Issues: Whether Grinding Media Balls and Rubber Liners fitted inside the Ball Mill constituted integral parts of plant and machinery or were liable to be treated as incidental goods attracting entry tax, and whether the consequential penalty could stand.

Analysis: The definition of incidental goods under Section 2(hh) of the M.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958 excludes raw material and packing material and applies to goods used in manufacture. The controlling distinction is between goods used for carrying out manufacture, which are plant and machinery, and goods used in the manufacturing process as consumables. On the facts found, the Ball Mill could not function without the Grinding Media Balls and Rubber Liners, which performed the very grinding function of the machine and were indispensable to its operation. Their periodic replacement due to wear and tear did not change their legal character. The functional integrality test therefore required classification of these items as constituent parts of the machine, not as incidental goods. Once the levy of entry tax failed, the penalty levied under Section 17(3) of the Entry Tax Act could not survive.

Conclusion: Grinding Media Balls and Rubber Liners were not incidental goods but integral parts of plant and machinery, so no entry tax was leviable on them and the penalty also could not be sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: Where goods are indispensable constituent parts of machinery and the machinery is inoperative without them, they are to be treated as plant and machinery on the basis of functional integrality, and not as incidental goods merely because they directly participate in the process or wear out in use.

Issues: Whether the revisional interference with the appellate order denying input tax credit was sustainable, and whether the matter required re-adjudication in light of the burden of proof under Section 70 of the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003.

Analysis: The dispute turned on discharge of the burden under Section 70 of the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003 in relation to input tax credit claims. The reassessment authorities and the revisional authority proceeded on the basis that the selling dealers had filed NIL returns or not uploaded turnover details, and that the assessee had to establish genuineness of the purchases and actual physical movement of goods. The Court noted that the governing standard requires the purchasing dealer to prove the transaction with supporting material such as the identity of the selling dealer, vehicle details, freight particulars, acknowledgment of delivery, tax invoices and payment particulars, and that the findings recorded by the authorities below were not aligned with that standard as explained by the Supreme Court.

Conclusion: The revisional order could not be finally sustained on the existing record, and the matter had to be sent back to the Assessing Authority for fresh adjudication of the input tax credit claim in accordance with the burden of proof under Section 70 of the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003.

Ratio Decidendi: A claim for input tax credit under the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003 is sustainable only when the purchasing dealer establishes the genuineness of the transaction and the actual movement of goods by reliable supporting evidence; where the record does not reflect application of that standard, re-adjudication is warranted.

Issues: Whether the revisional order under the Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005 was barred by limitation.

Analysis: The revisional order was passed on 21.04.2022, whereas the order under revision had been passed on 09.02.2018. On the facts noted, the period prescribed for revision had expired before the revisional order was made. The challenge was therefore accepted on the ground that the revision was initiated and concluded beyond the permissible time limit.

Conclusion: The revisional order was barred by limitation and liable to be set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: A revisional order passed after expiry of the statutory limitation period is invalid and cannot be sustained.

Issues: Whether coercive recovery by attachment of the bank account was permissible when the assessment and penalty orders had not been served on the petitioner, and whether the time to challenge those orders would commence only upon service.

Analysis: Recovery proceedings cannot be pursued through coercive measures unless the assessee has been served with the assessment order. On the facts, the assessment order had not been served, so attachment of the bank account and other recovery steps were not justified at that stage. At the same time, the assessment order itself was not set aside, and the respondents retained the right to recover the dues in accordance with law after service of the orders and after the petitioner had an opportunity to avail the appellate remedy.

Conclusion: Coercive recovery was held impermissible until service of the assessment and penalty orders, and the period for filing an appeal was directed to run from the date of such service.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of by protecting the petitioner from immediate recovery action, directing service of the orders, and preserving the statutory right of challenge thereafter.

Ratio Decidendi: Coercive tax recovery cannot be initiated before service of the demand order on the assessee, and the limitation to challenge the order begins only from valid service.

