Issues: (i) Whether differential anti-dumping duty and IGST could be demanded under Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962 without prior appellate modification of the self-assessment; (ii) Whether anti-dumping duty is a duty of customs and IGST is leviable on such duty; (iii) Whether the penalty under Section 117 of the Customs Act, 1962 could exceed the statutory maximum applicable on the dates of import.

Issue (i): Whether differential anti-dumping duty and IGST could be demanded under Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962 without prior appellate modification of the self-assessment.

Analysis: The requirement of modification of an assessment or self-assessment before grant of refund operates in refund proceedings and does not restrict recovery proceedings for duty not levied or short-paid. Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962 independently authorises recovery of differential customs duty through a show-cause notice after clearance of imported goods.

Conclusion: The differential-duty demand under Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962 is sustainable without prior appellate modification of the self-assessment, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether anti-dumping duty is a duty of customs and IGST is leviable on such duty.

Analysis: Anti-dumping duty imposed under Section 9A of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 is a duty of customs by virtue of Section 12 of the Customs Act, 1962. Under Sections 3(7) and 3(8) of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, IGST on imported goods is calculated on the aggregate value that includes customs duties chargeable on those goods. The notified anti-dumping duty was consequently includible in the IGST base.

Conclusion: Anti-dumping duty is a duty of customs and IGST is chargeable on it; the related duty, IGST and interest demands are affirmed, against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the penalty under Section 117 of the Customs Act, 1962 could exceed the statutory maximum applicable on the dates of import.

Analysis: The imports occurred before the enhancement of the maximum penalty under Section 117 of the Customs Act, 1962 from Rs. 1 lakh to Rs. 4 lakh. The applicable maximum penalty on the import dates was therefore Rs. 1 lakh.

Conclusion: The penalty is reduced to Rs. 1 lakh, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The customs-duty and IGST liabilities, with applicable interest, remain enforceable, while the penalty is confined to the maximum prescribed when the imports occurred.

Ratio Decidendi: Recovery of customs duty not levied or short-paid under Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962 is not contingent on prior appellate modification of the self-assessment.

Issues: Whether the challenge to SEBI's interim directions should be entertained in writ jurisdiction despite the statutory appellate remedy.

Analysis: The challenge to the scope of the restrictions appeared arguable at first blush, but no prima facie finding was recorded. The statutory appeal before the Securities Appellate Tribunal was treated as an efficacious remedy for raising all objections to the interim order.

Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of with liberty to approach the appropriate forum, with all rights and contentions left open.

Issues: Whether the show-cause notice proposing wilful-defaulter classification could be quashed or deferred because arbitral proceedings concerning the underlying loan transactions were pending.

Analysis: The Reserve Bank of India Directions treat disposal of assets furnished as security without the lender's approval as a form of wilful default. The notice identified the assets and disclosed the supporting material, which was not alleged to have been withheld. Pending arbitration did not bar the independent wilful-defaulter process; the arbitral tribunal had also declined to stay the notice. A determination had not yet been made, since the borrowers could respond before the Identification and Review Committees, making judicial intervention at the show-cause stage premature.

Conclusion: The challenge to the show-cause notice was rejected, with two weeks granted for filing a reply.

Issues: (i) Whether the Bank Charges were taxable consideration or were exempt interest on discounting/reimbursable expenses; (ii) Whether invocation of the extended period and imposition of penalty under Section 78 were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the Bank Charges were taxable consideration or were exempt interest on discounting/reimbursable expenses.

Analysis: Notification No. 29/2004-ST exempts the value equivalent to interest on discounting of bills, bills of exchange or cheques where the interest is separately disclosed. The earlier departmental adjudication had accepted that cheque-discounting charges recorded as Bank Charges represented interest, and no change in the nature or accounting of the receipts was established for the relevant period. The ledger nomenclature alone could not establish taxability. The entries comprised cheque-related charges, realisation charges and amounts debited by banks, while no transaction-wise evidence established that the entire amount was consideration for a taxable service. Amounts representing interest on discounting were exempt, and actual bank expenses recovered from clients were not includible in taxable value for the relevant period.

