Court's power to compel relevant evidence survives repeal of section 137, subject to discretion and abuse-of-process limits.

After the repeal of section 137 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the court's ordinary power to compel production of relevant evidence was not curtailed by section 138, which dealt only with disclosure by the Commissioner in public interest. The earlier confidentiality regime under the 1922 Act and the 1961 Act operated in different fields, and the court's authority in pending litigation continued to be governed by the Code of Civil Procedure and the Evidence Act, subject to judicial discretion and the prohibition against abuse of process. The court therefore could order production and admission of another assessee's income-tax return documents, and the objection to exhibiting them failed.

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Issues: Whether, after the repeal of section 137 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the court could permit production and admission in evidence of another assessee's income-tax return documents notwithstanding section 138.

Analysis: The provisions governing confidentiality under the earlier 1922 Act and the corresponding provisions under the 1961 Act were treated as operating in different fields. Section 137 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, which earlier restricted the court's power, had been repealed, and the amended section 138 dealt with disclosure by the Commissioner in public interest, not with the court's own power in pending litigation. The court's authority to call for evidence was therefore to be exercised under the Code of Civil Procedure and the Evidence Act, subject to ordinary judicial discretion against abuse of process, and not curtailed by the repealed provision.

Conclusion: The court held that it could order production and admission of the document in evidence, and the objection to its exhibition was unsustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: Once the statutory embargo in section 137 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, stood repealed, the court retained its ordinary power to compel production of relevant evidence, subject only to judicial discretion and the prohibition against abuse of process.

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