Issues: (i) whether the applicant was kept in illegal custody for want of compliance with the procedure under the Customs Act, 1962 and the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985; (ii) whether prolonged incarceration and the primacy of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India justified grant of bail despite the bar under Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.

Issue (i): whether the applicant was kept in illegal custody for want of compliance with the procedure under the Customs Act, 1962 and the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.

Analysis: The material showed that part of the contraband had already been recovered at the airport, yet the applicant was not immediately produced before the Magistrate. The record also did not disclose a clear admission or voluntary willingness by the applicant so as to attract the exception under Section 103(8) of the Customs Act, 1962. In these circumstances, the Court found prima facie non-compliance with the statutory procedure governing detention, production before the Magistrate, and further action for recovery from the body.

Conclusion: The applicant was held to have remained in illegal custody from interception until formal arrest, and this factor weighed in his favour.

Issue (ii): whether prolonged incarceration and the primacy of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India justified grant of bail despite the bar under Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.

Analysis: The applicant had undergone substantial incarceration, trial progress was slow, and the Court treated the delay in conclusion of trial as a material liberty concern. The Court applied the principle that where personal liberty is seriously affected and trial is unlikely to conclude soon, Article 21 can prevail over the statutory embargo under Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, especially when the custody itself is prima facie tainted by procedural illegality.

Conclusion: Bail was granted to the applicant notwithstanding the restriction under Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.

Final Conclusion: The application succeeded on the combined grounds of prima facie illegal custody, prolonged incarceration, and the protection of personal liberty, and the applicant was ordered to be released on bail subject to conditions.

Ratio Decidendi: Where custody is prima facie illegal for non-compliance with mandatory statutory safeguards and the trial is not likely to conclude soon, the Court may grant bail on the ground of violation of Articles 21 and 22 despite the embargo under Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.

Issues: Whether anticipatory bail should be granted when the accused has joined the investigation and custodial interrogation is not shown to be necessary, and whether cooperation with investigation can compel self-incrimination.

Analysis: The appellant had joined the investigation and was cooperating. The only grievance raised was non-production of the mobile phone, but cooperation with investigation does not extend to requiring an accused to incriminate himself. In the absence of grounds warranting custodial interrogation, continued protection from arrest was justified, subject to compliance with lawful conditions.

Conclusion: Anticipatory bail was granted and the denial of relief by the High Court was set aside.

Final Conclusion: The appellant obtained pre-arrest protection, with liberty to proceed on bail in the event of arrest, subject to compliance with the stipulated statutory conditions.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an accused has joined the investigation and custodial interrogation is not necessary, anticipatory bail may be granted, and cooperation with investigation cannot be equated with compelled self-incrimination.

Issues: (i) Whether the complaint was liable to be quashed on the ground that the complainant was misdescribed and had no privity with the petitioner; (ii) Whether the cheque dated 18.05.2023 was supported by a legally enforceable liability so as to sustain proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Issue (i): Whether the complaint was liable to be quashed on the ground that the complainant was misdescribed and had no privity with the petitioner.

Analysis: The documents showed that the lease arrangement, termination notice, cheque, and earlier proceedings were all in the name of Triangles Consolidated Ltd., while the complaint was filed in the name of Triangles Consolidated Pvt. Ltd. The discrepancy appeared to be a misdescription rather than a distinct legal entity dispute capable of being finally resolved at the quashing stage. The Court held that the complainant should be afforded an to explain its locus standi during trial.

Conclusion: The complaint was not quashed on this ground.

Issue (ii): Whether the cheque dated 18.05.2023 was supported by a legally enforceable liability so as to sustain proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Analysis: The admitted material showed that a security deposit of Rs. 15 lakhs had been paid at the inception of the lease, that an eviction notice had been issued, and that the cheque amount was subsequently transferred back by RTGS on 06.06.2023. The Court found that the complainant had received Rs. 15 lakhs in respect of the cheque and that no legally enforceable liability survived. The belated plea that the amount represented damages for fit-outs was not supported by the demand notice or the parallel proceedings.

Conclusion: The cheque was not backed by a legally enforceable liability and the Section 138 proceedings could not stand.

Final Conclusion: The criminal complaint and all proceedings arising from it, including the summoning order, were set aside because the foundational liability for the cheque was absent.

