Issues: (i) Whether Section 129DD of the Customs Act, 1962 empowers the revisional authority to remand a matter for fresh adjudication; (ii) Whether the revisional authority's order pre-judged redemption or exceeded the scope of revisional jurisdiction; (iii) Whether absence of a separate notice under Section 129DD(5) of the Customs Act, 1962 invalidated the remand; and (iv) Whether the departmental revision was barred by limitation.

Issue (i): Whether Section 129DD of the Customs Act, 1962 empowers the revisional authority to remand a matter for fresh adjudication.

Analysis: Section 129DD(1) authorises annulment or modification of an appellate order. The power to annul necessarily permits setting aside that order and, in the absence of an express statutory prohibition, carries the incidental power to remit the matter for a fresh decision. The separate provision governing the appellate tribunal does not restrict the revisional authority's powers under Section 129DD.

Conclusion: The revisional authority had jurisdiction to annul the appellate order and remand the matter for fresh adjudication.

Issue (ii): Whether the revisional authority's order pre-judged redemption or exceeded the scope of revisional jurisdiction.

Analysis: Revisional scrutiny of legality and propriety permits interference where material evidence has been overlooked or findings are unsupported or legally unsustainable; it does not amount to appellate reappreciation of all evidence. The recovery circumstances, the contemporaneous statement indicating a carrier arrangement, and unresolved inconsistencies in the subsequently produced purchase invoice justified review of whether redemption was legally available. Under Section 123, the burden to establish that seized gold is not smuggled rests upon the person from whose possession it was seized or a person claiming ownership. The remand left the ultimate question of confiscation and redemption for fresh determination on the evidence.

Conclusion: The remand neither pre-judged redemption nor exceeded the limits of revisional jurisdiction.

Issue (iii): Whether absence of a separate notice under Section 129DD(5) of the Customs Act, 1962 invalidated the remand.

Analysis: The notice requirement in Section 129DD(5) applies where enhancement of penalty or redemption fine, or confiscation of goods of greater value, is proposed. A remand for fresh adjudication did not involve any such enhancement. An opportunity of hearing had been afforded in the revision proceedings, and the fresh adjudication also preserved an opportunity to meet the case under Section 123.

Conclusion: No separate notice under Section 129DD(5) was required for the remand.

Issue (iv): Whether the departmental revision was barred by limitation.

Analysis: Section 129DD(2) prescribes three months from communication of the appellate order, with a further maximum period of three months upon sufficient cause. The record did not establish the date on which the appellate order was communicated to the department, and no limitation objection had been raised before the revisional authority. There was consequently no factual basis to find that the revision was filed beyond the permissible period.

Conclusion: The revision could not be invalidated as time-barred on the available record.

Final Conclusion: The order directing fresh adjudication, with a fresh opportunity to establish the lawful nature of the seized gold and the defence against confiscation, remains legally effective.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory revisional power to annul or modify an appellate order includes the incidental power to remand for fresh adjudication unless that power is expressly excluded.

Issues: (i) Whether a dealer whose quarterly return was accepted under self-assessment was entitled to refund under Section 38(3)(a)(ii) of the Delhi Value Added Tax Act, 2004 in the absence of proceedings under Sections 32, 58 or 59; (ii) Whether Section 40A of the Delhi Value Added Tax Act, 2004 justified rejection of the refund on an allegation that the transactions were paper transactions intended to defeat the Act.

Issue (i): Whether a dealer whose quarterly return was accepted under self-assessment was entitled to refund under Section 38(3)(a)(ii) of the Delhi Value Added Tax Act, 2004 in the absence of proceedings under Sections 32, 58 or 59.

Analysis: Section 31 treats a compliant return as a self-assessment. Sections 32 and 58 provide distinct mechanisms for default assessment and audit, while Section 38 requires refund of the excess amount remaining after adjustment of outstanding dues. The quarterly return had been accepted, no outstanding demand remained, and no proceedings under Sections 32, 58 or 59 had been initiated. Section 34 concerns assessment or reassessment proceedings and does not govern a refund application.