Issues: (i) Whether the notices and reassessment under Section 10(1) and Section 10(2) of the Odisha Entry Tax Act, 1999 were barred by limitation and invalid for want of timely acceptance and communication of the self-assessment returns. (ii) Whether the Revenue could sustain the reassessment by invoking Section 10(3) of the Odisha Entry Tax Act, 1999 or by importing Section 49(2) of the Odisha Value Added Tax Act, 2004 read with Rule 34 of the Odisha Entry Tax Rules, 1999.

Issue (i): Whether the notices and reassessment under Section 10(1) and Section 10(2) of the Odisha Entry Tax Act, 1999 were barred by limitation and invalid for want of timely acceptance and communication of the self-assessment returns.

Analysis: The assessment period related to 01.04.2005 to 28.02.2006. The Court held that reassessment under Section 10(1) could be initiated only within the statutory limitation counted from the end of the relevant year, and that the pre-amendment period was five years. It further held that the self-assessment returns had not been formally accepted and communicated in time, and that the belated communication of acceptance in 2023 could not cure the jurisdictional defect or extend an already expired limitation period. The reassessment notices issued in 2023 were therefore beyond time.

Conclusion: The reassessment under Section 10(1) and Section 10(2) was time-barred and invalid, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the Revenue could sustain the reassessment by invoking Section 10(3) of the Odisha Entry Tax Act, 1999 or by importing Section 49(2) of the Odisha Value Added Tax Act, 2004 read with Rule 34 of the Odisha Entry Tax Rules, 1999.

Analysis: The Court held that the case did not fall within Section 10(3), and the Revenue itself had abandoned that route. It further held that Rule 34 could not be used to import Section 49(2) of the Odisha Value Added Tax Act, 2004 into a situation where the Odisha Entry Tax Act already contained a specific reassessment mechanism under Section 10 and Rule 15D. The later change in the stated basis of reassessment could not validate the proceedings, and the impugned notices were inconsistent on their face.

Conclusion: The reassessment could not be justified under Section 10(3) or by reliance on Section 49(2) of the Odisha Value Added Tax Act, 2004 and Rule 34 of the Odisha Entry Tax Rules, 1999, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The reassessment notices and the consequential assessment were quashed because the proceedings were not lawfully initiated within the applicable statutory framework and limitation period.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a taxing statute prescribes a specific reassessment procedure and limitation period, reassessment cannot be sustained by belatedly asserting acceptance of self-assessment, changing the stated basis of jurisdiction, or importing a different statute through a general rule-making clause.

Issues: (i) Whether the pre-deposit made by the dealer satisfied the requirement for admission of the appeal under proviso (2) to Section 31(1) of the Telangana Value Added Tax Act, 2005; (ii) Whether the penalty notice and penalty order could survive independently when the appeal against the fresh assessment was liable to be restored.

Issue (i): Whether the pre-deposit made by the dealer satisfied the requirement for admission of the appeal under proviso (2) to Section 31(1) of the Telangana Value Added Tax Act, 2005.

Analysis: The statutory condition required proof of payment of tax admitted to be due, or instalments granted, and proof of payment of 12.5% of the difference between the tax assessed and the tax admitted for the relevant period. The dealer had disputed the entire liability, and the amount already deposited in the earlier round exceeded 12.5% of the difference of tax assessed in the fresh assessment. The earlier deposit, made to sustain the prior appeal, remained available for the fresh appeal after remand.

Conclusion: The pre-deposit requirement was satisfied, and the appeal could not have been dismissed for want of further deposit.

Issue (ii): Whether the penalty notice and penalty order could survive independently when the appeal against the fresh assessment was liable to be restored.

Analysis: The penalty arose from non-payment of the demand under the fresh assessment and was dependent on the result of the appeal challenging that assessment. Once the appellate dismissal was found unsustainable and the appeal was restored for decision on merits, the penalty could not independently stand at that stage.

Conclusion: The penalty order was quashed, with liberty to impose penalty depending on the outcome of the restored appeal.

Final Conclusion: The appeals were allowed, the High Court's order was set aside, and the dealer's appeal was restored for decision on merits, with the penalty issue left to follow the result of that appeal.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the assessee has already deposited an amount exceeding the statutory pre-deposit computed on the disputed tax difference, an appeal cannot be rejected for non-compliance of the pre-deposit condition, and any penalty dependent on that assessment must await the outcome of the restored appeal.