Ratio Decidendi: A prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 cannot survive where the cheque amount has already been discharged and no legally enforceable liability remains; a mere nomenclatural discrepancy in the complainant's name will not by itself justify quashing if it is only a misdescription.

Issues: (i) Whether the purchaser's claim that the sale was without notice of the existing liability could displace the attachment in execution; (ii) Whether a post-award transferee could resist execution of the money award under Order XXI Rule 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Issue (i): Whether the purchaser's claim that the sale was without notice of the existing liability could displace the attachment in execution.

Analysis: The sale deed was executed after the arbitral proceedings had been instituted and after the award had been made. The Court noted that the non-production of the tripartite agreement, which explained the earlier debt-related arrangement, weakened the plea of absence of notice. The independent recovery steps under the SARFAESI proceedings did not shield the judgment-debtor's property from execution of the award. On the record, the purchaser failed to establish that the transfer was free from notice of the existing claim.

Conclusion: The plea of purchase without notice was rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether a post-award transferee could resist execution of the money award under Order XXI Rule 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Analysis: An arbitral award enforceable under Section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 stands in the position of a decree. Order XXI Rule 102 bars a transferee pendente lite from resisting execution through the protections otherwise available to third-party claimants. The Court held that pendency for this purpose is linked to the institution of the proceeding that culminated in the award, and not merely to the later challenge under Section 34. A transferee after institution of the arbitral proceedings and after the award cannot defeat execution by setting up a later purchase, even in a money claim, because that would frustrate realization of the decree-holder's fruits of the decree.

Conclusion: The purchaser was treated as a transferee pendente lite and her claim petition was not maintainable against execution.

Final Conclusion: The attachment and the dismissal of the claim petition were upheld, and the execution of the arbitral award was allowed to proceed against the property.

Ratio Decidendi: A transferee of the judgment-debtor's property after institution of the proceeding that culminates in a decree or enforceable award is a transferee pendente lite and cannot resist execution under Order XXI Rule 102, including where the decree is for money and the award remains unsatisfied.

Issues: (i) Whether applications under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 challenging issuance of process and seeking quashment of proceedings are maintainable through a power of attorney holder. (ii) Whether such applications are maintainable at the instance of directors and non-executive directors when the application against the company stands dismissed.

Issue (i): Whether applications under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 challenging issuance of process and seeking quashment of proceedings are maintainable through a power of attorney holder.

Analysis: The applications were instituted to assail the orders issuing process in complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The Court held that, in the absence of any pleaded legal disability of the accused, a criminal challenge to the legality of the process and complaint must be pursued by the accused themselves and not through a power of attorney holder. Reliance was placed on the principle that a proxy challenge in criminal proceedings is impermissible unless law recognises a specific disability permitting a next friend or guardian to act.

Conclusion: The challenge through a power of attorney holder was held not maintainable and the issue was answered against the applicants.

Issue (ii): Whether such applications are maintainable at the instance of directors and non-executive directors when the application against the company stands dismissed.

Analysis: The Court treated the company as the primary offender in the prosecution arising from dishonour of cheques and held that the directors' challenge could not survive independently once the application against the company had already been dismissed. The Court further noted that criminal liability in such proceedings is tied to the persons shown to be in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the company's business, and the applicants had not established a sufficient basis to maintain quashing proceedings by directors alone.

Conclusion: The applications by the directors and non-executive directors were held not maintainable in the absence of the company, and the issue was answered against the applicants.

Final Conclusion: The criminal applications were not tenable and were dismissed, with the trial directed to be expedited.

Ratio Decidendi: A criminal petition for quashing process and proceedings must ordinarily be filed by the accused themselves, and directors cannot independently maintain such a challenge where the company, being the primary offender, is no longer before the Court.

Issues: Whether the second application for regular bail was liable to be allowed despite the prior rejection of bail, dismissal of the SLP, and the alleged active role attributed to the applicant in the offence.

Analysis: The application was considered as a second bail request after earlier rejection on merits and dismissal of the SLP. The material on record, including the prosecution version, the charge-sheet, the sanction for prosecution, the search and seizure proceedings, and the allegation of the applicant's involvement in the conspiracy and raid, was taken into account. The distinction drawn between the applicant's role and the bail granted to a co-accused did not persuade the Court to hold that the applicant's case stood on the same footing. No sufficient or compelling ground was found to justify release on bail.

