governing arrest and detention.

Conclusion: The arrest and consequent remand were held illegal, and habeas corpus relief was granted.

Ratio Decidendi: Failure to communicate the grounds of arrest and to comply with the mandatory arrest-memo safeguards required by Article 22(1) and Sections 47 and 48 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 renders the arrest illegal and justifies release in habeas corpus proceedings.

Issues: Whether the cheque was issued towards a legally enforceable debt or liability and whether the acquittal recorded by the trial Court required interference in appeal.

Analysis: The cheque dishonour and statutory notice were not sufficient by themselves to warrant reversal where the appellant failed to disclose the prior transaction between the parties and suppressed material facts relating to the registered sale agreement, power of attorney, cancellation of power of attorney, and connected civil proceedings. The respondent produced documentary evidence showing that the cheque was issued as a security instrument in the course of the sale transaction, and that defence was found to be probable. In proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the statutory presumption under Sections 118 and 139 operates, but it remains open to the accused to rebut it on a preponderance of probabilities. On the evidence, the trial Court's view that the cheque was not issued in discharge of a legally enforceable debt and that the complainant had not come with clean hands was a plausible view.

Conclusion: The cheque was not proved to have been issued in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability, and the acquittal did not call for interference.

Ratio Decidendi: In a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the statutory presumption may be rebutted by a probable defence showing that the cheque was issued as security and not towards an enforceable debt, and an appellate court will not disturb an acquittal based on a plausible appreciation of evidence.

Issues: (i) Whether levy and collection of building-workers welfare cess could operate before constitution of a Welfare Board, and whether subsequent operationalisation of the statutory machinery attracted the contractual subsequent-legislation clause; (ii) Whether cess could be retrospectively adjusted from amounts payable under an arbitral award in respect of a contract terminated before the Uttar Pradesh cess regime became operative; (iii) Whether the contractual foreign-currency price-adjustment formula permitted an additional 85% adjustment over the adjustable Euro component.

Issue (i): Whether levy and collection of building-workers welfare cess could operate before constitution of a Welfare Board, and whether subsequent operationalisation of the statutory machinery attracted the contractual subsequent-legislation clause.

Analysis: The welfare cess legislation was enacted to augment the resources of Welfare Boards. Although the enactments formally commenced on their notified dates, their effective operation required the statutory machinery for levy, collection, deposit and utilisation of cess, including constitution of Welfare Boards. In the absence of a Board, cess collected could not be transferred and applied for the statutorily intended welfare purpose. Constitution of the Board was therefore a condition precedent to levy and collection; registration of workers and provision of welfare benefits were not.

Analysis: Contractors could not reasonably include cess in bid prices when no enforceable collection mechanism existed at the relevant bid date. The subsequent establishment of the machinery and implementation of cess in the relevant States fell within the contractual framework for subsequent legislation. Mere inclusion of the enactments among labour laws in certain contracts did not alter this position. The arbitral interpretation was plausible, justified and neither perverse nor patently illegal, and did not warrant interference under the limited review available under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Conclusion: The cess became leviable and collectible only after constitution of the relevant Welfare Board and operationalisation of the statutory machinery; the contractors were entitled to relief under the subsequent-legislation clause. This conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether cess could be retrospectively adjusted from amounts payable under an arbitral award in respect of a contract terminated before the Uttar Pradesh cess regime became operative.

Analysis: The contract had been entered into and terminated before Uttar Pradesh implemented the cess regime for ongoing projects. The cess issue was not raised during arbitration, the challenge proceedings, or review proceedings, and was raised only during execution to reduce the award liability. The contractor could not have factored a non-operative cess liability into its 2001 bid, and retrospective adjustment after termination of the contract was impermissible.

Conclusion: The contractor was not liable for cess in relation to the terminated contract, and the adjusted amount with award interest was required to be released. This conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the contractual foreign-currency price-adjustment formula permitted an additional 85% adjustment over the adjustable Euro component.

