Issues: Whether the arbitral award suffered from patent illegality or perversity under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 on the finding that the petitioner had not taken steps to avail input tax credit and that the documents furnished were sufficient.

Analysis: The challenge was confined to the narrow jurisdiction under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. The Court reiterated that an arbitral award may be interfered with only on limited grounds, including conflict with the public policy of India, patent illegality, or perversity, and that the Court does not sit in appeal over the award. The Majority Arbitral Tribunal had recorded a categorical finding that the petitioner had not made any effort to avail the input tax credit, including by approaching the concerned authorities, and had also noted that the respondent had furnished the relevant documents and that the petitioner had reimbursed amounts towards CENVAT and VAT. On that basis, the Tribunal rejected the claim of shortfall. The Court held that this was a plausible and reasonable view on the material before the Tribunal, and that the objections raised amounted only to an impermissible request for reappreciation of evidence.

Conclusion: The award did not suffer from patent illegality or perversity, and no ground for interference under Section 34 was made out.

Issues: Whether the appellants, accused under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, were entitled to bail in view of the statutory restriction under Section 43-D(5), the material collected against them, and the prolonged period of pre-trial incarceration.

Analysis: The Court applied the bail framework under Section 43-D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 and the accused-specific inquiry articulated by the Supreme Court, requiring examination of whether the prosecution material, taken at face value, disclosed a prima facie nexus between the individual role attributed and the alleged unlawful activity. It noted that the appellants were alleged mainly to have participated in social media groups, exchanged digital content, and made limited calls to a co-accused, but there was no allegation that they created the groups or disseminated objectionable material as such. The Court also considered the long custody period, the uncertain duration of trial, the limited nature of the attributed role, the absence of conclusive corroboration from a key witness as against one appellant, and the medical condition of the other appellant as relevant to the overall Article 21 assessment.

Conclusion: The Court held that the statutory threshold for continued detention was not met on the facts placed before it and that continued incarceration would not serve the ends of justice. Bail was therefore granted to the appellants on stringent conditions.

Issues: Whether, in an application for appointment of an arbitrator arising out of a partnership deed, the dispute could be referred to arbitration by impleading a non-signatory company on a prima facie case of alter ego, commonality of subject matter, and use of the corporate form to carry on competing business.

Analysis: The partnership deed contained a broad arbitration clause governing disputes relating to the partnership affairs. The subsequent memorandum of understanding indicated that the partnership business continued and that the parties' rights under the deed remained relevant. On the pleadings and materials placed, there were specific allegations that the non-signatory company was operating from the same premises, using the same resources, user identification, customers, workers, and purchase orders, and was allegedly functioning as the alter ego of a signatory partner. The referral court noted that it must confine itself to a prima facie examination at the stage of appointment of an arbitrator and should not conduct a mini-trial on joinder or corporate separateness. It further held that objections as to misjoinder, non-signatory status, and the applicability of estoppel or piercing the corporate veil could be raised before the arbitral tribunal, which is competent to decide its own jurisdiction and the party status of those before it.

Conclusion: The non-signatory company could be brought within the arbitration at the referral stage on a prima facie basis, and the application for appointment of an arbitrator was allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: At the stage of appointment under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the referral court should ordinarily restrict itself to a prima facie view on the existence of the arbitration agreement and leave contested questions about binding non-signatories, including alter ego and veil-piercing objections, to the arbitral tribunal under its jurisdictional competence.

Issues: Whether the respondent rebutted the statutory presumption arising from the admitted cheque and signature under the Negotiable Instruments Act, and whether the lower appellate court was justified in setting aside the conviction under Section 138.

Analysis: The cheque and signature were admitted. The defence was that the cheque had been handed over as a security cheque in a chit transaction with another person and was later misused. The Court held that the entire defence rested on the testimony of that person, who was said to be available but was not examined. Once the respondent set up a specific defence based on that transaction, the burden lay on the respondent to substantiate it. The Court found that the respondent failed to probabilize the defence, while the trial court had appreciated the evidence correctly. The lower appellate court erred in treating non-examination of the said person by the complainant as fatal and in upsetting the conviction.