Conclusion: The second bail application was rejected.

Ratio Decidendi: A second bail application will not be allowed where the record reflects active involvement in the offence and no sufficient change in circumstances is shown to warrant departure from the earlier refusal of bail.

Issues: Whether the criminal proceeding alleging offences of criminal breach of trust and cheating, arising out of a business transaction, disclosed the essential ingredients of the offences so as to justify quashing.

Analysis: The dispute arose from long-standing commercial dealings between the parties, with payments having been made over time and the alleged balance relating to outstanding business accounts. For an offence of cheating, the necessary element is dishonest intention at the inception of the transaction, and mere non-payment or subsequent failure to honour a commercial arrangement does not by itself establish such intention. The materials did not show any fraudulent or dishonest inducement from the beginning, nor did the complaint disclose the ingredients necessary for criminal breach of trust. The controversy was found to be essentially civil in nature, and continuation of the criminal case would amount to abuse of process.

Conclusion: The criminal proceeding was quashed insofar as the petitioner was concerned; the case against the petitioner could not be sustained under Sections 406 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code.

Final Conclusion: The order brings the revisional application to a final end in favour of the petitioner by terminating the criminal prosecution arising from the commercial dispute.

Ratio Decidendi: In a commercial transaction, criminal liability for cheating or criminal breach of trust arises only where dishonest intention or fraudulent inducement exists from the inception; a mere unresolved monetary dispute or breach of contract does not justify criminal prosecution.

Issues: (i) Whether the High Court's order granting bail was legally sustainable; (ii) Whether the completed investigation warranted transfer to a special agency; (iii) Whether bail applicants must make full disclosure of material particulars and criminal antecedents.

Issue (i): Whether the High Court's order granting bail was legally sustainable.

Analysis: An appellate challenge to grant of bail is distinct from cancellation based on post-bail misconduct. A bail order may be annulled where it is perverse, legally untenable, based on irrelevant material, or overlooks material considerations including the gravity of accusations, criminal antecedents and societal impact. The bail order relied upon documents whose genuineness formed the subject of the prosecution, despite prima facie material that the purported institution lacked affiliation to conduct a law course and that the marksheet had not been issued by the University. The respondent's suppression of multiple criminal antecedents materially vitiated the exercise of bail discretion.

Conclusion: The bail order was legally unsustainable and was set aside; bail was cancelled in favour of the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the completed investigation warranted transfer to a special agency.

Analysis: Transfer of an investigation to an independent or special agency after filing of the chargesheet is an exceptional measure, requiring cogent material showing bias, mala fides, improper investigation, extraneous influence, or a credible need to restore public confidence. The investigation had concluded, cognizance had been taken, and no substantiated material established that the State investigation was tainted or influenced.

Conclusion: Transfer of the investigation to a special agency was declined.

Issue (iii): Whether bail applicants must make full disclosure of material particulars and criminal antecedents.

Analysis: Suppression or selective disclosure of material facts in bail proceedings amounts to abuse of process and undermines informed judicial discretion. Bail applicants must disclose criminal antecedents, earlier and pending bail applications, coercive processes, custody details, procedural status and other material particulars, supported by affidavit. An illustrative, recommendatory disclosure framework was issued to promote transparency and uniformity, with circulation to High Courts and the district judiciary for appropriate consideration.

Conclusion: Full and candid disclosure of material particulars by bail applicants was reaffirmed, and a recommendatory disclosure framework was issued.

Final Conclusion: The invalid grant of bail was annulled, while the request to transfer the concluded investigation was rejected; institutional measures for transparent bail disclosures were directed.

Ratio Decidendi: A superior court may annul a bail order without proof of supervening circumstances where the order is perverse, relies on suspect or irrelevant material, or ignores material considerations such as criminal antecedents and the gravity of the accusations.

Issues: (i) Whether a writ of mandamus could be issued to direct framing and implementation of a regulatory framework for cryptocurrency exchanges and transactions; (ii) whether a Special Investigation Team or CBI investigation could be ordered on the facts pleaded; (iii) whether the prayer for release of funds and compensation was maintainable in writ jurisdiction despite disputed questions of fact and private law origins.