Issues: (i) Whether the refund claim under the Tripura Value Added Tax Act, 2004 could be rejected for want of documents not required by the refund rule; (ii) Whether the limitation period in Rule 35(4) of the Tripura Value Added Tax Rules, 2005 could bar the refund claim; (iii) Whether an alternative remedy of appeal under Section 69 of the Tripura Value Added Tax Act, 2004 made the writ petition non-maintainable.

Issue (i): Whether the refund claim under the Tripura Value Added Tax Act, 2004 could be rejected for want of documents not required by the refund rule.

Analysis: Section 43 of the Act provides for refund of tax paid in excess, and Rule 35 of the Rules prescribes the particulars and manner of the refund application. The application filed by the petitioner contained the particulars required by Rule 35(1), and the authority could not insist on additional documents not contemplated by that rule as a ground to refuse refund. The materials said to be missing had already been filed along with monthly returns and were annexed to the writ petition.

Conclusion: The refusal of refund on the ground of non-production of additional documents was unsustainable and is against the Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether the limitation period in Rule 35(4) of the Tripura Value Added Tax Rules, 2005 could bar the refund claim.

Analysis: The Act does not prescribe a limitation period for refund claims in Section 43, while Section 87 empowers rules only for carrying out the purposes of the Act and for prescribing the manner of refund. A rule framed under delegated legislation cannot impose a limitation that takes away a substantive right where the parent statute has not done so. The limitation clause in Rule 35(4) was therefore not accepted as a valid bar to the refund claim.

Conclusion: The limitation objection failed and is against the Revenue.

Issue (iii): Whether an alternative remedy of appeal under Section 69 of the Tripura Value Added Tax Act, 2004 made the writ petition non-maintainable.

Analysis: Section 69 provides an appeal against an order of assessment or penalty, not against an order refusing refund. The remedy suggested by the respondents was therefore not an effective alternative remedy for the impugned refund refusal.

Conclusion: The writ petition was maintainable and this objection is against the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The refund rejection order was set aside and the refund application was directed to be reconsidered afresh in accordance with law, with interest to follow if the refund is ultimately found admissible.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the parent statute confers a refund right without prescribing a limitation, subordinate legislation cannot impose a time bar that extinguishes that right, and a refund authority cannot add document requirements beyond those expressly prescribed by the refund rule.

Issues: (i) whether mining carried on through job work, where the assessee remained the lessee of the captive mine, disentitled the assessee from input tax credit; (ii) whether explosives used in the mining operation qualified as capital goods for the purpose of input tax credit under Section 18 of the Rajasthan Value Added Tax Act, 2003; (iii) whether mining and manufacturing formed an integral process so as to support the claim for input tax credit.

Issue (i): whether mining carried on through job work, where the assessee remained the lessee of the captive mine, disentitled the assessee from input tax credit.

Analysis: The decisive fact was that the assessee itself held the mining licence for the captive mine. The material excavated was not purchased from any third party after mining, but was got excavated for the assessee. The circumstance that the excavation was carried out on job work basis did not change the legal character of the mining activity for the assessee, because the assessee remained the lessee and beneficiary of the mining operation.

Conclusion: The job-work arrangement did not defeat the claim to input tax credit and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): whether explosives used in the mining operation qualified as capital goods for the purpose of input tax credit under Section 18 of the Rajasthan Value Added Tax Act, 2003.

Analysis: The explosives were purchased for use in the actual mining operation and not for some subsequent or independent activity after mining. On that footing, the goods were treated as falling within the scope of the relevant entitlement for credit, and the objection that they were merely consumables used in mining did not prevail on the facts found.

Conclusion: The explosives qualified for input tax credit and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): whether mining and manufacturing formed an integral process so as to support the claim for input tax credit.

Analysis: The excavated iron ore and limestone were used in the manufacturing of iron ore pellets and cement. The mining operation and the manufacturing activity were treated as inter-dependent parts of a single commercial process, consistent with the controlling principle applied from the earlier binding decision relied upon in the order.