Conclusion: The accepted self-assessment entitled the assessee to the refund due under Section 38(3)(a)(ii), in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether Section 40A of the Delhi Value Added Tax Act, 2004 justified rejection of the refund on an allegation that the transactions were paper transactions intended to defeat the Act.

Analysis: Section 40A could not be invoked merely on an allegation of paper transactions. No arrangement between the parties had been declared null and void, and no inquiry or investigation had produced evidence of collusion or identified a contract intended to defeat the Act.

Conclusion: Section 40A was not attracted and could not support rejection of the refund, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The unadjusted refund arising from an accepted self-assessment remained statutorily payable and could not be withheld on unsubstantiated allegations of collusive transactions.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory refund arising from an accepted self-assessed return cannot be withheld where no applicable assessment, audit or other statutory proceedings have been initiated and no void arrangement has been legally established.

Issues: Whether the assessment order required reconsideration in light of the available GSTR 2A/2B data, GSTR 3B returns and annual return.

Analysis: The available portal records and annual return furnished prima facie evidence of input tax credit. Since the assessment was confirmed for non-production of return copies, fresh consideration was warranted after verification of the asserted recovery of 40% of the tax demand and after affording a reasonable opportunity.

Outcome: The impugned assessment order was set aside for fresh consideration, with consequential lifting of bank attachment upon verification of the asserted recovery.

Issues: Whether notional rental income under Section 23(1)(a) could be assessed in respect of unsold flats for the period before issuance of an occupancy certificate.

Analysis: A property lacking an occupancy certificate is legally incapable of occupation. Where the property was neither legally occupiable nor actually occupied during the relevant period, no annual letting value could be attributed on a notional basis under the head income from house property. The completion certificate did not establish legal occupiability in the absence of the occupancy certificate.

Conclusion: No notional rental income was chargeable for the period preceding issuance of the occupancy certificate.

Issues: (i) Whether an amendment effective 15.06.2026 applied to an imported consignment handed to the first carrier on 08.06.2026 under a combined transport Bill of Lading; and (ii) Whether the request for provisional release of the imported goods required consideration under Section 110A of the Customs Act, 1962.

Issue (i): Whether an amendment effective 15.06.2026 applied to an imported consignment handed to the first carrier on 08.06.2026 under a combined transport Bill of Lading.

Analysis: The relevant date was determined with reference to the handing over of the goods to the first carrier. The goods had been so handed over before the amendment came into force. Multimodal transport is recognised under Chapter 11 of the Foreign Trade Policy, 2023, and the later date on the shipment document did not alter the position. The amendment therefore operated prospectively and could not govern the consignment.

Conclusion: The amendment effective 15.06.2026 was inapplicable to the consignment and could not be a ground to refuse consideration of the release request, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the request for provisional release of the imported goods required consideration under Section 110A of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: Section 110A of the Customs Act, 1962 provides the statutory framework for provisional release. No distinguishing feature justified departure from the approach applicable to similar imported goods. The release request was required to be decided under that provision, with conditions permissible in law, while the merits of the adjudication proceedings remained independent.

Conclusion: The request for provisional release must be considered under Section 110A of the Customs Act, 1962 and, upon compliance with lawfully imposed conditions, the goods must be provisionally released, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The provisional-release request must be addressed without applying the subsequent amendment, while the merits of the customs adjudication remain open for independent determination.

Ratio Decidendi: An amendment brought into force after goods are handed to the first carrier in a recognised multimodal shipment cannot be applied to that consignment.

Issues: Whether a corporate debtor, after approval of a resolution plan resulting in a change of management or control, is immune under Section 32A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 from prosecution for alleged offences committed before commencement of the corporate insolvency resolution process.

Analysis: Section 32A(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 ceases the corporate debtor's criminal liability for pre-CIRP offences and bars its prosecution once a resolution plan approved under Section 31 results in management or control passing to an unconnected new person. The approved resolution plan resulted in such a change of management and control, and the alleged environmental offences related to the period of the previous management. The statutory conditions for immunity were therefore satisfied.

