Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to interest on the delayed refund of VAT and, if so, at what rate and from which date the interest was payable.

Analysis: The refund claim was found to have been validly made under the VAT regime, and the statutory framework provided that refund interest would accrue after ninety days from the date of the refund application. The refund application was filed on 16.09.2020, so interest commenced after the expiry of ninety days and could not be shifted to the later date on which the Department processed the interest claim. The Court also held that the exclusion of time relating to the COVID-19 limitation orders did not apply to the computation of interest on a refund, since the matter concerned payment of money already due and not institution of proceedings. On the facts, the Court further accepted that the petitioner was entitled to enhanced compensation for the delayed use of the money and rejected the Department's reduced-calculation approach.

Conclusion: The petitioner was entitled to interest on the refunded amount for the period of delay, and the applicable rate was 9% per annum, with payment of the differential interest directed after deducting the amount already paid.

Issues: (i) Whether the plaintiff was entitled to recover the differential tax amount and balance consideration, including the amount paid on account of non-furnishing of Form-C; (ii) Whether the suit was liable to be dismissed for non-compliance with Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.

Issue (i): Whether the plaintiff was entitled to recover the differential tax amount and balance consideration, including the amount paid on account of non-furnishing of Form-C.

Analysis: The purchase order expressly provided that the price was inclusive of taxes and that Form-C would be provided. The invoice reflected CST at 2% against Form-C. The plaintiff proved, through the assessment material and waiver order, that it had in fact suffered and paid the differential tax attributable to the defendant's failure to furnish Form-C. The defendant did not discharge the burden of proving that Form-C had been forwarded, and no supporting communication or documentary proof was produced. The attempt to rely on additional evidence at the appellate stage did not displace the plaintiff's proved liability.

Conclusion: The plaintiff was entitled to recover the claimed amount of Rs. 9,54,094/-, and the finding on this issue was in favour of the plaintiff.

Issue (ii): Whether the suit was liable to be dismissed for non-compliance with Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.

Analysis: The suit was instituted along with an application for urgent interim relief under Order XXXVIII Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. In the facts of the case, the plaintiff's need for immediate protection could not be treated as a mere ruse. Although pre-institution mediation under Section 12A is mandatory, the urgency-based exception was attracted on the facts. The Supreme Court's pronouncement on mandatory compliance was noted, but its prospective operation preserved the present suit.

Conclusion: The suit was not barred for want of pre-institution mediation, and this issue was decided against the appellants.

Final Conclusion: The decree in favour of the plaintiff was upheld, and the appeal failed on both grounds.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the contract expressly requires Form-C to enable concessional sales tax, the party asserting supply of Form-C bears the burden of proving it by cogent evidence; and pre-institution mediation under Section 12A does not bar a suit where the facts bring the matter within the urgent interim relief exception, particularly in view of the prospective operation of the mandatory-rule decision.

Issues: Whether the secured creditor bank had priority over the Commercial Taxes Department in relation to the mortgaged property and the lease rentals, and whether the impugned notices and communications under the sales tax recovery provisions could be sustained.

Analysis: The bank's security interest was created in 1991, much before the tax department's impugned demands. Section 26E of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 gives priority to secured creditors after registration of security interest, notwithstanding any other law. Section 24 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 creates a charge and a recovery mechanism, but it does not create a first charge. The Court held that the special priority rule in Section 26E, together with the overriding effect of the secured-creditor regime, prevails over the department's claim. The authorities relied on by the Revenue were distinguished on the basis that they concerned statutes creating a specific first charge or different legal contexts.

Conclusion: The secured creditor's claim had priority over the sales tax department's demand, and the impugned notices and communications were unsustainable.

Issues: Whether Rule 18(3)(b) of the Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Rules, 2005 could be applied to deny refund or forfeit excess tax collected from a dealer executing works contract for the Central Government through Indian Railways, when Section 22(3-A) of the Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005 is confined to Government or local authority.

Analysis: Section 22(3) of the Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005 covers deductions in respect of works contracts executed for the Central Government, the State Government and the other bodies mentioned therein. Section 22(3-A), read with the definition of Government in Section 2(18), is confined to the State Government of Andhra Pradesh and local authority. Rule 18(3) is expressly linked to tax collected under Section 22(3-A), and therefore its forfeiture mechanism cannot be extended to works contracts executed for the Central Government. The absence of coverage under Section 22(3-A) means the State could not refuse refund by invoking Rule 18(3)(b).

