Issues: Whether the Tribunal was justified in condoning the delay of 1365 days in filing the revenue appeal.

Analysis: The delay was examined on the facts of the case, including shortage of staff, deployment of employees in election duties, absence of the concerned official, and the impact of the COVID-19 period. The explanation for delay was found to be satisfactory. The period affected by COVID-19 was treated as excluded for limitation purposes, and the delay attributable to election-related duties was also accepted as having a reasonable connection with the administrative circumstances. The Tribunal's approach was viewed as a proper exercise of discretion on sufficient cause.

Conclusion: The condonation of delay was upheld and the challenge to it failed.

Final Conclusion: The revision was not accepted, and the Tribunal was directed to decide the appeal expeditiously.

Ratio Decidendi: Condonation of delay depends on the acceptability of the explanation and, where sufficient cause is shown, the exercise of discretion should not be disturbed in revisional jurisdiction unless it is arbitrary, perverse, or based on untenable grounds.

Issues: Whether the writ petition challenging the appellate authority's order under the CGST regime should be entertained despite the availability of a further appellate forum, and whether interim protection against recovery should be granted.

Analysis: The petition was entertained on the stated ground that the further appellate forum was presently unavailable. The respondents were directed to file affidavit-in-opposition, with a reply thereafter, and the matter was fixed for final hearing. Pending further consideration, interim protection was granted against recovery on deposit of an additional 20% of the disputed remaining unpaid interest within the stipulated time and filing proof before the authority concerned.

Outcome: No final adjudication was made on the merits; the matter was kept pending for final hearing with interim protection against recovery subject to the stated deposit.

Issues: Whether the assessment order and penalty notice were liable to be quashed for breach of natural justice and non-compliance with earlier directions, and whether the matter required remand for fresh de novo consideration.

Analysis: The assessment was found to have been passed without granting an effective opportunity of hearing and without properly considering the directions issued in the earlier round of litigation. The order also did not record clear findings on the applicability of Section 2(30)(c) of the Gujarat Value Added Tax Act, 2003 or deal with the accounting method and the deduction claims in a reasoned manner. The penalty notice was also treated as a cyclostyled notice. In these circumstances, the impugned assessment and penalty proceedings could not be sustained and the matter required reconsideration after hearing the petitioner and assigning reasons.

Conclusion: The assessment order and penalty notice were quashed and the matter was remanded for fresh de novo adjudication after granting an opportunity of hearing and complying with the earlier directions.

Final Conclusion: The petitioner obtained relief against the impugned tax assessment, but the dispute was sent back for a fresh decision on merits in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: An assessment or penalty order passed without an effective hearing, without due consideration of binding earlier directions, and without a reasoned finding on the statutory basis of computation cannot be sustained and must be remitted for fresh consideration.

Issues: Whether the cello used by the assessee was capital goods, namely a storage tank or apparatus used in manufacture, within Section 2(f) of the Uttar Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2008.

Analysis: The statutory definition of capital goods under Section 2(f) covers plant, machinery, equipment, apparatus and includes storage tank under clause (iii). The Tribunal's factual finding was that the cello was fitted to the plant and machinery, held the manufactured ink as part of the production process, and was repeatedly attached and removed as part of the manufacturing setup. In revision, the scope of interference was limited to questions of law, and the Court declined to reappreciate the Tribunal's factual findings. On the facts found, the cello functioned as a storage device integral to manufacture and its movable character did not alter its character as capital goods.

Conclusion: The cello qualified as capital goods under Section 2(f)(iii) of the Act, and no revisional interference was warranted.

Final Conclusion: The revisions failed as the Tribunal's view on the nature of the cello was sustained, leaving the assessee's entitlement undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: An apparatus that functions as a storage tank and forms an integral part of the manufacturing process falls within the definition of capital goods, and concurrent factual findings on such character are not to be disturbed in revision absent a legal infirmity.

Issues: Whether the delay in filing the revision petitions under Section 72 of the Tripura Value Added Tax Act, 2004 could be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in the absence of an express or implied exclusion under the special statute.

