Issues: Whether GST reimbursement claims concerning contracts executed after 1 July 2017 could be denied by applying paragraph 3(iv), instead of paragraph 4, of Notification No. 5050-F(Y) dated August 16, 2017.

Analysis: A plain-meaning interpretation of the Notification distinguishes pre-GST contracts from post-GST contracts. Paragraph 3(iv) is confined to pre-GST contracts, whereas paragraph 4 applies to post-GST contracts and ongoing projects covered by its terms. Reliance on paragraph 3(iv) to reject a post-GST reimbursement claim was therefore based on a misconstruction of the Notification. The factual entitlement and quantification of the reimbursement claim were not adjudicated.

Conclusion: Paragraph 3(iv) cannot be invoked to deny GST reimbursement in respect of contracts executed after 1 July 2017; such claims fall for consideration under paragraph 4 of Notification No. 5050-F(Y) dated August 16, 2017.

Issues: (i) Whether the statutory minimum penalty under Section 73(9) could be interfered with on the plea that the breach was minor, absent a constitutional challenge; and (ii) Whether the assessment order required intervention because it was issued without affording a hearing.

Issue (i): Whether the statutory minimum penalty under Section 73(9) could be interfered with on the plea that the breach was minor, absent a constitutional challenge.

Analysis: The applicable GST provisions draw a distinction between Section 74(1), which does not prescribe a minimum amount, and Section 73(9), which prescribes a minimum penalty. Although that distinction may furnish a basis to challenge the validity of the provisions, no such challenge was made.

Conclusion: Interference with the statutory minimum penalty was not warranted in the absence of a constitutional challenge, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessment order required intervention because it was issued without affording a hearing.

Analysis: The order had been issued without giving the petitioner an opportunity of hearing. The alleged breach also appeared prima facie to be minor. Fair adjudication required an opportunity to contest the tax proposals on merits, upon remittance of the tax demand within the stipulated period.

Conclusion: The denial of hearing vitiated the assessment order, and the assessee was entitled to a reasonable opportunity to contest the tax proposals on merits upon payment of the tax demand, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: A challenge to the statutory penalty provision cannot succeed without directly questioning its validity, whereas an assessment made in breach of natural justice requires a fresh merits determination after affording a reasonable hearing.

Issues: Whether regular bail should be granted in a prosecution alleging fraudulent availment and transfer of input tax credit through bogus firms.

Analysis: The applicant had remained in custody since 23.06.2026, the investigation had culminated in filing of the charge-sheet, and the material was documentary in nature. Bail granted in similar matters and bail extended to another accused in a comparable case supported parity.

Conclusion: Regular bail was warranted on the recorded circumstances.

Issues: (i) Whether writ jurisdiction should be exercised despite the statutory appellate remedy where non-service of the show-cause notice and denial of personal hearing are alleged; (ii) Whether the absence of remand power with the Appellate Authority permits bypassing the statutory appeal.

Issue (i): Whether writ jurisdiction should be exercised despite the statutory appellate remedy where non-service of the show-cause notice and denial of personal hearing are alleged.

Analysis: Article 226 of the Constitution of India may be invoked notwithstanding an alternative remedy in exceptional cases involving jurisdictional error or breach of natural justice. The alleged non-service of the notice and denial of an effective personal hearing depended upon verification of the notices, their mode of service, receipt, and allied record. These were disputed factual matters suitable for determination in the statutory appeal under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. Any hearing-related infirmity was curable and did not establish a jurisdictional defect.

Conclusion: The alleged defects in service and hearing do not justify writ intervention and must be raised before the Appellate Authority.

Issue (ii): Whether the absence of remand power with the Appellate Authority permits bypassing the statutory appeal.

Analysis: The power to decide an appeal on merits through a fresh and independent appraisal of the record is distinct from the power to remand. The lack of remand power does not impair the Appellate Authority's jurisdiction to entertain the appeal and determine the objections on merits.

Conclusion: Absence of remand power does not permit bypassing the statutory appellate remedy.

Final Conclusion: The factual and procedural objections remain open for independent adjudication on their merits in the statutory appellate process.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory appeal should not be bypassed for fact-dependent and curable allegations of defective service or breach of natural justice, and the absence of remand power does not diminish the appellate authority's power to decide the appeal on merits.

