Issues: (i) Whether non-consideration of the applicable circular and precedent constituted a mistake apparent from the record permitting rectification under Section 129B(2) of the Customs Act, 1962; (ii) Whether the FOB value declared in shipping bills dated before 31.12.2008 was required to be treated as a cum-duty price for determining assessable value.

Issue (i): Whether non-consideration of the applicable circular and precedent constituted a mistake apparent from the record permitting rectification under Section 129B(2) of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: The shipping-bill dates were evident from the record and fell within the period expressly covered by paragraph 4 of CBEC Circular No. 18/2008-Cus. dated 10.11.2008. The final order had not considered that paragraph or the decision in the assessee's own case applying it. Giving effect to those directly applicable materials required no fresh evidence or elaborate investigation and did not entail a review of the merits.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee: the omission constituted a mistake apparent from the record, and rectification was permissible.

Issue (ii): Whether the FOB value declared in shipping bills dated before 31.12.2008 was required to be treated as a cum-duty price for determining assessable value.

Analysis: Paragraph 4 of the circular directed continuation of the existing practice of computing export duty by treating FOB price as cum-duty price until 31.12.2008. The changed valuation method under paragraph 5 applied only from 01.01.2009. Decisions concerning the post-31.12.2008 regime did not govern the subject shipping bills, whereas the applicable circular and precedents required backward computation from the declared FOB value.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee: the declared FOB value was required to be treated as cum-duty price and the assessable value determined by working backwards from it.

Final Conclusion: Export-duty assessment for the subject pre-31.12.2008 shipping bills must follow the cum-duty valuation method prescribed by the applicable circular.

Ratio Decidendi: Failure to consider an applicable Board circular and directly relevant precedent apparent from the record is a mistake amenable to rectification where correcting it does not require reappreciation of evidence or review of the merits.

Issues: Whether the pending proceedings before the NCLT should be kept in abeyance pending completion of the governmental proceedings concerning the investigation report.

Analysis: Prima facie indications of a demerger and vesting of the company into the resulting company, together with the ongoing proceedings pursuant to the earlier direction for examination of the investigation report, warranted limited protective directions before further adjudication by the NCLT. The statutory authorities were required to complete the pending proceedings and place their report before the NCLT.

Outcome: The NCLT proceedings were directed to remain in abeyance for three months, pending completion of the governmental proceedings and submission of a report to the NCLT.

Issues: Whether a deemed stay of recovery upon appellate pre-deposit requires unblocking of an electronic credit ledger blocked in relation to input tax credit.

Analysis: Blocking of credit under Rule 86A is a provisional measure requiring recorded reasons and cannot subsist beyond one year. A deemed stay arising under Section 107(7) upon filing an appeal and making the prescribed pre-deposit stays recovery of the balance demand and prevents appropriation from the electronic cash ledger or blocked electronic credit ledger. Such deemed stay does not, by itself, affect the independently issued blocking order. The statutory framework permits the affected person to seek unblocking.

Conclusion: The deemed stay consequent to appellate pre-deposit does not mandate unblocking of the electronic credit ledger. The request for unblocking must be considered, and any refusal must be supported by a speaking order.

Issues: (i) Whether a new undertaking qualified for deductions under Sections 80IA and 80IB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 by commencing independent manufacturing operations by 31 March 1995; (ii) Whether depreciation was allowable under Section 32 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on machinery received at the end of the previous year.

Issue (i): Whether a new undertaking qualified for deductions under Sections 80IA and 80IB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 by commencing independent manufacturing operations by 31 March 1995.

Analysis: Eligibility under Sections 80IA and 80IB depends upon the undertaking being an identifiable, integrated and independently capable manufacturing unit, and not upon complete operational isolation from the existing business. Manufacture of the same product by both units, phased augmentation of capacity, common invoicing arrangements, or limited use of old machinery within the permissible statutory threshold do not by themselves establish splitting up or reconstruction.