Analysis: The revisional provision under Section 72 of the Tripura Value Added Tax Act, 2004 was found to be silent on condonation of delay beyond the prescribed period of sixty days. The Court treated the provision as pari materia to the revisional scheme considered by the Supreme Court under the Himachal Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005, where the absence of an express or implied exclusion of the Limitation Act had led to the conclusion that Section 5 of the Limitation Act remained applicable. Applying that ratio, the Court held that silence in the special statute did not amount to exclusion of the general law of limitation. On the explanation offered for the delay, the Court found it sufficient to justify condonation.

Conclusion: The delay condonation applications were allowed and the delay of 239 days in filing the revision petitions was condoned in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether Section 19(15) of the Tamil Nadu Value Added Tax Act, 2006 was unconstitutional and unenforceable; (ii) Whether reversal of input tax credit was justified where the purchasing dealer had bought goods from a seller whose registration had already been cancelled.

Issue (i): Whether Section 19(15) of the Tamil Nadu Value Added Tax Act, 2006 was unconstitutional and unenforceable.

Analysis: The challenge to the fiscal provision was examined in the light of the settled principle that input tax credit is a statutory concession and not an absolute right. The provision requiring reversal of credit where the selling dealer's registration is cancelled operates within the statutory scheme and no material was shown to establish any violation of constitutional guarantees.

Conclusion: The challenge to the validity of Section 19(15) failed and the provision was upheld.

Issue (ii): Whether reversal of input tax credit was justified where the purchasing dealer had bought goods from a seller whose registration had already been cancelled.

Analysis: The purchasing dealer had effected the purchase after the seller's registration had been cancelled. Under the statutory scheme, a dealer claiming input tax credit must strictly satisfy the conditions attached to the concession, and the production of a tax invoice does not override the requirement that the selling dealer's registration should be subsisting. In these circumstances, the plea of double taxation was not sustainable.

Conclusion: Reversal of input tax credit was justified and the challenge to the audit notice failed.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition was found to be without merit, and the statutory demand for reversal of input tax credit was sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: Input tax credit under the VAT scheme is a concession that must be availed only on strict fulfilment of the statutory conditions, and where the seller's registration has already been cancelled, reversal of the credit on the purchasing dealer is legally permissible.

Issues: Whether liabilities already settled under the earlier amnesty scheme could be reopened or reckoned again while seeking benefit under the 2020 amnesty scheme, and whether the assessing authority erred in refusing to treat earlier payments as available credit for the later scheme.

Analysis: The Scheme under Section 23B of the Kerala Finance Act, 2020 applies only to arrears that remain pending on the date of exercise of option. Amounts relating to earlier assessment years which had already been settled and attained finality under the earlier scheme could not be reopened or reworked for the purpose of the later scheme. The credit mechanism in Section 23B(8) operates only in respect of remittances towards arrears subsisting on the relevant date, and does not permit the assessee to revive closed liabilities or to carry forward payments made towards finally settled years into a fresh settlement exercise. The impugned order therefore suffered from no jurisdictional or legal error.

Conclusion: The challenge to the impugned order was rejected, and the assessing authority's view was upheld.

Final Conclusion: Only the liabilities actually outstanding on the date of the 2020 scheme could be reckoned for settlement, and earlier concluded liabilities could not be reopened for fresh credit or adjustment.

Ratio Decidendi: An amnesty scheme for arrears can be applied only to liabilities subsisting on the date of the option, and payments relating to liabilities already settled with finality cannot be revived or recredited for a subsequent settlement.

Issues: Whether the Tribunal's order upholding rejection of books of account and best judgment assessment on the basis of stock variation and material found in survey called for interference in revision.

Analysis: The assessment was based on survey findings, including loose papers and variation in stock, and the appellate authority had already granted partial relief after examining the material. The remaining adverse inference regarding the disputed papers and stock discrepancy was not satisfactorily explained. The revision did not assail the factual findings on stock variation, which formed the foundation for rejecting the books of account and making the best judgment assessment.