Issues: Whether an ex parte tax assessment order could be sustained where it was not passed on the notified hearing date and no notice of the subsequently fixed hearing date was given.

Analysis: Where the assessing authority does not decide the matter on the date fixed for hearing and instead fixes another date, it must communicate that subsequent date to the taxpayer. Failure to do so deprives the taxpayer of an effective opportunity of personal hearing and results in a breach of the principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: An ex parte assessment made without notice of the subsequent hearing date is unsustainable for breach of natural justice.

Issues: Whether a show cause notice and adjudication order electronically uploaded on the GST portal, but bearing neither a physical signature nor a digital signature, are legally valid under Rule 26(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017.

Analysis: Rule 26(3) makes electronic issuance and authentication through a digital signature certificate, e-signature, or other Board-notified mode cumulative and mandatory requirements. Portal upload, generation of an ARN or reference number, and the officer's authenticated portal login establish only access to the portal; they do not authenticate the contents of a particular notice or order. A signature attributes the document to the competent officer, fixes responsibility, and protects against arbitrariness. No notified alternative mode of verification was shown. The complete absence of authentication is a jurisdictional defect, not a curable irregularity under Section 160. The statutory appellate remedy does not bar writ jurisdiction where the purported adjudication order has no legal existence.

Conclusion: The unsigned show cause notice and adjudication order were non est in law; consequently, the recovery notice and bank-account attachment founded on them could not survive. Fresh proceedings may be initiated in accordance with law using duly authenticated documents.

Issues: (i) Whether the show-cause notice issued on 29.11.2024 satisfied the requirement under Section 73(2) that it be issued at least three months before the terminal date for an order under Section 73(10); (ii) Whether the ex parte determination under Section 73(9) should be interfered with to afford an opportunity to contest the show-cause notice.

Issue (i): Whether the show-cause notice issued on 29.11.2024 satisfied the requirement under Section 73(2) that it be issued at least three months before the terminal date for an order under Section 73(10).

Analysis: Section 73 establishes a single statutory adjudicatory process beginning with the notice under Section 73(1) and culminating in the order under Section 73(9), subject to the outer limit in Section 73(10). A month is a calendar month under Section 3(35) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, and the date of issuance is excluded while computing the prescribed interval under Section 9 of that Act. Section 73(2) requires a minimum available interval before the statutory terminal date; it does not prescribe an independent backward-calculated corresponding-date cut-off. Excluding 29.11.2024, the full calendar months of December 2024, January 2025 and February 2025 were available before 28.02.2025.

Conclusion: The notice was within the limitation prescribed by Section 73(2), in favour of the Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether the ex parte determination under Section 73(9) should be interfered with to afford an opportunity to contest the show-cause notice.

Analysis: The statutory scheme under Sections 73 and 75 contemplates an opportunity to contest the proposed demand before its determination. Since the proceedings had culminated during the pendency of the challenge, an opportunity to submit a reply to the notice was necessary to enable adjudication after consideration of the appellant's defence.

Conclusion: The determination under Section 73(9) was interfered with to enable the appellant to contest the notice, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The notice remains valid, but the demand requires fresh completion of the statutory adjudicatory process after the appellant is given the specified opportunity to respond.

Ratio Decidendi: For Section 73(2), the minimum interval of three months is satisfied where, after excluding the date of issuance of notice, three calendar months remain available before the terminal date under Section 73(10); a backward corresponding-date calculation is not an independent limitation cut-off.

Issues: Whether Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 could be invoked and a 100% penalty imposed for input tax credit mismatch where tax and interest were paid before issuance of the show cause notice.

Analysis: Section 73 applies to wrongly availed or utilised input tax credit in the absence of fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts, while Section 74 requires a demonstrable nexus between the mismatch and such culpable conduct with intent to evade tax. A mere mismatch between Form GSTR-3B and Form GSTR-2A, without evidence connecting it to deliberate non-disclosure, fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression, does not justify invocation of Section 74. Payment of the ascertained tax and interest before the show cause notice, including after departmental verification, falls within Section 73 where the requisite intent to evade is not established. A third-party supplier's default cannot, without further evidence, be attributed to the recipient as suppression of facts.

