Issues: Whether continuation of a criminal prosecution for 35 years for minor offences violated the appellant's right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: The right to a speedy trial is an integral component of fair, just and reasonable procedure under Article 21 and extends through every stage of criminal proceedings. Whether delay infringes that right depends on the overall circumstances, including the nature and complexity of the offence, responsibility for delay, prejudice to the accused, and the balancing of individual liberty with societal interests; no universal outer time-limit can be prescribed. Here, the prosecution concerned a trivial altercation involving simple hurt and criminal intimidation, remained pending for 35 years without any attributable cause or explanation, and the co-accused had already been acquitted because the prosecution led no evidence. The prolonged pendency kept the appellant, a public servant, in suspended animation and was oppressive and unfair.

Conclusion: The appellant's right to a speedy trial under Article 21 was violated; the criminal trial and prosecution against him shall proceed no further.

Issues: Whether a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is maintainable against a private asset reconstruction company in respect of measures taken under the SARFAESI Act.

Analysis: Relying on the principles stated by the Supreme Court, the Court held that a private financial institution or asset reconstruction company does not, by itself, perform a public function so as to attract writ jurisdiction. The existence of a statutory framework under the SARFAESI Act and the availability of remedies under that Act do not convert the private creditor into a writ-amenable authority. The Court also held that the petitioner could not seek interim protection in writ proceedings when the writ itself was not maintainable.

Conclusion: The writ petition was held to be not maintainable against the private respondent and the petitioner was left to pursue the appropriate remedy before the proper forum.

Issues: (i) Whether the cheques issued by the accused were supported by a legally enforceable debt so as to sustain conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; (ii) Whether the First Appellate Court could enhance the default sentence in an appeal filed only by the accused.

Issue (i): Whether the cheques issued by the accused were supported by a legally enforceable debt so as to sustain conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Analysis: The cheques were admitted, the signatures were admitted, and the statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 arose in favour of the complainant. The accused relied on an escrow arrangement, third-party dealings, and the plea that the cheques were only security cheques, but the Court found no reliable material to show that the entire liability stood shifted to the third party or that the cheques ceased to represent an enforceable liability. The Court also held that pendency of civil proceedings or a separate company petition did not bar criminal prosecution, and that the revisional jurisdiction did not permit reappreciation of concurrent factual findings absent perversity.

Conclusion: The conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was upheld and the challenge to the finding of guilt failed.

Issue (ii): Whether the First Appellate Court could enhance the default sentence in an appeal filed only by the accused.

Analysis: The appeal before the First Appellate Court was filed by the accused, and the complainant had not challenged the sentence. In such a situation, the appellate court had no authority to enhance the punishment on its own motion. The enhancement of the default sentence was therefore unsustainable, while the substantive conviction and the trial court's sentence could otherwise stand.

Conclusion: The enhancement of the default sentence was set aside and the sentence imposed by the Trial Magistrate was restored.

Final Conclusion: The revision succeeded only to the extent of deleting the appellate enhancement of sentence, while the conviction and the original sentence were maintained.

Issues: Whether a party unsuccessful in arbitral proceedings, having no enforceable award in its favour, may maintain an application for post-award interim measures under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Analysis: Section 9, read with the definition of "party" in Section 2(h), plainly permits any party to an arbitration agreement to seek interim protection before, during, or after arbitral proceedings until enforcement of the award. The provision does not distinguish between successful and unsuccessful parties. Restricting post-award relief to an award-holder would impermissibly add a qualification absent from the statutory text and would narrow the statutory expressions "subject matter of arbitration" and "amount in dispute" to the "fruits" of an award. Sections 34 and 36 operate in distinct spheres: they concern challenge to, and stay of, an award, whereas Section 9 protects the subject matter or amount in dispute. The possibility of modification or severance of an award, recommencement of arbitration after setting aside, and preservation of limitation under Section 43(4) further demonstrate that an unsuccessful party may require protection pending challenge proceedings. Interim relief remains governed by prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury; the threshold is higher for an unsuccessful party and relief is warranted only in rare and compelling cases.