Conclusion: The impugned order suffered from no legal infirmity warranting interference. The issue is answered against the revisionist.

Final Conclusion: The revision was dismissed and the Revenue's assessment-based position was upheld.

Ratio Decidendi: Where findings of stock variation and unexplained material from survey remain unchallenged, rejection of books of account and best judgment assessment will not be interfered with in revision.

Issues: Whether penalty under Section 54(1)(14) of the U.P. VAT Act was sustainable in the absence of a specific finding that the revisionist intended to evade tax.

Analysis: The goods were accompanied by invoices and Form-38, and the dispute arose only because the form had been taken as a screenshot instead of being downloaded and printed from the departmental website. The record also showed earlier acceptance of similar screenshot-based Form-38 submissions without objection. In such circumstances, and in the absence of any specific or cogent finding by the authorities that the revisionist intended to evade tax, the statutory basis for penalty was not made out.

Conclusion: The penalty was not sustainable and the issue is decided in favour of the revisionist.

Issues: (i) Whether the reassessment proceedings for assessment years 2006-2007 and 2007-2008 were barred by limitation. (ii) Whether the assessment for assessment year 2007-2008 could be sustained in the absence of proof of service of notice and opportunity.

Issue (i): Whether the reassessment proceedings for assessment years 2006-2007 and 2007-2008 were barred by limitation.

Analysis: The provisions of the State VAT law applied to the proceedings by virtue of Section 9(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. Section 27(2) of the Tamil Nadu Value Added Tax Act, 2006 prescribed a six-year limitation period for reassessment from the date of assessment. The deemed assessment date for the relevant years was 30.06.2012 under Section 22(2). The Court also applied the earlier view that the six-year limitation governs proceedings under Section 22(4) as well. On the materials placed, the notice relied on for assessment year 2006-2007 did not satisfactorily prove receipt within limitation, and the later reminder was beyond the six-year period. For assessment year 2007-2008, there was no proof of service of the earlier assessment order or notices within limitation.

Conclusion: The proceedings for both assessment years were not shown to be within the statutory period of limitation.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessment for assessment year 2007-2008 could be sustained in the absence of proof of service of notice and opportunity.

Analysis: The later assessment order for assessment year 2007-2008 did not refer to any prior notice, and the record did not establish service of the earlier assessment order. In the circumstances, the validity of the assessment could not be upheld without proof that the assessee was afforded a reasonable opportunity in the manner required by the assessment procedure.

Conclusion: The assessment for assessment year 2007-2008 also warranted interference.

Final Conclusion: The impugned assessment orders were set aside and the writ petitions succeeded.

Ratio Decidendi: When the statute requires reassessment within a fixed limitation period computed from deemed assessment, the revenue must establish timely service of the foundational notice or order and cannot sustain the assessment on an unproved or belated dispatch alone.

Issues: (i) Whether the secured creditor had priority over the State Sales Tax Department in realisation of sale proceeds from the secured assets. (ii) Whether the departmental attachment could survive when the security interest had been registered with CERSAI and the department had not registered its claim.

Issue (i): Whether the secured creditor had priority over the State Sales Tax Department in realisation of sale proceeds from the secured assets.

Analysis: The secured assets were already subjected to a valid security interest, enforcement had proceeded under the SARFAESI Act, and the security interest had been registered with CERSAI. The governing legal position, as settled by the Full Bench, is that a secured creditor's claim ranks in priority over governmental tax dues, subject to compliance with the statutory scheme and the relevant registration requirements. The priority conferred by the SARFAESI framework overrides a claim of first charge asserted by the revenue authorities in respect of the secured assets.

Conclusion: The secured creditor had priority over the State Sales Tax Department, and the attachment could not prevail against the secured creditor's claim.

Issue (ii): Whether the departmental attachment could survive when the security interest had been registered with CERSAI and the department had not registered its claim.