Conclusion: The corporate debtor was entitled to statutory immunity from prosecution for the pre-CIRP offences. The criminal proceeding and cognizance order were quashed insofar as they concerned the petitioner-company, without any adjudication of the case against the remaining accused persons.

Issues: Whether an individual shareholder is an aggrieved person entitled to maintain an appeal against approval of a resolution plan.

Analysis: Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 confers appellate standing upon a person aggrieved by an order of the Adjudicating Authority. The binding interpretation of that expression excludes an individual shareholder from challenging approval of a resolution plan, since shareholders' interests are represented through the resolution professional or liquidator and permitting individual shareholder challenges would undermine the time-bound insolvency process. Allegations of fraud or collusion, unsupported by specific material, do not create an exception to this rule. Homebuyers who did not independently challenge the resolution plan cannot indirectly contest it by supporting the shareholder's appeal.

Conclusion: An individual shareholder is not an aggrieved person under Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and cannot maintain an appeal against approval of a resolution plan.

Issues: Whether the addition for cash deposits was sustainable despite the assessee's claimed opening cash balance supported by prior bank withdrawals.

Analysis: The cash-flow statement and bank records demonstrated the availability of cash in hand from withdrawals made from various bank accounts, which was subsequently re-deposited. No defect in the cash-flow statement was identified. The addition rested solely on an inference based on perceived normal human behaviour and the preponderance of human probabilities, notwithstanding the documented source of cash.

Conclusion: The cash deposits stood explained by the available opening cash balance; the addition was deleted.

Issues: Whether a timeframe for deciding applications for cancellation of duplicate Permanent Account Numbers should be prescribed.

Analysis: The grievance concerned the absence of a prescribed period for disposal of duplicate PAN cancellation applications and the resulting difficulties in accessing PAN-linked services. Since no representation seeking prescription of such timeframe had first been made to the CBDT, the matter was considered appropriate for consideration by that authority.

Outcome: The petitioner was granted liberty to submit a representation to the CBDT within two weeks, and the CBDT was directed to decide it within eight weeks of receipt and communicate its decision.

Issues: Whether the Tribunal could reject appeals for want of territorial jurisdiction despite their administrative transfer to the Delhi Bench.

Analysis: Rule 4 of the Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963 and the situs of the assessees' business and Assessing Officer ordinarily connected the matters with Lucknow. However, the appeals had been transferred to the Delhi Bench by an administrative order of the President, and the appellate orders had been passed by the Delhi Commissioner (Appeals) pursuant to an order under Section 120 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. A Tribunal Bench cannot judicially nullify or disregard an administrative transfer order. The principle governing High Court jurisdiction under Section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, following a transfer under Section 127, does not govern the place of hearing of appeals before the Tribunal after an administrative transfer.

Conclusion: The Tribunal's rejection of the appeals for lack of territorial jurisdiction was erroneous; the restored appeals shall be heard and decided on merits by the Delhi Bench.

Issues: (i) Whether gains from sale of shares and securities were taxable as capital gains or business income; (ii) Whether payments for purchases from a non-resident parent attracted withholding tax and disallowance under section 40(a)(i); and (iii) Whether an additional administrative-expense disallowance relating to exempt income could be made under Rule 8D(2)(iii) without recorded satisfaction.

Issue (i): Whether gains from sale of shares and securities were taxable as capital gains or business income.

Analysis: The factually identical prior rulings were followed. Consistent investment treatment, deployment of non-interest-bearing surplus funds, absence of trading activity, and the investment intention underlying the transactions supported capital-gains character; transaction volume alone did not convert the investments into business activity.

Conclusion: The gains are assessable as capital gains and not as business income, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether payments for purchases from a non-resident parent attracted withholding tax and disallowance under section 40(a)(i).

Analysis: Under section 195, withholding tax arises only where the non-resident payment is chargeable to tax in India. The payments were for imported materials supplied from outside India and had been accepted as international transactions without a transfer-pricing adjustment. The related chargeability and permanent-establishment aspects could not support a withholding disallowance on the purchase payments.

