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Issues: (i) Whether the priority conferred on a secured creditor under Section 26E of the SARFAESI Act prevails over a statutory first charge created under the State sales tax enactments when the tax attachment orders predate CERSAI registration but postdate the mortgage; (ii) Whether a provision declared to be prospective can still operate retroactively on pending or antecedent transactions, and whether CERSAI registration could affect the prior attachment orders; (iii) Whether the statutory first charge under the State recovery framework extends to dues recoverable under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.
Issue (i): Whether the priority conferred on a secured creditor under Section 26E of the SARFAESI Act prevails over a statutory first charge created under the State sales tax enactments when the tax attachment orders predate CERSAI registration but postdate the mortgage.
Analysis: Section 26E confers priority in payment after registration of security interest, but it does not create a statutory first charge. The State enactments, particularly Section 16C of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957, create a first charge dehors the non obstante clause. On the principles governing conflicting priority clauses and statutory first charge, a mere priority provision cannot override a validly created first charge. The subsequent CERSAI registration therefore did not displace the State's first charge in respect of the tax dues already crystallised and attached under the State laws.
Conclusion: The priority under Section 26E does not prevail over the statutory first charge created under the State sales tax enactments; this issue is answered against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue.
Issue (ii): Whether a provision declared to be prospective can still operate retroactively on pending or antecedent transactions, and whether CERSAI registration could affect the prior attachment orders.
Analysis: Prospectivity, retrospectivity and retroactivity are distinct concepts. A provision declared prospective is not automatically excluded from all retroactive operation unless the higher court has expressly negatived such application. The amended Chapter IVA of the SARFAESI Act takes into account antecedent facts, but its operation cannot defeat vested statutory first charge where that charge had already crystallised under the State enactments. In the present facts, the tax claims and attachment orders had already arisen well before the CERSAI registration.
Conclusion: Section 26E cannot be applied so as to defeat the prior statutory first charge in the present case; this issue is answered against the assessee.
Issue (iii): Whether the statutory first charge under the State recovery framework extends to dues recoverable under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.
Analysis: Though the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 does not itself create an express first charge, Section 9(2) incorporates the recovery machinery and powers under the State sales tax laws for collection and enforcement. In the absence of any exclusion, the statutory incidents attached to the State recovery provisions apply to CST dues as well. The State authorities may therefore enforce the first charge while recovering CST arrears.
Conclusion: The statutory first charge is available for recovery of CST dues also; this issue is answered in favour of the Revenue.
Final Conclusion: The secured creditor's claim to priority under Section 26E did not displace the State's statutory first charge, the amendment could not be used to unsettle the prior tax attachment rights in the facts of this case, and the State could proceed for recovery of APGST, APVAT and CST dues.
Ratio Decidendi: A statutory first charge validly created dehors the non obstante clause prevails over a later statutory provision that confers only priority in payment, and such priority cannot be used to defeat pre-existing tax recovery rights.
Statutory tax first charge prevails over secured-creditor payment priority where tax attachments arose before security-interest registration.
Statutory first charges under State sales tax laws prevail over Section 26E SARFAESI priority where tax dues and attachments crystallised before CERSAI registration, even if the mortgage predated those attachments. Section 26E confers priority in payment after security-interest registration but does not create a first charge capable of displacing an existing statutory charge. Although prospective and retroactive operation are distinct, the SARFAESI amendment cannot unsettle vested tax-recovery rights arising from antecedent facts. State sales tax recovery machinery incorporated for Central Sales Tax dues also carries the statutory first charge, enabling recovery of APGST, APVAT and CST arrears.