Conclusion: The refund could not be denied under Rule 18(3)(b), and the petitioner was entitled to refund of the excess amount with interest.

Issues: Whether the revisional show-cause notices under Section 32(1) of the Telangana Value Added Tax Act, 2005 were liable to be interfered with at the threshold.

Analysis: Section 32(1) empowers the revisional authority to call for the record and to revise, modify or set aside an order if it is prejudicial to the interests of revenue. The challenge was not based on lack of competence. The notices were only tentative in nature, and the petitioners could raise all objections, including distinction of the Supreme Court decision relied upon in the notices and reliance on State circulars, in their replies. The settled principle is that interference at the show-cause notice stage is exceptional and is not warranted unless the notice is wholly without jurisdiction or otherwise non est. The notices here were neither sketchy nor cryptic in the sense that would justify interference.

Conclusion: The revisional show-cause notices were not liable to be interfered with and the challenge failed.

Final Conclusion: The writ petitions were disposed of, leaving the petitioners to pursue their objections before the revisional authority in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: A tentative show-cause notice invoking revisional power will not be quashed at the threshold unless it is shown to be wholly without jurisdiction or otherwise non est; objections on merits and on prejudice to revenue are to be raised before the issuing authority.

The core legal questions considered by the Court were:

(a) Whether sub-rule (20) of Rule 17 of the Central Sales Tax (Rajasthan) Rules, 1957, which empowers the cancellation of declaration forms or certificates issued under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, is intra vires the rule-making powers conferred on the State Government under Sections 8(4), 13(1)(d), 13(3), and 13(4)(e) of the CST Act.

(b) Whether the State Government had the authority to enact a rule enabling cancellation of validly issued declarations/forms, especially given that the Central Government had prescribed the form and particulars of such declarations.

(c) Whether the cancellation of Form C declarations issued to certain dealers on the ground of bogus business premises and non-functioning commercial activities was legally valid.

(d) The extent and limits of the rule-making powers under Section 13 of the CST Act, particularly the interplay between the Central Government's rule-making power under Section 13(1) and the State Government's power under Sections 13(3) and (4).

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue (a) and (b): Validity of sub-rule (20) of Rule 17 of the Rajasthan Rules and the scope of State rule-making power under the CST Act

The relevant legal framework includes Sections 8 and 13 of the CST Act. Section 8(1) sets the tax liability on dealers selling goods in the course of inter-State trade, subject to the condition in Section 8(4) that the dealer furnishes a declaration in a prescribed form. The term "prescribed" refers to rules made under Section 13.

Section 13(1)(d) confers rule-making power exclusively on the Central Government to prescribe the form and particulars of declarations or certificates under the CST Act. The Central Government exercised this power and framed the Central Registration Rules, 1957, prescribing Form C as the declaration under Section 8(4).

Section 13(3) empowers the State Government to make rules "not inconsistent" with the CST Act and rules made by the Central Government, to carry out the purposes of the Act. Section 13(4) enumerates specific purposes for which the State Government may make rules, none of which explicitly include cancellation of declarations or certificates.

The Court interpreted these provisions to establish that the Central Government alone has the authority to prescribe the form and contents of declarations under Section 8(4), and that the State Government's rule-making power is subordinate and must not conflict with rules made by the Central Government.

The Court found that the Central Registration Rules do not provide any authority to cancel Form C declarations. Therefore, any State rule purporting to enable cancellation of such declarations is inconsistent with the Central Rules and hence ultra vires.

The Court relied on precedents, particularly the decision in R. Nand Lal & Co., which held that the State Government cannot enact rules inconsistent with the Central Government's rules under Section 13(1), especially regarding declarations.

The appellant's argument that sub-rule (20) was enacted to prevent fraud and evasion was acknowledged, but the Court held that such objectives cannot override the statutory limitations on rule-making powers and the requirement of consistency with Central Government rules.

Issue (c): Legality of cancellation of Form C declarations on grounds of bogus business premises

The facts showed that the revenue authorities inspected the business premises of two dealers to whom the respondent had sold goods against Form C declarations. The inspections revealed no business activity, and the registrations of these dealers were found to be bogus. Consequently, the declarations were cancelled under sub-rule (20) of Rule 17 of the Rajasthan Rules.

The Court observed that while the cancellation orders were based on findings of fraud and non-functioning businesses, the power to cancel declarations was derived from a rule that was ultra vires the CST Act. Since the rule enabling cancellation was invalid, the cancellation orders made under it were also invalid.