Conclusion: The Bank Charges were not established as taxable consideration; the confirmed service-tax demand was unsustainable on merits, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether invocation of the extended period and imposition of penalty under Section 78 were sustainable.

Analysis: The relevant entries were recorded in the books and ledgers, had been examined in departmental and CERA audit, and the same accounting practice had previously been accepted in adjudication. No deliberate suppression, wilful misstatement or concealment with intent to evade tax was established. The dispute concerned the interpretative taxability of the receipts, and the entire confirmed demand fell beyond the normal limitation period.

Conclusion: The extended period was unavailable, the demand was time-barred, and the penalty under Section 78 could not survive, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The disputed levy, consequential interest and penalty lack legal basis because taxability was not proved and the extended limitation period was inapplicable.

Ratio Decidendi: A ledger description does not by itself establish service-tax liability; where the Department fails to prove that receipts are consideration for taxable service and prior disclosures negate suppression, the extended limitation period and suppression-based penalty cannot be invoked.

Issues: (i) Whether type-testing charges recovered from the buyer for ACSR conductors form part of the assessable value for central excise duty; (ii) Whether the equal penalty imposed for non-inclusion of such charges requires modification.

Issue (i): Whether type-testing charges recovered from the buyer for ACSR conductors form part of the assessable value for central excise duty.

Analysis: Type tests prescribed under IS 398 (Part II) were found necessary to ensure the quality and safety of ACSR conductors used in electricity transmission. The testing was mandatory rather than optional, and the sale could not occur without the requisite test certificate or report. The separately recovered charges therefore had a direct connection with the sale and formed part of transaction value. The plea of revenue neutrality was not accepted because excise liability and Cenvat credit entitlement arise under distinct provisions, with credit remaining subject to prescribed conditions.

Conclusion: Type-testing charges are includible in the assessable value of the conductors; the duty demand and consequential interest are sustainable against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the equal penalty imposed for non-inclusion of such charges requires modification.

Analysis: Earlier show-cause notices on the same issue showed that the dispute was not new to the assessee. Nevertheless, a lenient view was taken on the quantum of penalty.

Conclusion: The penalty under Rule 25 is reduced to Rs. 35,000, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The valuation demand remains unaffected, while relief is confined to restriction of the monetary penalty.

Ratio Decidendi: Amounts recovered for testing that is mandatory and indispensable to the sale of goods form part of transaction value, notwithstanding that they are separately charged or that credit may potentially be available to the buyer.

Issues: (i) Whether the assessee's entitlement to deduction as a developer of infrastructure facilities under Section 80-IA(4) gave rise to a substantial question of law under Section 260-A; and (ii) Whether the Tribunal's reliance on its earlier confirmed order gave rise to a substantial question of law.

Issue (i): Whether the assessee's entitlement to deduction as a developer of infrastructure facilities under Section 80-IA(4) gave rise to a substantial question of law under Section 260-A.

Analysis: Admission under Section 260-A is confined to a substantial question of law and does not permit reappreciation of evidence or substitution of a different factual view. The concurrent findings that the assessee qualified as a developer of an infrastructure facility were based on the material on record. No perversity, absence of evidence, or application of an erroneous legal test was established.

Conclusion: No substantial question of law arose on the assessee's eligibility for deduction under Section 80-IA(4); this issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the Tribunal's reliance on its earlier confirmed order gave rise to a substantial question of law.

Analysis: The earlier order relied upon had been confirmed, and it involved the same assessee and identical findings on the same subject matter. Reliance on that order did not disclose any infirmity warranting appellate intervention.