Issue (i): Whether a writ of mandamus could be issued to direct framing and implementation of a regulatory framework for cryptocurrency exchanges and transactions.

Analysis: Mandamus lies to enforce an existing public duty and not to compel the legislature to enact law or the executive to frame policy in the absence of a statutory duty. The Court found no legislative vacuum requiring such a direction and held that a constitutional court cannot assume the role of the legislature.

Conclusion: The prayer for framing or mandating a cryptocurrency regulatory framework was declined.

Issue (ii): Whether a Special Investigation Team or CBI investigation could be ordered on the facts pleaded.

Analysis: Direction to the CBI or a similar agency is an extraordinary remedy, to be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances supported by prima facie material. The record disclosed no such exceptional circumstance or sufficient basis warranting such intervention.

Conclusion: The request for constitution of an SIT and for investigation by a special agency was rejected.

Issue (iii): Whether the prayer for release of funds and compensation was maintainable in writ jurisdiction despite disputed questions of fact and private law origins.

Analysis: The claims for compensation and release of funds depended upon prior determination of liability and involved disputed questions of fact requiring evidence and cross-examination. The entities against whom relief was sought were also held not to be State or public functionaries for the purpose of Article 226, and the dispute was treated as one with private law origins, making writ adjudication inappropriate.

Conclusion: The prayers for release of funds and compensation were not entertained in writ jurisdiction.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of after declining substantive relief on the principal prayers, while leaving the petitioners free to pursue the monetary claims before an appropriate forum.

Ratio Decidendi: A writ court will not compel legislation or policy-making, will order a CBI-type investigation only in exceptional cases supported by prima facie material, and will decline writ relief where the dispute turns on contested private law issues requiring factual adjudication.

Issues: (i) Whether a direction for constitution of a Special Investigation Team for investigation into the alleged misconduct of the cryptocurrency exchange was warranted. (ii) Whether the Court could issue a writ of mandamus to direct framing of stricter policies or a regulatory regime for cryptocurrency exchanges dealing in virtual digital assets. (iii) Whether the private respondents were amenable to writ jurisdiction for a direction to release the petitioner's invested monies.

Issue (i): Whether a direction for constitution of a Special Investigation Team for investigation into the alleged misconduct of the cryptocurrency exchange was warranted.

Analysis: The power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to direct investigation by the CBI or a similar agency is extraordinary and is to be exercised sparingly, cautiously, and only in exceptional cases where the material on record discloses a prima facie case requiring such intervention. The record did not disclose any exceptional circumstance, and no FIR had been registered at the petitioner's instance. Alternative remedies were available in accordance with law.

Conclusion: The request for constitution of a Special Investigation Team was rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether the Court could issue a writ of mandamus to direct framing of stricter policies or a regulatory regime for cryptocurrency exchanges dealing in virtual digital assets.

Analysis: A writ of mandamus lies to enforce an existing legal duty, and the Court cannot assume the role of the legislature by compelling enactment of policy or law on a subject. The petitioner's own reliance on existing remedies showed that the matter was not one of a remediless legislative vacuum warranting judicial creation of policy.

Conclusion: No direction for framing of policy or regulation was issued.

Issue (iii): Whether the private respondents were amenable to writ jurisdiction for a direction to release the petitioner's invested monies.

Analysis: The private respondents were not shown to be State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, nor were they found to be discharging public functions. On that basis, they were not amenable to writ jurisdiction for the monetary relief sought.

Conclusion: The monetary claim against the private respondents was not entertained in writ jurisdiction.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of without granting the substantive reliefs sought, while leaving the petitioner free to pursue remedies available in law.

Ratio Decidendi: The extraordinary writ jurisdiction cannot be used to compel a policy-making function or to order investigative intervention absent exceptional circumstances and a prima facie basis, and purely private entities not performing public functions are not amenable to writ relief for private monetary claims.

Issues: Whether the writ petition could be entertained in Delhi when the award, the pending challenge under Section 34, and the recovery proceedings all had their substantial connection with Agra, and whether the doctrine of forum conveniens required relegation to the court having the dominant territorial nexus.

