Section 5 Limitation Act applies to special-law misfeasance claims, but mistaken statutory construction did not justify delay.

Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 was treated as applicable to a misfeasance application governed by the special limitation provisions in section 543 of the Companies Act, 1956 and section 45-O(2) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 because those enactments did not expressly exclude it, and section 29(2) therefore applied. However, the liquidator's explanation for delay, based on a mistaken construction of section 458A of the Companies Act, was not accepted as sufficient cause, since a self-construction of the statute without due care and attention did not justify condonation. The condonation request failed and the misfeasance application remained time-barred.

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Issues: (i) Whether section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to a misfeasance application governed by the limitation provisions in the Companies Act, 1956 and the Banking Regulation Act, 1949; (ii) Whether the liquidator had sufficient cause for the delay in filing the application.

Issue (i): Whether section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to a misfeasance application governed by the limitation provisions in the Companies Act, 1956 and the Banking Regulation Act, 1949.

Analysis: The limitation provisions in section 543 of the Companies Act, 1956 and section 45-O(2) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 were treated as special law provisions. The Limitation Act, 1963 was held to apply through section 29(2) because those enactments prescribed a special period of limitation and did not expressly exclude section 5. The non-obstante language in section 45-O(2) was not regarded as an express exclusion of section 5.

Conclusion: Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to the application.

Issue (ii): Whether the liquidator had sufficient cause for the delay in filing the application.

Analysis: The delay was attributed to a mistaken construction of section 458A of the Companies Act, 1956. The explanation was treated as a mistake of law made without obtaining legal advice. A party construing the statute for itself without due care and attention was held not to satisfy the test of sufficient cause. The pleaded reason did not justify extension of time.

Conclusion: The liquidator did not establish sufficient cause for condonation of delay.

Final Conclusion: The application for condonation failed, and the misfeasance application could not be entertained as time-barred.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to applications governed by a special law unless expressly excluded, but a mistake of law unsupported by due care and attention does not constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay.

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