Conclusion: No substantial question of law arose from reliance on the earlier confirmed order; this issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The concurrent determination supporting the assessee's deduction remained undisturbed within the limited appellate jurisdiction under Section 260-A.

Ratio Decidendi: Concurrent factual findings cannot be reopened under Section 260-A absent perversity, lack of evidence, or erroneous application of law, and reliance on an earlier confirmed decision involving identical findings does not by itself raise a substantial question of law.

Issues: Consideration of foreign tax credit for salary taxed in Norway where Form No. 67 was not filed with the return.

Outcome: The assessee was directed to submit Form No. 67 and the credit details to the Assessing Officer, who must verify the claim and grant credit if it is in order. Eligibility remains to be determined.

Issues: (i) Whether the assessee was entitled to the concessional tax regime despite Form 10-IC referring to the following assessment year; (ii) Whether minimum alternate tax was applicable after exercise of the concessional tax option.

Issue (i): Whether the assessee was entitled to the concessional tax regime despite Form 10-IC referring to the following assessment year.

Analysis: Section 115BAA and Rule 21AE require exercise of the taxation option in Form 10-IC. The applicable circular provided condonation of delay for eligible companies that timely filed their returns and opted for the regime in those returns. The assessee made the option in its timely return and filed the form before the circular's deadline, but the form reflected the following assessment year, a mismatch attributed to portal difficulties.

Conclusion: Form 10-IC constituted sufficient compliance for the assessment year in question. The concessional regime was to be allowed subject to the other substantive conditions, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether minimum alternate tax was applicable after exercise of the concessional tax option.

Analysis: Section 115JB excludes from minimum alternate tax a person who has exercised the option under Section 115BAA.

Conclusion: The minimum alternate tax computation was to be deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Concessional taxation applies subject to the remaining statutory conditions, with the minimum alternate tax computation removed and tax liability to be recomputed.

Ratio Decidendi: An assessment-year mismatch in Form 10-IC arising from portal difficulties does not defeat a timely return's concessional tax option where the form is filed within the period permitted by the applicable condonation circular and the other substantive conditions are fulfilled.

Issues: Whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction over an appeal from a Commissioner (Appeals) order concerning gold imported as passenger baggage.

Analysis: The proviso to Section 129A(1) excludes the Tribunal's appellate jurisdiction over orders of the Commissioner (Appeals) relating to goods imported or exported as baggage. The exclusion depends on the mode and category of import as baggage, not on whether the goods are bona fide, eligible for duty-free clearance, declared, or liable to confiscation. Gold recovered from a passenger arriving from abroad constituted baggage under Section 77; its alleged smuggled character did not alter that category. The statutory remedy against such an appellate order lies by revision under Section 129DD.

Conclusion: The Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeals; the proper remedy is a revision before the Revisional Authority.

Issues: (i) Whether, after a search under Section 132 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and reliance on search-derived material, a pending scrutiny assessment could be completed under Section 143(3) rather than Sections 147 and 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (ii) Whether administrative approval under CBDT Instruction F. No. 299/36/2021-Dir(Inv.III)/577 dated 15.07.2022 could satisfy the statutory prior-approval requirement under Section 148B of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Whether, after a search under Section 132 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and reliance on search-derived material, a pending scrutiny assessment could be completed under Section 143(3) rather than Sections 147 and 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Explanation 2 to Section 148 creates a deemed basis of information suggesting escapement of income where a search is initiated, covering the assessment year within its prescribed period. The assessment was founded upon material and statements obtained in the search, rather than being confined to the original scrutiny material. The special search-triggered mechanism under Sections 147 and 148 prevailed over the general scrutiny mechanism under Section 143(3), applying the principle of generalia specialibus non derogant. The earlier issuance of a notice under Section 143(2) did not authorise continuation of the regular assessment route after the search.