Conclusion: Any party to an arbitration agreement, including a party unsuccessful in arbitration, may invoke Section 9 at the post-award stage before enforcement of the award; decisions denying such access do not state the correct law.

Issues: Whether a claim for reimbursement of service tax and GST implication cost under the contract was arbitrable under the dispute resolution clause, so as to warrant appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Analysis: The arbitration clause was construed as confining reference to disputes relating to the specifications, design, drawings, instructions, quality of workmanship, materials, and other disputes arising in relation to the execution of the work. The payment clause separately dealt with taxes and duties, including reimbursement of service tax on actual basis, and the Court held that the present dispute concerned tax liability and reimbursement under that clause rather than a dispute of the kind contemplated by the arbitration agreement. Applying the limited prima facie scrutiny applicable at the referral stage, the Court found that the parties had not agreed to refer this category of dispute to arbitration and that the non-arbitrability was clear.

Conclusion: The tax reimbursement dispute was held not to fall within the arbitration clause and no arbitrator was appointed.

Issues: Whether the assessment orders passed almost ten years after issuance of the Form-H notices were liable to be quashed for unreasonable delay and as being contrary to Rule 25 of the Cess Rules, 1996.

Analysis: The challenge turned on the inordinate gap between the issuance of the Form-H notices and the eventual assessment orders. The governing rule required the assessment process to be carried out within the framework of Rule 25, and the earlier binding decision in Siemens Limited had already held that such proceedings cannot be allowed to remain pending for an indefinite period and must be completed within a reasonable time. The Court found that the respondent-authority had remained inactive for years after the notices, and that the delay was not justified by any legally sustainable explanation. The subsequent binding rejection of the review petition reinforced that the earlier ruling continued to govern the issue. The same delay-based defect was present in the connected petitions as well.

Conclusion: The assessment orders were held to be unsustainable and liable to be quashed on account of inordinate and unreasonable delay.

Final Conclusion: The petitions succeeded because the delayed assessments could not be sustained, and the connected matters were disposed of in the same manner.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory assessment that is left pending for an inordinate and unjustified period, beyond what is reasonable under the governing scheme, is liable to be quashed for unreasonableness and denial of fair adjudication.

Issues: Whether an order of the arbitral tribunal rejecting a plea of lack of jurisdiction under Section 16(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 could be challenged under Section 34 of the Act and carried in appeal under Section 37 of the Act before the final arbitral award.

Analysis: The statutory scheme of Section 16 permits the arbitral tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction and mandates, under sub-sections (5) and (6), that if a plea of lack of jurisdiction is rejected, the tribunal must continue the proceedings and the aggrieved party may challenge the rejection only after the final award. Section 37 provides a direct appeal only where the tribunal accepts the plea and terminates the proceedings. The earlier decision concerning an interim award on limitation was confined to a decision finally determining a preliminary issue on merits and did not govern a jurisdictional ruling under Section 16. Treating the rejection of a Section 16 plea as an interim award would defeat the statutory structure and render Section 37(2) redundant.

Conclusion: The challenge under Section 34 was not maintainable against the order rejecting the jurisdictional plea, and the appeal under Section 37 could not have been entertained on that basis.

Ratio Decidendi: A tribunal's order rejecting a jurisdictional plea under Section 16(2) is not an interim award; it becomes assailable only after the final award in accordance with Sections 16(5) and 16(6), while Section 37 is confined to orders accepting the plea of lack of jurisdiction.

Issues: (i) Whether the client could disown the trading losses on the ground that there were no prior written or recorded instructions for each trade and no timely objection was raised; (ii) whether the stock broker was liable for the fraudulent and unauthorized acts of its alliance partner and his employees.

Issue (i): Whether the client could disown the trading losses on the ground that there were no prior written or recorded instructions for each trade and no timely objection was raised.