Conclusion: The statutory presumption remained unrebutted, the cheque was held to have been issued towards a legally enforceable liability, and the acquittal by the lower appellate court was unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: The conviction under Section 138 was restored and the criminal appeal was allowed.

Issues: Whether the suit for permanent injunction against use of the plaintiff's trademarks and deceptively similar marks was liable to be decreed in light of the defendants' undertaking to shut down the school and discontinue use of the impugned marks.

Analysis: The defendants placed on record an affidavit of undertaking stating that the school had been permanently shut down, admissions for the next academic session had not been invited, the website had been deleted, and the defendants would abide by the earlier injunction and hand over documents bearing the impugned marks. The Court proceeded on the basis of this undertaking and the defendants' stated willingness to suffer a permanent injunction.

Conclusion: The suit was decreed by granting a permanent injunction restraining the defendants and persons acting on their behalf from running a school using the plaintiff's trademarks and logos or any deceptively similar mark, and from representing any association with the plaintiff.

Issues: Whether an application under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was maintainable for appointment of an arbitrator when the dispute arose under the Special Economic Zones Act, 2005 and the statute itself provided the mechanism for reference to arbitration and appointment of the arbitrator.

Analysis: The special scheme under the Special Economic Zones Act, 2005 contemplates designated courts under Section 23 for civil disputes arising in a Special Economic Zone. In the absence of such designation, Section 42 provides for reference of disputes to arbitration, but the arbitrator is to be appointed by the Central Government under Section 42(2). Section 42(3) only makes the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 applicable to arbitrations conducted under the SEZ Act, subject to the Act itself and after the statutory mode of appointment is followed. The preconditions for invoking Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 were not satisfied, and the statutory power of appointment under the SEZ Act could not be displaced by resort to Section 11.

Conclusion: The application under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was not maintainable and was rejected.

Issues: Whether the High Court erred in remitting the limited question of valuation and fixation of reserve price of Schedule A to E properties to the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) after the auction sale had been conducted, confirmed and a sale certificate registered; and whether such remand unlawfully disturbed the rights of the bona fide auction purchaser.

Analysis: The Court examined the factual matrix showing that the DRT conducted the auction after obtaining a valuation report dated 08.09.2010, that sixteen bidders participated, that the appellant was declared the highest bidder, deposited the sale consideration and obtained a registered sale certificate in 2011, and that the DRT and DRAT had earlier upheld the auction's legality. The Court recognised the settled principle protecting bona fide auction purchasers and the need for finality in court-confirmed sales, citing authorities that confirmed auction sales should not be lightly disturbed except in cases of fraud or material irregularity. The Court balanced that principle against the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court to examine the adequacy of valuation and the lawfulness of reserve price fixation where credible issues are raised, noting that the objective of recovery proceedings is to realise the maximum value of secured assets. The Court observed that the High Court's direction was narrowly confined to remanding the valuation issue to the DRT for fresh consideration on relevant materials and did not set aside the auction, disturb the sale confirmation, or negate the rights of the auction purchaser. The remand was held to be a limited exercise to permit the Tribunal to reassess whether valuation and reserve price fixation accorded with law so as to protect the interests of all parties.

Conclusion: The High Court did not err in remitting the limited issue of valuation and fixation of the reserve price to the DRT for fresh consideration; the remand is a lawful, confined exercise of supervisory jurisdiction and does not unjustifiably disturb the confirmed auction. The Civil Appeal is dismissed (decision in favour of the respondents).

Issues: (i) whether a cheque initially issued as security could form the basis of prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 when liability had crystallized by the date of presentation; (ii) whether the complaint could proceed against the managing director and the director on the basis of the averments made under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Issue (i): whether a cheque initially issued as security could form the basis of prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 when liability had crystallized by the date of presentation

Analysis: A cheque issued as security is not immune from Section 138 proceedings if, on the date of presentation, the underlying liability has become legally recoverable. The governing test is the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability at the time of presentation, not the label attached to the cheque at the time of issuance. A signed blank cheque, once voluntarily handed over, also attracts the statutory presumptions under the Act, and the drawer must rebut them at trial. On the record, the correspondence relied upon indicated acknowledgment of outstanding dues and proposals for repayment, which prima facie supported the existence of a subsisting liability when the cheque was presented.