Conclusion: The assessment completed under Section 143(3) was legally unsustainable; the search-triggered assessment had to follow Sections 147 and 148. In favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether administrative approval under CBDT Instruction F. No. 299/36/2021-Dir(Inv.III)/577 dated 15.07.2022 could satisfy the statutory prior-approval requirement under Section 148B of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 148B imposed a distinct and mandatory statutory condition of prior approval for an assessment covered by Explanation 2 to Section 148. The approval recorded in the assessment order was traced to the CBDT Instruction and was administrative or supervisory in character. The identity of the approving authority could not convert an administrative approval into approval exercised under the statutory source and character required by Section 148B.

Conclusion: The administrative approval did not satisfy the mandatory statutory prior approval under Section 148B. In favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessment and the first appellate order sustaining it could not stand; the issues concerning the addition under Section 69C were academic and were not adjudicated on merits.

Ratio Decidendi: A search-triggered assessment governed by a special statutory reassessment mechanism must comply with that mechanism and its mandatory approval requirement, which cannot be replaced by an administrative approval process.

Issues: Whether penalty for concealment or furnishing inaccurate particulars could be sustained in respect of the addition relating to area development fund when the underlying issue was debatable.

Analysis: Penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 requires concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars. The addition concerning area development fund involved an issue that had reached the Supreme Court in comparable proceedings, demonstrating that the matter was debatable. The relevant particulars had also been disclosed during the assessment proceedings. A penalty is not attracted merely because an addition is made on a debatable issue.

Conclusion: Penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the addition relating to area development fund is not imposable and must be deleted.

Issues: (i) Whether the first appellate authority violated Rule 46A by admitting additional evidence without a remand report; (ii) Whether deletion of the addition for alleged unexplained purchases, founded on a third-party statement, was justified; and (iii) Whether the payer's non-deduction of tax at source disproved the recipient's claim of job-work receipts.

Issue (i): Whether the first appellate authority violated Rule 46A by admitting additional evidence without a remand report.

Analysis: Rule 46A of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 regulates the admission and verification of additional evidence. The material had been forwarded to the Assessing Officer for verification and a reminder had been issued. The Assessing Officer acknowledged that the required details had been collected but the report was not furnished before the appellate order. A further opportunity to verify the material was also provided in the appellate proceedings, and the Assessing Officer's reports and the assessee's response were taken on record.

Conclusion: No violation of Rule 46A was established; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether deletion of the addition for alleged unexplained purchases, founded on a third-party statement, was justified.

Analysis: Section 69C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 requires a sustainable evidentiary basis for an addition for unexplained expenditure. The sole adverse material was an uncorroborated third-party statement recorded under Section 131(1A) following a survey under Section 133A, without any search or survey involving the assessee. The third party subsequently denied the alleged sale in response to the statutory enquiry under Section 133(6) and confirmed the job-work arrangement. The assessee's books, payment entries, job-work register, delivery records and absence of unaccounted stock supported the explanation. Repeated requests to cross-examine the maker of the statement were not granted, rendering the untested statement insufficient as the sole basis for the addition.

Conclusion: The deletion of the addition for alleged unexplained purchases was justified; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the payer's non-deduction of tax at source disproved the recipient's claim of job-work receipts.

Analysis: Under Section 194C of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the obligation to deduct tax at source rests on the person responsible for making the payment. A payer's default does not alter the true character of the recipient's receipt. The statutory enquiry, the payer's confirmation, the assessee's disclosed job-work receipts from numerous jewellers and the revenue records corroborated that the disputed receipt formed part of the regular job-work business.

Conclusion: Non-deduction of tax at source by the payer did not disprove the job-work nature of the receipt; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The recorded job-work explanation prevailed over the unsupported allegation of unaccounted purchases, and the substantive challenges to the deletion lacked evidentiary foundation.

Ratio Decidendi: An addition for unexplained expenditure cannot be sustained solely on an uncorroborated third-party statement where cross-examination is denied and the statutory enquiry supports the assessee's explanation.

