Special leave from acquittal is governed by a special limitation rule that excludes condonation under the Limitation Act.

Section 417(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure prescribed a special sixty-day limitation for applications for special leave to appeal from an acquittal, and that mandatory scheme excluded the general condonation power in section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908. Read with section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, the Code created a self-contained limitation regime for such applications, so the application could not be entertained after the prescribed period. The delayed special leave application was therefore barred.

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Issues: Whether the period of sixty days prescribed for an application for special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal under section 417(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was a special law of limitation so as to exclude the operation of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908.

Analysis: The application for special leave under section 417(3) was held to be governed by a special rule of limitation contained in section 417(4), which expressly barred entertainment of such an application after sixty days from the date of acquittal. The general rule in the Limitation Act, 1908, including section 5, applied to ordinary appeals where limitation was prescribed by that Act, but section 417(4) created a distinct and mandatory limitation scheme for complainants seeking special leave. Read with section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1908, the special limitation in the Code excluded the remaining provisions of the Limitation Act, including the power to condone delay under section 5.

Conclusion: Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 did not apply to an application for special leave under section 417(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the delayed application was barred.

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