Issues: (i) Whether the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in second appeal by reversing the first appellate court's factual findings; (ii) Whether the notarised photocopy of the power of attorney was admissible and sufficient to establish authority to alienate the properties.

Issue (i): Whether the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in second appeal by reversing the first appellate court's factual findings.

Analysis: Section 100 confines second-appellate jurisdiction to substantial questions of law and ordinarily preserves findings of fact. Interference remains permissible where findings rest on inadmissible material, ignore material evidence, misconstrue documents, or are vitiated by perversity. Reliance by the first appellate court on an unproved photocopy to infer authority to alienate constituted reliance on no legally admissible evidence, raising a question of law.

Conclusion: The High Court's interference was within the permissible scope of second-appellate jurisdiction. The issue is decided in favour of the plaintiff.

Issue (ii): Whether the notarised photocopy of the power of attorney was admissible and sufficient to establish authority to alienate the properties.

Analysis: Documentary facts must ordinarily be proved by primary evidence. Secondary evidence is admissible only after establishing the existence and execution of the original, a legally recognised reason for its non-production, and the authenticity of the copy. The photocopy was produced without the required factual foundation or compliance with the procedure governing secondary evidence. Statutory presumptions concerning authentication could not be invoked before the document was lawfully admitted and proved.

Conclusion: The photocopy was no evidence of authority to sell, and the alleged power of attorney could not validate the conveyances. The issue is decided in favour of the plaintiff.

Final Conclusion: The alleged authority to alienate having remained unproved, the conveyances executed on its basis did not bind the plaintiff.

Ratio Decidendi: A photocopy of a document cannot establish its contents or attract presumptions of due execution unless the statutory conditions for admission and proof of secondary evidence are first satisfied.

Issues: Whether the applicant was entitled to regular bail.

Analysis: Investigation was complete and the charge sheet had been filed. The applicant had remained in custody since October 2024. The role attributed to the applicant was substantially similar to that of a co-accused subsequently granted bail. The relevant bail considerations, including the prima facie case, availability for trial, risk of absconding, and possibility of witness tampering, supported release subject to safeguards.

Conclusion: The applicant was entitled to regular bail, subject to conditions securing attendance at trial and preventing interference with the proceedings.

Issues: (i) whether, after approval of a resolution plan and change of management in corporate insolvency resolution process, the company could still be proceeded against for dishonour of cheques issued before the takeover; (ii) whether the complainant could continue proceedings only against the erstwhile directors-in-charge and cheque-signatories.

Issue (i): whether, after approval of a resolution plan and change of management in corporate insolvency resolution process, the company could still be proceeded against for dishonour of cheques issued before the takeover;

Analysis: Once the corporate insolvency resolution process culminated in approval of the resolution plan, the erstwhile management stood replaced by the successful resolution applicant. The liability for dishonour of cheques issued prior to the change in management could not be fastened on the company under the new management, as the legal effect of the approved resolution plan and the consequent takeover had to be given full effect. The company, therefore, could not be treated as responsible for the alleged offence in relation to acts committed before the new management assumed charge.

Conclusion: The company could not be held liable for the dishonour of the cheques after the resolution process and change of management.

Issue (ii): whether the complainant could continue proceedings only against the erstwhile directors-in-charge and cheque-signatories.

Analysis: The complaint could survive against those persons who were in charge of the company and were responsible for the issuance and dishonour of the cheques at the relevant time. The later impleadment of the company, after the change in management, could not affect the position of the new management, and the prosecution could proceed against the persons allegedly responsible in the erstwhile regime.

Conclusion: The complainant could proceed only against the erstwhile directors-in-charge and cheque-signatories.

Final Conclusion: The impugned remand and subsequent impleadment of the company were set aside to the extent they exposed the company under the new management, while the prosecution was left to continue against the persons responsible at the time of the cheque transactions.

Ratio Decidendi: On approval of a resolution plan and substitution of management in corporate insolvency resolution process, the company under the new management cannot be made liable for dishonour of cheques issued before the takeover; proceedings may continue only against those who were in charge at the relevant time.

