Issues: (i) Whether goodwill arising on amalgamation is an intangible asset eligible for depreciation under Section 32(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (ii) Whether the Revenue could, for the first time before the High Court, invoke the restriction under the fifth proviso to Section 32(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Whether goodwill arising on amalgamation is an intangible asset eligible for depreciation under Section 32(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Explanation 3(b) to Section 32(1) treats goodwill as an asset for depreciation purposes. The question stood settled by the binding determination that goodwill is an asset within that Explanation and is eligible for depreciation.

Conclusion: Goodwill is a depreciable intangible asset and depreciation thereon is allowable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the Revenue could, for the first time before the High Court, invoke the restriction under the fifth proviso to Section 32(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The proposed restriction had neither been specifically raised before nor decided by the appellate authorities. It did not constitute an independent substantial question of law arising from the Tribunal's order.

Conclusion: The Revenue cannot raise the fifth-proviso restriction for the first time before the High Court; no substantial question of law arises on that basis, against the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The assessee's entitlement to depreciation on goodwill remains undisturbed, and the unraised statutory restriction cannot be introduced at the appellate stage.

Ratio Decidendi: Goodwill falls within the statutory category of depreciable assets, and a new issue not raised or adjudicated before the lower appellate authorities cannot be made the basis of a substantial question of law.

Issues: Whether the writ challenge to the NCLT's observations could be entertained despite the statutory appellate remedy under Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: The NCLT's observations proceeded on the settled position that claims relating to the period preceding approval of a resolution plan stand extinguished. Those observations fell within the NCLT's jurisdiction under the insolvency framework. The asserted conflict with State tax legislation did not establish a jurisdictional error, as permitting State tax claims to bypass the corporate insolvency resolution process would undermine the statutory effect of an approved resolution plan.

Conclusion: No jurisdictional infirmity was established to bypass the statutory appellate remedy before the NCLAT.

Issues: (i) Whether the employees' dismissals without an inquiry violated the principles of natural justice and were illegal; (ii) Whether approval of a corporate insolvency resolution plan extinguished the employees' rights under pre-CIRP labour awards and barred withdrawal of the court deposits.

Issue (i): Whether the employees' dismissals without an inquiry violated the principles of natural justice and were illegal.

Analysis: The employees were dismissed through composite charge-sheet-cum-dismissal orders after they had reported at their transferred locations, without a disciplinary inquiry. The employer did not establish any perversity in the labour awards finding that the dismissals had been effected in gross breach of the principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: The terminations were illegal, and the finding in the labour awards was affirmed in favour of the employees.

Issue (ii): Whether approval of a corporate insolvency resolution plan extinguished the employees' rights under pre-CIRP labour awards and barred withdrawal of the court deposits.

Analysis: The labour awards had adjudicated the employees' claims and granted compensation before commencement of the corporate insolvency resolution process. Their entitlement under the awards had therefore crystallised before the moratorium under Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and approval of the resolution plan. This was distinguishable from an unadjudicated employment claim pending when the resolution plan was approved. The deposits were made to secure compensation awarded to the employees during the challenge proceedings; their continued deposit in court did not, by itself, entitle the new management to recover them. The general question whether court deposits constitute assets of the corporate debtor was not decided.

Conclusion: The resolution plan did not defeat the employees' crystallised entitlement under the labour awards. The employees were entitled to withdraw the deposited amounts with accrued interest as compensation, in full settlement of their service-related claims.

Final Conclusion: The labour awards remain operative, and the court deposits with accrued interest are to satisfy the compensation payable to the employees, with no further service-related benefits remaining payable.

Issues: (i) Whether scrutiny under Section 39(1) could be initiated against a continuously registered dealer without a valid notice under Section 35; (ii) Whether the five-year limitation in Section 57 applied to Section 39 scrutiny; (iii) Whether the Superintendent of Taxes had lawful delegated authority to commence Section 39 proceedings; and (iv) Whether the writ petition was maintainable despite the alternative remedy under Section 65.

Issue (i): Whether scrutiny under Section 39(1) could be initiated against a continuously registered dealer without a valid notice under Section 35.