Priority of secured creditors vis-a-vis statutory first charge - Statutory first charge for sales tax and value added tax dues - Prospective and retroactive operation of amended provisions - Recovery of Central Sales Tax dues through State first charge mechanism - Failure to hear interested claimant before permitting sale outside liquidation - Concepts of prospective, retrospective and retroactive operation of statutes Priority of secured creditors vis-a-vis statutory first charge - Statutory first charge under State tax enactments - CERSAI registration and priority in payment - HELD THAT: - In Punjab and Sind Bank [2023 (12) TMI 1506 - SUPREME COURT (LB)], the secured creditor had issued a notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act on 06.09.2013. The State, on the other hand, claimed a statutory first charge under the provisions of the Punjab Value Added Tax Act, 2005 (“PBVAT Act”), and initiated recovery proceedings in the year 2014. Both proceedings commenced prior to the insertion of Section 26E into the SARFAESI Act by the Amendment Act of 2016, which was brought into force on 20.01.2020. While deciding the case, the Hon'ble Apex Court took note of the subsequent amendment introducing Section 26E and held that the statutory first charge created under the State enactment would prevail over the claim of the secured creditor, since Section 26E operates prospectively. The Apex Court further held that Section 35 of the SARFAESI Act, as it stood prior to the amendment, did not eclipse the statutory first charge created under the State enactment and that there was no inconsistency between the provisions of the PBVAT Act and the SARFAESI Act with regard to the creation and enforcement of the statutory first charge. The Apex Court further observed that, prior to the 2016 amendment; the SARFAESI Act did not confer any statutory priority upon a secured creditor, whereas Section 35 of the PBVAT Act expressly created a statutory first charge over the assets of the tax defaulter. The Apex Court in Punjab & Sind Bank (supra), has held that Section 26E is prospective. Thus, the said judgment by Apex Court is not an authority on the question whether the priority in payment under Section 26E of the SARFAESI Act, prevails over statutory first charge. Said judgment holds that Section 26E is prospective in operation. It is settled principle that the ratio is what the Court decides but not everything that logically flows from it. The Court held that the controlling principle is the distinction between a provision that merely gives priority in payment and one that independently creates a first charge. Under the State enactments, the first charge was held to exist dehors the non obstante clause. Section 26E of the SARFAESI Act, on the other hand, was construed as conferring priority after registration of security interest, but not as creating a statutory first charge. On that basis, the later non obstante clause in the SARFAESI Act could not displace a valid statutory first charge already created under the State tax laws. The Court also held that, even otherwise, Section 26E is prospective, and on either footing Omkara Assets could not claim precedence over the Commercial Tax Department. [Paras 45, 46, 55, 56, 90] The claim of Omkara Assets to recall the attachment orders on the basis of priority under Section 26E failed. Prospective and retroactive operation of amended provisions - Section 26E of the SARFAESI Act - HELD THAT: - The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Jalgaon Janata Sahakari Bank Ltd.[2022 (9) TMI 163 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] has held that a CERSAI registration effected before or after 20.01.2020 would confer priority in payment, including over a statutory first charge, provided that the statutory first charge had not crystallised into a vested right by the initiation of recovery proceedings in accordance with law. Thus, although the Full Bench held Chapter IVA to be prospective, it nevertheless took into account transactions and events that had occurred prior to its introduction. In a way, the statutory first charge created by operation of law, and not crystallised into a vested right (for want of further steps to enforce statutory charge) yielding to CERSAI registration exhibits a degree of retroactive operation. If the broad principles governing prospective, retrospective and retroactive applications are kept in mind, and also considering the actual application of the said principles as applied by the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court supra, it is possible to take a view that doctrines “prospective”, “retrospective”, “retroactive”, quasi retroactive”, “true retroactive” which are essentially judicial constructs cannot be applied like inflexible formula. It stated that a provision may operate prospectively while still taking into account antecedent events, depending on statutory language, legislative intent and context. At the same time, it drew a clear limit on the High Court's role: if the superior court has declared a provision to be prospective while excluding retrospective or retroactive operation, that conclusion cannot be revisited. If, however, only prospectivity has been decided and retroactive application has not been examined, the question may still be considered in an appropriate case. In the present matter, that discussion did not advance Omkara Assets because the Court had already held that statutory first charge prevailed over Section 26E. [Paras 70, 71, 72, 73, 90] The Court answered the legal question in the abstract, but held that it did not alter the outcome against Omkara Assets. Recovery of Central Sales Tax dues through State first charge mechanism - Incorporation of State recovery powers under the CST Act - HELD THAT: - The Court noted that the Central Sales Tax Act does not itself expressly create a statutory first charge. However, it held that Section 9(2) authorises the State sales tax authorities to assess, collect and enforce payment under the CST Act as if the dues were payable under the State sales tax law, and to exercise all powers available under that law. On that construction, the recovery machinery of the State enactments, including the statutory first charge attached to such recovery, stood incorporated for the limited purpose of recovering CST dues. In the absence of any exclusion in the CST Act, the State first charge was therefore available for recovery of CST dues as well. [Paras 78, 79, 80, 81, 90] The Commercial Tax Department was held entitled to invoke the State statutory first charge while recovering dues under the CST Act. Failure to hear interested claimant before permitting sale outside liquidation - HELD THAT: - The Court found that the earlier order allowing sale outside liquidation had been made without hearing the Commercial Tax Department, despite its claim against the property. Since the Department had a legally relevant claim that required consideration before such permission was granted, the earlier order could not be sustained. [Paras 92] The recall application filed by the Commercial Tax Department was allowed and the earlier order permitting sale outside liquidation was recalled. Final Conclusion: The Court held that the Commercial Tax Department's statutory first charge under the applicable State enactments, including for recovery of CST dues, prevailed over the priority claimed by the secured creditor under Section 26E of the SARFAESI Act. Omkara Assets' application to recall the attachment orders was dismissed, the earlier permission to sell outside liquidation was recalled for want of hearing the Department, and the Department was permitted to sell the property, subject to deposit of the sale proceeds with the Official Liquidator.