The Court noted that the CST Act provides specific provisions for cancellation of registration certificates (Section 7(5)) but does not provide for cancellation of declarations such as Form C. Hence, cancellation of declarations must be governed strictly by the rules framed by the Central Government, which do not authorize such cancellation.

Issue (d): Interplay between Central and State rule-making powers under Section 13 of the CST Act

The Court analyzed the scheme of Section 13, emphasizing that the Central Government has exclusive power under sub-section (1) to make rules prescribing forms and particulars of declarations and certificates. The State Government's power under sub-section (3) is to make rules to carry out the purposes of the Act but must not be inconsistent with Central Government rules.

Further, sub-section (4) of Section 13 enumerates specific areas for State rules, none of which include cancellation of declarations. The Court held that the State cannot, under the guise of sub-section (3), enact rules inconsistent with the Central Government's rules, such as sub-rule (20) of Rule 17.

The Court found that the Rajasthan Rules providing for cancellation of declarations conflicted with the Central Registration Rules and thus were ultra vires.

3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS

The Court held:

"The State Government cannot frame rules under Section 13(3) of the CST Act which are inconsistent with the rules framed by the Central Government under Section 13(1) of the CST Act."

"The Central Registration Rules framed by the Central Government prescribe the form of declaration (Form C) under Section 8(4) of the CST Act and do not confer any power on any authority to cancel such declaration forms."

"Sub-rule (20) of Rule 17 of the Central Sales Tax (Rajasthan) Rules, 1957, which provides for cancellation of declaration forms or certificates, is ultra vires Sections 8(4), 13(1)(d), 13(3), and 13(4)(e) of the CST Act."

"The cancellation of declaration forms of M/s. H.G. International and M/s. Saraswati Enterprises made under the impugned sub-rule (20) is invalid as the rule itself is inconsistent with the Central Government's rules and beyond the State Government's legislative competence."

Core principles established include the primacy of Central Government rule-making powers under the CST Act regarding declarations and certificates, and the requirement that State Government rules must be consistent with those Central rules. The State cannot enact standalone rules enabling cancellation of declarations where no such power is conferred by the CST Act or Central Government rules.

Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed, affirming the High Court's judgment that sub-rule (20) of Rule 17 of the Rajasthan Rules is ultra vires and invalid.

Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of by leaving it open to the petitioner to avail the remedy before the Additional Deputy Commissioner, with the period spent in the writ proceedings directed to be excluded for limitation purposes and no additional pre-deposit insisted upon as a condition for filing the appeal.

Issues: Whether a mobile charger sold along with a cell phone is to be treated as a part of the cell phone for tax purposes under the H.P. VAT Act, 2005, and whether the Tribunal was correct in applying the Supreme Court's Nokia ruling to hold otherwise.

Analysis: The statutory entry under the H.P. VAT Act, 2005 taxed cell phones, but did not expressly include chargers or accessories. The Court held that the Supreme Court's decision in Nokia India governed the issue because it had already determined that a mobile charger is an accessory and not a constituent part of the cell phone. The Court rejected the contention that bundled retail sale or one MRP by itself converts the charger into a composite part of the phone. It also held that decisions rendered under materially different statutory entries, including those under the U.P. VAT Act and Karnataka VAT Act, did not displace the binding effect of the Supreme Court's ruling on the pari materia statutory scheme. The Court further held that the Tribunal had misread the applicable entry and the binding law, and that the charger remained independently taxable.

Conclusion: The charger is an accessory and not a part of the cell phone, and the Tribunal's contrary view was ; the assessee's challenge failed and the Revenue's position was accepted.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the taxing entry covers cell phones but does not include accessories, a mobile charger sold with a handset remains an accessory and is separately taxable, and bundled retail sale does not alter its independent character.

- Whether the Commercial Tax Tribunal erred in remanding the matter back to the assessing authority for fresh assessment despite having recorded findings in favor of the revisionistRs.

- Whether the Tribunal, as the last fact-finding authority, ought to have decided the issues on the basis of the material available on record instead of remanding the caseRs.

- Whether remanding the matter for fresh assessment amounted to granting the department an opportunity for a fishing and roving enquiry, which is impermissibleRs.