Analysis: Section 35(2) mandates registered dealers to file returns, whereas Section 35(3) permits notice to dealers other than registered dealers. Section 39(1) confines scrutiny to returns furnished by a registered dealer to whom a notice under Section 35 has been issued. The notice requirement is a condition precedent to the exercise of scrutiny jurisdiction. A harmonious construction did not permit the statutory qualification to be disregarded; a dealer that was always registered and filed returns under Section 35(2) could not be subjected to Section 39 scrutiny without the prescribed notice.

Conclusion: The Section 39(1) scrutiny was without jurisdiction for want of the mandatory Section 35 notice, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the five-year limitation in Section 57 applied to Section 39 scrutiny.

Analysis: The statutory limitation governing completion of assessments could not be circumvented through recourse to the scrutiny mechanism under Section 39. Section 57 was applied to Section 39 proceedings, and scrutiny commenced in 2023 for returns relating to 2007 to 2017 fell beyond the prescribed period.

Conclusion: The impugned Section 39 scrutiny proceedings were barred by statutory limitation, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the Superintendent of Taxes had lawful delegated authority to commence Section 39 proceedings.

Analysis: Section 26 read with Rule 3 requires delegation of the Commissioner's powers through notification in the Official Gazette. No gazette notification delegating Section 39 powers to the Superintendent of Taxes was produced. Internal orders or circulars could not satisfy the mandatory statutory requirement for delegation.

Conclusion: The Superintendent of Taxes lacked lawful delegated authority to initiate the Section 39 proceedings, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether the writ petition was maintainable despite the alternative remedy under Section 65.

Analysis: The challenge disclosed a jurisdictional error arising from non-fulfilment of the statutory notice requirement and absence of valid delegation. This brought the matter within the recognised exception to the rule requiring exhaustion of an alternative remedy.

Conclusion: The writ petition was maintainable notwithstanding the alternative remedy, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The statutory scheme did not permit scrutiny against the assessee without fulfilment of the express jurisdictional preconditions, compliance with limitation, and lawful delegation of power.

Ratio Decidendi: A fiscal scrutiny power conditioned by statute may be exercised only upon strict compliance with its express jurisdictional preconditions, prescribed limitation, and lawful delegation.

Issues: (i) Whether Section 16(2)(c), read with Section 155, of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is unconstitutional or must be read down to confine ITC reversal to fraudulent, collusive, or non-genuine transactions; (ii) Whether and subject to what safeguards a purchaser's ITC may be denied or reversed when the supplier defaults in depositing tax or its registration is subsequently cancelled.

Issue (i): Whether Section 16(2)(c), read with Section 155, of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is unconstitutional or must be read down to confine ITC reversal to fraudulent, collusive, or non-genuine transactions.

Analysis: Input tax credit is a statutory concession, and actual payment of tax to the Government is integral to the credit mechanism. Section 16(2)(c) operates subject to Section 41 and forms part of an integrated statutory framework governing eligibility, reversal, recovery from the supplier, and subsequent re-availment. The earlier matching and reconciliation framework under Sections 42 and 43 was not operationalised, but the resulting difficulty concerns the manner of enforcement rather than the constitutional validity of the condition itself.

Analysis: The possibility of arbitrary or mechanical action in individual cases does not invalidate Section 16(2)(c). The condition cannot be restricted only to fraud, collusion, or fictitious transactions by reading down its text; instead, it must be applied harmoniously with the statutory safeguards and recovery mechanisms available against the defaulting supplier.

Conclusion: Section 16(2)(c), read with Section 155, is constitutionally valid and is not read down to limit its operation exclusively to fraudulent, collusive, or non-genuine transactions.

Issue (ii): Whether and subject to what safeguards a purchaser's ITC may be denied or reversed when the supplier defaults in depositing tax or its registration is subsequently cancelled.

Analysis: The non-operationalisation of the original matching mechanism, the phased substitution of Section 41, and the subsequent introduction of Rule 37A require the statutory regime applicable to the relevant tax period to be applied. For periods before Rule 37A, the absence of a re-availment mechanism is material. The statutory power to recover tax collected but not deposited by the supplier, including under Section 76, remains a relevant part of the scheme and cannot be rendered ineffective.

Analysis: Subsequent or retrospective cancellation of the supplier's registration, a nil or short tax declaration, or an alert concerning the supplier may justify an inquiry but cannot alone justify denial or reversal of ITC. The notice must disclose the relevant supplier, invoices, tax periods, nature of the default, material relied upon, and the status of recovery proceedings against the supplier. The purchaser may discharge the burden of proof through invoices and evidence of actual receipt and movement of goods or services. A notice invoking fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression must itself state the foundational facts connecting the purchaser to such conduct. Personal hearing, reasoned consideration of the purchaser's material, and examination of the grounds for retrospective cancellation are required.