Issues: (i) Whether lack of territorial jurisdiction under Section 142(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 vitiated the complaint and summoning order, (ii) whether the complaint was liable to fail for want of impleadment of the partnership firm and for absence of vicarious liability against the petitioner, and (iii) whether the statutory demand notice was invalid on account of alleged non-service, security cheque defence, or absence of computation of the claimed amount.

Issue (i): Whether lack of territorial jurisdiction under Section 142(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 vitiated the complaint and summoning order

Analysis: Territorial jurisdiction under Section 142(2)(a) is governed by the place where the payee maintains the account when the cheque is delivered for collection through that account. Even assuming that the complaint was instituted before a court not having the correct territorial forum, such defect goes to local jurisdiction and not to the inherent competence of the Magistrate to try an offence under Section 138. The defect was treated as a curable irregularity in view of the principles reflected in Sections 460 and 462 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and no case of failure of justice was made out for quashing.

Conclusion: The territorial-jurisdiction objection did not justify quashing of the proceedings.

Issue (ii): Whether the complaint was liable to fail for want of impleadment of the partnership firm and for absence of vicarious liability against the petitioner

Analysis: The complaint was read as alleging direct liability arising from the petitioner's own act of signing and issuing the cheque from a joint account as a co-borrower and guarantor. Liability under Section 138 is attracted to the drawer of the dishonoured cheque, and the requirement of impleading the firm as principal offender applies to cases of vicarious liability under Section 141. The Court held that the petitioner could not avoid liability by characterising the transaction as purely civil or by relying on the absence of the firm as an accused, because the prosecution was not founded solely on vicarious liability but on the petitioner's own cheque issuance.

Conclusion: The complaint was maintainable against the petitioner despite non-impleadment of the partnership firm.

Issue (iii): Whether the statutory demand notice was invalid on account of alleged non-service, security cheque defence, or absence of computation of the claimed amount

Analysis: Service of the demand notice was held to stand on the statutory presumption once it was dispatched to the correct address, and a minor discrepancy such as pin code was insufficient to rebut service at the threshold. A cheque issued as security was held capable of attracting Section 138 if presented against a subsisting liability and dishonoured. The absence of a detailed breakup of the cheque amount in the notice did not invalidate it, because the statutory demand was for the cheque amount and disputes as to quantification or discharge of liability were matters for trial, not for quashing at the pre-trial stage.

Conclusion: The demand notice was not invalid and no interference was warranted on that ground.

Final Conclusion: The petition failed on all substantive grounds and the criminal proceedings arising from the dishonoured cheque were permitted to continue.

Ratio Decidendi: A defect in territorial forum under Section 142(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is not by itself a ground for quashing where the Magistrate is otherwise competent, and a person who signs and issues a cheque in discharge of liability can be proceeded against directly under Section 138 notwithstanding objections based on security cheque, non-impleadment of the firm, or asserted civil nature of the underlying transaction.

Issues: (i) Whether, in proceedings under Section 15(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the High Court could declare prior arbitral proceedings as a nullity on the ground that they were conducted during a moratorium under Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; (ii) Whether transactions undertaken pursuant to the arbitral orders during the relevant period should be protected.

Issue (i): Whether, in proceedings under Section 15(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the High Court could declare prior arbitral proceedings as a nullity on the ground that they were conducted during a moratorium under Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: Section 15(2) contemplates only substitution of the arbitrator according to the rules applicable to the original appointment. Section 15(3) and Section 15(4) preserve the continuity of the arbitration and protect prior hearings and orders, unless the parties agree otherwise. The Court held that the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 15(2), could not travel beyond the limited statutory remit and could not set aside or nullify arbitral orders which the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 does not permit to be challenged in that manner. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is a self-contained code and the course prescribed by statute cannot be displaced by an alternate procedure.

Conclusion: The High Court lacked jurisdiction to declare the proceedings held between 17.03.2022 and 25.08.2022 a nullity, and that part of the impugned order was set aside.

Issue (ii): Whether transactions undertaken pursuant to the arbitral orders during the relevant period should be protected.

Analysis: The Court took note of the long lapse of time and the creation of third-party rights, including home buyers' interests, and exercised its constitutional power to avoid undoing completed commercial arrangements that had proceeded on the strength of the arbitral orders.