Conclusion: The defence that the cheque was only a security instrument did not justify quashing and was rejected.

Issue (ii): whether the complaint could proceed against the managing director and the director on the basis of the averments made under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

Analysis: For prosecution of directors under Section 141, the complaint must contain averments showing that the persons sought to be made liable were in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the company's business. The complaint here specifically stated that both officers were actively involved in the day-to-day business operations and financial affairs of the company and linked the cheque transaction to their working relationship. The managing director was also the signatory of the cheque, making his liability direct at the threshold stage. In these circumstances, the allegations were sufficient to permit trial and the issues raised by the petitioners involved disputed facts unsuitable for quashing.

Conclusion: The complaint was maintainable against both officers and no interference was warranted.

Final Conclusion: The petition disclosed no ground for exercise of writ or inherent jurisdiction to terminate the cheque dishonour proceedings, and the criminal complaint was allowed to proceed in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: A security cheque can attract Section 138 if a legally enforceable debt exists on the date of presentation, and directors can be proceeded against under Section 141 where the complaint contains specific averments of responsibility for the company's business.

Issues: Whether the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and the consequential proceedings were liable to be quashed for want of a legally enforceable debt and absence of material showing that the cheque liability was that of the petitioner.

Analysis: The record did not show any board resolution or other reliable corporate authorisation fixing the complainant's alleged commission or brokerage. The alleged entitlement was unsupported by contemporaneous accounts, balance sheets, or calculations, and the material relied on by the complainant was found to be unconvincing and inconsistent. The Court found that the purported liability, if any, was of the company and not the personal liability of the petitioner, and therefore the cheques drawn on the petitioner's personal account could not, on the pleaded facts, be treated as issued towards a legally enforceable debt. In the absence of foundational facts showing such debt, the presumption under Section 139 could not sustain the complaint.

Conclusion: The complaint and the proceedings arising from it were liable to be quashed.

Final Conclusion: The petitions succeeded and the criminal proceedings based on the cheque complaints were terminated.

Ratio Decidendi: A prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 cannot be sustained where the complainant fails to establish foundational facts showing a legally enforceable personal liability of the drawer, especially when the alleged dues are corporate in nature and unsupported by the company's authorised records.

Issues: Whether the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was liable to be quashed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 on the plea that the cheque and supporting documents were forged, the cheque formed part of pending police investigations, and continuation of the proceedings would amount to abuse of process.

Analysis: The inherent power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is to be exercised sparingly and not as a substitute for trial. At the quashing stage, the Court does not conduct a mini trial or weigh disputed defence material. The issuance of the cheque and the signatures thereon were not disputed. The allegations that the cheque was a blank signed instrument, that the MOU and related documents were forged, and that the cheque had been misused were matters of defence requiring proof in trial. The pendency of police proceedings and the petitioner's reliance on seized documents did not by itself render the cheque-bounce complaint unsustainable, particularly when the complainant maintained that the cheque arose from the MOU and was independent of the documents referred to in the FIRs. Prior dismissal of earlier quashing petitions and the discharge application also supported continuation of the complaint proceedings.

Conclusion: The prayer for quashing was rejected and the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was held to be fit to proceed.

Final Conclusion: The petition failed because the defence raised disputed factual issues that could not be decided in proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and the cheque-bounce prosecution was permitted to continue.

Ratio Decidendi: Allegations of forgery or misuse of a cheque, when they rest on disputed facts and require evidence, do not justify quashing of a Section 138 prosecution at the threshold under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 if the cheque and signatures are not in dispute.

Issues: Whether criminal proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 arising from undated security cheques could be quashed when the loan account was continuing, repayments had been made, no prior demand or default notice had been issued, and the alleged liability had not crystallised.

Analysis: The loan documents showed a continuing facility, with the cheques given as security for the overall loan and not for a specific instalment or settled due date. The record indicated substantial repayments during the relevant period and did not show a final recall of the facility or a definitive computation of the outstanding liability. The complaint also did not disclose any prior notice demanding rectification of default before presentation of the cheques. In these circumstances, the presentation of the security cheques without crystallisation of the debt or prior demand was held to be inconsistent with the contractual framework and unfair to the guarantors.