Conclusion: ITC cannot be denied or reversed mechanically merely because the supplier defaulted or its registration was subsequently cancelled. Reversal may follow where the purchaser fails to establish eligibility or where fraud, collusion, non-receipt of goods or services, or other grounds rendering the credit inadmissible are established in accordance with law.

Final Conclusion: Pending notices and completed adjudications must be dealt with afresh in conformity with the prescribed safeguards, after adequate opportunity to furnish material and be heard. Amounts already reversed, deposited, or recovered shall be adjusted or refunded as warranted by the fresh determination, and no fresh coercive recovery may be undertaken until that determination.

Ratio Decidendi: Actual payment of tax is a valid statutory condition for input tax credit, but Section 16(2)(c) must be enforced as part of the integrated GST scheme and cannot be used to impose mechanical reversal upon a bona fide purchaser without a fact-based inquiry, procedural fairness, and consideration of recovery from the defaulting supplier.

Issues: Whether the reassessment order under Section 148A(3) and the consequent notice under Section 148 for assessment year 2020-21 warranted writ interference where the materially identical reassessment challenge for the preceding assessment year had already been decided against the assessee.

Analysis: The information and allegations underlying the impugned reassessment action were identical to those involved in the preceding assessment year. The earlier decision had found that determining whether the amount disclosed by the assessee arose from a spurious transaction resulting in escaped income required factual examination by the Assessing Officer. Judicial discipline required adherence to the coordinate bench decision rendered in the assessee's own case.

Conclusion: The reassessment order and consequential notice did not warrant writ interference; the issue was decided against the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether service tax paid under a mistake of law on exempt goods transport agency services is refundable; (ii) Whether interest is payable on that amount and, if so, at what rate.

Issue (i): Whether service tax paid under a mistake of law on exempt goods transport agency services is refundable.

Analysis: The assessee was eligible for exemption under Clause (21)(d) of Notification No. 25/2012-ST, as amended, but paid service tax under reverse charge despite no liability. Such payment, made under a mistake of law, is a revenue deposit rather than tax or duty. Consequently, Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 does not govern the refund claim, and retention of the amount would be without authority of law under Article 265 of the Constitution of India.

Conclusion: The refund of the amount paid under mistake of law is admissible, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether interest is payable on that amount and, if so, at what rate.

Analysis: Since the payment retains the character of a revenue deposit and is outside the statutory refund mechanism for duty, the interest regime under Section 11BB of the Central Excise Act, 1944 is inapplicable. The applicable principle supports compensatory interest at 12% per annum for wrongful retention of the deposit.

Conclusion: The assessee is entitled to interest at 12% per annum from the respective dates of deposit until payment of the refund, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The exemption is given full effect by treating the erroneous payment as a refundable revenue deposit, with compensation for its retention.

Ratio Decidendi: A payment made under a mistake of law where no tax liability exists is a revenue deposit outside Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944, and its unlawful retention warrants refund with compensatory interest.

Issues: Whether the Commissioner could withhold the refund under Section 54(11) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 when an anti-evasion investigation concerning alleged fraudulent input tax credit was pending.

Analysis: Section 54(11) permits withholding where the refund-generating order is subject to an appeal, further proceedings, or any other pending proceeding under the Act, and the Commissioner, after hearing the taxable person, forms an opinion that release would adversely affect revenue because of fraud or malfeasance. The expression concerning other pending proceedings extends beyond a formally instituted appeal and includes a pending statutory investigation. The anti-evasion investigation had commenced before the refund-withholding order and was supported by contemporaneous material indicating non-existent or cancelled suppliers, absence of established movement of goods, and absence of the claimant from the manufacturer's supply chain. Those circumstances bore directly on actual receipt of goods for input tax credit purposes and supported the requisite opinion of fraud or malfeasance. A subsequently issued show-cause notice merely crystallised the ongoing investigation; the absence of a pending appellate proceeding or separate judicial stay did not invalidate the statutory withholding.

Conclusion: The refund was validly withheld under Section 54(11); the issue was decided against the assessee.

