Civil court access to income-tax assessment records after omission of confidentiality bar; Commissioner's finality under disclosure provision could not defeat summons.

The omission of section 137 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 removed the statutory bar that had earlier prevented civil courts from directing production of assessment records, so records filed after 1 April 1964 could be summoned in ordinary judicial proceedings. Section 6(c) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 did not preserve any privilege for those later records because no accrued right or confidentiality protection survived the omission. The finality attached to the Commissioner's decision under section 138(1)(b) was confined to information requests by persons seeking disclosure and did not override a court's judicial requisition. Accordingly, a civil court could summon the assessment records, and the High Court's contrary view was set aside.

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Issues: Whether, after the omission of section 137 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 with effect from 1 April 1964, a civil court retained the power to summon assessment records filed before the income-tax authorities for assessment years 1964-65 onwards, and whether the finality attached to the Commissioner's decision under section 138(1)(b) could defeat such judicial summons.

Analysis: The earlier provisions in section 54 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 and section 137 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 imposed a statutory bar on court-directed production of assessment records and treated the material as confidential. That bar operated only while the provisions remained in force. Once section 137 was omitted, the fetter on the ordinary jurisdiction of civil courts to require production of relevant documents was removed for records filed after 1 April 1964. Section 6(c) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 did not preserve any privilege for records filed after the omission, because no accrued right or privilege existed in relation to those later documents. The finality attached to the Commissioner's order under section 138(1)(b) was confined to applications by persons seeking information and did not extend to judicial requisitions issued by a court in pending proceedings.

Conclusion: The civil court's power to summon assessment records filed after 1 April 1964 was not barred, and section 138(1)(b) did not confer on the Commissioner any power to override a judicial summons. The answer of the High Court on that point was set aside in favour of the assessee.

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