Analysis: The territorial reach under Article 226 depends not on any isolated or slender fact, but on whether the pleaded facts form a material, essential, and integral part of the cause of action. Even where some consequence of the impugned action is felt within the forum, the High Court may decline to exercise writ jurisdiction if another forum is more appropriately connected with the lis. The decision-making authority, the underlying arbitral proceedings, the pending Section 34 proceedings, and the recovery steps were all centred at Agra, while the Delhi connection was only incidental. The writ remedy, being discretionary, could not be treated as available merely because a recovery notice was received within Delhi.

Conclusion: The petition was not fit to be entertained in Delhi and the petitioner was required to pursue remedies before the court of competent jurisdiction at Agra.

Issues: (i) Whether successive registration of FIRs (FIR No.20/2025 and FIR No.458/2025) constituted a mala fide abuse of the criminal process to keep petitioner No.1 in custody and whether petitioner No.1 is entitled to be released on bail in those FIRs; (ii) Whether coercive action should be restrained against petitioner No.2 during the pendency of the petition.

Issue (i): Whether successive FIRs were mala fide and whether petitioner No.1 is entitled to bail in FIR No.20/2025 and FIR No.458/2025.

Analysis: The petition record shows that petitioner No.1 had been called for inquiry in an earlier FIR and that two subsequent FIRs were registered after this Court had granted interim bail; the timing and sequence of registrations and remands indicate a pattern aimed at prolonging custody. Applicable constitutional provisions invoked include Article 32 read with Article 142 and the petition raised alleged violations of Articles 14, 19 and 21. Criminal law framework includes offences alleged under specified sections of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The registrational chronology, remand orders following grant of bail by this Court, and the absence of prior prosecution activity over many years were treated as material in assessing whether the process was being abused to frustrate the effect of bail.

Conclusion: Petitioner No.1 is entitled to be released on bail in FIR No.20/2025 and FIR No.458/2025. This conclusion is in favour of the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether coercive action should be restrained against petitioner No.2 during the pendency of the petition.

Analysis: Petitioner No.2 had not been arrested at the time of decision. Given the findings on the pattern of successive FIRs and the need to protect personal liberty while investigation proceeds, a protective restraint on coercive steps was considered appropriate, subject to cooperation with the investigation.

Conclusion: No coercive steps shall be taken against petitioner No.2 subject to her cooperation with the investigation. This conclusion is in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition is allowed; petitioner No.1 is directed to be released on bail in the specified FIRs and coercive action against petitioner No.2 is restrained on the stated condition, thereby providing protective relief to the petitioners while preserving investigative rights of the State.

Ratio Decidendi: Where successive criminal proceedings are instituted in sequence after judicial bail to defeat the effect of that bail and to perpetuate custody without independent supporting circumstances, such registrations constitute abuse of process and justify grant of bail and protective restraint on coercive action.

Issues: (i) Whether the High Court order directing listing of the contempt petition for framing of charges can be sustained without a clear and categorical direction as to existence of a right and mode of compliance, and whether the respondents should be permitted to challenge the Government order dated 09.05.2025 by filing a writ petition to be taken up along with the contempt proceedings.

Analysis: The Court examined the sequence of writ orders, executive orders and repeated remands/reconsideration directed by the High Court, noting the absence of a clear, categorical finding by the High Court establishing a right and specifying the manner of compliance such that the executive would have no discretion. The Court also considered the propriety of invoking contempt jurisdiction when an appealable or challengeable executive order (09.05.2025) existed and remained unchallenged. Applying principles that courts must issue clear directions when seeking compliance and that contempt should not be used as a substitute for available challenges to executive action, the Court directed that the respondents be permitted to file a writ petition against the 09.05.2025 order and required the High Court to first decide that writ petition (hearing petitioners and State) and to refrain from remanding the matter back to the authorities; if the High Court finds merit it must issue clear and categorical directions for compliance, otherwise it may dismiss the writ petition with reasons.

Conclusion: Permission is granted to respondents to file a writ petition against the order dated 09.05.2025; the High Court shall take up that writ petition along with the contempt proceedings, decide the writ petition on merits without remanding the matter to the authorities, and either issue clear directions for compliance or dismiss the writ petition with reasoned findings.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a court's order lacks a clear, categorical identification of a legally enforceable right and a specified mode of compliance, contempt proceedings are inappropriate; instead, parties must be permitted to challenge the executive order by ordinary writ remedy and courts should issue explicit directions or dismiss the challenge after reasoned consideration.