Conclusion: The transactions entered into pursuant to the arbitral orders were declared legally valid.

Final Conclusion: The appeal was partly allowed by removing the declaration of nullity, while preserving the transactions carried out in the interregnum and substituting the arbitrator for continuation of the arbitration from the existing stage.

Ratio Decidendi: In proceedings for substitution of an arbitrator, the court must confine itself to the limited power of appointing a substitute under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and cannot nullify prior arbitral proceedings or orders, which remain protected by the statutory scheme of continuity.

Issues: Whether an application under Section 29A(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for extension of the mandate of the arbitrator is maintainable after expiry of the time prescribed under Section 29A(1) and the extended period under Section 29A(3), and even after an award has been rendered.

Analysis: Section 29A is designed to secure timely completion of arbitral proceedings while preserving the court's supervisory power to extend time before or after expiry of the statutory period. The structure of Section 29A, including the proviso to sub-section (4), sub-sections (5) to (9), and the deeming continuity of the reconstituted tribunal, shows that the mandate is not treated as finally extinguished in a manner that disables judicial intervention. The absence of an express bar on a post-award application, together with the legislative purpose of ensuring that arbitration reaches an effective conclusion, supports the view that the court's power under Section 29A(5) is not lost merely because the arbitrator has rendered an award after the mandate expired. Such an award is ineffective and unenforceable, but that circumstance does not denude the court of jurisdiction to consider extension on sufficient cause and on appropriate terms.

Conclusion: The application under Section 29A(5) is maintainable even after expiry of the statutory and consensual extension periods and even after an award has been rendered; the award passed after expiry of mandate is unenforceable, and the court may still consider extension, substitution, costs, and other conditions as warranted.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the High Court's refusal was accepted, and the matter was sent back for decision on the Section 29A application in accordance with the declared principles, thereby preserving the arbitral process rather than treating the late award as an absolute bar to relief.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 does not create a threshold prohibition against seeking extension of an arbitrator's mandate after expiry of the prescribed period or after a late award has been made; the court retains jurisdiction to extend time on sufficient cause, with incidental powers to impose conditions, substitute arbitrators, and secure effective continuation of the arbitration.

Issues: Whether interim bail should be granted to the petitioner in the pending criminal proceedings arising out of the alleged liquor scam, having regard to the stage and complexity of the investigation and the competing claims of liberty and effective investigation.

Analysis: The proceedings involved a large-scale alleged scam, multiple accused persons, several charge-sheets or prosecution complaints already filed, further investigation still pending, and a substantial number of witnesses proposed to be examined. The Court balanced the petitioner's claim to liberty and prolonged custody against the prosecution's need for an uninterrupted and effective investigation, and considered that the investigation was likely to take considerable time. To ensure that the investigation was not impeded while protecting personal liberty, the Court granted interim bail with stringent conditions, including restrictions on travel, residence, appearance, contact with witnesses, and public statements on the allegations.

Conclusion: Interim bail was granted to the petitioner in both matters, subject to the stated conditions.

Ratio Decidendi: In complex multi-accused criminal investigations expected to continue for a considerable time, interim bail may be granted by balancing the accused's right to liberty against the prosecution's need for an unhindered investigation, and by imposing conditions sufficient to prevent interference with the process.

Issues: (i) Whether non-production of postal receipt, acknowledgment card, or other postal records proving issuance and service of the demand notice under the Negotiable Instruments Act was fatal to the complaint; (ii) Whether the acquittal should be set aside and the matter remanded to permit further evidence on notice and service.

Issue (i): Whether non-production of postal receipt, acknowledgment card, or other postal records proving issuance and service of the demand notice under the Negotiable Instruments Act was fatal to the complaint.

Analysis: The complaint under Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was founded on dishonour of cheques punishable under Section 138, and issuance of a demand notice within the statutory framework was essential. While service may be presumed when a notice is sent by registered post to the correct address, and endorsements such as unclaimed or refused may amount to valid service in law, the date of issuance and the date of service or deemed service still had relevance for compliance with the limitation requirements. In the absence of postal receipt, acknowledgment card, or comparable postal records, the evidentiary basis to establish those dates was missing.