Analysis: The Court applied the settled principle that absence of prior written or recorded authorisation does not, by itself, permit a client to wriggle out of trade consequences, and that the arbitral tribunal may examine surrounding evidence to determine what actually transpired. It also noted that delayed objections after the occurrence of losses ordinarily do not assist a client, unless the case falls within the exception of blatantly unauthorized or fraudulent trading. On the evidence accepted by the tribunal, the trades were not treated as ordinary market losses but as part of a manipulated course of dealing designed to benefit the broker and its representatives.

Conclusion: The client was not entitled to avoid liability for the trades merely on the ground of absence of prior instructions or delayed objection, and the case fell within the exception for fraudulent unauthorized trading.

Issue (ii): Whether the stock broker was liable for the fraudulent and unauthorized acts of its alliance partner and his employees.

Analysis: The Court held that a principal is liable for fraud and misrepresentation committed by its agent in the course of the agency and within the scope of authority, even if the principal did not expressly authorise the misconduct or personally benefit from it. It further held that the client was entitled to proceed against the broker directly, and that the absence of the alliance partner and his employees as parties did not defeat the claim. Applying these principles, the Court accepted the finding that the broker benefited from the impugned transactions through abnormal brokerage generation and could not avoid responsibility for the acts of its representatives.

Conclusion: The stock broker was liable for the acts of its alliance partner and his employees, and the award fastening liability on the broker was upheld.

Final Conclusion: The arbitral award and the order refusing to interfere with it were sustained, as the broker was held accountable for fraudulent trading carried out through its agency arrangement.

Ratio Decidendi: A principal is liable for fraud, misrepresentation, and unauthorized acts committed by its agent in the course of the agency and within the scope of authority, and a client cannot avoid trade consequences merely because prior written authorisation was not produced if the evidence establishes fraudulent manipulation or agency-based misconduct.

Issues: Whether the auction purchaser was entitled to refund of the amount paid, with interest, on account of the secured creditor's failure to disclose the pendency of the civil suit and the decree affecting the secured asset, and whether the bank's conduct violated the mandatory requirements governing sale of secured assets.

Analysis: The sale notice required bidders to undertake due diligence, but the bank was aware of the civil suit and the decree and did not disclose either in the sale notice or otherwise. The encumbrance was not reflected in the Sub-Registrar's records, and the bank also failed to take effective steps to complete registration despite collecting registration charges. Rule 9(9) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 obligates the authorized officer to deliver the property free from encumbrances known to the secured creditor, and Rule 9(10) requires the sale certificate to state whether the property has been sold free from such encumbrances. The nondisclosure amounted to breach of the statutory scheme and, in the circumstances, rendered the auction purchaser entitled to refund of the amount deposited. The award of reasonable interest was also justified because the bank retained the purchaser's money after the sale.

Conclusion: The petitioner was entitled to refund of the sale consideration and registration charges with interest, and the bank's failure to disclose the known encumbrance warranted relief in favour of the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition succeeded, and the auction purchaser obtained restitutionary relief against the secured creditor for breach of the mandatory disclosure obligations governing sale of secured assets.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a secured creditor sells property under the SARFAESI framework, it must disclose encumbrances known to it and comply with the prescribed manner of sale certificate and delivery obligations; failure to do so entitles the auction purchaser to refund and appropriate interest.

Issues: Whether the recusal applicants established a reasonable and legally sustainable apprehension of bias on the basis of the order dated 09.03.2026, earlier judicial observations in connected matters, the expeditious listing of the case, alleged ideological association, alleged conflict of interest arising from relatives' professional engagements, and other related circumstances.