Analysis: Once Chapter IV-A of the SARFAESI Act operated, the department was required to register its claim with CERSAI. The department had not done so, and a subsequent attachment or recorded charge could not displace a prior registered security interest. The absence of departmental registration was fatal to its claim against the secured asset and could not prejudice the auction process or the secured creditor's enforcement rights.

Conclusion: The departmental attachment could not survive, and the secured creditor was entitled to proceed with sale and appropriation of the proceeds.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition succeeded, the impugned attachment was set aside, and the secured creditor was permitted to realise its dues with any surplus to be remitted to the revenue authority.

Ratio Decidendi: A prior registered security interest under the SARFAESI framework has precedence over subsequent governmental attachment or tax claims, and a revenue authority that does not register its claim with CERSAI cannot defeat the secured creditor's enforcement rights.

Issues: Whether the consideration received under the slaughter tapping arrangement was taxable under the Kerala Value Added Tax Act, 2003 as sale turnover, or whether the arrangement was merely a licence or profit a prendre carrying no sales tax liability.

Analysis: The agreement authorised the third party to tap the rubber trees and appropriate the latex, and the consideration was paid for the latex obtained, not merely for a bare right to collect it. The absence of any contractual provision dealing with the latex after expiry of the licence period supported the view that the transaction involved transfer of property in the latex to the third party. The statutory definitions of agriculturist and turnover under the Kerala Value Added Tax Act, 2003 were also relied on to hold that a company holding rubber plantations did not get the benefit available to an agriculturist.

Conclusion: The arrangement was held to be a taxable sale of latex and not a mere grant of licence or profit a prendre, and the demand under the Kerala Value Added Tax Act, 2003 was upheld against the assessee.

Issues: Whether the writ court should interfere with the assessment order under the Kerala Value Added Tax Act, 2003 when the petitioner was issued notice, no objection was filed, and an appeal remedy was available.

Analysis: The assessment record showed that notice was issued for production of records and a proposed assessment was served, yet no reply or objection was filed and no personal hearing was availed. The court held that the impugned order was not shown to be without jurisdiction or contrary to the express provisions of law. In writ jurisdiction, the court does not undertake appellate scrutiny of the merits of an assessment order, and where a statutory appeal lies, interference is not warranted absent jurisdictional infirmity or patent illegality.

Conclusion: The assessment order was not interfered with, and the writ challenge was rejected.

Issues: Whether granite stone block and pieces sold by the dealer were taxable at 5% under Entry No. 109 of Schedule II Part A pursuant to Notification No. KA.NI-2-421/XI-9(1) dated 31.03.2011, or were liable to be treated as unclassified and taxed at a higher rate.

Analysis: Entry No. 109 specifically included "stone" and expressly excluded only glazed stone, marble and marble chips. The exclusion of those specified items indicated that other forms of stone were intended to remain within the entry unless expressly taken out. The reasoning adopted by the Tribunal, that unprocessed stones would fall within the entry while processed stones would not, was found consistent with the express exclusion of glazed stone. A broader exclusion of granite stone was not warranted when the Legislature had not said so.

Conclusion: Granite stone block and pieces were covered by Entry No. 109 and taxable at 5%. The revision was therefore dismissed against the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal's classification of granite stone within the concessional entry was upheld, and the revenue challenge failed.

Issues: Whether granite stone block and pieces sold by the dealer fall within Entry No. 109 of Schedule II Part A as "stone" taxable at 5% or are to be treated as unclassified goods taxable at 14.5%.

Analysis: Entry No. 109 expressly includes "stone" while specifically excluding glazed stone, marble and marble chips. The legislative intent did not indicate any exclusion of granite stone, and the omission of that specific item could not justify a restrictive reading that would exclude ordinary stones generally covered by the entry. The Tribunal's view that unprocessed stones fall within the entry, whereas processed stones may stand outside it, was found consistent with the express exclusion of glazed stone.

Conclusion: Granite stone block and pieces are covered by Entry No. 109 and are taxable at 5%. The revenue's challenge failed.