Analysis: A harmonious reading of the payment and price-adjustment clauses showed that 85% of the Euro component was already adjustable, with 15% being non-adjustable. A further 85% adjustment would produce an impermissible compounded adjustment. The arbitral construction of the formula was reasonable, and no correction of an alleged contractual drafting error could be undertaken in arbitral-review proceedings.

Conclusion: The formula permitted adjustment only of 85% of the Euro component and not an additional 85% adjustment. This conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The welfare cess could not be imposed on contractors for bid-period costs before the legally required Welfare Board and collection mechanism existed, and the reasoned arbitral constructions allocating the resulting burden were maintained.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a welfare cess is statutorily intended to fund Welfare Boards, constitution of the Board and operational statutory machinery are indispensable to its levy and collection; a plausible arbitral interpretation treating later operationalisation as subsequent legislation cannot be displaced in limited arbitral review.

Issues: Whether a three-member arbitral tribunal should be constituted under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for disputes arising under the sale and purchase contract and the connected agreements, with the parties having consented to a common reference and to Mumbai as the seat of arbitration.

Analysis: The arbitration clause contemplated a three-member tribunal. In view of the respondent's request and the applicant's consent, the disputes arising from the listed contracts and agreements were referred together to a common arbitral tribunal. The parties also agreed on Mumbai as the seat of arbitration. Each side nominated its respective arbitrator, and those nominee arbitrators were directed to appoint the presiding arbitrator expeditiously. The arbitrators' fees were directed to be governed by the Bombay High Court (Fee Payable to Arbitrators) Rules, 2018, with costs to be shared equally subject to the award.

Conclusion: A three-member arbitral tribunal was constituted by consent for adjudication of the disputes arising out of the specified contracts and agreements.

Issues: (i) Whether the arbitral award was liable to be set aside for refusing to permit amendment of the defence and for not adjudicating the challenge based on suppression of initiation of CIRP against the lead consortium member, thereby affecting the validity of the contract and arbitration agreement; (ii) Whether the award could stand when the claims were decided without oral evidence and the findings were not supported by discussion of documentary evidence.

Issue (i): Whether the arbitral award was liable to be set aside for refusing to permit amendment of the defence and for not adjudicating the challenge based on suppression of initiation of CIRP against the lead consortium member, thereby affecting the validity of the contract and arbitration agreement.

Analysis: The challenge to the contract went to the root of the dispute because it raised the question whether the tender, award and resulting contract were procured by suppression and false disclosure regarding insolvency proceedings against the lead consortium member. The request to amend the defence was made after the petitioner claimed discovery of the true CIRP position, and the amendment was relevant to the foundational issue of validity of the contract and the arbitration agreement. The refusal to permit the amendment prevented adjudication of a vital defence and resulted in the tribunal deciding jurisdiction and merits without first examining the effect of the alleged suppression.

Conclusion: The refusal to entertain the defence was unsustainable and was against the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether the award could stand when the claims were decided without oral evidence and the findings were not supported by discussion of documentary evidence.

Analysis: The tribunal decided disputed questions of delay, breach, entitlement to damages, and several monetary claims without oral evidence and without properly correlating its findings to specific documents on record. The conclusions were recorded in broad terms and, in several instances, by arithmetic or general assertions rather than by evaluation of proved material. In the absence of evidence supporting the essential factual findings, the award suffered from perversity and patent illegality.

Conclusion: The award could not be sustained and was against the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The arbitral award was set aside in its entirety because the proceedings were conducted on an erroneous procedural basis and the findings on material issues were found unsustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: An arbitral award is liable to be set aside where a party is wrongly prevented from raising a foundational defence going to the validity of the contract and the award is founded on disputed facts without proof by evidence or meaningful consideration of the record.

Issues: Whether police or investigating agencies may direct debit-freezing of a non-accountholder's bank accounts under Section 106 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, without material establishing the account holder's complicity.