Analysis: The grounds urged for recusal were examined against the settled test of a fair-minded and informed observer and not the subjective unease of a litigant. The order dated 09.03.2026 contained only prima facie observations made at an interim stage and could not, by itself, establish pre-judgment or bias. Service on counsel who had represented the accused before the Trial Court was treated as valid advance service in the circumstances, and the stay of remarks and consequential departmental action against the Investigating Officer was held to be a normal interim protection. Earlier detailed judgments in matters arising from the same dispute, including challenges relating to arrest and bail under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, were confined to the statutory tests then in issue and did not create a disqualifying predisposition for later proceedings. Allegations based on attendance at legal programmes, public statements by a political functionary, or professional engagements of relatives were found too remote and speculative to establish a real conflict of interest or reasonable apprehension of bias. The Court also held that expeditious hearing in MP/MLA matters and adverse rulings in earlier cases do not, without more, furnish a ground for recusal.

Conclusion: The applicants failed to establish any real or reasonable apprehension of bias, and the request for recusal was rejected.

Issues: Whether a legal representative aggrieved by an arbitral award must challenge it under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, or may invoke Article 227 of the Constitution of India or Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Analysis: The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is a complete code for arbitral remedies. Section 34 provides the exclusive statutory route for setting aside an arbitral award, and the scheme of the Act contemplates continuity of arbitral proceedings despite the death of a party. The definition of legal representative, the binding effect of awards on persons claiming under parties, and the enforceability of arbitration agreements against legal representatives together indicate that such representatives step into the shoes of the deceased party. Denying them access to Section 34 would leave them remediless while still binding them to the award, which would be contrary to the statutory scheme.

Conclusion: A legal representative seeking to challenge an arbitral award must proceed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and not under Article 227 of the Constitution of India or Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The legal position affirmed the High Court's view against the appellant.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the arbitration statute makes the award binding on parties and persons claiming under them, a deceased party's legal representative inherits both the burden and the remedy under Section 34, which is the exclusive route for challenge.

Issues: (i) Whether the plaintiff was entitled to refund of the balance sale amount after default in paying the auction sale consideration within the stipulated time; (ii) whether the defendant bank was entitled to forfeit 25% of the bid amount under the SARFAESI auction rules; (iii) whether absence of loss to the bank or a higher price fetched in the re-auction affected the right of forfeiture.

Issue (i): Whether the plaintiff was entitled to refund of the balance sale amount after default in paying the auction sale consideration within the stipulated time?

Analysis: The plaintiff admittedly failed to remit the entire bid amount within the period prescribed in the auction terms and the security interest enforcement rules. The sale in his favour was therefore cancelled, and the amount already retained by the bank was adjusted in accordance with the auction conditions and the statutory framework governing sale of secured assets.

Conclusion: The plaintiff was not entitled to refund of the forfeited amount.

Issue (ii): Whether the defendant bank was entitled to forfeit 25% of the bid amount under the SARFAESI auction rules?

Analysis: Rule 9(3) and Rule 9(4) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 required payment of the balance consideration within the stipulated time, and Rule 9(5) prescribed forfeiture on default. The forfeiture was treated as a statutory consequence of non-payment, not dependent on any separate finding of loss or on the purchaser's subsequent participation in another auction.

Conclusion: The defendant bank was entitled to forfeit 25% of the bid amount.

Issue (iii): Whether absence of loss to the bank or a higher price fetched in the re-auction affected the right of forfeiture?

Analysis: The higher value obtained in the re-auction did not dilute the statutory consequence of default. The Court applied the principle that equity cannot override a clear statutory mandate, and held that the forfeiture under Rule 9(5) operated irrespective of the subsequent sale price or the extent of recovery made by the bank.

Conclusion: Absence of loss to the bank and the higher re-auction price did not affect the forfeiture.

Final Conclusion: The suit failed in full because the forfeiture flowed from the plaintiff's default under the auction rules and no equitable ground could displace the statutory consequence.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the auction purchaser defaults in paying the balance consideration within the prescribed time, forfeiture under Rule 9(5) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 is a statutory consequence that operates irrespective of any subsequent higher sale price or questions of loss, and equitable considerations cannot override that mandate.

Issues: Whether a dispute resolution clause stating that disputes "can be settled by arbitration" creates a binding arbitration agreement capable of supporting appointment of an arbitrator.