Conclusion: The complaint and the connected criminal proceedings were not maintainable on the facts and were quashed.

Final Conclusion: The continuation of the cheque dishonour proceedings was found to be an abuse of process in the circumstances of a subsisting and restructured loan account.

Ratio Decidendi: A security cheque issued for a continuing loan facility cannot sustain prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 unless the liability has crystallised and the contractual preconditions for invocation have been satisfied.

Issues: (i) Whether the charge of criminal conspiracy and the alleged demand of bribe on behalf of the assessing officer were proved. (ii) Whether the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the inspector were proved so as to sustain conviction under the anti-corruption law.

Issue (i): Whether the charge of criminal conspiracy and the alleged demand of bribe on behalf of the assessing officer were proved.

Analysis: The evidence did not establish any meeting of minds between the two public servants. There was no reliable proof that the assessing officer demanded any bribe, and no convincing material showed that the inspector made the demand in the presence of the assessing officer. The prosecution case, so far as it linked the assessing officer to a conspiracy, remained unsupported by proof of direct demand or participation.

Conclusion: The charge of criminal conspiracy was not proved and the assessing officer's acquittal stood confirmed.

Issue (ii): Whether the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the inspector were proved so as to sustain conviction under the anti-corruption law.

Analysis: The complainant's testimony as to the demand made by the inspector on the relevant date was supported by the trap laying officer and substantial parts of the independent witnesses' evidence. The pre-trap formalities, recovery of the marked notes from the inspector, and the positive sodium carbonate test on his hands and clothing corroborated acceptance. The absence of reliable evidence against the assessing officer did not dilute the separate case against the inspector, and the recoveries and conduct of the inspector provided sufficient proof of the offence.

Conclusion: The inspector's conviction for the offence of accepting illegal gratification was restored, while the conspiracy charge remained unproved.

Final Conclusion: The judgment preserves the acquittal of the assessing officer, but reinstates the inspector's conviction for corrupt acceptance of gratification, with a reduced sentence.

Ratio Decidendi: A public servant can be convicted for acceptance of illegal gratification on independent proof of demand, acceptance, recovery, and corroborative trap evidence even when the alleged conspiracy with another accused is not established.

Issues: (i) Whether the technical disqualification of bidders scoring below the prescribed qualifying marks warranted judicial interference before completion of the tender process; (ii) Whether unsuccessful technical bidders were entitled to immediate disclosure of criterion-wise marks, reasons for disqualification, and comparative marks of other bidders.

Issue (i): Whether the technical disqualification of bidders scoring below the prescribed qualifying marks warranted judicial interference before completion of the tender process.

Analysis: Judicial review in tender matters is confined to testing the legality of the decision-making process for arbitrariness, irrationality, bias, mala fides or procedural impropriety; it does not extend to reassessing comparative technical merit. The petitioners did not allege mala fides or establish arbitrariness in the technical evaluation. Their challenge depended upon comparison with shortlisted bidders when successful bidders had not yet been identified and, save for one tender, financial bids had not been opened. The challenge to the technical disqualifications was therefore premature. The need for timely commencement of consular, passport and visa services for the Indian diaspora outweighed the petitioners' commercial interest in halting the ongoing tender processes.

Conclusion: The technical disqualifications did not warrant judicial interference at the ongoing tender stage, against the petitioners.

Issue (ii): Whether unsuccessful technical bidders were entitled to immediate disclosure of criterion-wise marks, reasons for disqualification, and comparative marks of other bidders.

Analysis: Rule 173(iv) of the General Financial Rules, 2017 and the tender condition requiring communication of reasons for technical disqualification obligated the respondents to provide reasons to unsuccessful bidders. A pre-bid response could not override or amend the substantive tender terms. However, the tender terms did not prescribe the timing of disclosure. Immediate disclosure of detailed marks and reasons, before conclusion of the tender process, was declined because it could disrupt and delay procurement of essential public services. Comparative marks and benchmarks of other bidders were also not required to be disclosed at that stage, particularly where no successful bidder had been selected and commercial confidentiality was involved. The respondents' undertaking to furnish the petitioners' detailed marks and reasons after completion of the tender process was recorded.