Conclusion: The non-production of the relevant postal documents justified the trial court's finding and, by itself, supported the acquittal on the record as it then stood.

Issue (ii): Whether the acquittal should be set aside and the matter remanded to permit further evidence on notice and service.

Analysis: The missing documents had been produced in a connected matter between the same parties, and the dispute involved money due to a public sector undertaking. In these circumstances, an opportunity to adduce further evidence, including the relevant postal documents, was considered appropriate so that the complaint could be decided afresh after both sides were heard on evidence.

Conclusion: The acquittal was set aside and the matter was remanded to the Magistrate court for fresh consideration with liberty to both sides to adduce further evidence.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded, and the prosecution was restored to the trial stage for a fresh adjudication on evidence.

Ratio Decidendi: In a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the service or deemed service of the statutory notice must be supported by reliable postal evidence where the dates of issuance and service are material to limitation, but a defective evidentiary record may justify remand to permit additional evidence and fresh consideration.

Issues: (i) whether a dispute founded on an allegedly forged and fabricated admission deed, which itself contains the arbitration clause, is amenable to arbitration at the stage of Sections 8 and 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; (ii) whether the High Court was justified in exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to refer the suit to arbitration despite concurrent findings doubting the existence of the arbitration agreement.

Issue (i): whether a dispute founded on an allegedly forged and fabricated admission deed, which itself contains the arbitration clause, is amenable to arbitration at the stage of Sections 8 and 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

Analysis: Serious allegations of fraud touching the arbitration agreement itself stand on a different footing from ordinary contractual disputes. Where the very existence or genuineness of the document containing the arbitration clause is in grave doubt, the dispute goes to the root of arbitral jurisdiction. Consent remains the foundation of arbitration, and an arbitrator cannot be appointed until it is shown, at least prima facie, that the parties entered into a valid arbitration agreement. The material on record, together with the earlier final prima facie assessment in the Section 9 proceedings, supported the view that the admission deed was under serious cloud and required a full-fledged inquiry rather than reference to arbitration.

Conclusion: The dispute was not amenable to arbitration at this stage, and the refusal to appoint an arbitrator was correct.

Issue (ii): whether the High Court was justified in exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to refer the suit to arbitration despite concurrent findings doubting the existence of the arbitration agreement

Analysis: Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 is not an appellate jurisdiction and does not permit reappreciation of evidence. The Trial Court and the First Appellate Court had concurrently held that the allegations of fraud were serious and that the original admission deed or a certified copy was not produced as required. Those concurrent findings were grounded in the record and could not be displaced merely on a different view of the facts. In these circumstances, directing reference of the suit to arbitration was beyond the proper scope of Article 227.

Conclusion: The order referring the suit to arbitration was unsustainable, while the order declining appointment of an arbitrator was correctly affirmed.

Final Conclusion: The controversy arising from the disputed admission deed was held to be non-arbitrable at the present stage, the order directing arbitration was set aside, and the refusal to appoint an arbitrator was maintained.

Ratio Decidendi: When the very existence or genuineness of the document containing the arbitration clause is seriously disputed on allegations of forgery, the matter is non-arbitrable until the arbitration agreement itself is shown to exist, and supervisory jurisdiction cannot be used to overturn concurrent factual findings on that issue.

Outcome: Arguments heard. Judgment reserved. Written submissions may be filed within one week.

Issues: Whether a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and the summoning order could be quashed in exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 on the grounds that the cheques were security cheques and that no legally enforceable liability subsisted.

Analysis: The complaint and the summoning order could be interfered with only within the limited parameters governing inherent jurisdiction. At the stage of quashing, the Court must proceed on the basis of the complaint averments and cannot undertake appreciation of evidence or decide disputed factual questions. The petitioners did not deny the signatures or issuance of the cheques, and the plea that they were security cheques and that the goods supplied were defective raised factual disputes requiring trial. In the presence of the statutory presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the existence of a legally enforceable liability could not be negated at the quashing stage. The order issuing process was based on preliminary evidence and disclosed a possible view warranting trial.