Analysis: The new building, fresh capital, new machinery, enhanced power load, additional workforce, unit-wise accounts, production and dispatch records, sales invoices, excise-linked records, and contemporaneous inauguration material cumulatively established commencement of commercial production before the prescribed date. The technical certification of independent capability could not be discarded without contrary expert material. Machinery added in the following year was for capacity augmentation, additional facilities and backward integration, rather than to create the undertaking for the first time. The production records also sufficiently established manufacture in the new unit.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee: the undertaking was an integrated and independent manufacturing unit that commenced commercial production by 31 March 1995, and the claimed deductions under Sections 80IA and 80IB were allowable for all the relevant assessment years.

Issue (ii): Whether depreciation was allowable under Section 32 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on machinery received at the end of the previous year.

Analysis: For Section 32, use for business includes an asset installed and kept ready for use. Purchase invoices, inward records and installation evidence showed that the machinery formed part of an already operational manufacturing set-up. No contrary material established that it remained uninstalled, unavailable, or incapable of deployment by the close of the previous year; receipt on 30 or 31 March alone was insufficient to deny depreciation.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee: depreciation on the machinery was allowable on the ready-for-use principle.

Final Conclusion: The undertaking's initial-year qualification sustained its profit-linked deduction entitlement throughout the relevant statutory period, and the machinery satisfied the ready-for-use requirement for depreciation.

Ratio Decidendi: A newly established undertaking is eligible for profit-linked deduction where, by the prescribed date, it is an identifiable and independently capable manufacturing unit; later augmentation, manufacture of the same product, and non-separate invoicing do not negate eligibility when contemporaneous evidence establishes independent production.

Issues: Whether the continuation of search proceedings beyond the stated validity of the authorisation and alleged coercive recovery from the petitioner for a supplier's purported wrongful input tax credit warranted interim protection.

Analysis: The respondents' position that a search initiated within the authorisation period may continue thereafter was recorded. The allegation of pressure to discharge the supplier's liability was also noted, and instructions were directed to be obtained.

Outcome: The petitioner may carry on normal business activities, and the authorities shall not take coercive steps or exert pressure to recover the allegedly defaulting supplier's liability until the next listing.

Issues: (i) Whether the claimed cost of improvement was allowable on the basis of the approved engineer's valuation report despite absence of bills and vouchers; (ii) Whether deduction under Section 54F for interior expenditure was allowable without supporting evidence.

Issue (i): Whether the claimed cost of improvement was allowable on the basis of the approved engineer's valuation report despite absence of bills and vouchers.

Analysis: Construction of the building was undisputed. The approved engineer's valuation report was not shown to contain any defect, and no adverse material against its valuation was brought on record. The assessing authority adopted the construction year stated in that report but substituted the stated cost with unsupported per-square-foot estimates. The appellate authority likewise rejected the valuation without identifying any defect and independently applied CPWD plinth area rates. Neither authority obtained an alternative valuation despite lacking technical valuation expertise.

Conclusion: The approved engineer's valuation report must be accepted and the claimed cost of improvement allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether deduction under Section 54F for interior expenditure was allowable without supporting evidence.

Analysis: No bills, vouchers, or other supporting material substantiating the claimed interior expenditure were produced before either lower authority, and the inability to produce such evidence was maintained.

Conclusion: Deduction under Section 54F for the unsubstantiated interior expenditure is not allowable, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Long-term capital gains must be computed by allowing the claimed cost of improvement, while the unproved interior expenditure remains excluded from the Section 54F deduction.

Ratio Decidendi: An approved valuation report must be accepted where no defect or contrary material is established, and tax authorities cannot replace it with unsupported estimates made without technical basis.

Issues: Whether interim protection should continue pending consideration of challenges to orders raising GST demands where the adjudicating authority recorded inability to reconcile extensive e-way bill, invoice and accounting data.