- Whether the deletion of turnover enhancement based on purchase of wheat by twenty trucks was rightly considered and whether the appeal filed by the revenue on this ground was justifiably dismissedRs.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue 1 & 2: Legitimacy of the Tribunal's Remand Instead of Deciding on Merits

Relevant legal framework and precedents: The Court referred to a precedent from this High Court in the case of Indian Sugar & General Engineering Corporation (supra), which emphasized that appellate authorities should exercise the power to remand sparingly. The preference is to decide matters finally at the appellate stage when sufficient material is available on record. Remand is justified only when the appellate authority finds that the material on record is insufficient for decision and further factual investigation or enquiry is necessary. Rule 68(8) of the relevant Rules permits seeking reports if factual queries arise during appeal adjudication.

Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Court observed that the Tribunal had before it all the material necessary to decide the matter. The Tribunal had allowed the revisionist's appeal and dismissed the revenue's appeal but still remanded the matter for fresh assessment. The Court found this approach to be a misdirection because the Tribunal, as the final fact-finding authority, should have adjudicated the matter on merits rather than providing a fresh opportunity to the assessing authority to reconsider the same material.

Key evidence and findings: The assessment order was based on a survey report and rejection of books of accounts, estimating tax on turnover including purchase of wheat and packing materials from unregistered dealers. The revisionist's first appeal partly deleted the turnover enhancement related to twenty trucks and granted partial relief on best judgment assessment. Both parties filed second appeals; the Tribunal allowed the revisionist's appeal and dismissed the revenue's appeal but remanded the matter.

Application of law to facts: Since all relevant material was on record, the Tribunal's remand for fresh assessment was equivalent to granting the department a "fresh innings" without new material or investigation. This was contrary to the principle that remand should be sparingly used and only when factual investigation is necessary. The Court held that the Tribunal should have decided the appeal on merits and could have sought factual clarifications under Rule 68(8) if needed, rather than remanding the entire matter.

Treatment of competing arguments: The revenue argued that the revisionist had himself pleaded for an opportunity to rebut material regarding the twenty trucks, justifying remand. The Court, however, found that the Tribunal had recorded findings against the revisionist but remanded nonetheless, which was unjustified. The Court noted an apparent inadvertent mistake in recording the dismissal of the revenue appeal but emphasized that the remand was improper regardless.

Conclusions: The Court concluded that the Tribunal's remand was not justified as it had sufficient material to decide the matter. The remand was quashed, and the matter was directed to be decided by the Tribunal on merits expeditiously.

Issue 3: Whether Remand Amounted to Permitting Fishing and Roving Enquiry

Relevant legal framework and precedents: The principle against allowing fishing and roving enquiries is well-settled, emphasizing that tax authorities cannot be granted repeated opportunities to reopen settled issues without new material or cause.

Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Court observed that by remanding the matter for fresh assessment despite having all material before it, the Tribunal effectively permitted the department a fishing and roving enquiry. This was impermissible and contrary to the principle of finality in tax proceedings.

Key evidence and findings: The Tribunal's order remanded the matter for fresh adjudication despite dismissing the revenue's appeal and allowing the revisionist's appeal, indicating no new material or investigation was necessary.

Application of law to facts: The Court applied the principle that remand should not be used to prolong proceedings or allow repeated assessments on the same material, thereby preventing harassment and delay.

Treatment of competing arguments: The revenue's argument that the revisionist sought opportunity to rebut was rejected as the Tribunal had already recorded findings and remand was not warranted.

Conclusions: The Court held that the remand amounted to impermissible fishing and roving enquiry and was therefore improper.

Issue 4: Deletion of Turnover Enhancement Based on Twenty Trucks and Dismissal of Revenue Appeal on This Ground

Relevant legal framework and precedents: The assessment order included enhancement of turnover based on purchase of wheat via twenty trucks from unregistered dealers. The revisionist's first appeal deleted this enhancement partly. The revenue's appeal against this deletion was dismissed by the Tribunal.

Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Court noted that the Tribunal had allowed the revisionist's appeal and dismissed the revenue's appeal on this ground. However, despite this, the matter was remanded for fresh assessment, which was contradictory and unjustified.

Key evidence and findings: The deletion of turnover enhancement related to the twenty trucks was upheld in the appellate proceedings, and the revenue's challenge to this was rejected.

Application of law to facts: Since the revenue's appeal on this ground was dismissed, the Tribunal should have upheld the deletion and decided the matter accordingly without remand.

Treatment of competing arguments: The revenue contended that the revisionist's plea for opportunity to rebut justified remand, but the Court found this unpersuasive given the Tribunal's dismissal of the revenue's appeal.