Issues: Whether extraordinary writ jurisdiction could be exercised to quash an input-tax-credit adjudication order despite an available statutory appeal, on the asserted bar under Section 6(2)(b), variance from the show-cause notice, and denial of an effective hearing.

Analysis: Article 226 jurisdiction does not ordinarily substitute the statutory appellate process where the challenge requires examination of the adjudication record and disputed facts. The bar under Section 6(2)(b) depends upon identity of the precise subject matter, including the relevant tax period, transactions, invoices, ITC liability and allegations; a common supplier or general connection with ITC is insufficient. Whether the State and Central proceedings concerned identical liabilities required examination of their respective notices, orders and transaction-wise material. The impugned order disclosed an independent finding of ITC availment on goods-less invoices with reference to Section 16(2)(b), and therefore did not facially rest on a wholly new basis. The recorded grant of hearing opportunities, notwithstanding an apparent date discrepancy, and objections regarding evidence, limitation, clubbing of periods, replies and invocation of Section 74 required scrutiny of the underlying record in appeal.

Conclusion: An efficacious appellate remedy was required to be pursued because no ex facie lack of jurisdiction or undisputed breach of natural justice was established; all objections, including the applicability of Section 6(2)(b), remained open for appellate determination.

Issues: (i) Whether unfiled GST dues, interest and penalty for the pre-resolution-plan period were extinguished upon approval of the resolution plan, thereby barring later proceedings; and (ii) Whether the statutory appeal barred writ jurisdiction where the demands were initiated without jurisdiction.

Issue (i): Whether unfiled GST dues, interest and penalty for the pre-resolution-plan period were extinguished upon approval of the resolution plan, thereby barring later proceedings.

Analysis: Section 31(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 makes an approved resolution plan binding upon the Central Government and authorities owed statutory dues, while Section 238 gives the Code overriding effect. The GST liabilities concerned the period preceding approval of the resolution plan, and no claim was lodged during the corporate insolvency resolution process. The approved plan extinguished all pre-effective-date governmental claims, whether assessed or unassessed, unless specifically preserved. This accords with the clean-slate principle, under which a successful resolution applicant cannot be burdened with undisclosed or undecided pre-plan claims.

Analysis: The distinction between adjudication and recovery was inapplicable after extinguishment of the underlying claim. A show-cause notice and consequential demand proceedings under Section 73(9), including interest and penalty, amount to proceedings concerning that extinguished claim. Section 88 concerns liquidation and cannot revive a liability extinguished through an approved resolution plan; the general adjudicatory powers under the GST law remain subject to Sections 31(1) and 238 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee, the pre-resolution-plan GST dues, interest and penalty stood extinguished, and no subsequent proceedings for their determination or recovery could be initiated or continued.

Issue (ii): Whether the statutory appeal barred writ jurisdiction where the demands were initiated without jurisdiction.

Analysis: Availability of an appeal under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 does not bar writ jurisdiction where the challenged action is without jurisdiction and contrary to binding insolvency law. The relevant facts were undisputed and the challenge raised a pure legal question concerning the authority to initiate proceedings for an extinguished claim.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee, writ jurisdiction was available notwithstanding the alternate statutory appeal.

Final Conclusion: An approved resolution plan conclusively extinguishes unfiled statutory claims relating to the pre-approval period and precludes subsequent tax-adjudication proceedings concerning those claims.

Ratio Decidendi: Statutory dues not lodged in the corporate insolvency resolution process and not preserved by an approved resolution plan are extinguished under Section 31(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, and cannot thereafter be assessed, adjudicated or recovered notwithstanding general powers under fiscal legislation.

Issues: Whether the approved valuer's report should be admitted and the property referred for departmental valuation in reassessing the addition based on stamp duty value.

Analysis: The addition under section 56 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 arose from the difference between the property's stamp duty value and its purchase consideration. Despite the assessee's request, the assessing officer had not made a departmental valuation reference under section 50C. The first appellate authority had not considered the approved valuer's report because it had not been furnished during assessment.

Conclusion: The valuation report was admitted as additional evidence. A departmental valuation and fresh assessment were directed, with consideration of both valuation reports and an adequate opportunity of hearing. The correctness of the addition remains to be determined.

Issues: (i) Whether reassessment initiated by an Assessing Officer lacking pecuniary jurisdiction was valid; (ii) Whether the deletion of additions under section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was justified.

