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Issues: (i) Whether the writ petitions were maintainable despite the statutory appellate remedy under section 76 of the Regulation; (ii) whether the notice of assessment of tax and interest under section 32 was barred by limitation; (iii) whether the impugned notices were vitiated by breach of the principles of natural justice.
Issue (i): Whether the writ petitions were maintainable despite the statutory appellate remedy under section 76 of the Regulation.
Analysis: The Regulation provides a complete appellate mechanism before the Appellate Tribunal. The Court reiterated that availability of an efficacious alternative remedy is a rule of self-imposed restraint, particularly in fiscal matters. The petitioner had also chosen to invoke the statutory objection procedure under section 74 and suffered an adverse reasoned order. Since the Tribunal was subsequently constituted and was functional, the disputes ought to be tested in the statutory forum rather than in writ jurisdiction. The challenge did not disclose any exceptional ground warranting bypass of the appellate remedy.
Conclusion: The writ petitions were not maintainable on the ground of alternative remedy and the petitioners were to be relegated to the Appellate Tribunal.
Issue (ii): Whether the notice of assessment of tax and interest under section 32 was barred by limitation.
Analysis: The limitation plea depended upon disputed facts, including whether returns were duly filed and from which point the statutory period had to be computed. The respondents disputed the petitioner's factual foundation, and the returns were not placed before the Court. In these circumstances, limitation did not present a pure jurisdictional question fit for writ adjudication. The issue was better left to the statutory appellate forum, where evidence and factual controversy could be examined.
Conclusion: The notice was not held to be time-barred in writ jurisdiction, and the limitation objection was left to the statutory forum.
Issue (iii): Whether the impugned notices were vitiated by breach of the principles of natural justice.
Analysis: The statutory scheme did not require a pre-notice hearing before issuance of notices under sections 32 and 33. A post-decisional objection and hearing were available under section 74, and the petitioner in fact availed that remedy. The petitioner failed to demonstrate any actual prejudice caused by the absence of an earlier hearing. On that basis, the Court held that the notices were not invalid for violation of natural justice.
Conclusion: The notices were not vitiated by breach of natural justice.
Final Conclusion: The writ petitions were not entertained on merits and the matters were relegated to the statutory appellate remedy, with pre-August 19, 2025 cases directed to be transmitted to the Appellate Tribunal and later cases dismissed so that all disputes could be decided under the statutory framework.
Ratio Decidendi: In fiscal matters, writ jurisdiction will ordinarily not be exercised where an effective statutory appellate remedy exists, especially when the dispute involves contested facts and the statute itself provides a post-decisional remedial mechanism; limitation and natural justice objections do not justify writ intervention unless they disclose a clear jurisdictional or exceptional infirmity.
Writ remedy and natural justice in fiscal notices: statutory appeal prevails where disputed facts and post-decisional objections exist.
In fiscal disputes under the Regulation, writ jurisdiction is ordinarily declined where an efficacious statutory appeal lies before the Appellate Tribunal, especially after the assessee has already used the statutory objection process under section 74. Limitation objections based on disputed facts, such as filing of returns and computation of the statutory period, are treated as matters for the statutory forum rather than writ review. Notices issued under sections 32 and 33 are also not invalid merely because no pre-notice hearing was given where the scheme provides a post-decisional objection and hearing mechanism under section 74 and no actual prejudice is shown.
Rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy / availability of an alternative efficacious statutory appeal - time bar u/s 34 (limitation for assessment and reassessment) - post decisional hearing u/s 74 as compliance with audi alteram partem - assessment to the best of judgment u/s 32 and penalty assessment u/s 33 - transfer of pre existing writ records to statutory Appellate Tribunal and dismissal of later petitions for availability of alternative remedy - HELD THAT:- In the present case, the petitioner submitted that it duly filed returns under the VAT Regulation 2017 for the four financial years in question. This has been denied by the respondents in their affidavit-in-opposition. Copies of returns have not been enclosed to the writ petition. Therefore, the facts of the case, on the hinges of which the issue of limitation has to be decided, are not admitted. Hence, the issue of limitation, in my opinion, does not partake the nature of a jurisdictional issue in the facts of this case. In my considered view, it cannot be said at this stage that the impugned notices dated December 31, 2024, are without jurisdiction and therefore, this writ petition is maintainable notwithstanding availability of the appellate remedy. In the course of hearing of this matter, it was mentioned by learned counsel for the respondents that the petitioner had, in fact, approached the writ court earlier. The Court refused to interfere and relegated the petitioner to the statutory avenue under section 74 of the Regulation to file objection to the impugned notices. Although no such court order is on record before me, even if that was the case, still the petitioner would not be entitled to maintain the present writ petition since the petitioner did not assail such order before any higher forum but acted in terms thereof. Under challenge in this writ petition is also an order of the Joint Commissioner dated July 22, 2025, rejecting the petitioner’s objection to the impugned notices. It is nobody’s case that said order suffers from jurisdictional error. The order may be an erroneous order but that would not entitle the petitioner to invoke the writ jurisdiction to challenge that order, bypassing the statutory remedy of appeal under section 76 of the Regulation. A taxing statute may provide for issuance of notice imposing a tax burden/penalty on an assessee without providing for a hearing prior to issuance of such notice. But the statute may provide for an objection being filed by the assessee to such notice and a full-fledged hearing being given by the authority issuing such notice. This would be post-decisional hearing but nonetheless would pass the test of fairness. The assessee would have full opportunity of assailing such notice and arguing why such notice should be withdrawn or modified. There has been no breach of the principles of nature justice on the part of the respondents in the present case. In any event, the petitioner has not been able to demonstrate any prejudice that it has suffered by not being granted a hearing prior to issuance of the notice of assessment of tax and interest and notice of penalty. It had full opportunity of hearing before the Joint Commissioner under section 74 of the 2017 Regulation, albeit post-facto. Therefore, unable to agree with the petitioner’s contention that this writ petition is maintainable in spite of there being an alternative remedy for the reason that principles of natural justice have been violated by the respondents in issuing the impugned notices. Whether it can be said that a writ petition is not maintainable when on the date of filing of the petition the alternative statutory remedy was illusory by reason of the statutory appellate tribunal being non-functional for want of presiding officer? - HELD THAT:- Once a writ petition is taken on record and affidavits are exchanged, at the final hearing the writ petition should not be dismissed on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy. However, those cases may not be relevant if at the final hearing the writ court is of the opinion that because of existence of disputed facts or for any other reason, the alternative remedy should be resorted to by the writ petitioner. This is a case where the disputes between the parties which pertain to a fiscal statute and to an extent are factual in nature, should be adjudicated by the Appellate Tribunal. I do not think that just because the writ petitioner was permitted to file this petition in the absence of a functional Appellate Tribunal, the same would give the petitioner any vested right to have the disputes adjudicated by the writ court. Therefore direct that the records of all those writ petitions out of the bunch of 47 petitions which have been heard, which were filed prior to August 19, 2025, be transferred/transmitted to the Appellate Tribunal constituted under section 73 of the VAT Regulation, 2017. All those writ petitioners as well as the respondents will be entitled to file additional pleadings before the Tribunal. The Tribunal will decide those cases in accordance with law. In respect of all those pre-August 19, 2025, cases, the Tribunal will not insist on pre-deposit being made in terms of section 76 of the VAT Regulation, 2017. The appeals will be decided within the statutory framework in accordance with the applicable laws, Rules and Regulations. The said writ petitions will be treated as disposed of insofar as the records of this Court are concerned. Insofar as the writ petitions filed on or after August 19, 2025, are concerned, the same shall stand dismissed solely on the ground of availability of an alternative statutory remedy. Those writ petitioners will be at liberty to approach the Appellate Tribunal. If any question of limitation/time-bar arises, the Tribunal shall decide the issue taking into consideration the applicable provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, and in particular section 14 thereof as also the factum of pendency of the writ petitions in this Court. I clarify that I have not touched the merits of the respective cases of the writ petitioners in the 47 writ petitions which are being disposed of by this judgment and order. The Appellate Tribunal is requested to decide the transferred cases or any appeal(s) that may be preferred by any or all of the writ petitioners whose petitions stand dismissed by this order, without being influenced by any observation in this judgment and order. All the writ petitions are disposed of on the above terms.