Conclusion: The petitioners were entitled to reasons and detailed breakup of their own marks only after completion of the tender processes, and were not entitled to immediate comparative disclosure, against the petitioners.

Final Conclusion: The tender evaluations remain insulated from premature merits review, while the respondents must provide the unsuccessful bidders with their reasons for disqualification and detailed scores upon completion of the respective tender processes, leaving statutory remedies thereafter available.

Ratio Decidendi: In tender matters, a contractual and procurement-law obligation to disclose reasons for technical disqualification does not require immediate disclosure during an ongoing procurement where no arbitrariness or mala fides is established and deferred disclosure is necessary to protect overriding public interest in timely completion of the tender.

Issues: Whether the applicant was entitled to regular bail in a case involving alleged organised crime under MCOCA.

Analysis: The application was considered in the context of alleged membership of an organised crime syndicate, the seriousness of the underlying offences, the applicant's criminal antecedents, and the stringent bail standard under Section 21(4) of the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999, which requires the Court to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe the accused is not guilty and is not likely to commit an offence while on bail. The period of custody was noted, but it was held that, in the facts of the case, the gravity of the allegations and the applicant's conduct in breaching bail conditions outweighed the plea for release.

Conclusion: The applicant was not entitled to bail and the application was dismissed.

Issues: Whether a statutory notice issued under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is valid when it demands an amount different from the cheque amount and whether such defect vitiates the prosecution.

Analysis: The notice under proviso (b) to Section 138 must make a demand for the very amount covered by the dishonoured cheque. The object of the notice is to afford the drawer an opportunity to make payment of the cheque amount and thereby avoid criminal liability. Where the notice demands a larger or different amount, the mandatory requirement is not satisfied. The Court applied the principle of strict compliance to hold that the cheque amount and the demanded amount must correspond, though additional sums such as interest or charges may be claimed only after specifically demanding the cheque amount itself.

Conclusion: The notice was invalid because it demanded more than the cheque amount, and the complaint based on such notice was not maintainable. The proceedings were quashed in favour of the petitioner.

Issues: (i) Whether the amalgamation scheme framed under Section 45 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 and sanctioned by the Central Government was liable to be struck down as ultra vires, arbitrary or violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 300A of the Constitution of India; (ii) Whether the classification between retail depositors and institutional depositors and the staggered repayment structure, including the reduced post-appointed-date interest, was discriminatory or otherwise impermissible; (iii) Whether the procedural objections based on consultation, shareholder approval, and the treatment of insurance and related liabilities under the deposit insurance framework had merit.

Issue (i): Whether the amalgamation scheme framed under Section 45 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 and sanctioned by the Central Government was liable to be struck down as ultra vires, arbitrary or violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 300A of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: The scheme was framed after the bank's financial condition had become precarious, with negative net worth, substantial deposit erosion and large unreported exposures. Section 45 confers a special power to formulate a scheme of reconstruction or amalgamation in public interest, in the interest of depositors, or to secure proper management, and its non obstante clause gives it overriding effect. The decision-making process was undertaken by the banking regulator with expertise in economic and financial matters, and the Court declined to substitute its own assessment for that of the regulator in the absence of arbitrariness, mala fides or patent illegality.

Conclusion: The challenge to the scheme on the ground of unconstitutionality and statutory invalidity failed.

Issue (ii): Whether the classification between retail depositors and institutional depositors and the staggered repayment structure, including the reduced post-appointed-date interest, was discriminatory or otherwise impermissible.

Analysis: The scheme classified depositors by the nature of the depositor entity, not by arbitrary preference. Retail depositors and institutional depositors formed distinct classes with different characteristics, and the repayment structure was designed to protect the maximum number of depositors and preserve banking stability. The staggered payment schedule, the postponement of some payments, and the reduced interest component were all measures contemplated by the statutory power to reduce rights or interests where necessary in public interest. The Court rejected the contention that pro rata liquidation principles had to be imported into a scheme under Section 45, and held that Article 14 permits reasonable classification with a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved.

Conclusion: The depositor classification and the repayment structure were held to be valid and non-discriminatory.