Issue (i): Whether reassessment initiated by an Assessing Officer lacking pecuniary jurisdiction was valid.

Analysis: Under CBDT Instruction No. 1/2011, the returned loss placed pecuniary jurisdiction with the Income-tax Officer rather than the Assistant Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner. The notice under section 148 was issued by an officer who lacked that jurisdiction. The restriction concerning objections to territorial jurisdiction did not cure a defect of pecuniary jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The reassessment notice and consequential reassessment were void ab initio for want of pecuniary jurisdiction, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the deletion of additions under section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was justified.

Analysis: The appellate authority had obtained and considered documentary material establishing the identity and creditworthiness of the lenders and the genuineness of the loan transactions. Its power to make further inquiry under section 250(4) was not restricted by the rules governing additional evidence. The advertisement receipts were received through banking channels, adjusted against services rendered, and offered to tax as business revenue in the relevant assessment years; their further treatment as unexplained cash credits would result in double taxation.

Conclusion: The deletion of the additions under section 68 was sustained, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The reassessment was invalid for want of valid pecuniary jurisdiction and, independently, the impugned credits stood satisfactorily explained.

Ratio Decidendi: A reassessment initiated by an officer lacking statutory pecuniary jurisdiction is void ab initio, and a limitation applicable to territorial-jurisdiction objections does not validate that defect.

Issues: Whether the actual rates paid by the receiving cement units to independent State electricity distribution companies could be adopted as internal comparable uncontrolled prices for determining the arm's-length price of electricity transferred from captive power plants.

Analysis: The arm's-length-price regime applicable to specified domestic transactions requires selection of the most appropriate method and a transaction-specific comparability analysis under the comparable uncontrolled price method. The post-amendment reference to arm's-length price in the provisions governing transfers between eligible and non-eligible businesses does not mandate comparison exclusively with generator-to-distribution-company rates. Although captive generators and distribution licensees perform different functions and assume different risks, those differences are not conclusive where the consumer tariff represents the actual contemporaneous price at which the receiving manufacturing unit could obtain electricity from an independent supplier. The generator-side procurement rates selected by the TPO represented a different stage of the supply chain and were not shown to be rates available to the receiving units.

Conclusion: The consumer-side rates actually paid by the cement units to the independent distribution companies were valid internal CUPs, and substitution of those rates with generator-side procurement rates was not justified. The transfer-pricing adjustments were unsustainable.

Issues: Whether reassessment for Assessment Year 2016-17 under Section 148A(d) and Section 148 was valid where the short-term capital loss relating to the mutual fund had already been specifically examined and accepted in the original scrutiny assessment.

Analysis: Reassessment jurisdiction requires a foundation distinct from matters already scrutinised; a subsequent review on the same material amounts to a change of opinion. The allegations arising from survey action concerning the fund manager had been addressed in binding decisions involving identical facts. No fresh tangible material, other than material examined during the original scrutiny assessment, was shown to justify reopening.

Conclusion: The reassessment initiation was invalid as an impermissible change of opinion and was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the availability of a statutory appellate remedy barred writ jurisdiction where only undisputed facts and pure questions of law concerning the effect of an approved resolution plan arose; (ii) Whether income-tax reassessment proceedings, assessment orders and demand notices for pre-resolution-plan assessment years could be sustained after approval of the resolution plan under Section 31(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Issue (i): Whether the availability of a statutory appellate remedy barred writ jurisdiction where only undisputed facts and pure questions of law concerning the effect of an approved resolution plan arose.

Analysis: The material facts were undisputed and the challenge raised a pure question of law concerning the Assessing Officer's jurisdiction after approval of the resolution plan and the interpretation of Section 31(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The rule requiring exhaustion of an alternative statutory remedy did not warrant relegation where the dispute could be resolved without factual adjudication.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee, the writ petitions were maintainable notwithstanding the statutory appellate remedy.

Issue (ii): Whether income-tax reassessment proceedings, assessment orders and demand notices for pre-resolution-plan assessment years could be sustained after approval of the resolution plan under Section 31(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: Section 31(1) makes an approved resolution plan binding upon the corporate debtor, creditors, the Central Government and authorities owed statutory dues. Statutory claims for periods preceding plan approval that are not part of the approved plan stand extinguished; belated proceedings would defeat the clean slate available to the successful resolution applicant. The alleged underassessment and transactions related to assessment years preceding approval of the resolution plan, and subsequent discovery of those matters could not revive tax claims outside the plan.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee, the proceedings initiated under Section 153C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 were without jurisdiction, and the resulting assessment orders and demand notices were quashed.