Conclusions: The Court held that the deletion of the turnover enhancement was rightly upheld and remanding the matter despite this was erroneous.

3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS

- "Remand should be made only in a situation when it is found that on the basis of the material available on record, decision is not possible at the appellate stage and the matter requires factual investigation and enquiry."

- "The appellate authority has power to remand the case for fresh decision but such power should be exercised sparingly and preference should be to decide the matter finally instead of keeping the matter pending for long time."

- "Effort should be that the proceeding should be finally closed and settled as early as possible. Unnecessary remand of the case, keep the matter pending for long time and delay in reaching to finality."

- "In the present case, all the materials relating to the nature of transaction are available and on the basis of such materials, decision is only required to be taken. Therefore, in my view, remand of the case is not justified."

- The Tribunal erred in remanding the matter for fresh assessment despite having recorded findings in favor of the revisionist and dismissing the revenue's appeal.

- Remanding the matter amounted to granting the department an impermissible "fresh innings" and facilitated fishing and roving enquiry.

- The matter is remanded to the Tribunal with directions to decide the appeals by passing reasoned and speaking orders expeditiously after hearing all stakeholders.

Issues: Whether input tax credit was admissible to a dealer whose sales were covered by clause (c) of section 7 of the Uttar Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2008 read with the notifications dated 24.02.2010 and 25.03.2010, in view of the embargo in section 13(7) of the Act.

Analysis: The turnover in question was admittedly brought within section 7(c) by the notifications issued for direct sale to manufacturer-exporters on Form-E. Section 13(1) provides the general scheme for input tax credit, but section 13(7) creates an express restriction and denies input tax credit where the sale of goods is exempt under section 7(c). The statutory bar is clear and operates notwithstanding any policy objective behind the exemption notifications. In tax law, the clear legislative command governs eligibility for credit, and the dealer could not claim input tax credit contrary to the express prohibition.

Conclusion: Input tax credit was not admissible, and the denial/reversal of credit was upheld in favour of the revenue.

The core legal questions considered by the Court are:

• Whether the demand for payment of interest @ 9% from the date of filing of the return, as raised by the Department under the Orissa Entry Tax Act, 1999, is legally sustainable.
• Whether the interim order passed by the Supreme Court, restraining coercive action against certain assessees, operates in rem (applicable to all similarly situated assessees) or in personem (applicable only to the petitioners before the Supreme Court).
• Whether the petitioner, who did not file a special leave petition against the High Court's order dated 15th March 2023, can claim the benefit of the Supreme Court's interim order.
• Whether the High Court was competent to direct the levy of compensatory interest for the interregnum period between the date of filing of the return and the Supreme Court's judgment.
• The procedural propriety and legal effect of the writ petition filed by the petitioner seeking relief against the interest demand after having accepted the High Court's order.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue 1: Legality of the demand for interest @ 9% from the date of filing of the return

Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The demand arises under the Orissa Entry Tax Act, 1999, which empowers the Department to levy entry tax and interest on delayed payments. The Supreme Court upheld the vires of the Act and the Department's competence to impose tax on specified transactions.

Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court noted that the demand for interest was challenged on multiple grounds, including the legality of imposing interest for the interregnum period. The Apex Court's decision affirmed the Department's authority to impose tax, but the question of interest for the period prior to the Supreme Court's judgment remained contentious.

Key Evidence and Findings: The Department issued a demand letter for interest @ 9% from the date of filing of the return. The petitioner had deposited 2/3rd of the demand post the Supreme Court judgment but contested the interest component for the earlier period.

Application of Law to Facts: The Court recognized the Department's statutory right to levy interest but acknowledged the ongoing litigation regarding the period for which interest is chargeable.

Treatment of Competing Arguments: The petitioner argued that interest for the interregnum period should not be charged due to the pendency of litigation and the interim order by the Supreme Court. The Department contended that the demand was valid and enforceable.

Conclusion: The Court deferred the ultimate decision on the legality of interest for the interregnum period to the Apex Court but upheld the Department's right to demand interest subject to the final outcome.

Issue 2: Nature and scope of the Supreme Court's interim order

Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: Interim orders by the Supreme Court typically bind the parties before it (in personem) unless expressly stated to operate generally (in rem).

Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court examined whether the interim order restraining coercive action against assessees who approached the Supreme Court applies to all assessees or only those petitioners. It concluded that the interim order is in personem, binding only the parties who filed the special leave petitions.