Conclusion: The complaint and the summoning order were not liable to be quashed, and the petition failed.

Ratio Decidendi: In proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, disputed questions of fact and the defence to a cheque dishonour complaint cannot be examined where the cheque and signature are admitted and the statutory presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 operates.

Issues: (i) whether the employer was entitled to reasonable compensation by way of liquidated damages for delay in commissioning a public utility project without proving actual loss; (ii) whether the Division Bench, in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, was justified in reworking and reducing the amount of compensation awarded under Section 34.

Issue (i): whether the employer was entitled to reasonable compensation by way of liquidated damages for delay in commissioning a public utility project without proving actual loss.

Analysis: The contractual schedule for commissioning was admitted to have been breached, and the agreed clause provided consequences for delayed commissioning. In a project undertaken to advance the objectives of the solar mission and promote green energy, the delay was treated as a matter affecting public interest and environmental welfare. Applying Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, the Court held that in such cases the stipulated sum operates as a basis for reasonable compensation, and the burden lay on the defaulting party to show that no loss was caused or that the stipulation was penal in nature.

Conclusion: Yes. The employer was entitled to reasonable compensation notwithstanding the absence of proof of exact actual loss.

Issue (ii): whether the Division Bench, in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, was justified in reworking and reducing the amount of compensation awarded under Section 34.

Analysis: The learned Single Judge had determined compensation by applying the contractual clause and exercising a limited discretion on the quantum. The Court held that the Division Bench went beyond the permissible scope of Section 37 by substituting its own assessment for a plausible determination already made under Section 34, without showing that the earlier determination was arbitrary, perverse, or outside the contractual framework. The Court also held that the limited power of modification recognized in arbitration jurisprudence could not justify the appellate re-calculation undertaken in this case.

Conclusion: No. The Division Bench was not justified in reworking or reducing the compensation.

Final Conclusion: The judgment of the Division Bench was set aside to the extent it altered the compensation, the Single Judge's order was restored, and the employer's claim to the amount determined under the contractual clause stood upheld.

Ratio Decidendi: In a public utility or public interest project, delay can justify reasonable compensation under Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 without strict proof of exact loss, and an appellate court under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 cannot re-assess or reduce a plausible compensation determination made within the contractual framework by the Section 34 court.

Issues: (i) Whether the summoning order and continuation of proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act could be sustained against Sandhya Gupta on the allegation that she was in charge of and responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the company; (ii) Whether Abhishek Gupta had resigned from the company before the cause of action arose and was therefore entitled to discharge from the complaint proceedings.

Issue (i): Whether the summoning order and continuation of proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act could be sustained against Sandhya Gupta on the allegation that she was in charge of and responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the company.

Analysis: The material on record, including Form-32 and the company documents, showed Sandhya Gupta as a director and also as a signatory to the cheques and co-signatory to the balance sheets. On that basis, the allegation that she was merely a sleeping director was not borne out from the record at this stage. The defence that she was not actively involved in the business raised a matter for trial and could not displace the summoning order in proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Conclusion: The summoning order was upheld against Sandhya Gupta and the proceedings against her were maintained.

Issue (ii): Whether Abhishek Gupta had resigned from the company before the cause of action arose and was therefore entitled to discharge from the complaint proceedings.

Analysis: The Form-32 and the minutes of the board meeting consistently reflected that Abhishek Gupta had resigned from the company on 01.10.2013. The cheques in question were issued later and the alleged dishonour arose thereafter. On the evidence available, his resignation stood corroborated and there was no basis to treat him as concerned with the affairs of the company after resignation.

Conclusion: Abhishek Gupta was entitled to discharge and the summoning order was quashed insofar as he was concerned.

Final Conclusion: The challenge succeeded only in part, with the proceedings continuing against Sandhya Gupta while Abhishek Gupta was relieved from the complaint case.

Ratio Decidendi: In a prosecution under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, a director shown by company records to be a signatory/co-signatory and part of the company's functioning may be proceeded against at the summoning stage, while a director whose prior resignation is duly corroborated by record cannot be fastened with liability for subsequent transactions.