Analysis: The clause was construed in the light of settled principles that an arbitration agreement must reflect a clear and enforceable intention to submit disputes to arbitration. The word "can" ordinarily denotes possibility or permission, not compulsion, and in the contractual setting the parties' chosen words are the best evidence of their intent. The clause did not show that arbitration was the exclusive or mandatory mode of dispute resolution, nor did it indicate that the parties were already ad idem to arbitrate. Rather, it left arbitration as a future possibility requiring further agreement. On that construction, the clause did not satisfy the essential attributes of an arbitration agreement.

Conclusion: The clause was held not to be a binding arbitration agreement, and the request for appointment of an arbitrator failed.

Outcome: The Special Leave Petitions were disposed of without interference with the impugned High Court order.

Issues: (i) Whether GDCL had any subsisting authority or locus to deal with the assets and shareholding of JUL and JAIL after the repeal of SICA and abatement of the pending appellate proceedings; (ii) whether the Court could invoke Article 142 to condone the unauthorised sale of assets and the altered share allotments, or sustain any plea of legitimate expectation in favour of GDCL; (iii) whether the rehabilitation offers submitted by the prospective investors could be accepted without prior valuation and identification of JUL and JAIL assets; and (iv) what consequential directions were required regarding workers' dues, provident fund dues, valuation of assets, and the pending winding-up petition.

Issue (i): Whether GDCL had any subsisting authority or locus to deal with the assets and shareholding of JUL and JAIL after the repeal of SICA and abatement of the pending appellate proceedings?

Analysis: The scheme sanctioned in 1992 had failed, winding up had already been recommended by BIFR, and the appeal before AAIFR abated on repeal of SICA when no reference was filed before NCLT within the statutory period under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. On that footing, the earlier rehabilitation arrangement lost force and GDCL could not continue to assert control as if it were owner of the undertakings. The Court further held that JAIL had been a subsidiary relevant to the overall asset pool and that the subsequent allotment of shares to GDCL group entities was unsupported by the record and legally unsustainable.

Conclusion: GDCL had no subsisting authority to sell or otherwise deal with JUL and JAIL assets, and the share allotments in JAIL were illegal.

Issue (ii): Whether the Court could invoke Article 142 to condone the unauthorised sale of assets and the altered share allotments, or sustain any plea of legitimate expectation in favour of GDCL?

Analysis: Article 142 cannot be used to sanitise illegality or to validate actions taken without legal authority, especially where the company had continued selling assets while the matter was pending and without taking the Court into confidence. The doctrine of legitimate expectation was found inapplicable because it cannot override illegality or create rights where none existed, and GDCL's long management of the unit did not mature into an enforceable entitlement to ownership or unfettered control.

Conclusion: The plea under Article 142 was rejected and the plea of legitimate expectation failed.

Issue (iii): Whether the rehabilitation offers submitted by the prospective investors could be accepted without prior valuation and identification of JUL and JAIL assets?

Analysis: The Court held that, in the absence of a reliable valuation and complete identification of assets, the proposed schemes could not be evaluated fairly or lawfully. Since the Court was acting as custodia legis over the estate, the first priority was to secure and verify the asset base, ascertain liabilities, and identify the workers and their heirs for payment of dues. In that setting, the offers were premature and could not be accepted.

Conclusion: The rehabilitation proposals of the prospective investors were rejected.

Issue (iv): What consequential directions were required regarding workers' dues, provident fund dues, valuation of assets, and the pending winding-up petition?

Analysis: The Court directed a time-bound verification and payment process for workmen's dues, including provident fund dues, and ordered preparation of inventories and valuation of the remaining assets of JUL and JAIL. The sale of Kanpur Jute Mill and the two JAIL properties was not interfered with, but the sale of scrap from the Sawai Madhopur unit was set aside and the consideration ordered to be refunded with interest. The pending company petition was treated as infructuous in view of the cleared financial position, and an Administrator was appointed to supervise compliance and valuation.