Final Conclusion: The revision was rejected and the Tribunal's classification of the goods was upheld.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a tax entry expressly includes a generic commodity and carves out only specified exclusions, the entry cannot be narrowly read to exclude other goods that ordinarily fall within that generic description.

Issues: Whether the assessment orders rejecting the input tax credit claim were liable to be quashed for failure to consider the documents furnished by the dealer and for not recording a reasoned assessment of the genuineness of the purchases.

Analysis: The assessment orders referred to invoices, declaration letters, bank statements and related material said to have been filed by the dealer, but did not examine those documents, assess their evidentiary value, or explain why they were insufficient to establish the genuineness of the purchases. The rejection was instead founded on broad and vague observations of non-submission of documents, along with reliance on the requirement of original tax invoices under the TNVAT Rules. In these circumstances, the orders did not reflect a proper consideration of the material placed before the assessing authority.

Conclusion: The assessment orders were quashed and the matters were remanded to the assessing officer for fresh consideration after permitting production of supporting documents, including the original tax invoices, and after giving a reasonable opportunity of hearing.

Issues: (i) whether targeted discounts and rebates received on purchase of vehicles could be treated as subsidy so as to attract reversal of input tax credit under Section 18(3A) of the Rajasthan Value Added Tax Act, 2003; (ii) whether penalty under Section 61(2)(b) of the Rajasthan Value Added Tax Act, 2003 was leviable on the facts of the case.

Issue (i): whether targeted discounts and rebates received on purchase of vehicles could be treated as subsidy so as to attract reversal of input tax credit under Section 18(3A) of the Rajasthan Value Added Tax Act, 2003.

Analysis: Input tax credit under the Rajasthan Value Added Tax Act, 2003 is a statutory concession and not an absolute right. Section 18(3A) specifically provides that where goods purchased in the State are subsequently sold at subsidized price, the input tax allowable cannot exceed the output tax payable on such goods. The expressions used in the Act, including the definitions of input tax, output tax, sale price and reverse tax, support the view that the legislature intended to restrict credit where the sale is at a subsidized or lesser price. The provision operates with overriding force and its applicability depends on the factual matrix of the sale transaction. On the facts found, the assessee sold the vehicles at a price lower than the purchase price and therefore fell within the scope of the provision.

Conclusion: The issue is decided against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue; reversal of input tax credit was justified.

Issue (ii): whether penalty under Section 61(2)(b) of the Rajasthan Value Added Tax Act, 2003 was leviable on the facts of the case.

Analysis: Penalty is attracted only where there is a deliberate and conscious attempt to evade tax. The transactions were duly recorded in the books and disclosed in the returns, and no material showed a conscious design to evade tax. The nature of the dispute was interpretational, and the precedents relied upon by the Revenue were treated as inapposite on the facts and statutory setting of the case.

Conclusion: The issue is decided in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue; penalty was not leviable.

Final Conclusion: The order of the Rajasthan Tax Board was upheld, the input tax credit reversal was sustained, and the deletion of penalty was also sustained, resulting in dismissal of all the revisions.

Ratio Decidendi: Input tax credit under the VAT law is a conditional statutory concession, and where goods are sold at a subsidized or lower price, the credit cannot exceed the output tax payable; penalty requires proof of deliberate tax evasion, not merely an interpretational dispute.

Issues: Whether a Sales Tax Officer appointed under the West Bengal Value Added Tax Act, 2003 could validly exercise the power of seizure under Section 67 without a separate written delegation by the Commissioner under Section 3(4).

Analysis: Section 6(1) empowers the State Government to appoint persons to assist the Commissioner, and the notification issued under that provision appointed Commercial Tax Officers as Sales Tax Officers for carrying out the purposes of the Act. Section 6(2) authorises such persons to exercise powers conferred or prescribed by the Act, in addition to powers delegated in writing by the Commissioner. Since the power of seizure is itself prescribed under Section 67, a Sales Tax Officer duly appointed under Section 6(1) read with the notification was competent to exercise that power. The requirement of separate written delegation under Section 3(4) was not attracted on these facts.