Final Conclusion: The approved resolution plan conclusively barred enforcement of unprovided statutory tax claims relating to periods before its approval.

Ratio Decidendi: Approval of a resolution plan under Section 31(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 extinguishes statutory claims not incorporated in the plan and precludes proceedings for such pre-approval claims.

Issues: Whether construction services relating to a single residential unit otherwise than as part of a residential complex were exempt from service tax.

Analysis: Serial No. 14(b) of Notification No. 25/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012 exempts services by way of construction, erection, commissioning or installation of original works pertaining to a single residential unit otherwise than as part of a residential complex. The activity was found to fall within this exempt entry, consistently with the applicable Tribunal precedent.

Conclusion: The construction services relating to the single residential unit were exempt from service tax, and the impugned demand was unsustainable.

Issues: (i) Whether consideration for software and related support was taxable as royalty or fees for technical services in India; (ii) whether gains from transferring ownership in a foreign entity holding an Indian subsidiary were taxable in India under the India-Ireland treaty; (iii) whether treaty benefits could be denied on the basis of alleged treaty abuse and double non-taxation.

Issue (i): Whether consideration for software and related support was taxable as royalty or fees for technical services in India.

Analysis: Earlier decisions in the assessee's own case addressed the same software offerings, and no material distinction in the nature of the services or revenue was identified.

Conclusion: The consideration was not taxable as royalty or fees for technical services under the Income-tax Act or the India-Ireland treaty. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether gains from transferring ownership in a foreign entity holding an Indian subsidiary were taxable in India under the India-Ireland treaty.

Analysis: Article 13 allocates taxing rights according to the property alienated. The transferred ownership was in a foreign entity, while the Indian subsidiary was held indirectly. Treaty terms require their ordinary contextual meaning; the domestic definition of transfer and the indirect-transfer deeming fiction cannot expand an unambiguous treaty provision through Article 3.

Conclusion: The gains fell under the treaty's residuary capital-gains provision and were not taxable in India. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether treaty benefits could be denied on the basis of alleged treaty abuse and double non-taxation.

Analysis: The alleged abuse was assessed against the absence of a specific inquiry or supporting evidence, the assessee's business operations and employees, and a restructuring involving transfers of ownership in several entities.

Conclusion: Treaty benefits could not be denied on the alleged basis. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Neither the software consideration nor the gains from the foreign ownership transfer were taxable in India on the grounds determined.

Ratio Decidendi: A domestic-law deeming fiction cannot expand an unambiguous allocation of taxing rights under a tax treaty.

Issues: (i) Whether the revised Rs. 50 lakh prosecution threshold under the Circular dated 16.08.2022 applies to the pending customs prosecution; (ii) Whether a Magistrate may consider withdrawal of a complaint already filed under the retained withdrawal mechanism in the earlier circular.

Issue (i): Whether the revised Rs. 50 lakh prosecution threshold under the Circular dated 16.08.2022 applies to the pending customs prosecution.

Analysis: The earlier circular prescribed a Rs. 20 lakh threshold for prosecution in outright smuggling cases involving precious metals, which was exceeded by the value of the goods involved. The subsequent circular increased that threshold to Rs. 50 lakh and modified the earlier circular only to that extent, while retaining its other terms. The value involved was below the revised threshold.

Conclusion: The revised Rs. 50 lakh threshold applies and the accused is entitled to its benefit, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether a Magistrate may consider withdrawal of a complaint already filed under the retained withdrawal mechanism in the earlier circular.

Analysis: Clause 11.2.1 of the earlier circular, retained except as to the revised threshold, permits the Court to decide whether the prosecution should continue where a complaint has already been filed. Neither the later circular nor its terms imposed a restriction barring consideration of withdrawal merely because sanction for prosecution had been issued.

Conclusion: The Magistrate has authority to consider and decide whether withdrawal of the pending complaint is warranted, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The request must be considered under the revised monetary threshold and the continuing judicial mechanism for withdrawal of an already-filed complaint.

Ratio Decidendi: A circular that revises only the monetary prosecution threshold while retaining earlier terms does not displace the Court's authority under the retained withdrawal provision to consider discontinuance of a pending complaint.