Conclusion: No tax was deductible at source on the purchase payments; consequently, no disallowance under section 40(a)(i) is permissible, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether an additional administrative-expense disallowance relating to exempt income could be made under Rule 8D(2)(iii) without recorded satisfaction.

Analysis: Section 14A(2) read with Rule 8D(1) requires recorded dissatisfaction, having regard to the accounts, with the correctness of the assessee's own expenditure disallowance before the Rule 8D formula may be applied. The assessment applied the formula without identifying expenditure relatable to exempt income or recording the requisite satisfaction despite the assessee's voluntary disallowance.

Conclusion: The additional administrative-expense disallowance under Rule 8D(2)(iii) is deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The recharacterisation adjustment, the withholding-tax purchase disallowance, and the incremental exempt-income expense disallowance do not survive.

Ratio Decidendi: A disallowance under Rule 8D(2) is permissible only after the assessing authority, upon examination of the accounts, records dissatisfaction with the assessee's computation as required by section 14A(2).

Issues: Whether referral commission, calculated as a percentage of sales made by the Indian group entity to referred customers, constituted fees for technical services under section 9(1)(vii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and Article 12(5)(b) of the India-Netherlands Tax Treaty.

Analysis: Article 12(5)(b) requires technical or consultancy services to make available technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how or processes, or to involve development and transfer of a technical plan or design. The commission invoices, memoranda of understanding and sales reports established that the receipts were fixed-rate commission for referring potential customers, correlated to sales concluded by the Indian entity. No design, technical or consultancy service was provided, and no technology, knowledge, skill or know-how was transferred so as to enable the Indian entity to apply it independently in future.

Conclusion: The referral commission did not constitute fees for technical services under section 9(1)(vii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 or Article 12(5)(b) of the India-Netherlands Tax Treaty; it was business income not taxable in India under Article 7 in the absence of a permanent establishment.

Issues: (i) Whether the writ petition was maintainable before the Delhi High Court despite objections as to territorial jurisdiction, alternative remedy and non-impleadment of the Kanpur office; (ii) Whether DEL orders based on pre-CIRP export-obligation defaults could continue after approval of the resolution plan.

Issue (i): Whether the writ petition was maintainable before the Delhi High Court despite objections as to territorial jurisdiction, alternative remedy and non-impleadment of the Kanpur office.

Analysis: A material part of the cause of action arose in Delhi because the competent headquarters there was seized of the representation and its inaction was challenged. The availability of an alternative remedy does not oust writ jurisdiction. The Kanpur office was also effectively represented through the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents.

Conclusion: The writ petition was maintainable before the Delhi High Court, and the preliminary objections failed.

Issue (ii): Whether DEL orders based on pre-CIRP export-obligation defaults could continue after approval of the resolution plan.

Analysis: Nine DEL orders were issued during the statutory moratorium under Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, rendering adverse coercive action against the corporate debtor void ab initio. The government claim arising from the same export-obligation defaults was lodged as operational debt and was provided for at nil value in the resolution plan approved by the adjudicating authority. Under Section 31(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, the approved plan bound governmental authorities and extinguished pre-CIRP claims not preserved in it. Continuance of DEL status, being a coercive mechanism to enforce those extinguished pre-CIRP liabilities, was incompatible with the clean slate principle. Verification of the credentials of the new management and action for any independent fresh default remained permissible in accordance with law.

Conclusion: The DEL orders were invalid and could not be continued against the corporate debtor after approval of the resolution plan.

Final Conclusion: Pre-CIRP government dues and coercive restrictions founded on them stand extinguished by an approved resolution plan and cannot burden the corporate debtor under its new management, without prejudice to action for independent fresh defaults.

Ratio Decidendi: An approved resolution plan binds governmental creditors and extinguishes pre-CIRP claims; a coercive administrative restriction imposed to recover or enforce such extinguished liabilities cannot subsist thereafter.

Issues: Whether amounts received from foreign entities as actual costs, without markup, constituted reimbursable expenses rather than consideration for a taxable service under the reverse charge mechanism.