Issues: (i) Whether the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was maintainable at the instance of the proprietor of a sole proprietorship concern; (ii) whether the statutory presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 were rebutted by the defence of misuse of cheque and absence of liability; and (iii) whether the revisional court could interfere with the concurrent conviction and sentence in the absence of perversity or illegality.

Issue (i): Whether the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was maintainable at the instance of the proprietor of a sole proprietorship concern.

Analysis: The cheque and the supporting transaction were linked to the trade name of the concern, and the pleadings, notice, and testimony consistently reflected that the concern was a sole proprietorship. A sole proprietorship has no legal identity distinct from its proprietor, so a transaction in the trade name is in law a transaction of the proprietor. The objection that the complaint was filed in an individual capacity therefore did not create a defect of locus standi.

Conclusion: The complaint was maintainable, and the objection to locus standi failed.

Issue (ii): Whether the statutory presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 were rebutted by the defence of misuse of cheque and absence of liability.

Analysis: The issuance of the cheque, its dishonour for stoppage of payment, and service of demand notice were established, which attracted the statutory presumptions in favour of the holder. The defence was inconsistent and unsupported by credible material. Mere suggestions of loss, theft, or misuse of a blank signed cheque, without supporting complaint or explanation of possession, were insufficient to displace the presumptions or show a probable defence.

Conclusion: The presumptions were not rebutted, and the defence failed.

Issue (iii): Whether the revisional court could interfere with the concurrent conviction and sentence in the absence of perversity or illegality.

Analysis: Revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is limited to examining correctness, legality, propriety, and regularity, and it does not permit a reappraisal of evidence as in an appeal. Since the findings below were concurrent and no perversity, illegality, or material infirmity was shown, interference was unwarranted.

Conclusion: No interference was called for in revisional jurisdiction.

Final Conclusion: The concurrent conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was sustained, and the revision petitions were dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: A complaint concerning a cheque issued in the trade name of a sole proprietorship is maintainable at the instance of the proprietor, and in the absence of a probable defence rebutting the statutory presumptions under the Negotiable Instruments Act, concurrent findings of conviction will not be disturbed in revisional jurisdiction unless perversity or illegality is shown.

Issues: (i) whether the simultaneous pursuit of a revision before the Sessions Court and quashing petitions before the High Court warranted interference on the ground of forum shopping and abuse of process; (ii) whether the complaints disclosed a prima facie case for vicarious liability of the directors under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; (iii) whether the deletion of the cheque signatory from the complaint undermined prosecution of the company and other directors; (iv) whether the defence of fraud, forged account opening, and breach of bank mandate could defeat prosecution at the summoning stage; and (v) whether the pleas that the cheques were security cheques and that no legally enforceable debt existed could justify quashing.

Issue (i): whether the simultaneous pursuit of a revision before the Sessions Court and quashing petitions before the High Court warranted interference on the ground of forum shopping and abuse of process.

Analysis: Parallel remedies for the same relief were impermissible. The pendency of a revision against the same summoning order, coupled with non-disclosure of that proceeding, indicated lack of candour and supported the objection that the petitions invited inconsistent outcomes in different forums. The Court treated the objection as a relevant factor against entertaining the quashing petitions.

Conclusion: The preliminary objection had merit and weighed against interference.

Issue (ii): whether the complaints disclosed a prima facie case for vicarious liability of the directors under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Analysis: The complaints contained the requisite statutory averments that the petitioners were in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the companies. The Managing Director's signatures on the facility and guarantee documents, and the CFO's role in the corporate financial arrangements, supplied sufficient factual foundation at the summoning stage. Detailed proof of internal management was not required before trial.

Conclusion: A prima facie case under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was made out against the directors.

Issue (iii): whether the deletion of the cheque signatory from the complaint undermined prosecution of the company and other directors.

Analysis: The drawer of the cheque was the company, which remains a distinct legal person. The signatory's resignation before presentation could affect his own liability, but it did not extinguish the company's liability or the liability of other persons who were in charge of its affairs at the relevant time. The absence of the signatory from the array of accused did not cause the complaint to collapse.

Conclusion: The prosecution against the company and other directors remained maintainable notwithstanding the dropping of the signatory.