Conclusion: Invocation of Section 74 and imposition of the 100% penalty were invalid and unjustified; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the First Appellate Authority was disqualified by a reasonable apprehension of institutional bias because the departmental appeal followed a review order of a superior officer; (ii) Whether penalties under Section 74 for audit-related input-tax-credit and transitional-credit issues could be sustained, and whether the pre-show-cause-notice tax and interest payments were liable to be treated under Section 73(5).

Issue (i): Whether the First Appellate Authority was disqualified by a reasonable apprehension of institutional bias because the departmental appeal followed a review order of a superior officer.

Analysis: The statutory appellate framework under Section 107 confers independent quasi-judicial authority on the appellate officer. A departmental review decision merely initiates appellate proceedings and does not dictate their merits. Departmental hierarchy alone, without personal interest, animus, or direct prejudice, does not establish a real likelihood of bias.

Conclusion: The objection based on institutional bias fails, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether penalties under Section 74 for audit-related input-tax-credit and transitional-credit issues could be sustained, and whether the pre-show-cause-notice tax and interest payments were liable to be treated under Section 73(5).

Analysis: Section 74 requires foundational facts demonstrating fraud, willful misstatement, or suppression of facts with intent to evade tax, together with the proper officer's independent satisfaction on concrete material. Audit detection and access to the relevant returns and declarations through departmental records do not, without proof of deliberate evasion, establish the requisite mens rea. The agreed tax and applicable interest for the relevant issues had also been discharged before issuance of the show-cause notice; consequently, the statutory pre-show-cause-notice payment mechanism and resulting penalty immunity under Section 73 applied.

Conclusion: The Section 74 penalties on Issues 1 and 3 are unsustainable, in favour of the assessee; the tax credit reversals and interest payments for those issues are payments under Section 73(5).

Final Conclusion: The appellate penalty determination for Issues 1 and 3 is nullified, while the voluntary tax-and-interest discharges for those issues take effect under the ordinary demand-settlement regime.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 74 penalties require pleaded and established foundational facts of deliberate tax evasion; audit-based discrepancies and accessible statutory records, without proof of fraud, willful misstatement, or suppression with intent to evade, cannot attract that provision.

Issues: Whether proceedings and consequential demands founded solely on Rule 96(10), after its unconditional omission without a saving clause, could survive.

Analysis: Rule 96(10) of the CGST/WBGST Rules, 2017 was omitted with effect from 8 October 2024 without a saving clause. The applicable principle is that, absent a statutory saving provision or legal fiction preserving accrued proceedings, an omitted rule ceases to exist and no proceedings may be initiated or continued solely under it. The departmental instruction accepting this position also required field formations not to initiate or pursue such proceedings.

Conclusion: The proceedings under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and consequential orders founded solely on omitted Rule 96(10) were unsustainable and stood quashed, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether writ jurisdiction should be exercised against cancellation of GST registration and rejection of its revocation despite an available statutory appeal.

Analysis: The petitioner did not satisfactorily establish that its reply to the show-cause notice had been filed within the stipulated time. The record also disclosed allegations of transactions and input-tax-credit claims involving firms whose registrations had been cancelled. A statutory appeal under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 was available, and the tax statute provided a complete remedial mechanism.

Outcome: Writ relief was declined in view of the efficacious statutory appellate remedy.

Issues: Whether the petitioner should be enlarged on bail pending trial for the alleged offences.

Analysis: The request for bail under the statutory bail jurisdiction was assessed with reference to the filing of the charge sheet, custody since 15.07.2026, absence of flight risk and criminal antecedents, the maximum prescribed punishment of five years, and the absence of a need for further undertrial detention. The pending investigation concerning co-accused was safeguarded through stringent conditions.

Conclusion: The petitioner was entitled to bail on stringent conditions.

Issues: Whether the accused was entitled to bail in a prosecution under the Central Goods and Services Tax law.