Analysis: Section 106 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 permits seizure for evidentiary purposes, whereas attachment or freezing intended to secure alleged proceeds of crime is governed by Section 107 and requires an order of the competent Magistrate with the prescribed safeguards. A blanket or disproportionate debit freeze of an account belonging to a person who is neither accused nor suspected, without recorded or communicated reasons and without material of complicity, is arbitrary and gravely affects the right to livelihood and freedom to carry on trade and business under Articles 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution of India.

Conclusion: Debit-freezing of the petitioners' accounts without established complicity was unjustified; the accounts were required to be defreezed, without prejudice to lawful action upon positive and specific material in accordance with the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.

Issues: Whether cheques issued under a loan transaction and described as security nevertheless attracted criminal liability under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 when the loan had been advanced, the repayment period had expired, and the cheques were dishonoured for insufficiency of funds.

Analysis: The loan agreement showed that the amount had already been advanced and the cheques were handed over on the same date with a stipulation that they could be presented if repayment was not made within the agreed period. A cheque described as security is not outside Section 138 merely because that label is used in the agreement. The decisive question is whether, on the date of presentation, an existing and legally recoverable liability was present. The Court relied on the principle that where a loan is advanced and the cheque is issued to secure repayment of an amount that has fallen due, dishonour of such cheque falls within Section 138. The complainant's evidence remained unrebutted, and the defence did not establish prior discharge of the liability.

Conclusion: The cheques were not treated as mere inert security instruments. They represented a liability enforceable at the time of presentation, and their dishonour attracted Section 138. The acquittal by the appellate court was set aside and the conviction and sentence restored.

Issues: (i) Whether notices under Section 35(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 are mandatorily required in cases involving offences punishable with imprisonment up to seven years; (ii) Whether, in the absence of the conditions in Section 35(1)(b)(i) and Section 35(1)(b)(ii), an arrest in such cases is legally justified.

Issue (i): Whether notices under Section 35(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 are mandatorily required in cases involving offences punishable with imprisonment up to seven years

Analysis: Section 35(3) is a safeguard provision meant to operate where arrest is not required under Section 35(1). In cases punishable with imprisonment up to seven years, the provision has to be read harmoniously with Section 35(1)(b), which makes arrest discretionary and conditions it on both reason to believe and satisfaction as to necessity. The statutory scheme shows that issuance of notice is the normal course, and the notice requirement cannot be treated as optional merely because arrest power exists in exceptional situations.

Conclusion: Yes. A notice under Section 35(3) is the rule in such cases.

Issue (ii): Whether, in the absence of the conditions in Section 35(1)(b)(i) and Section 35(1)(b)(ii), an arrest in such cases is legally justified

Analysis: Arrest under Section 35(1)(b) requires the simultaneous existence of reason to believe and at least one statutory necessity under clause (ii), and even then arrest is not automatic. Where a notice has been issued and complied with, Section 35(5) prohibits arrest unless recorded reasons show that arrest is still necessary. If notice is not complied with, arrest remains a matter of discretion and must be based on materials justifying the need for custody, not on routine or subjective convenience.

Conclusion: No. In the absence of the statutory conditions, arrest is not legally justified.

Final Conclusion: The statutory scheme under Section 35 treats notice as the ordinary course and arrest as a narrowly confined exception, controlled by recorded necessity and constitutional safeguards of liberty.

Ratio Decidendi: In offences punishable with imprisonment up to seven years, arrest is not mandatory; it is permissible only when the police officer satisfies the statutory preconditions of reason to believe and necessity, and notice under Section 35(3) ordinarily governs the process unless recorded reasons justify the exceptional course of arrest.

Issues: Whether complaint proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 could continue against erstwhile directors when, before the expiry of the statutory notice period, insolvency proceedings had commenced against the company, the moratorium had come into force, and the interim resolution professional had taken over the management and bank accounts of the corporate debtor.