Conclusion: Mining and manufacturing were held to be integral, and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The revision petitions succeeded, the adverse appellate orders were set aside, and the assessee companies were held entitled to input tax credit on the relevant purchases for the assessment years concerned.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the assessee remains the lessee of a captive mine and the extracted material is used in an integrated mining-and-manufacturing process, goods purchased for use in the actual mining operation, including explosives, may qualify for input tax credit under the governing value added tax provision.

Issues: Whether the assessee was entitled to concessional tax treatment in the absence of timely production of original C and F Forms, and whether the rejection of the claim for want of such forms was sustainable.

Analysis: The relevant assessment years were 2015-16, 2016-17 and 2017-18. Rule 12(1) of the CST Rules required C and F Forms to be furnished within three months. The forms were not produced before the adjudicating authority, the first appellate authority, the Tribunal, or the Court, and remained absent from the record. The governing principle is that production of the original forms is mandatory and not a mere technicality. Strict compliance is required for claiming concessional treatment under the CST regime.

Conclusion: The rejection of the assessee's claim for want of C and F Forms was upheld, and the issue was decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The revision petition failed because the statutory condition for concessional treatment was not satisfied on the record.

Ratio Decidendi: A dealer cannot claim concessional tax treatment under the CST framework without strict compliance with the requirement to furnish the original statutory forms within the prescribed time.

Issues: Whether a post-disposal interlocutory application seeking modification or clarification of a final writ order was maintainable.

Analysis: The application was filed after disposal of the writ petition and sought reopening of the final order under the guise of modification or clarification. The Court held that it had become functus officio after final disposal and could not entertain an application that would in substance amount to a review. It further held that such post-disposal applications are maintainable only in rare cases involving clerical or arithmetical correction or where an executory direction has become incapable of implementation because of subsequent events, neither of which was shown here.

Conclusion: The interlocutory application was not maintainable and was dismissed.

Final Conclusion: A disposed writ proceeding cannot be reopened through a modification or clarification application that seeks review of the final order; only limited corrective applications of the recognised kind may be entertained.

Ratio Decidendi: After final disposal of a writ petition, the Court is functus officio and cannot entertain a post-disposal application that seeks substantive alteration of the final order in the guise of clarification or modification, save for limited correction of clerical or arithmetical mistakes or exceptional executory situations.

Issues: Whether goods imported into a unit situated in a Special Economic Zone for authorised operations were entitled to exemption from entry tax under the West Bengal Special Economic Zone Act, 2003, and whether the assessment order and demand notices could survive after the administrative decision granting such exemption.

Analysis: The competent authority, in compliance with the earlier direction, determined that the goods imported into the unit located in the Falta Special Economic Zone for authorised operations were eligible for exemption from entry tax under Section 27(i) read with Section 30 of the West Bengal Special Economic Zone Act, 2003. Once that decision was taken, there remained no live controversy requiring further adjudication on the levy. The Court also noted that any future inquiry by the department regarding goods not entering the SEZ would be a matter for the department to examine in appropriate proceedings.

Conclusion: The exemption claim was accepted and the assessment order ceased to survive, along with the demand notices.

Issues: Whether coercive recovery could be continued pending consideration of the petitioner's application before the appellate authority on compliance with the pre-deposit requirement under the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act.

Analysis: The petitioner had already filed an appeal and a stay application before the appellate authority and had also moved a separate application asserting compliance with the pre-deposit requirement. That application had not yet been decided. In these circumstances, the Court considered it appropriate that the appellate authority first decide the application expeditiously and in accordance with law, and granted interim protection against coercive recovery till such decision.

Conclusion: Coercive recovery was restrained until the appellate authority decided the pending application, and the petitioner obtained interim relief.

Issues: Whether manufacturers of alcoholic liquor for human consumption were entitled to C-Forms for interstate purchase of Extra Neutral Alcohol during the period in which its GST treatment remained undecided.

Analysis: The GST Council had consciously deferred a decision on the tax treatment of Extra Neutral Alcohol used in the manufacture of alcoholic liquor for human consumption and directed maintenance of status quo. That status quo was understood as preserving the pre-GST position. Denial of C-Forms during this period would impede the respondent's seamless procurement of Extra Neutral Alcohol from other States and impair its right to carry on trade. The subsequent amendment excluding such Extra Neutral Alcohol from the charging provision did not justify denial of C-Forms for the intervening period.