Conclusion: The Court issued final directions for payment verification, valuation, and administration, while leaving the disputed asset sales largely undisturbed except for the scrap sale.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of with operative reliefs protecting the workmen, invalidating the unauthorised share allotments, rejecting the investor schemes, and directing a structured process for settlement of dues and valuation of remaining assets.

Ratio Decidendi: A party that retains only management, without subsisting legal title or authority, cannot validly alienate assets or alter shareholding after the underlying rehabilitation regime has lapsed and the statutory appellate proceedings have abated; equitable powers cannot be used to legitimise such illegality.

Issues: (i) Whether the bank was deficient in service in failing to re-present the cheques within the validity period; (ii) Whether the compensation awarded by the Commission was reasonable.

Issue (i): Whether the bank was deficient in service in failing to re-present the cheques within the validity period.

Analysis: The cheques were deposited within validity, but the record showed that they were not re-presented on the working days available after the strike. Under the Negotiable Instruments Act, presentment for payment must be made within a reasonable time, delay caused by circumstances beyond control is excused only until the cause ceases, and a bank receiving cheques for collection must exercise due diligence in presenting them within the prescribed validity period. Banking service falls within consumer law, and negligence in rendering that service constitutes deficiency when it causes loss or injury. The finding recorded by the Commission was based on evidence and did not suffer from patent error or perversity.

Conclusion: The bank was deficient in service, and this issue is answered against the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the compensation awarded by the Commission was reasonable.

Analysis: Compensation in consumer matters must be fair, reasonable, and commensurate with the proved loss or injury, and where the loss itself is uncertain, only a moderated award can be justified. Although the Commission was right in treating the loss as warranting token compensation, the assessment at 10% of the cheque value was considered on the higher side in the facts of the case, especially because a Section 138 prosecution would still have depended on further statutory requirements and the ultimate loss remained indeterminate. A reduced figure better met the standard of reasonable compensation.

Conclusion: The compensation was reduced to 6% of the total cheque amount with interest at 6% per annum, and this issue is partly in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The finding of deficiency in service was affirmed, but the compensation was scaled down, and the appeals were disposed of with modification of the monetary relief.

Ratio Decidendi: A bank acting as collecting agent must present cheques with due diligence within validity, and failure to do so amounts to deficiency in service under consumer law; however, compensation must remain fair, reasonable, and proportionate to the proven loss.

Issues: (i) Whether the cheque and its execution were proved and the statutory presumption under the Negotiable Instruments Act arose in favour of the complainant; (ii) whether the accused rebutted the presumption of legally enforceable debt or liability, including the challenge to dishonour proof and financial capacity of the complainant; and (iii) whether the concurrent findings of conviction suffered from illegality, perversity, or jurisdictional error warranting interference in revision.

Issue (i): Whether the cheque and its execution were proved and the statutory presumption under the Negotiable Instruments Act arose in favour of the complainant.

Analysis: The cheque was produced and proved in evidence. The accused did not adduce any credible material, handwriting evidence, or other reliable proof to dislodge the execution or signature on the cheque. Once execution was not specifically disproved, the statutory presumptions under the Negotiable Instruments Act came into operation.

Conclusion: The cheque and its execution were proved, and the statutory presumption arose in favour of the complainant.

Issue (ii): Whether the accused rebutted the presumption of legally enforceable debt or liability, including the challenge to dishonour proof and financial capacity of the complainant.

Analysis: The burden shifted to the accused to raise a probable defence on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities. Mere denial was held insufficient. The bank return memo carried the statutory presumption of dishonour, and the absence of a bank official did not by itself render the documentary evidence inadmissible. The accused also failed to bring reliable evidence to show absence of liability or to rebut the complainant's version regarding the transaction and financial capacity.

Conclusion: The presumption of legally enforceable debt or liability was not rebutted, and the challenge to dishonour proof failed.

Issue (iii): Whether the concurrent findings of conviction suffered from illegality, perversity, or jurisdictional error warranting interference in revision.