Conclusion: The seizure was within jurisdiction and the challenge to the Sales Tax Officer's authority failed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statute itself confers or prescribes a power on an officer appointed under it, that officer may exercise the power without a separate written delegation from the Commissioner.

Issues: (i) Whether the suo motu revision proceedings initiated on the same factual foundation after sanction for review, and after the review proceedings had been dropped, were maintainable under the Jharkhand Value Added Tax Act, 2005. (ii) Whether the revisional authority validly exercised jurisdiction under Section 80(4) of the Jharkhand Value Added Tax Act, 2005 without calling for and examining the relevant records and by disposing of the matter in undue haste.

Issue (i): Whether the suo motu revision proceedings initiated on the same factual foundation after sanction for review, and after the review proceedings had been dropped, were maintainable under the Jharkhand Value Added Tax Act, 2005.

Analysis: The refund applications had first led to review proceedings under Section 81 of the Jharkhand Value Added Tax Act, 2005 read with Rule 54 of the Jharkhand Value Added Tax Rules, 2006, and sanction for such review had been obtained from the Commissioner. Those proceedings were subsequently dropped. Thereafter, on the same set of grounds, a letter was placed before the revisional authority seeking suo motu revision under Section 80(4). The statutory scheme permits appeal and revision through the prescribed channels, but the use of a fresh revisional route on the very same grounds, after the review route had already been invoked and failed, was treated as an improper course and not a legally sound exercise of power.

Conclusion: The suo motu revision was not maintainable on the same grounds, and the objection of the assessee succeeded on this issue.

Issue (ii): Whether the revisional authority validly exercised jurisdiction under Section 80(4) of the Jharkhand Value Added Tax Act, 2005 without calling for and examining the relevant records and by disposing of the matter in undue haste.

Analysis: Section 80(4) requires the Commissioner to call for and examine the records of the proceeding and then satisfy himself as to the legality or propriety of the order before passing further orders. The record disclosed that the revisional authority proceeded on a letter from the assessing authority, recorded that the assessment records had been perused, but the relevant records were not shown to have been called for or available. The Tribunal's finding that the authority had mentioned perusal of records not on file was accepted. The short time-line, limited opportunity, and swift disposal were also treated as indicators of undue haste. On these facts, the jurisdictional precondition for revision was absent and the revisional order was vitiated.

Conclusion: The revisional order was invalid for want of jurisdictional compliance and procedural fairness, and this issue was decided against the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal's order setting aside the revisional order and restoring the original assessments was upheld, and the writ petitions failed.

Ratio Decidendi: Revisional power under Section 80(4) can be exercised only after the authority calls for and examines the relevant records and forms a lawful satisfaction on legality or propriety; a revision initiated on the same grounds after an earlier review process, without those jurisdictional steps, is unsustainable.

Issues: Whether a unit engaged in purification and packing of raw water as packaged drinking water was entitled to continue sales tax exemption or tax remission for the unexpired period under the earlier concession scheme and the substituted remission scheme, notwithstanding the statutory definition of manufacture under the later tax law.

Analysis: The concessional regime under the earlier industrial policy and the 1997 concession scheme was linked to manufactured finished products and later stood substituted by the 2005 remission scheme framed under the transitional provision of the 2003 tax statute. The later scheme was expressly required to operate in conformity with the 2003 Act, and remission under that scheme was available only where the eligible unit manufactured goods in Assam. The Court applied the statutory definition of manufacture under the 2003 Act and the earlier binding precedent holding that purification of raw water into packaged drinking water does not bring into existence a new and distinct commercial commodity. On that basis, the activity of converting raw water into packaged drinking water was held not to amount to manufacture. The claim based on prior eligibility certificates, promissory estoppel, and the earlier concession structure could not override the statutory scheme, and exemption notifications were required to be construed strictly.

Conclusion: The petitioner was not entitled to tax remission on packaged drinking water under the 2003 Act and the 2005 scheme.