Analysis: The demand notices were served after initiation of the corporate insolvency resolution process and during the statutory notice period the management of the corporate debtor had vested in the interim resolution professional under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. Once the moratorium operated and the board stood suspended, the petitioners, as erstwhile directors, had no control over the affairs of the company or its bank accounts and could not ensure payment of the cheque amount. The complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 therefore could not be sustained against them on the facts presented. The contrary reliance placed on a case not involving such insolvency-triggered incapacitation was found inapposite.

Conclusion: The proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 were not maintainable against the petitioners, and the summoning order as well as the connected complaint proceedings were quashed.

Issues: Whether the petitioner (assessee) is entitled to waiver of interest under Sections 12, 12A and 12B of the Interest Tax Act, 1974 for the Assessment Years 1996-97 and 1997-98 in view of prior CBDT circulars and resultant confusion regarding liability of interest on hire purchase charges.

Analysis: The issue arises from sequential CBDT communications: initial circular clarifying hire charges as interest, a subsequent communication directing assessing officers not to initiate proceedings pending reconsideration, and a later circular finally clarifying the position. These administrative clarifications created bona fide doubt about liability of interest on hire purchase charges. The petitioner voluntarily filed returns and paid tax and penal interest after final clarification without departmental detection. The respondent had earlier waived interest for preceding assessment years, demonstrating jurisdiction to grant waiver. Established principles afford the assessee the benefit of doubt where legal position was unclear and delay resulted from prevailing confusion; administrative circulars and press notes permitting waiver on voluntary filings support relief in such circumstances.

Conclusion: The impugned order is modified by allowing waiver of interest under Sections 12, 12A and 12B of the Interest Tax Act, 1974 for the Assessment Years 1996-97 and 1997-98 in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the applicant was entitled to regular bail in a case involving allegations of extortion, criminal conspiracy and corruption, having regard to the stage of investigation, absence of recovery, necessity of arrest, parity with co-accused, and the likelihood of prolonged trial.

Analysis: The application was examined on the settled principle that bail adjudication is confined to a prima facie assessment and does not permit a mini-trial or detailed appreciation of evidence. The applicant was not named in the FIR or the original charge-sheet, was arrested after a substantial delay, and no search, seizure or recovery was effected from his premises or possession. Investigation qua the applicant had substantially concluded and a supplementary charge-sheet had been filed, while charges were yet to be framed. The material against the applicant was largely documentary and electronic, and the apprehensions of tampering, abscondence or witness influence were not supported by concrete material. The Court also noted that arrest must satisfy the test of necessity and proportionality, and that prolonged pre-trial incarceration cannot be justified where the trial is likely to be delayed. Parity with co-accused already enlarged on bail was also a relevant factor.

Conclusion: The applicant made out a case for regular bail. Continued custody was held to be unnecessary and unjustified, and bail was granted on conditions.

Ratio Decidendi: Where investigation is substantially complete, no recovery is made from the accused, custodial interrogation is no longer necessary, and no concrete risk of absconding, tampering or witness influence is shown, continued pre-trial detention is not justified and regular bail ought to be granted subject to appropriate conditions.

Issues: Whether the Look Out Circular opened against the petitioners was liable to be quashed in the absence of any showing that they were evading investigation or likely to flee the country.

Analysis: The petitioners had been cooperating with the investigating agencies, had joined the investigation whenever required, and had furnished the documents and information sought. No non-bailable warrants or other coercive process had been issued against them. The circumstances noted for issuance of a Look Out Circular, as recognised in the governing principles, were therefore not established. Past foreign travel by the petitioners on court permission, without breach of conditions, also negatived the apprehension that they would not return or would evade the process of law.

Conclusion: The Look Out Circular could not be sustained and was quashed.

Final Conclusion: The writ petitions succeeded, and the petitioners were relieved from the travel restriction, subject to informing the Trial Court about their residence and travel itinerary.