Analysis: Revisional jurisdiction is limited and does not permit reappreciation of evidence as a second appeal unless there is patent illegality, perversity, or miscarriage of justice. The courts below had considered the oral and documentary evidence, applied the settled presumptions, and recorded reasoned concurrent findings against the accused.

Conclusion: No ground for revisional interference was made out.

Final Conclusion: The conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and the concurrent findings of the courts below were sustained, and the revision was dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: Once execution of the cheque is proved or not specifically disproved, the statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act arise, and they can be rebutted only by a probable defence proved on the standard of preponderance of probabilities; in revision, concurrent findings are not interfered with absent patent illegality or perversity.

Issues: Whether the petition under Section 37(2)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was maintainable against the arbitral order allowing impleadment of a trustee as co-claimant under Section 17 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and whether the impugned order suffered from any jurisdictional error warranting interference.

Analysis: The petition challenged an order that, though framed as one under Section 17, in substance permitted a person already connected with the arbitration and the LLP dispute to participate in a trustee capacity, on the footing that the beneficial interest in the LLP share had been settled in trust. The Court held that the LLP framework recognises only individuals or body corporates as partners, that the original partner had not ceased to be the relevant legal holder on the facts placed before the Tribunal, and that the Tribunal had proceeded cautiously by keeping the larger question of cessation of partnership open for final adjudication. The Court further held that the impugned order did not disclose perversity or any jurisdictional infirmity, especially when the Tribunal had reserved the substantive issues for later decision and the challenge had also suffered from delay and intervening proceedings.

Conclusion: The challenge was held to be without merit, and interference with the arbitral order was declined.

Final Conclusion: The arbitral order permitting participation of the trustee-capacity claimant was sustained, and the petition failed.

Ratio Decidendi: An interlocutory arbitral order allowing participation of a trustee-capacity claimant, where the underlying issue of partnership status remains open for final determination, will not be interfered with under Section 37 absent jurisdictional error, perversity, or other patent illegality.

Issues: Whether the arbitral interim and final awards, though rendered against the SPV alone, could be executed against its constituent shareholder companies as persons claiming under the award debtor, and whether their impleadment in execution proceedings was permissible.

Analysis: The awards had attained finality, and the execution proceedings were governed by Section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 read with the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The Court distinguished ordinary civil decree execution from execution of an arbitral award and held that Section 35 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 extends finality and binding force not only to the parties but also to persons claiming under them. Relying on the settled meaning of that expression, the Court found that the petitioners had created and led the SPV for the coal-block project, participated through their officers in its formation and functioning, shared management and finances, and had already contributed towards satisfaction of the award, showing that the SPV acted only as their instrumentality.

Conclusion: The petitioners fell within the expression "persons claiming under" the award debtor, and the execution against them was legally sustainable.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the execution orders failed because the arbitral awards were enforceable against the SPV's constituent companies on the facts of the corporate structure and their relationship with the award debtor.

Ratio Decidendi: Under Section 35 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, an arbitral award binds not only the signatory party but also persons whose capacity or position is derived from and is the same as that party, permitting execution against such persons in appropriate cases.

Issues: Whether gratuity may be released after departmental proceedings conclude when judicial proceedings remain pending under Rule 69(1)(c) of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972.

Analysis: Rule 69(1)(c) imposes a statutory embargo on payment of gratuity while either departmental proceedings or judicial proceedings remain pending. The word "or" carries its ordinary disjunctive meaning and broadens the bar; construing it to permit release upon conclusion of only one category of proceedings would defeat the provision's purpose of protecting the State's financial interests. Departmental and criminal proceedings retain distinct scope and standards of proof, and the conclusion of one cannot determine the consequence of the other. Rule 9(1) operates only after a finding of guilt and cannot support release of gratuity during the pendency of judicial proceedings.

Conclusion: Gratuity cannot be paid until the pending judicial proceedings are concluded and final orders are issued, notwithstanding exoneration in departmental proceedings.