Civil court summons for income-tax records remain discretionary, but statutory information remedies should ordinarily be used first.

The Income-tax Act, 1961 does not, in the absence of a notification under section 138(2), expressly or impliedly bar a civil court from summoning income-tax assessment records. However, the power to compel production is discretionary and must be exercised judicially. Where section 138 provides a specific statutory route for obtaining information, a party should ordinarily exhaust that remedy first, and the court may consider whether the whole assessment record is needed, whether the assessee is willing to produce it, and whether an application under section 138(1)(b) has been made. Direct summons without using the statutory mechanism will usually not justify compulsory production.

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Issues: Whether the civil court has jurisdiction to summon income-tax assessment orders, and whether the court should exercise its discretion to compel production of such records when the Income-tax Act provides a statutory mechanism for obtaining information.

Analysis: The confidentiality attached to assessment proceedings under the earlier law was removed by the Income-tax Act, 1961 except to the extent preserved by section 138. Section 138(1)(b) enables a person to seek information from the Commissioner, who may furnish it if satisfied that disclosure is in the public interest, and section 138(2) authorises the Central Government to impose restricted non-disclosure by notification. In the absence of a notification covering the relevant assessees, the Act does not expressly or impliedly bar the civil court from issuing summons to the income-tax authorities. At the same time, the power to summon is discretionary and must be exercised judicially. Where the Act itself provides a special route for obtaining the information, a party should ordinarily pursue that remedy first. Relevant considerations include the need for the entire assessment record, whether the assessee is willing to produce it, whether an application under section 138(1)(b) has been made, and any other relevant factor. A party who bypasses the statutory mechanism and seeks to summon the records directly, without exhausting the remedy under the Act, does not make out a fit case for compelling production.

Conclusion: The civil court did have jurisdiction to summon the assessment orders, but the refusal to issue summons was justified on the facts because the petitioner had not pursued the statutory remedy and had not shown a proper basis for discretionary relief. The revision petition failed.

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