Issue (iii): Whether the procedural objections based on consultation, shareholder approval, and the treatment of insurance and related liabilities under the deposit insurance framework had merit.

Analysis: The draft scheme was circulated, objections were invited and considered, and modifications were made before final sanction. The statutory procedure under Section 45 did not require an individual hearing for every objector, and the scheme was not one framed under Section 44A. The deposit insurance arrangements under the statutory insurance framework were also found to be consistent with the scheme, and the Court found no legal infirmity in the treatment of insured and uninsured liabilities, or in the mechanism by which the transferee bank and the insurer were to be repaid.

Conclusion: The procedural and insurance-related objections were rejected.

Final Conclusion: The scheme of amalgamation was upheld as a lawful economic and regulatory response to a failing banking institution, and the collective challenges to the notification and scheme were rejected.

Ratio Decidendi: A banking amalgamation scheme framed under Section 45 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 in public interest is entitled to judicial deference, and a depositor classification based on the nature of the depositor entity is a permissible reasonable classification when it rationally advances depositor protection and banking stability.

Issues: (i) whether a claim of reverse passing off is maintainable in trade mark law and whether the facts disclosed passing off or reverse passing off; (ii) whether the respondents' sale and import of end-of-life HDDs amounted to infringement, and whether Sections 30(3) and 30(4) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 were attracted.

Issue (i): whether a claim of reverse passing off is maintainable in trade mark law and whether the facts disclosed passing off or reverse passing off.

Analysis: The statutory saving for passing off protects only an action against a person passing off his own goods or services as those of another. The concept of reverse passing off, namely misrepresenting another's goods as one's own, does not fit within that framework. Even assuming such a claim were available, the appellants failed to show at the initial point of sale that consumers would identify the refurbished HDDs as theirs despite the respondents' rebranding. There was no prima facie material of misappropriation of goodwill or of damage caused to that goodwill. Mere assertions that technical tools might later reveal the original manufacturer were insufficient at the interlocutory stage.

Conclusion: No maintainable claim of reverse passing off was made out, and no prima facie case of passing off was established.

Issue (ii): whether the respondents' sale and import of end-of-life HDDs amounted to infringement, and whether Sections 30(3) and 30(4) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 were attracted.

Analysis: Infringement under Section 29 requires use of the registered mark or a deceptively similar mark in the course of trade. Once the appellants' marks were effaced before resale, the respondents were not using the appellants' marks in the impugned sale. Section 30(3) is not a separate source of infringement but an exception that preserves lawful resale of goods bearing a registered mark when lawfully acquired. The goods had been lawfully acquired, there was no shown prohibition on resale by the OEMs after end-of-life, and the import was not shown to be unlawful. Section 30(4) also did not apply, because the alteration undertaken by the respondents did not amount, on the material before the Court, to a change or impairment giving the appellants a legitimate reason to oppose further dealings. The expression "changed" was construed noscitur a sociis with "impaired", and no prima facie prejudice to the appellants' goodwill was shown.

Conclusion: No prima facie infringement was established, and the respondents were entitled to the protection of Section 30(3) while Section 30(4) was inapplicable.

Final Conclusion: The appellate challenge failed because the respondents' conduct did not disclose a prima facie cause of action for passing off, reverse passing off, or trademark infringement on the materials placed before the Court, and the interim relief granted by the learned Single Judge was not disturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: For refurbished second-hand goods, trademark infringement is not made out merely because the original mark is removed and the goods are resold under a different brand; the plaintiff must still establish use of its mark within Section 29, and Sections 30(3) and 30(4) operate only within that framework, with Section 30(4) requiring a legitimate reason based on change or impairment that prejudices the proprietor's goodwill.

Issues: (i) Whether the order removing the petitioner under Section 205 of the Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act, 1994 was vitiated for travelling beyond the show cause notice by relying on fresh allegations. (ii) Whether the order was unsustainable for want of reasons and for non-compliance with the requirements of natural justice in a quasi-judicial proceeding.

Issue (i): Whether the order removing the petitioner under Section 205 of the Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act, 1994 was vitiated for travelling beyond the show cause notice by relying on fresh allegations.