Key Evidence and Findings: The petitioner did not file a special leave petition against the High Court's order dated 15th March 2023, and therefore was not covered by the Supreme Court's interim order.

Application of Law to Facts: Since the petitioner was not a party to the Supreme Court proceedings granting interim relief, it cannot claim the benefit of such order.

Treatment of Competing Arguments: The petitioner contended that the interim order should benefit all assessees to avoid multiplicity of litigation and confusion. The Department argued that the order is limited to the petitioners before the Supreme Court.

Conclusion: The Court held that the interim order is not a general order in rem and does not extend to the petitioner who did not challenge the High Court's order before the Apex Court.

Issue 3: Competence of the High Court to direct compensatory interest for the interregnum period

Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The High Court's power to issue directions in writ proceedings includes the ability to grant relief as deemed just and proper, subject to appellate review.

Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court acknowledged that the question of whether the High Court was competent to direct compensatory interest @ 9% for the period between filing of the return and the Supreme Court judgment is a matter reserved for the Apex Court's determination.

Key Evidence and Findings: The High Court's order dated 15th March 2023 directed payment of the remaining 2/3rd of the demand with interest from the date of the Supreme Court order and compensatory interest for the interregnum period.

Application of Law to Facts: The Court refrained from interfering with the High Court's directions pending final adjudication by the Apex Court.

Treatment of Competing Arguments: The petitioner challenged the imposition of interest for the interregnum period; the Department supported the High Court's directions.

Conclusion: The issue remains pending before the Supreme Court, and this Court declined to stay or alter the High Court's order.

Issue 4: Procedural propriety of the writ petition filed after acceptance of the High Court's order

Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The principle that a party cannot seek review or re-agitate issues already adjudicated in the absence of statutory or procedural provisions allowing review.

Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court observed that since the petitioner had accepted the High Court's order dated 15th March 2023 without challenging it before the Apex Court, the present writ petition effectively seeks impermissible review.

Key Evidence and Findings: No special leave petition was filed by the petitioner against the High Court order; the writ petition was filed subsequently challenging the interest demand.

Application of Law to Facts: The Court treated the writ petition as an attempt to circumvent the finality of the High Court's order.

Treatment of Competing Arguments: The petitioner argued that the writ petition was necessary due to confusion over applicability of the Supreme Court's interim order; the Department contended it was a collateral attack on a binding judgment.

Conclusion: The Court held that the writ petition was not maintainable as a review and disposed of the petition accordingly.

Issue 5: Equitable relief and deposit of disputed amount

Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: To balance the rights of the parties and avoid prejudice pending final adjudication, the Court directed the petitioner to deposit the demanded amount within two months, without prejudice to the parties' rights.

Application of Law to Facts: This direction was to mitigate uncertainty and ensure that the Department's demand is not rendered nugatory, while preserving the petitioner's right to challenge the demand before the Apex Court.

Conclusion: The deposit direction was issued as an interim measure to maintain equilibrium between the parties.

3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS

"Since there is no express order of stay of operation of the said order and the petitioner being not an applicant in any of the special leave petitions pending before the Supreme Court, we do not find any justification in extending the benefit of the interim order at this stage."

"Whether the High Court was within its competence to direct the compensatory interest to be levied on the assessee for the interregnum period between the date of filing of the return and the judgment of the Apex Court, is a matter to be decided by the Apex Court."

"Any deposit as demanded would sub serve the justice as the same would be subject to an outcome of the decision taken by the Apex Court provided it inure to the benefit of all the assessees whether they approached the Apex Court or not."

The Court established the principle that interim orders passed by the Supreme Court are generally in personem and do not automatically extend to non-parties.

The Court reaffirmed the finality of the High Court's order dated 15th March 2023 in the absence of challenge before the Apex Court and held that collateral attempts to review such order through writ petitions are impermissible.

The Court emphasized the importance of equitable interim relief by directing deposit of the disputed amount to balance the rights of the parties pending final adjudication.

Issues: (i) Whether the goods manufactured and supplied by the petitioner were classifiable as IT products or capital goods taxable at 5%, or whether they fell under the residuary entry attracting tax at 13.75%; (ii) Whether penalty under section 16(8) of the Himachal Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005 was validly imposed.

Issue (i): Whether the goods manufactured and supplied by the petitioner were classifiable as IT products or capital goods taxable at 5%, or whether they fell under the residuary entry attracting tax at 13.75%.