Analysis: The orders indicated a prima facie inability to analyse and reconcile the delivery channels, e-way bills, invoices and supporting accounting records. The material comprised a substantial volume of entries, e-way bills and invoices, and no further material had been sought from the petitioner for reconciliation. The complexity of the amounts and documents warranted consideration of the petitions.

Outcome: Rule issued and the existing ad-interim relief continued until final disposal of the petitions.

Issues: Whether approval under Section 80G(5) can be denied to a trust having charitable objects for the public at large merely because of religious objects, without determining whether its religious expenditure exceeded the statutory threshold.

Analysis: Section 80G(5B) deems an institution or fund incurring religious expenditure not exceeding five per cent of its total income to be one to which Section 80G applies. The material did not establish that the trust had incurred religious expenditure beyond that limit. Its objects were substantially charitable and directed towards the general public. The principles concerning Section 13(1)(b) also establish that the restriction is relevant while determining exemption under Section 11, rather than at the stage of registration under Section 12A.

Conclusion: Approval under Section 80G(5) cannot be refused on the stated basis; the application requires consideration after the necessary verification of the statutory conditions.

Issues: Whether recovery of CENVAT credit for March 2007 to November 2008 under a show-cause notice issued on 30.11.2010 was barred by limitation.

Analysis: The extended limitation period under Section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 required fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts with intent to evade duty. The department was aware of the receipt of left-over bulk cement in the factory and had issued permission for availment of credit on that quantity. No evidence established fraud, suppression of facts, or intent to evade duty. Consequently, the notice was required to be issued within the normal limitation period of one year.

Conclusion: The CENVAT credit demand was time-barred and the limitation issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether assignment or acquisition of leasehold rights in a GIDC industrial plot constitutes a taxable supply liable to GST; (ii) Whether input tax credit on GST charged for acquisition of such leasehold rights is blocked under Section 17(5)(d); (iii) Whether proceedings under Section 74(1) could be invoked on the basis of fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression of facts.

Issue (i): Whether assignment or acquisition of leasehold rights in a GIDC industrial plot constitutes a taxable supply liable to GST.

Analysis: Assignment or transfer of leasehold rights in a GIDC plot transfers benefits arising from immovable property to the assignee, who takes the place of the original lessee. Such a transaction does not fall within the scope of supply under Section 7(1)(a) read with Entry 5(b) of Schedule II and Entry 5 of Schedule III, and is not chargeable to GST under Section 9. GST charged by the supplier on the transaction was therefore without legal authority, and the reversal of credit and interest payment founded on its assumed taxability could not survive.

Conclusion: Assignment or acquisition of the leasehold rights was not a taxable supply, and the tax and interest paid through DRC-03 were liable to be refunded to the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether input tax credit on GST charged for acquisition of such leasehold rights is blocked under Section 17(5)(d).

Analysis: Section 17(5)(d) applies to goods or services received for construction of an immovable property. The transaction involved only acquisition of leasehold rights, without any construction activity. Further, the blocking provision presupposes a lawfully taxable inward supply, which was absent because the underlying assignment was not taxable.

Conclusion: Section 17(5)(d) did not apply, and the demand founded on alleged blocked input tax credit was unsustainable in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether proceedings under Section 74(1) could be invoked on the basis of fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression of facts.

Analysis: The credit was disclosed in statutory returns and books of account, and was reversed with interest before the show-cause notice. As the underlying transaction was not taxable and the alleged blocked credit was misconceived, the statutory prerequisites of fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression with intent to evade tax were not established.

Conclusion: Invocation of Section 74(1), including the consequential penalty, was without basis and unsustainable in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The adjudication and appellate orders founded on the assumed taxability of the leasehold-rights transaction, blocked credit, and fraudulent availment of credit were rendered legally ineffective, requiring restoration of the amounts recovered from the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Assignment of leasehold rights in a GIDC plot is a transfer of benefits arising from immovable property and, being outside the taxable scope of supply, cannot attract blocked-credit restrictions or fraud-based recovery proceedings predicated on GST liability.