Analysis: The Tribunal accepted the invoices separating taxable and non-taxable charges, supporting transport and clearance documents, and chartered-accountant certification showing that air freight, ocean freight and pure-agent charges were recovered at actuals without markup. The allegation of markup lacked documentary support. It was also noted that no review ground challenged the finding on invocation of the extended period of limitation. Under the service-tax valuation framework, actual reimbursable expenses demonstrably recovered without markup were distinguishable from consideration for taxable services.

Conclusion: The amounts received from foreign entities were reimbursable expenses and were not liable to be treated as consideration for a taxable service under the reverse charge mechanism.

Issues: (i) Whether an encumbrance recorded in a sale notice and sale certificate may be removed from the encumbrance certificate without payment of the secured dues; (ii) Whether the statutory priority of secured creditors over government dues overrides the mandatory sale procedure governing known encumbrances; (iii) Whether the secured creditor became functus officio after issuance and registration of the sale certificate; (iv) Whether a departmental attachment recorded in the encumbrance certificate constitutes an encumbrance.

Issue (i): Whether an encumbrance recorded in a sale notice and sale certificate may be removed from the encumbrance certificate without payment of the secured dues.

Analysis: Rules 9(6) to 9(10) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 require disclosure of known encumbrances in the sale certificate. Rule 9(7) requires deposit of the amount necessary to discharge such encumbrances, and Rule 9(9) permits delivery free from known encumbrances only upon that deposit. A purchaser acquiring property with express notice of statutory encumbrances cannot obtain removal of the recorded entries without their discharge.

Conclusion: Removal of the recorded departmental encumbrance without payment of the disclosed statutory dues is impermissible. This issue is against the appellant bank and the auction purchaser.

Issue (ii): Whether the statutory priority of secured creditors over government dues overrides the mandatory sale procedure governing known encumbrances.

Analysis: Statutory priority under Section 26E of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 and Section 31B of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 enables secured creditors to realise secured debts in priority to government dues. That priority does not dispense with mandatory compliance with Rules 9(6) to 9(10) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002, particularly the obligation to settle disclosed encumbrances before delivery of the property free from them.

Conclusion: Secured-creditor priority does not override the mandatory procedure for discharge of known encumbrances. This issue is against the appellant bank's claimed relief.

Issue (iii): Whether the secured creditor became functus officio after issuance and registration of the sale certificate.

Analysis: Issuance and registration of a sale certificate do not by themselves terminate the secured creditor's statutory rights where its entire debt remains unrecovered and recovery proceedings concerning the borrower continue.

Conclusion: The secured creditor had not become functus officio, and the objection to maintainability fails. This issue is in favour of the appellant bank.

Issue (iv): Whether a departmental attachment recorded in the encumbrance certificate constitutes an encumbrance.

Analysis: An attachment imposing a legal burden on property and restricting its transfer, further mortgage, or charge is an encumbrance. Its entry in the encumbrance certificate gives notice of the restriction, and its effect is consistent with the concept of a charge under Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

Conclusion: The departmental attachment is an encumbrance that must be discharged in accordance with Rule 9(7). This issue is against the appellant bank and the auction purchaser.

Final Conclusion: A sale expressly made subject to known statutory encumbrances remains so burdened until the prescribed amounts are deposited and the encumbrances are discharged; statutory priority cannot be used to erase those recorded burdens without compliance with the mandatory sale rules.

Ratio Decidendi: A secured creditor's statutory priority over government dues does not dispense with mandatory compliance with Rules 9(6) to 9(10) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 for discharge of known encumbrances before delivery of property free from them.

Issues: Whether a notice issued under Section 153C for assessment year 2010-11 was within the applicable limitation period.

Analysis: The satisfaction note was recorded in assessment year 2024-25. Under Section 153A read with Section 153C, the extended ten-year period, applicable where escaped income exceeds Rs. 50 lakh, could extend only up to assessment year 2015-16 when computed backwards from assessment year 2024-25. Assessment year 2010-11 consequently fell outside the permissible period.

Conclusion: The notice for assessment year 2010-11 was time-barred and invalid.