Extension of time under consent orders remains available where no prejudice is shown and default is promptly cured in winding-up matters.

Rule 7 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959 was treated as conferring power to extend time fixed by a court order even after expiry, and a consent order was not excluded from that power merely because it was self-operative on default. Estoppel failed because the consent terms contained no representation that extension would never be sought and no prejudice from the short delay was shown. In winding-up proceedings, the court could exercise discretion in the company's favour where the default was promptly cured, the balance due was offered, and no legal prejudice to the creditor was established.

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Issues: (i) whether time fixed by a consent and self-operative order could be extended under rule 7 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959; (ii) whether the company was estopped from seeking enlargement of time; (iii) whether the discretion to grant relief ought to be exercised in the company's favour in winding-up proceedings.

Issue (i): whether time fixed by a consent and self-operative order could be extended under rule 7 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959.

Analysis: Rule 7 empowered the Court to extend time fixed by an order of the Court for doing an act or taking a proceeding, even after the time had expired. A consent order remained an order of the Court, and the mere fact that it operated automatically on default did not exclude the statutory power to enlarge time. The consent terms also showed that the matter was still alive before the Court, because further orders on default were contemplated.

Conclusion: Yes. The Court had jurisdiction to extend time notwithstanding that the order was made by consent and was self-operative.

Issue (ii): whether the company was estopped from seeking enlargement of time.

Analysis: Estoppel required a representation, reliance, and detriment. The consent terms contained no representation that the company would never seek extension of time, and no prejudice to the petitioning creditor was shown from the short and inadvertent delay in payment.

Conclusion: No. The plea of estoppel failed.

Issue (iii): whether the discretion to grant relief ought to be exercised in the company's favour in winding-up proceedings.

Analysis: The company promptly attempted to cure the default, later offered the full balance due, and was able to pay the amount bargained for. In winding-up proceedings, the Court was required to consider the wider commercial consequences and not treat the matter as a mere debt-enforcement dispute. On the facts, refusal of the creditor to accept payment did not justify the drastic step of winding up.

Conclusion: Yes. The discretionary relief was properly granted.

Final Conclusion: The appeal was not accepted, and the order extending time in favour of the company was sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: A consent or self-operative order does not, by itself, exclude the Court's power under the applicable procedural rule to enlarge time, and in winding-up proceedings that discretion may be exercised where the debtor promptly cures the default and no legal prejudice is shown.

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