Issues: (i) Whether the Fe content of Iron Ore Fines exported before 01.05.2022 must be determined on Wet Metric Ton basis or Dry Metric Ton basis for tariff classification and export-duty assessment; (ii) Whether the assessee was barred from raising the legal issue of correct Fe-content determination in appeal because it had accepted the original assessment without protest.

Issue (i): Whether the Fe content of Iron Ore Fines exported before 01.05.2022 must be determined on Wet Metric Ton basis or Dry Metric Ton basis for tariff classification and export-duty assessment.

Analysis: The applicable method is determined by the condition of the iron ore at export. For iron ore exported in moist condition, Fe content for export duty is to be computed on Wet Metric Ton basis after accounting for moisture and other impurities. The later insertion, effective from 01.05.2022, of a supplementary note to Chapter 26 requiring Dry Metric Ton computation for Heading 2601 confirms that the Dry Metric Ton method did not govern exports made before that date.

Conclusion: For the Shipping Bills filed before 01.05.2022, Fe content of the exported Iron Ore Fines must be determined on Wet Metric Ton basis, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessee was barred from raising the legal issue of correct Fe-content determination in appeal because it had accepted the original assessment without protest.

Analysis: The challenge concerned the legally correct classification and duty assessment on the basis of test reports already on record, rather than a new factual case or additional evidence. An appellate authority may entertain a legal ground necessary for correct determination of duty liability. Acceptance of an assessment cannot validate an assessment contrary to the governing tariff, binding precedents, or the applicable Board circular.

Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to raise the legal ground in appeal, and acceptance of the assessment did not preclude correction of classification or duty liability, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The applicable pre-01.05.2022 assessment requires determination of Fe content on Wet Metric Ton basis, followed by consequential reclassification, reassessment, and such relief as may be admissible in law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where iron ore is exported in moist condition before a later statutory prescription of Dry Metric Ton computation becomes effective, its Fe content for export-duty assessment must be determined on Wet Metric Ton basis; an assessee is not estopped from raising that legal objection at the appellate stage.

Issues: Whether penalty for attempted export of prohibited red sander logs could be imposed on the appellant solely on the basis of retracted statements without independent corroborative evidence.

Analysis: The allegation that the appellant provided logistical support rested entirely on statements, including his own statement which was retracted shortly after release from custody. The retraction was placed on record but was not addressed in the adjudication. The connected finding setting aside penalty on the person alleged to have introduced the appellant to the purported mastermind further undermined the basis for penalising the appellant. A statement under Section 108 is admissible, but a retracted statement or a co-accused's statement cannot, without independent admissible and tangible corroboration, establish involvement in the prohibited export.

Conclusion: The penalty under Section 114(i) of the Customs Act, 1962 was unsustainable for want of corroborative evidence and was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether Uttar Pradesh GST authorities could detain and seize goods merely transiting through Uttar Pradesh from Delhi to West Bengal.

Analysis: The goods were undisputedly destined for West Bengal and were only passing through Uttar Pradesh. The applicable precedent establishes that State GST authorities lack territorial jurisdiction to detain or seize goods that are merely in transit through the State and are not intended for delivery there.

Conclusion: The detention, consequential penalty and appellate order were without jurisdiction; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the petitioner could be permitted to avail the statutory appellate remedy despite delay in filing an appeal against the Order-in-Original.

Analysis: Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 provides an appellate remedy against the adjudication order. Direct writ interference was declined for non-exhaustion of that remedy. The delay of 99 days beyond the statutory appeal period was found to have arisen from circumstances beyond the petitioner's control, constituting sufficient cause for permitting recourse to the appeal.

Conclusion: The Appellate Authority shall entertain and decide the appeal on merits if it is filed within 30 days from uploading of the order.