Analysis: The goods supplied, including smart tables, display counters, leaflet holders, spec card holders, glass counters, experience counters and similar items, did not answer the description of the IT products listed in entry No. 60 of Schedule A. Mere use of sophisticated electrical or electronic features, or manufacture to special design, did not bring such goods within the specified entry. The goods also did not satisfy the definition of "capital goods" under section 2(d), as they were neither plant, machinery nor equipment used in the process of manufacture, processing or packing of goods for sale. They were therefore assessable under the residuary entry.

Conclusion: The classification at the higher residuary rate was upheld and the challenge to the tax levy failed.

Issue (ii): Whether penalty under section 16(8) of the Himachal Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005 was validly imposed.

Analysis: The petitioner described the goods differently in declarations and invoices, while the goods were not covered by its registration certificate. This amounted to concealment of particulars and furnishing of false or incorrect information within the meaning of section 16(8). The contention that the matter was only a rate dispute was rejected, and the notice under section 21(1) was held inapplicable. The record also showed service of notice before penalty, negativing the plea of breach of natural justice.

Conclusion: The penalty was held to be valid and the challenge to its imposition failed.

Final Conclusion: The petition was found to be without merit because the goods were correctly taxed at the residuary rate and the penalty was lawfully imposed.

Ratio Decidendi: Goods are taxable under a specific concessional entry only when they clearly satisfy the statutory description, and a dispute over classification coupled with incorrect disclosure may justify penalty where the statutory ingredients of concealment or false particulars are established.

Issues: Whether the rejection of the account books and the best judgment assessment based on survey findings and eye estimation of stock were legally sustainable.

Analysis: The assessment was founded on a survey in which stock was valued by eye estimation without actual weighment. Such estimation was treated as the sole basis for disbelieving the books of account and for making the assessment. Under Section 28(5) of the U.P. Value Added Tax Act, assessment power must rest on credible material, as contemplated by Section 28(2)(ii). Mere eye estimation of goods does not amount to credible material for sustaining best judgment assessment. The impugned orders were therefore contrary to the settled legal position that stock valuation cannot be made only on visual approximation.

Conclusion: The rejection of the books and the assessment based on eye estimation were not justified, and the revision was allowed.

Issues: Whether penalty under Section 34(8) of the U.P. VAT Act, 2008 was justified for delayed deposit of deducted tax and whether the quantum of penalty required reduction in the facts of the case.

Analysis: The delayed deposit was accompanied by payment of interest, and the surrounding circumstances showed that the delay arose in the course of governmental processing and was not treated as warranting the maximum penalty. The earlier authorities had not given due weight to the explanation offered, while an identical fact situation had already led to reduction of penalty. In view of the peculiar facts and the discretionary character of the penalty provision, the penalty was found liable to be scaled down.

Conclusion: The penalty was not sustained at the restored level of 200% and was confined to 1/4th of the amount, which had already been deposited; the issue was answered in favour of the assessee to that extent.

Final Conclusion: The revisions were allowed only to the extent of modifying the penalty order, and the substantive relief granted was reduction of the penalty burden in line with the assessee's explanation and the precedent relied upon.

Ratio Decidendi: Where delayed remittance is explained by bona fide administrative and interest is paid, a discretionary penalty under the VAT law may be reduced on proportionality grounds rather than sustained at the maximum level.

Issues: Whether the levy of trade tax and additional tax under the Uttar Pradesh Trade Tax Act could together exceed the ceiling of 26% prescribed under Section 3-A, and whether the later deletion of Section 3-E affected the legality of the levy for the relevant assessment years.

Analysis: Liability to tax arose under Section 3, while the rate of trade tax was prescribed under Section 3-A and the additional levy under Section 3-E. The provisions operated in different fields: trade tax and additional tax were separate and distinct imposts. The court held that the ceiling in Section 3-A governed the trade tax rate, but did not curtail the separate statutory levy of additional tax under Section 3-E. The later legislative omission of Section 3-E could not control the legality of the levy for earlier assessment years, and the subsequent amendment relied upon did not displace the plain meaning of the provisions applicable at the relevant time.

Conclusion: The challenge to the levy failed. The questions of law were answered against the assessee and in favour of the revenue, and the revisions were dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the statute creates separate charging provisions for trade tax and additional tax, the prescribed ceiling for one levy does not limit the other unless the statute expressly so provides.

Issues: Whether entry tax for the period from 01.04.2005 to 29.05.2005 could be recovered from the petitioner manufacturer in view of the Government circular and the finding recorded in the assessment order.