Analysis: Article 21 of the Constitution of India protects personal liberty through a just, fair and reasonable procedure, and pre-conviction detention is not punitive. Bail is directed to securing attendance at trial, while prolonged custody, absence of criminal antecedents, parity with similarly placed co-accused, completion of investigation, absence of charge framing, the limited maximum sentence, and absence of material suggesting flight risk, witness intimidation or evidence tampering support release. The absence of assessment proceedings under Sections 73 and 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 could also bear upon the criminal prosecution. The prosecution was substantially documentary, the alleged offences were triable by a Magistrate, and the trial was not likely to conclude within a reasonable time.

Conclusion: The accused was entitled to bail.

Issues: Whether a repeated show-cause notice and retrospective cancellation of GST registration could be sustained when earlier proceedings on identical registration-fraud allegations had been dropped and the cancellation relied upon allegations concerning fraudulent availment and passing of input tax credit that were not stated in the notice.

Analysis: The earlier cancellation proceedings had been dropped after the assessee responded to a notice founded on the allegation that registration had been obtained through fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression of facts. The subsequent notice was founded on the same allegation and substantially identical intelligence material. The cancellation order nevertheless relied on alleged fraudulent availment and passing of ineligible input tax credit, although the assessee had not been required to answer those allegations in the show-cause notice. This reflected non-application of mind and denied the assessee an opportunity to respond to the grounds ultimately relied upon. The merits of the allegations were left open.

Conclusion: The repeated show-cause notice and the registration-cancellation order were set aside. The authorities may initiate fresh proceedings through a proper notice and after affording an opportunity of hearing.

Issues: Whether partial rejection of refund claims for unutilised input tax credit without affording a hearing or recording reasons was valid.

Analysis: Refund applications under Section 54(3) were partly rejected without a prior opportunity of hearing and without any reasons being assigned for the rejected portion. These deficiencies constituted a breach of the principles of natural justice and the duty to issue a reasoned decision.

Conclusion: The partial rejection of the refund claims was invalid for violation of the principles of natural justice.

Issues: Whether the penalty imposed for GST non-compliance was sustainable after the petitioner had filed returns and paid the applicable late fees, particularly where the aggregate penalty exceeded the statutory maximum.

Analysis: The returns had already been filed and late fees paid in accordance with law. The aggregate penalty of Rs. 50,000 was found to exceed the maximum permissible limit under the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Conclusion: The show-cause notice and penalty order were quashed and set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether GST was payable on services completed in 2015, though post-facto approval and billing occurred after 1 July 2017; (ii) Whether interest was payable on the withheld contractual amount and, if so, at what rate.

Issue (i): Whether GST was payable on services completed in 2015, though post-facto approval and billing occurred after 1 July 2017.

Analysis: Deployment of technical personnel for repair and maintenance constituted a supply of services. Under the time-of-supply framework in Sections 13(1) and 13(2), read with the transitional protection in Section 142(11)(b) of the West Bengal Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, taxability depended on when the service was actually supplied. The service had been fully rendered before the GST appointed day. The post-facto approval and subsequent raising of bills did not alter the date of supply. The applicable Government memorandum likewise treated services supplied before 1 July 2017, where invoiced later, as falling under the erstwhile Service Tax regime.

Conclusion: GST was not payable on the completed service; any applicable tax was governed by the pre-GST Service Tax regime. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether interest was payable on the withheld contractual amount and, if so, at what rate.

Analysis: Although there was no restraint against payment in the pending civil suit, the existence of the taxability dispute meant that the delay could not be wholly attributed to the respondents. The claimed commercial rate of 12% was therefore not warranted, while interest at the prevailing banking rate was appropriate.

Conclusion: Interest was payable at 8% per annum from the date of submission of the bills until actual payment. This issue was partly decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Services actually supplied and completed before commencement of GST remain governed by the pre-GST tax regime notwithstanding later approval or invoicing, and the unpaid amount attracts interest at the banking rate.

Ratio Decidendi: For transitional tax purposes, liability is determined by the actual date of supply of services; subsequent approval or invoicing cannot subject a completed pre-GST service to GST.

Issues: (i) Whether Form GST DRC-01, as a summary of a show cause notice, can substitute the statutory notice required under Section 73(1) of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether input tax credit can be denied solely on a mismatch between Form GSTR-2A and Form GSTR-3B without prescribed verification.