Issues: Whether the Look-Out Circulars (LOCs) issued and continued at the instance of respondent banks against the petitioners are legally sustainable, and whether such LOCs should be quashed and permission to travel abroad granted.

Analysis: The Court examined the governing framework for issuance and continuation of LOCs, including Article 21 of the Constitution of India, the consolidated Office Memorandum dated 22.02.2021, and relevant precedents holding that LOCs are coercive executive measures affecting the fundamental right to travel and must be exercised sparingly and in accordance with law. The jurisprudence requires that LOCs ordinarily be limited to cases involving cognizable offences where tangible material shows deliberate evasion or a proximate likelihood of absconding, and that the exceptional power under Clause 6(L) of the Office Memorandum be narrowly construed for grave national or systemic threats. The Court reviewed authorities holding that requests for LOCs by principal officers of public sector banks lack lawful foundation and that mere commercial defaults or association with an accused, without concrete material of complicity, do not justify LOCs. Applying these principles to the record, the Court noted absence of material demonstrating that the petitioners were deliberately evading process, that their continued departure would threaten sovereignty, security, integrity, bilateral relations, or national economic interests in the exceptional sense required, and that the petitioners had cooperated and previously complied with conditions imposed by courts.

Conclusion: The Look-Out Circulars issued against the petitioners are quashed. The petitioners are directed to furnish undertakings to the trial Special Judges confirming continued cooperation and to obtain prior permission from the competent trial courts for future foreign travel.

Issues: Whether complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 could be quashed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 on the basis that cheques drawn on a bank merged with another bank had become invalid and were presented after expiry of their validity period, despite their return being reflected as "Funds Insufficient".

Analysis: The condition in clause (a) of the proviso to Section 138 requires presentation of the cheque within the period of validity. The expression "within the period of its validity" is not confined only to the period printed on the cheque and may also be affected by circumstances that render the cheque invalid, including merger or acquisition of the drawee bank. However, where the bank return memo records dishonour as "Funds Insufficient" and not as invalidity of the cheque, the statutory presumption under Section 146 operates and the issue whether the cheque had in fact become invalid and whether the dishonour was really on account of insufficiency of funds becomes a matter for trial. In such a situation, the Court would not undertake factual adjudication in exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482.

Conclusion: The plea for quashing was not accepted and the complaints were allowed to proceed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a cheque returned with the endorsement "Funds Insufficient" is challenged on the ground of later invalidity due to merger or acquisition of the drawee bank, the question whether the cheque was presented within its legal validity and whether the dishonour attracts Section 138 is ordinarily a disputed factual issue to be decided at trial, not in a petition under Section 482.

Issues: (i) Whether land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, but culminating in an award after commencement of the 2013 Act, are governed by Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act. (ii) Whether an appeal under Section 74 of the 2013 Act is subject to Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. (iii) Whether the delay in filing the first appeals deserved condonation.

Issue (i): Whether land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, but culminating in an award after commencement of the 2013 Act, are governed by Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act.

Analysis: Section 24(1)(a) applies where acquisition proceedings under the 1894 Act had commenced but no award had been made before commencement of the 2013 Act. In such cases, the acquisition continues, but the award-making stage is governed by the 2013 Act, save that rehabilitation and resettlement entitlements are not retrospectively imported into proceedings initiated under the earlier Act. The provision is a savings clause designed to extend the beneficial regime of the 2013 Act to pending matters at the stage of compensation determination.

Conclusion: The proceedings were correctly treated as governed by Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act, and the awards had to be made under the 2013 Act, apart from rehabilitation and resettlement entitlements.

Issue (ii): Whether an appeal under Section 74 of the 2013 Act is subject to Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Analysis: Section 74 prescribes a limitation period for appeals to the High Court, and its proviso only permits a further period within which the delayed appeal may still be entertained. The 2013 Act does not expressly exclude the Limitation Act, and Section 103 states that the Act is in addition to and not in derogation of other laws in force. Read with Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, the absence of express exclusion means that Section 5 remains available. The statutory scheme does not justify reading an implied exclusion into Section 74.

Conclusion: Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to appeals under Section 74 of the 2013 Act.