Analysis: The writ petition was disposed of on the basis of the Government circular dated 18.10.2006, which stated that entry tax and interest for the relevant period would not be recovered from a manufacturer if the tax had not been realized from the purchaser, though no refund would be made where tax had already been deposited. The assessment order itself contained a finding that the petitioner had not realized entry tax from its customers for the relevant period and that recovery was to remain stayed. In these circumstances, the circular continued to govern the field and the authorities were bound by it.

Conclusion: No recovery of entry tax for the period from 01.04.2005 to 29.05.2005 could be made from the petitioner.

Issues: Whether delivery of telecom equipment on a 24-month trial basis with deferred payment and an option to purchase, coupled with non-return of the goods, amounted to a sale exigible to VAT under the Punjab Value Added Tax Act, 2005.

Analysis: The agreement showed that the equipment was supplied for trial use for 24 months, that price was specified in the agreement and delivery challans, that payment was structured in installments after the trial period, and that the goods were to be returned if not accepted. The Court held that the arrangement could not be characterised merely by the private description given by the parties when the transaction otherwise satisfied the statutory definition of sale. The goods were not returned, and the deferred-payment structure brought the transaction within the inclusive definition of sale under Section 2(zf), including transfer of the right to use goods for consideration.

Conclusion: The transaction constituted a sale liable to tax, and the challenge to the demand failed.

Ratio Decidendi: A transaction structured as trial use with deferred payment and a contractual option to purchase is a taxable sale where the goods are delivered for consideration and are not returned in accordance with the agreement.

Issues: Whether the Tribunal was justified in rejecting the restoration application and whether the second restoration application should have been allowed by restoring the earlier restoration application in the second appeal.

Analysis: The petition concerned restoration of proceedings in a long-pending tax appeal. The reason for non-appearance was to be assessed on the facts of the case, and the Tribunal was required to consider whether restoration could be permitted in the interest of adjudication on merits, particularly where the petitioners sought to place Form-F on record for the pending appeal. Rejection merely on the ground of pendency of the litigation and non-payment of tax demand was found to be an insufficient basis to deny restoration. The proper course was to restore the matter with costs so that the appeal could be heard on merits in accordance with law.

Conclusion: The rejection of the restoration application was unsustainable, and restoration of the earlier restoration application in the second appeal was warranted in favour of the petitioners, subject to costs.

Issues: Whether the writ petitions were to be entertained despite the availability of an efficacious statutory appeal under the relevant tax statute, and whether the petitioners could successfully insist on writ adjudication on the ground of alleged want of proper notice or opportunity of hearing.

Analysis: The statutory framework provided an appellate remedy against orders passed under Section 49 of the Chhattisgarh Value Added Tax, 2005. The Court noted that the distinction between maintainability and entertainability is material: existence of an alternate remedy does not render a writ petition nonexistent, but the writ court may decline to exercise jurisdiction where a statutory forum is available. The prior Division Bench view was that the petitioners were aware of the nature of the proceedings and could not deny opportunity of hearing on that basis. The Court also relied on settled Supreme Court authority that, particularly in tax matters, the normal rule is exhaustion of the statutory remedy, subject only to limited exceptions.

Conclusion: The writ petitions were not to be entertained, and the petitioners were to pursue the statutory appeal remedy.

Issues: Whether the assessee was entitled to interest on the delayed refund of excess tax deposited under the Jharkhand Value Added Tax Act, and from what date such interest was payable.

Analysis: The refund application was not decided within the statutory period, and the refund itself was released only during the pendency of the writ petition. The record did not disclose any justification for the delay in processing the refund or for withholding the amount after the refund application was filed. The Court held that non-allocation of funds could not defeat the statutory mandate governing timely refund, and that interest was payable as recompense for the period during which the assessee was deprived of the use of its money. On the facts, the Court also accepted the assessee's case that the excess demand notice was received much later than its date, and therefore the period for interest had to run from the date of the demand notice, with adjustment for the time taken by the assessee to file the refund application after receipt of that notice.

Conclusion: The assessee was held entitled to 6% simple interest on the refunded amount from 31 August 2020 until payment of the principal amount, after excluding the period taken by the assessee to file the refund application after receiving the demand notice.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition succeeded, and the refund delay was held to carry compensatory interest liability in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statutory refund is withheld beyond the prescribed period without justification, interest becomes payable as compensation for deprivation of money, and the refund authority cannot defeat that liability by administrative delay or lack of fund allocation.