Issue (iv): whether the defence of fraud, forged account opening, and breach of bank mandate could defeat prosecution at the summoning stage.

Analysis: The alleged fraud by an erstwhile officer, the creation of a purported sham account, and the internal bank-mandate requirement of joint signatures were all disputed factual matters. Such defences could not be adjudicated in a quashing petition, especially where the cheques bore the signature of a person who was connected with the company and the complainant was a holder in due course. The question whether the signature was authorised had to be tested in evidence.

Conclusion: The bank-mandate and fraud-based challenges were triable issues and did not justify quashing.

Issue (v): whether the pleas that the cheques were security cheques and that no legally enforceable debt existed could justify quashing.

Analysis: The existence of a facility agreement, addendum, disbursement of funds, and dishonour of the cheques attracted the statutory presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. A security cheque is not outside Section 138 if the liability has matured by the time of presentation. Rebuttal of the presumptions and proof of absence of liability were matters for trial, not for summary interference at the stage of summoning.

Conclusion: The pleas of absence of debt and security nature of the cheques could not defeat the complaints at the threshold.

Final Conclusion: The petitions were found to raise disputed factual defences unsuitable for summary adjudication, and the complaints were permitted to proceed to trial.

Ratio Decidendi: In prosecutions under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, complaints containing the basic statutory averments under Section 141 and supported by the cheque transaction and dishonour are not liable to be quashed at the summoning stage merely because the accused raise disputed defences of fraud, lack of authority, security cheque, or absence of debt; such defences require trial.

Issues: Whether a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 against directors is maintainable when the company, being the drawer and principal obligor, is not arraigned as an accused.

Analysis: The complaint itself proceeded on the basis that the cheque was issued on behalf of the company towards its liability, while the company was not impleaded as an accused. Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 fastens vicarious liability on officers only when the company, which committed the offence under Section 138, is also proceeded against. The settled position is that arraignment of the company is a condition precedent to prosecuting its directors or authorised signatories, subject only to exceptional cases where impleadment is legally impossible. No such impediment existed here.

Conclusion: The complaint was not maintainable against the petitioner in the absence of the company as an accused, and the summoning order could not stand.

Issues: Whether the conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act could be sustained when the complainant's witness had no direct knowledge of the transaction and the authorisation to prosecute was not produced.

Analysis: A company may prosecute a complaint through an authorised representative, but such representative must have witnessed the transaction or possess direct knowledge of it. A witness who only speaks from company records and has no personal knowledge cannot prove the issuance or execution of the cheque. The statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 arise only after execution of the cheque is proved; until then, the initial burden remains on the complainant. On the evidence, there was no substantive proof of issuance or execution of the cheque, and the complainant failed to discharge the primary burden.

Conclusion: The conviction and sentence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act were unsustainable and were set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: In a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the complainant must first prove issuance and execution of the cheque through a competent witness with direct knowledge before the statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 can operate.

Issues: (i) Whether the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was made out in the absence of reliable evidence that the cheque was issued in discharge of a third party's liability. (ii) Whether the partners of the firm could be convicted in the absence of specific averments in the complaint and evidence showing their role in the conduct of the firm's business.

Issue (i): Whether the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was made out in the absence of reliable evidence that the cheque was issued in discharge of a third party's liability.

Analysis: The complaint and testimony did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had undertaken repayment of the borrower's liability. The complainant's evidence on this aspect remained a bare assertion, was not supported by documents or other witnesses, and was weakened by cross-examination. The evidence also failed to explain the increase from the alleged hand loan amount to the cheque amount, and the finding that there was no privity of contract between the complainant and the accused was found to be justified.

Conclusion: The issue was answered against the appellant. The acquittal on this ground was sustained.

Issue (ii): Whether the partners of the firm could be convicted in the absence of specific averments in the complaint and evidence showing their role in the conduct of the firm's business.

Analysis: The complaint contained only a general assertion that the accused were responsible for day-to-day affairs, but it did not contain a clear and specific statement of the part played by each accused. No evidence was led to show which partner was responsible for the transaction or for assuming the alleged liability. In the absence of such specific averments and proof, prosecution of the partners could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The issue was answered against the appellant. The conviction of the partners could not be maintained.