Issue (iii): Whether the delay in filing the first appeals deserved condonation.

Analysis: Since Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applied, and the matters involved appeals against awards under the 2013 Act, the delay applications were liable to be considered on the liberal standard of sufficient cause. The Court found no reason to remit the matters for further delay adjudication and preferred to avoid prolonging the litigation.

Conclusion: The delay in filing the first appeals was condoned and the applications were allowed.

Final Conclusion: The impugned High Court orders were set aside to the extent they had rejected condonation, and the first appeals were permitted to proceed on merits under the 2013 Act regime.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a special statute prescribing a limitation period does not expressly exclude the Limitation Act, 1963, Section 5 remains applicable by virtue of Section 29(2); and for pending land acquisition proceedings culminating in an award after commencement of the 2013 Act, Section 24(1)(a) requires application of the 2013 Act at the award stage.

Issues: (i) whether summoning and criminal proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 could be quashed against Non-Executive and Independent Directors in the absence of material showing that they were in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the company's business; (ii) whether the summoning order could be interfered with in respect of the Chief Financial Officer of the company at the stage of proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Issue (i): whether summoning and criminal proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 could be quashed against Non-Executive and Independent Directors in the absence of material showing that they were in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the company's business.

Analysis: The protective scheme for Independent Directors under the Companies Act, 2013 recognizes that such directors are not, by status alone, responsible for the company's day-to-day affairs. Liability for an offence by the company does not automatically extend to every director. For vicarious criminal liability, there must be specific material showing active involvement or a direct nexus with the transaction and the company's business. The record showed that the petitioners in this category were Independent and Non-Executive Directors, and there was no sufficient basis to treat them as persons in charge of the company's affairs for the purpose of Section 141.

Conclusion: The issue was decided in favour of the petitioners. The summoning order and the proceedings were quashed against the Non-Executive and Independent Directors.

Issue (ii): whether the summoning order could be interfered with in respect of the Chief Financial Officer of the company at the stage of proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Analysis: A Chief Financial Officer is part of the company's key managerial personnel and, by office, is connected with financial administration and monetary affairs. Whether such a person had knowledge of the transaction and exercised control over it is ordinarily a matter for trial, especially where the role is linked to financial management. On the materials before the Court, no ground was made out to conclude at the quashing stage that the summoning order was unsustainable against the Chief Financial Officer.

Conclusion: The issue was decided against the petitioner. The summoning order was upheld in respect of the Chief Financial Officer.

Final Conclusion: The petition succeeded only in part: the proceedings were terminated against the Independent and Non-Executive Directors, while the prosecution was permitted to continue against the Chief Financial Officer.

Ratio Decidendi: In prosecutions for dishonour of cheques, a director can be made vicariously liable only on specific material showing responsibility for the conduct of the company's business, whereas mere status as a director is insufficient; a key managerial officer whose role is intrinsically connected with company finances may require trial to determine involvement.

Issues: (i) whether the cheque was issued in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability and the statutory presumption under the Negotiable Instruments Act stood unrebutted; (ii) whether the absence of direct privity between the petitioner and the respondent, and the cheque being linked to the petitioner's brother, defeated liability under Section 138; (iii) whether the complaint was barred by limitation because the memorandum of understanding was executed earlier than the cheque transaction.

Issue (i): whether the cheque was issued in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability and the statutory presumption under the Negotiable Instruments Act stood unrebutted.

Analysis: Once execution of the cheque and receipt of legal notice were admitted, the presumption under Sections 118(a) and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 arose in favour of the holder. The evidential burden then shifted to the petitioner to rebut the presumption by a probable defence. The petitioner did not lead any evidence and relied only on his statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which was insufficient to displace the statutory presumption. The cheque signature being admitted, the instrument was treated as issued towards a legally enforceable debt.

Conclusion: The presumption of liability was not rebutted and the finding of liability was upheld against the petitioner.

Issue (ii): whether the absence of direct privity between the petitioner and the respondent, and the cheque being linked to the petitioner's brother, defeated liability under Section 138.