Conclusion: Manufacturers entitled to procure Extra Neutral Alcohol for manufacture of alcoholic liquor for human consumption were entitled to C-Forms during the period of GST Council indecision; the finding is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the intra-court appeals against the reasoned order of the learned Single Judge merited admission and interference.

Analysis: The appeals arose from a common order in which the learned Single Judge had dealt with the availability of a statutory appellate remedy, the plea of limitation, and the alleged breach of natural justice in the context of notices issued under the VAT regime. The appellate Court found that the impugned order was a reasoned one, that the learned Single Judge had considered the material questions raised, and that the scope of interference in intra-court appeal was limited. On that basis, the Court declined to reopen the controversy at the admission stage.

Conclusion: The appeals were not admitted and no interference was warranted; the challenge failed.

Final Conclusion: The judgment leaves the learned Single Judge's disposal undisturbed and results in dismissal of the batch of intra-court appeals.

Ratio Decidendi: A reasoned order declining writ interference in the presence of an alternative statutory remedy will ordinarily not be interfered with in intra-court appeal unless a clear jurisdictional or legal infirmity is shown.

Issues: Whether the Commissioner could refuse to exercise the power under Section 17(7) of the Odisha Entry Tax Act, 1999 to stay realization during pendency of the appeal on the ground that any consideration of the request would touch the merits of the appeal, and whether the impugned order was liable to be set aside for absence of reasons.

Analysis: Section 17(7) confers power on the Commissioner to stay realization of tax, interest or penalty, in whole or in part, while the appeal remains pending before the Tribunal. The power is meant to operate during the appellate stage and any observation made for deciding the stay application is only tentative and does not bind or prejudice the Tribunal in the merits of the appeal. Refusing to exercise the power merely because the appeal is pending, or because some reference to the issues may be made, defeats the statutory purpose. The impugned order, though lengthy, did not record the requisite reasons for declining relief and therefore did not satisfy the statutory requirement.

Conclusion: The refusal to consider the stay application on the stated ground was unsustainable, and the order was rightly set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statute confers power to grant stay of realization during pendency of an appeal, the authority must decide the application on reasons germane to stay and cannot decline to exercise the power merely because the appeal is pending or because the order may incidentally refer to the merits.

Issues: (i) Whether the review petitions filed after a delay of 522 days are maintainable and whether the delay has been satisfactorily explained; (ii) Whether the review petitions disclose any error apparent on the face of the record or any other ground of merit warranting reconsideration of the impugned orders.

Issue (i): Whether the delay of 522 days in filing the review petitions is satisfactorily explained and whether the petitions are maintainable.

Analysis: The review petitions were filed with an unexplained delay of 522 days; defects in the petitions identified in the Office Report remained uncured; the application for listing in open court was rejected. The absence of a satisfactory explanation for the delay and failure to cure the communicated defects were considered in assessing maintainability.

Conclusion: The delay is not satisfactorily explained and the review petitions are not maintainable on the ground of delay.

Issue (ii): Whether the review petitions disclose an error apparent on the face of the record or any merit justifying review.

Analysis: A review requires an error apparent on the face of the record or other recognised grounds; on examination of the petitions, the impugned orders and annexed papers, no such error or merit was found. The petitions therefore do not satisfy the substantive threshold for review even apart from the delay.

Conclusion: The review petitions do not disclose any error apparent on the face of the record or any other merit warranting review and are dismissed on merits.

Final Conclusion: The review petitions are dismissed both for inordinate and unexplained delay and for lack of merit; pending applications are disposed of.

Ratio Decidendi: A review petition must be filed within a reasonably explained time and must demonstrate an error apparent on the face of the record or other recognised grounds; failure to satisfactorily explain delay or to show such an error warrants dismissal of the review.

Issues: Whether stay of realization of the balance tax demand pending the second appeal before the Tribunal was warranted, and what interim protection should be granted in the writ jurisdiction.