Final Conclusion: The appellate court found no patent perversity or misreading of evidence in the acquittal and declined to interfere with the Sessions Court's view.

Ratio Decidendi: In an appeal against acquittal, interference is warranted only when the acquittal is perverse or based on a material misreading of evidence, and a conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 against partners requires specific averments and supporting evidence establishing liability and responsibility.

Issues: (i) Whether the accused was liable to be convicted under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 on the basis of the cheque, dishonour memos, notice, and the presumption under Section 139 of that Act. (ii) Whether additional evidence sought in appeal under Section 391 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 should be allowed. (iii) Whether the sentence required interference to the limited extent of the amount imposed towards defraying expenses of the State.

Issue (i): Whether the accused was liable to be convicted under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 on the basis of the cheque, dishonour memos, notice, and the presumption under Section 139 of that Act.

Analysis: The cheque admittedly belonged to the accused and the signature was not shown to be false. The cheque was dishonoured twice for insufficiency of funds. The complainant produced the invoice, tax documents, delivery-related material, and bank evidence, which was sufficient to raise the statutory presumption under Section 139. The accused did not lead defence evidence or effectively rebut the presumption by cross-examination or by contemporaneous material showing absence of liability. The later material relied upon did not displace the finding that the cheque was issued towards payment for the trailers and that a legally enforceable debt existed.

Conclusion: The conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was upheld and the challenge on merits failed.

Issue (ii): Whether additional evidence sought in appeal under Section 391 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 should be allowed.

Analysis: The additional material was sought after conviction and was substantially subsequent in origin, except for one receipt. The accused had ample opportunity during trial to produce the material but did not show due diligence or any compelling reason for non-production earlier. The material was viewed as an attempt to fill in gaps in the defence rather than as evidence necessary to prevent failure of justice. The appellate court's refusal to admit it did not warrant interference.

Conclusion: The request for additional evidence was rightly rejected.

Issue (iii): Whether the sentence required interference to the limited extent of the amount imposed towards defraying expenses of the State.

Analysis: The dispute was between private parties and no State machinery was involved. The component of Rs. 5,000/- awarded towards defraying expenses of the State was therefore unsustainable, while the compensation component could be maintained within the permissible limit.

Conclusion: The amount of Rs. 5,000/- towards State expenses was set aside and the fine was reduced accordingly.

Final Conclusion: The conviction was maintained, the attempt to introduce additional evidence failed, and only the sentence was modified to the limited extent of deleting the State-expense component and reducing the total fine to the cheque amount.

Ratio Decidendi: In a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, once the complainant proves issuance and dishonour of the cheque and the accused fails to rebut the presumption of liability, conviction can be sustained; additional evidence under Section 391 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is allowed only where due diligence is shown and its absence would cause failure of justice.

Issues: (i) Whether the conviction for dishonour of cheques under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was liable to be interfered with. (ii) Whether the requirements for fastening vicarious liability on the Managing Director of the company under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 were satisfied.

Issue (i): Whether the conviction for dishonour of cheques under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was liable to be interfered with.

Analysis: The cheque transaction, dishonour memos, statutory notice, and reply notice established the issuance of cheques towards partial discharge of liability and their dishonour for insufficiency of funds. The accused admitted the transaction, liability, and the issuance of cheques, and no defence evidence was adduced to dislodge the prosecution case.

Conclusion: The conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was upheld.

Issue (ii): Whether the requirements for fastening vicarious liability on the Managing Director of the company under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 were satisfied.

Analysis: The complaint contained specific averments that the accused was the Managing Director and was in charge of and responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the company at the relevant time. The accused also admitted his role in the company and his involvement in the transaction, and the record showed that he had issued the cheques. On these facts, the statutory conditions for company liability and vicarious liability were met.

Conclusion: Vicarious liability under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was correctly fastened on the accused.

Final Conclusion: The revision failed, and the conviction and sentence, as modified in appeal, were left undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: To fasten liability on an individual for an offence by a company under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the complaint must contain specific averments that the person was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time, and such liability may be sustained where the evidence also shows active involvement in the cheque transaction.