Issue (i): Whether Form GST DRC-01, as a summary of a show cause notice, can substitute the statutory notice required under Section 73(1) of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 73(1) mandates service of a notice upon the person chargeable with tax, requiring that person to show cause against the proposed demand. Rule 142(1)(a) requires electronic service of Form GST DRC-01 only as a summary accompanying such notice. The DRC-01 issued to the assessee merely tabulated tax dues and was accompanied by a show cause notice addressed to another taxpayer; it neither disclosed the allegations, statutory contraventions, factual basis, nor afforded a meaningful opportunity of defence. A summary cannot independently dispense with the mandatory statutory notice or the requirements of natural justice.

Conclusion: Form GST DRC-01 cannot substitute a show cause notice under Section 73(1); in the absence of a valid notice issued to the assessee, the consequential adjudication proceedings were void ab initio, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether input tax credit can be denied solely on a mismatch between Form GSTR-2A and Form GSTR-3B without prescribed verification.

Analysis: The relevant tax period preceded the restriction introduced through Rule 36(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017. Circular No. 183/15/2022-GST requires the proper officer first to obtain invoice-level details for credit reflected in Form GSTR-3B but absent in Form GSTR-2A, and to verify fulfilment of the statutory conditions for input tax credit. Neither the original adjudication nor the first appellate order verified invoices, receipt of supplies, or other applicable conditions; the demand was sustained without the prescribed inquiry. Mere non-reflection in Form GSTR-2A was therefore insufficient for denial of credit.

Conclusion: Input tax credit could not be denied solely on the GSTR-2A and GSTR-3B mismatch without the required verification, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The absence of a valid statutory show cause notice invalidated the demand proceedings and the consequential orders, leaving the impugned tax, interest, and penalty demands without legal foundation.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory summary of demand in Form GST DRC-01 cannot replace the mandatory show cause notice required for adjudication, and a demand founded solely on GSTR-2A mismatch without prescribed verification of input tax credit conditions is unsustainable.

Issues: Whether input tax credit reflected under the IGST head in GSTR-2A could be retained when it was claimed under the CGST and SGST heads in GSTR-3B due to an asserted technical or clerical error.

Analysis: The record showed a mismatch between the tax heads under which credit was reflected and those under which it was claimed. The first appellate authority had allowed the portion of IGST credit supported by GSTR-2A, but sustained reversal of the CGST and SGST credit. No new facts or records were produced to displace that determination, and the cited precedents were found factually inapplicable.

Conclusion: The reversal of CGST and SGST input tax credit, with consequential interest and penalty, was sustained against the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the applicant's ex-works supply of forty aircraft to the government purchaser from Gujarat is liable to GST in India; (ii) Whether the applicant must obtain GST registration in Gujarat for that supply.

Issue (i): Whether the applicant's ex-works supply of forty aircraft to the government purchaser from Gujarat is liable to GST in India.

Analysis: Section 7(1)(a) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 covers supplies of goods made for consideration in the course or furtherance of business. Aircraft are movable goods under Section 2(52), and transfer of title is treated as a supply of goods under Section 7(1A) read with Entry 1(a) of Schedule II. The aircraft are manufactured in Gujarat, procured by the applicant from the Indian aircraft contractor, and supplied ex-works in Gujarat to the government purchaser for contractual consideration. Notification No. 10/2025-Central Tax (Rate) dated 17.09.2025 does not provide an exemption for aircraft.

Conclusion: The supply of forty aircraft is liable to GST in India and is not exempt. This is against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the applicant must obtain GST registration in Gujarat for that supply.

Analysis: Sections 22 and 25 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 require registration in the State from which taxable supplies are made once the applicable aggregate-turnover threshold is exceeded. The outward supply is made from Gujarat, and its stated transaction value exceeds the registration threshold.

Conclusion: GST registration in Gujarat is required. This is against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The domestic procurement and onward ex-works supply of the aircraft constitute a taxable supply chain situated in Gujarat, with the corresponding registration nexus in that State.

Ratio Decidendi: A transfer of title in movable goods for consideration in the course of business is a taxable supply under GST, and the supplier must register in the State from which the taxable supply is made once the statutory threshold is crossed.