Analysis: The disputed demand arose from audit assessment under the Odisha Value Added Tax Act, 2004 and the Odisha Entry Tax Act, 1999, where the authorities proceeded on the basis that mandatory supporting documents, including C Forms and mining permits, had not been produced. The writ Court noted that the Commissioner's power under Section 17(7) of the Odisha Entry Tax Act, 1999 to stay recovery pending the second appeal was discretionary, and that the petitioner had not shown sufficient justification for non-production of material before the assessing and appellate authorities. At the same time, the Court took note of the pre-deposit already made and considered it appropriate, for maintaining the balance of convenience, to grant conditional interim protection against coercive recovery.

Conclusion: The prayer for unconditional stay was not accepted, but conditional protection against recovery was granted on deposit of 30% of the balance demand within the stipulated time; failing compliance, the revenue authorities were left free to proceed in accordance with law.

Final Conclusion: The writ proceeding was finally disposed of with limited interim relief in favour of the petitioner, subject to compliance with the directed deposit.

Ratio Decidendi: Relief against recovery pending statutory appeal may be granted in the exercise of writ jurisdiction on a conditional basis, where the Court balances the parties' interests and the statutory authority's discretionary refusal to stay recovery is not found wholly unjustified.

Issues: Whether earthen roofing tiles manufactured by a unit recognized and financed by the Kerala Khadi and Village Industries Board are exempt from tax as "pottery" under Entry 55 of the First Schedule to the Kerala Value Added Tax Act, 2003, or are taxable under Entry 18 of the Third Schedule to that Act as kiln-burnt flooring, roofing and earthen tiles.

Analysis: Entry 55 of the First Schedule was construed as a specially designed exemption for products notified for manufacturing units approved by the Khadi and Village Industries Board and the Commission, reflecting the social object of supporting khadi and village industries. The Board's statutory functions under the Kerala Khadi and Village Industries Board Act, 1957 were treated as central to that purpose. The Court held that the term "pottery" in this setting is of wide import and covers all articles made of clay and hardened by heat, including earthen roofing tiles. The specific fiscal entry in the Third Schedule was not treated as overriding the exemption where the product was made by a Board-recognized unit and certified for the benefit under the notification.

Conclusion: Earthen roofing tiles manufactured by the petitioner were held to fall within "pottery" under Entry 55 of the First Schedule and to be exempt from tax, not taxable under Entry 18 of the Third Schedule.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a fiscal exemption entry is enacted to protect products of Board-approved khadi and village industries, the term "pottery" must receive a broad contextual meaning that includes clay articles hardened by heat, including earthen roofing tiles.

Outcome: Delay in filing and refiling was condoned and the special leave petition was dismissed.

Issues: Whether the authorities could adjust the refund determined for an earlier tax period against the settlement dues of a subsequent tax period under the Maharashtra Settlement of Arrears of Tax, Interest, Penalty or Late Fee Act, 2023, and whether the impugned settlement order could be sustained despite the absence of a defect notice and opportunity of hearing.

Analysis: The Settlement Act was enacted as a self-contained amnesty scheme to settle specified arrears period-wise and to give quietus to old disputes. The scheme requires assessment of arrears and payment obligations with reference to each financial year and operates on its own footing. The provisions governing settlement did not authorise importing the refund-adjustment mechanism under Section 50 of the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002 into the settlement computation. A refund for one year was not treated as an amount that could be appropriated to reduce settlement dues of another year in the absence of a lawful refund adjustment order under the MVAT Act. The impugned order was also made without giving the assessee an opportunity of hearing, although adverse action under the Settlement Act required such opportunity where the application was not in accordance with law.

Conclusion: The adjustment of the refund against the settlement dues was impermissible and the impugned settlement order could not be sustained. The challenge succeeded in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The settlement application for the relevant year had to be accepted without setting off the earlier-year refund, and the refund amount was directed to be released with statutory interest.

Ratio Decidendi: Under the Settlement Act, authorities cannot invoke the MVAT refund-adjustment machinery to appropriate a refund of one tax period against the settlement dues of another tax period, and any adverse settlement action must comply with the Act and the requirements of fair hearing.