Analysis: The power under Section 205 is quasi-judicial and must be exercised within the scope of the notice issued to the elected office bearer. The notice must put the person on clear notice of the specific allegations so that an effective explanation can be furnished. The impugned order relied not only on the charges in the notice but also on additional matters relating to the manner in which later meetings were conducted, which were never put to the petitioner for explanation.

Conclusion: The order was invalid to the extent it relied on matters beyond the show cause notice, and this was against the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether the order was unsustainable for want of reasons and for non-compliance with the requirements of natural justice in a quasi-judicial proceeding.

Analysis: Removal of an elected Panchayat President has serious civil consequences and requires a strict and fair procedure. A quasi-judicial authority must consider the explanation, record reasons for accepting or rejecting it, and pass a speaking order. The impugned order merely set out the charges and the replies in tabular form and then reached a conclusion without explaining why the explanations were rejected. Such an order does not satisfy the requirement of reasoned decision-making and is arbitrary within the meaning of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Conclusion: The order was unsustainable for want of reasons and violation of natural justice, against the respondents.

Final Conclusion: The removal order could not stand and the disciplinary proceeding was restored to the authority for fresh consideration after hearing the petitioner.

Ratio Decidendi: In a quasi-judicial proceeding under Section 205 of the Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act, 1994, an elected office bearer cannot be removed on grounds not disclosed in the show cause notice, and the final order must be a reasoned speaking order reflecting consideration of the explanation.

Issues: Whether the District Registrar had power under Section 68(2) of the Registration Act, 1908 to cancel registered sale deeds by nullifying them on the basis of alleged fraud.

Analysis: Section 68(2) confers supervisory authority on the Registrar to issue orders concerning the acts or omissions of subordinate Sub-Registrars and rectification of errors regarding the book or office in which a document has been registered. It does not confer an express power to cancel or nullify a registered document. The power to cancel registration is a substantive power and cannot be assumed in the absence of clear statutory authorisation. Disputes involving title, civil rights, consideration, or alleged fraud in the execution of documents are matters for the civil court, especially when a civil suit and counter claim are already pending. Administrative registration authorities cannot adjudicate civil rights through summary proceedings, and any interference beyond an error-correcting function would amount to jurisdictional overreach.

Conclusion: The District Registrar was not empowered to cancel the sale deeds under Section 68(2) of the Registration Act, 1908, and the order nullifying the documents was unsustainable; the issue is decided in favour of the appellants.

Ratio Decidendi: In the absence of express statutory authority, a Registrar exercising supervisory powers under the Registration Act cannot cancel a registered document or adjudicate disputed civil rights, which must be left to the competent civil court.

Issues: (i) Whether the cheques were presented within the prescribed period under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act; (ii) Whether dishonour for the reason "instrument out dated stale" gave rise to liability under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, including vicarious liability of the fourth accused.

Issue (i): Whether the cheques were presented within the prescribed period under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Analysis: The cheques were dated 28.11.2016 and presented on 27.02.2017. The period of three months was computed on the basis of calendar months under Section 3(35) of the General Clauses Act, and the date of issue was excluded. On that computation, the presentation fell within time, even though the banker returned the cheques with the endorsement "instrument out dated stale".

Conclusion: The cheques were presented within the prescribed period, and this issue was answered in favour of the petitioners.

Issue (ii): Whether dishonour for the reason "instrument out dated stale" gave rise to liability under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, including vicarious liability of the fourth accused.

Analysis: The Court held that the endorsement did not create liability against the petitioners, as the return was attributable to the banker and the accused could not be fastened with criminal liability on that basis. As to the fourth accused, the materials showed that he was neither a partner of the first accused firm nor a signatory to the cheque, and no evidence established his participation so as to attract vicarious liability under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Conclusion: No offence was made out against the accused, including the fourth accused, and this issue was answered in favour of the petitioners.

Final Conclusion: The criminal proceedings were held unsustainable and were quashed in their entirety, leaving the complainant free to proceed against the banker in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Presentation of a cheque within the statutory period must be computed by calendar months, and criminal liability under Section 138 cannot be fastened where the return endorsement does not establish the statutory ingredients of dishonour or where vicarious liability is not shown by necessary foundational facts.