Income-tax confidentiality survives repeal, and disclosure remains controlled by the Commissioner's public-interest discretion under the special statutory scheme.

Income-tax confidentiality attached to records filed under the earlier statutory regime was treated as an accrued right and corresponding obligation preserved by the saving clause, so protection survived repeal unless later legislation clearly showed a contrary intention. For records filed during the period when the 1961 Act still contained confidentiality provisions, that protection also continued despite later omission or amendment. For later records, the court's summons power remained subject to the special disclosure scheme: disclosure depended on the Commissioner's statutory public-interest decision, which was controlling and could not be overridden by the court's general power to compel production.

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Issues: (i) Whether the confidentiality and non-disclosure protection attached to income-tax records filed before 1 April 1962 survived repeal of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 and the later omission or amendment of sections 137 and 138 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. (ii) Whether the same protection applied to records filed after 1 April 1962 but before 1 April 1964, and to records filed after 1 April 1964, having regard to the changed text of section 138. (iii) Whether the court could compel production of such records notwithstanding the Commissioner's statutory power to decide disclosure in the public interest.

Issue (i): Whether the confidentiality and non-disclosure protection attached to income-tax records filed before 1 April 1962 survived repeal of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 and the later omission or amendment of sections 137 and 138 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The declaration that assessment records were confidential, the prohibition on a court requiring their production, and the prohibition on disclosure by public servants created concrete rights in favour of the assessee or other person filing the documents and a corresponding obligation on the income-tax authority. Those rights and obligations were treated as rights, privileges, and liabilities accrued or incurred within section 6(c) of the General Clauses Act, 1897. The later enactment of the 1961 Act, including the repeal of the 1922 Act and the subsequent amendment of section 138, did not manifest a contrary intention sufficient to destroy the protection already attached to records filed while the earlier confidentiality regime was in force.

Conclusion: The protection survived the repeal and continued to apply to records filed before 1 April 1962.

Issue (ii): Whether the same protection applied to records filed after 1 April 1962 but before 1 April 1964, and to records filed after 1 April 1964, having regard to the changed text of section 138.

Analysis: For records filed after 1 April 1962 but before 1 April 1964, the 1961 Act substantially reproduced the earlier confidentiality scheme in section 137 and the corresponding disclosure provision in section 138. The omission of section 137 in 1964, and the later amendment of section 138 in 1967, did not reveal an intention to extinguish protection already attached to records filed during the period when the confidentiality provisions were operative. For records filed after 1 April 1964, the court's general power to summon evidence remained subject to section 138, under which the Commissioner could refuse disclosure if not satisfied that production would be in the public interest, and that decision was final. The two powers had to be reconciled so that the court could issue summons, but the Commissioner's statutory decision on public interest remained controlling.

Conclusion: The confidentiality protection continued for records filed before 1 April 1964, and for later records the court could summon them, but the Commissioner's final decision under section 138 controlled disclosure in the public interest.

Issue (iii): Whether the court could compel production of such records notwithstanding the Commissioner's statutory power to decide disclosure in the public interest.

Analysis: The special statutory scheme could not be bypassed by resorting to the court's general summons power. Where section 138 vested a final discretion in the Commissioner to determine whether disclosure would serve the public interest, the court had to respect that statutory restraint. The judgment therefore rejected the view that the general power of summoning records could override the special statutory protection or render the Commissioner's final decision ineffective.

Conclusion: The court could not compel disclosure contrary to the Commissioner's final statutory decision where section 138 applied.

Final Conclusion: The reference was answered by holding that pre-1964 income-tax records retained their confidentiality protection under the saving clause, while post-1964 records were governed by the modified disclosure regime under section 138, subject to the Commissioner's final control on public-interest disclosure; no opinion was expressed on certified copies.

Ratio Decidendi: Rights, privileges, obligations, and liabilities created by a repealed confidentiality provision survive by virtue of the saving clause unless the later legislation clearly manifests a contrary intention, and a special statutory discretion over disclosure prevails over the court's general summons power.

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