Issues: Whether refusal of an adjournment for oral arguments, despite consideration of the Revenue's written submissions, constituted a violation of principles of natural justice warranting recall or rectification under Section 254(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The Revenue's detailed written submissions on taxability were reproduced and considered in the original order, and the adjudication addressed the material contentions advanced by both sides. Natural justice does not invariably require oral hearing where an effective right of representation has been afforded and considered. The rectification jurisdiction is available where a material contention on record has not been considered and resultant prejudice is shown; it cannot be used to obtain a review on merits merely because further oral submissions were not permitted.

Conclusion: No violation of principles of natural justice or mistake apparent from the record was established; recall or rectification under Section 254(2) was not warranted.

Issues: Whether, following the omission of Rule 96(10) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 without a saving or sunset clause, the restriction under that rule could be applied to a pending claim for refund of integrated tax on exports.

Analysis: The omission of Rule 96(10) was held to have ended the restriction without preserving its operation for pending proceedings. The show-cause notice was issued after the rule had been omitted with effect from 08.10.2024.

Conclusion: The restriction under Rule 96(10) could not be invoked against the assessee, and the show-cause notice and consequential order were quashed.

Issues: Whether reassessment proceedings under Sections 148A and 148 could be initiated against a person other than the searched person when their foundation was material seized during a third-party search.

Analysis: The seized electronic data, statements and alleged transaction details formed the sole foundation of the proposed reassessment. Sections 153A and 153C create a distinct and overriding statutory machinery for assessment where material found in a search relates to a person other than the searched person. Subsequent analysis or corroboration of search material does not alter its source or permit recourse to the general reassessment mechanism. Invocation of the extended limitation provision and obtaining approval could not cure an invalid assumption of jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The reassessment mechanism under Sections 148A and 148 was unavailable; the proceedings founded on third-party search material were without jurisdiction and invalid. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the earlier setting aside of seizure/freezing orders and the quashing of proceedings against certain individuals precluded attachment proceedings against the firm and the present individual appellants; (ii) Whether confirmation of the provisional attachment of bank deposits, fixed deposits and term deposits as proceeds of crime or their equivalent value was sustainable despite payment of compensation for mining and environmental violations.

Issue (i): Whether the earlier setting aside of seizure/freezing orders and the quashing of proceedings against certain individuals precluded attachment proceedings against the firm and the present individual appellants.

Analysis: The earlier order setting aside the seizure/freezing was expressly not on merits and was based on failure to file a prosecution complaint within the then-applicable statutory period. It therefore neither barred a subsequent attachment nor invalidated the attachment solely because the earlier freezing had been set aside. The quashing of predicate-offence proceedings was confined to particular individuals, whereas proceedings against the firm continued. The present three individual appellants were not covered by those orders.

Conclusion: The earlier orders did not bar consideration or confirmation of the attachment against the firm and the present appellants. The issue is against the appellants.

Issue (ii): Whether confirmation of the provisional attachment of bank deposits, fixed deposits and term deposits as proceeds of crime or their equivalent value was sustainable despite payment of compensation for mining and environmental violations.

Analysis: The impugned confirmation order reflected consideration of the complaint, replies and estimate of proceeds of crime. The investigation indicated production beyond approved limits, and the deposits were linked by recorded statements to sale proceeds of iron ore and manganese ore. Compensation paid for environmental and forest-law violations did not compound or extinguish alleged money-laundering offences and could not be set off against proceeds of crime. Pending final determination in the PMLA trial, the identified available proceeds of crime or their equivalent value were required to remain secured for possible confiscation.

Conclusion: The provisional attachment and its confirmation were sustainable, and the attached properties were to continue under attachment pending final findings in the PMLA trial. The issue is against the appellants.

Final Conclusion: The firm and the present individual appellants remain subject to the confirmed attachment, without prejudice to the final adjudication of the money-laundering prosecution.

Ratio Decidendi: A prior setting aside of freezing on a non-merits procedural ground does not preclude a subsequent PMLA attachment, and compensation for underlying regulatory violations does not displace attachment of identified proceeds of crime or their equivalent value pending trial.