Ratio Decidendi: A Look Out Circular is a coercive restraint justified only where the person is evading arrest or investigation, or there is a concrete likelihood of flight from justice; mere pendency of investigation, without such circumstances, is insufficient.

Issues: (i) Whether Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is constitutionally valid; (ii) Whether the prior approval mechanism under Section 17A can be sustained only if it is read with an independent screening process involving the Lokpal or Lokayukta.

Issue (i): Whether Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is constitutionally valid.

Analysis: One opinion held that Section 17A, though intended to protect honest public servants from frivolous complaints, cannot stand in its existing form because it forecloses even a preliminary enquiry by a police officer unless prior approval is obtained from the Government or competent authority. That opinion treated the provision as inconsistent with the principle that enquiries into corruption must be filtered by an independent mechanism, and concluded that the provision suffers from arbitrariness, lack of neutrality, and a vice of classification in substance. The other opinion held that Section 17A is a valid statutory safeguard, applies across the board without rank-based classification, is narrowly confined to offences relatable to recommendations or decisions taken in discharge of official duties, and can be saved by reading it down so that the screening function is performed through the Lokpal or Lokayukta framework.

Conclusion: One view held Section 17A unconstitutional, while the other view held Section 17A constitutionally valid subject to reading it down.

Issue (ii): Whether the prior approval mechanism under Section 17A can be sustained only if it is read with an independent screening process involving the Lokpal or Lokayukta.

Analysis: One opinion held that the statutory scheme must be harmonised with the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 so that information received under Section 17A is first screened by the Lokpal or Lokayukta, whose recommendation would bind the competent authority. It was reasoned that this is necessary to preserve independence, fairness, and the rule of law. The other opinion rejected this approach as impermissible judicial substitution, holding that the Court cannot read the words Lokpal or Lokayukta into Section 17A in place of the Government or competent authority.

Conclusion: One view accepted reading down with Lokpal or Lokayukta screening, while the other view rejected such substitution.

Final Conclusion: The matter did not culminate in a single majority determination on the merits and was directed to be placed before the Chief Justice of India for constitution of an appropriate Bench for fresh consideration.

Issues: Whether the appellant was entitled to bail on parity with co-accused, and whether continued incarceration was warranted after completion of investigation and filing of charge-sheet.

Analysis: The allegations against the appellant were found to be substantially similar to those against the co-accused, with only a marginally higher allegation relating to receipt and use of proceeds of crime. The alleged use of those proceeds was treated as a matter to be examined at trial. Since investigation had been completed and charge-sheets had been filed, further incarceration was not considered justified.

Conclusion: The appellant was held entitled to be released on bail.

Issues: (i) Whether execution of a decree passed exclusively against a company can be proceeded with against its directors/promoters who were not parties to the underlying adjudication and against whom no notice, pleadings, evidence or findings were recorded.

Analysis: The adjudicatory process required for fastening personal liability includes service of notice, pleadings, opportunity to contest, leading of evidence and recorded findings; a decree binds only those against whom it is pronounced. Execution proceedings must strictly conform to the decree and cannot be used to enlarge liability or bind persons who were neither parties nor adjudicated as liable. Where a moratorium under Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 operates against the corporate judgment-debtor, modes of execution under Section 71 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 are interdicted against the corporate debtor; however, the moratorium does not, by itself, create personal liability of directors/promoters. Piercing the corporate veil is an exceptional remedy requiring specific pleadings and a reasoned determination of abuse, fraud or misuse of corporate personality; absent such pleadings or findings, execution cannot impose personal liability on directors/promoters. The prior confinement of the lis to the company by omission to issue notice to directors/promoters attained finality and cannot be enlarged by execution.

Conclusion: Execution cannot be proceeded with against persons who were not parties to and against whom no adjudication was made in the original proceedings; therefore, the execution applications against the directors/promoters must be declined.