Analysis: The cheque was found to have been issued by the petitioner himself, and the evidence of the witnesses supported the conclusion that it was handed over by him towards payment of the respondent's share in profit. The fact that the underlying arrangement was entered into with the petitioner's brother did not negate the petitioner's own liability where the cheque was issued on his behalf and the surrounding evidence supported the transaction. The revisional court also declined to reopen factual findings already upheld by the appellate court.

Conclusion: The plea of absence of privity did not dislodge the conviction.

Issue (iii): whether the complaint was barred by limitation because the memorandum of understanding was executed earlier than the cheque transaction.

Analysis: For a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, limitation is computed from the date of issuance, presentation, and dishonour of the cheque, not from the date of the underlying memorandum of understanding. The earlier date of the memorandum therefore had no bearing on limitation in the cheque dishonour proceeding.

Conclusion: The complaint was not barred by limitation.

Final Conclusion: The revisional court found no illegality or perversity in the concurrent findings of conviction and sentence, and the petitioner was not entitled to interference in revision.

Ratio Decidendi: In a cheque dishonour case, admission of the cheque and signature activates the statutory presumption of liability, which can be displaced only by a probable defence; limitation is governed by the cheque transaction and dishonour, not by the date of the underlying commercial arrangement.

Issues: Whether the delay in filing and re-filing the special leave petition could be condoned on the facts pleaded by the State.

Analysis: The application for condonation of delay disclosed no sufficient cause. The explanation was treated as a mere excuse rather than a legally acceptable justification. While a liberal approach to delay is sometimes adopted in matters involving the State, condonation remains discretionary and cannot be claimed as of right. The prolonged and unexplained lapse, including the failure to act with promptitude even after the earlier dismissal in the High Court, showed utter lethargy and indolence. The governing principle under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 requires a real and satisfactory explanation, and the Court found none.

Conclusion: The delay was not condonable and the special leave petition was liable to be dismissed as time-barred.

Ratio Decidendi: Condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is a matter of judicial discretion requiring sufficient cause, and governmental litigants are not exempt from showing a real, acceptable explanation for prolonged delay.

Issues: (i) Whether the Revenue Officer had jurisdiction to review the concluded vesting order dated 07.10.1971 under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953; (ii) Whether the respondent-company satisfied the requirements of Section 6(1)(j) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 to retain the land on the footing that it was exclusively engaged in agricultural farming on 01.01.1952.

Issue (i): Whether the Revenue Officer had jurisdiction to review the concluded vesting order dated 07.10.1971 under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953.

Analysis: The power of review is not inherent and can be exercised only when the statute expressly or by necessary implication confers it. The authorities under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 are statutory, quasi-judicial authorities and the omnibus investment of Civil Court powers under Section 57A of that Act does not, by itself, include a substantive power of review. Section 57B further shows a legislative intent against reopening matters already enquired into, determined or decided under the Act. A concluded vesting order, which had attained finality, could not be reopened by an executive authority in the absence of an express review provision. Such an exercise would also be inconsistent with the finality of adjudication and the separation of powers.

Conclusion: The Revenue Officer had no jurisdiction to review the vesting order, and the fresh order dated 07.05.2008 was void ab initio.

Issue (ii): Whether the respondent-company satisfied the requirements of Section 6(1)(j) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 to retain the land on the footing that it was exclusively engaged in agricultural farming on 01.01.1952.

Analysis: To claim retention under Section 6(1)(j), the company had to establish that it was engaged exclusively in farming, and that such engagement existed on 01.01.1952. The materials relied upon by the respondent-company did not satisfactorily prove that statutory condition. The earlier vesting proceedings had given it opportunities to produce supporting evidence, but it failed to do so. The memoranda and later documents did not establish exclusive farming as the sole business of the company, and belated reliance on old documents could not justify reopening a concluded determination.

Conclusion: The respondent-company failed to satisfy Section 6(1)(j) and was not entitled to retain the lands in question.

Final Conclusion: The statutory framework did not permit the revival of a final vesting determination by review, and the respondent-company's claim to retention failed on merits as well. The Tribunal's restoration of the 1971 vesting order was upheld and the High Court's contrary view was rejected.

Ratio Decidendi: A quasi-judicial authority cannot review a concluded order unless the statute expressly or by necessary implication confers that power, and a claim for retention under Section 6(1)(j) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 must be proved by strict compliance with the statutory precondition of exclusive engagement in farming on the relevant date.