Issues: Whether revision of the assessment under Section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was valid where the alleged unexplained investment relating to construction expenditure had been considered and brought to tax in subsequent assessment years.

Analysis: Revision under Section 263 requires the assessment order to be both erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. The construction expenditure aggregating to Rs. 83,93,850 was attributed to assessment years 2017-18 and 2018-19, where it had been examined and considered by the Assessing Officer. As the amount was already brought to tax in those years, no further addition was warranted for assessment year 2016-17.

Conclusion: The prerequisites for exercise of revisionary jurisdiction were not satisfied; the revision order under Section 263 was quashed.

Issues: Whether deduction for the claimed political donation was allowable under Section 80GGC of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Eligibility under Section 80GGC of the Income-tax Act, 1961 requires a genuine political contribution. Payment through banking channels and production of donation receipts were not conclusive where investigation material, physical verification, non-compliance by the recipient political party, and the established layering of funds demonstrated a systematic accommodation-entry arrangement. Applying the test of human probabilities and preponderance of probabilities, the apparent donation was found not to reflect a genuine contribution.

Conclusion: The claimed deduction under Section 80GGC of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was rightly disallowed; the issue is decided against the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the 198-day delay in filing the appeal should be condoned; (ii) Whether the cash deposit of Rs. 1,75,000 was unexplained money under section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Whether the 198-day delay in filing the appeal should be condoned.

Analysis: The delay arose because the appellate order remained unnoticed while the tax professional handling the matter was unwell. The assessee became aware of the outstanding demand later and pursued the appeal promptly thereafter. These circumstances constituted sufficient cause.

Conclusion: The delay was condoned in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the cash deposit of Rs. 1,75,000 was unexplained money under section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 69A applies where the source of money is not satisfactorily explained. The bank statement showed further cash withdrawals sufficient to explain the disputed deposit, apart from the withdrawals already accepted. The returned income, rental income and property-sale proceeds also supported the availability of funds.

Conclusion: The cash deposit of Rs. 1,75,000 was satisfactorily explained and could not be treated as unexplained money under section 69A; the addition was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: No taxable unexplained amount remained from the disputed cash deposit.

Ratio Decidendi: A cash deposit cannot be treated as unexplained money where contemporaneous withdrawals and the taxpayer's demonstrated financial resources satisfactorily establish its source.

Issues: (i) Whether sale proceeds from unlisted shares sold through a SEBI-registered portfolio management service could be treated as unexplained cash credit and the consequential long-term capital loss denied; (ii) Whether the cost and indexed cost of acquisition of shares could be taken as nil while computing long-term capital gains; (iii) Whether the assessee's share of profit from limited liability partnerships could be added as unexplained cash credit.

Issue (i): Whether sale proceeds from unlisted shares sold through a SEBI-registered portfolio management service could be treated as unexplained cash credit and the consequential long-term capital loss denied.

Analysis: Under Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the transaction was supported by the PMS registration certificate, portfolio and capital-gains statements, valuation report under Rule 11UA of the Income Tax Rules, 1962, and demat delivery instructions. No material established that a PMS could not deal in unlisted shares, nor was any defect identified in the valuation methodology. Non-disclosure of the shares in the return schedule alone could not displace the documentary evidence establishing the purchase and sale.

Conclusion: The share-sale transaction was genuine; the sale proceeds could not be assessed as unexplained cash credit, and the claimed long-term capital loss was allowable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the cost and indexed cost of acquisition of shares could be taken as nil while computing long-term capital gains.

Analysis: The statutory corporate filings, including the annual return and shareholder records, evidenced the assessee's holding of the shares from the relevant financial year and substantiated their original subscription cost. The absence of old bank payment slips did not justify disregarding this corroborative documentary record.

Conclusion: The original cost and indexed cost of acquisition were allowable in computing long-term capital gains, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the assessee's share of profit from limited liability partnerships could be added as unexplained cash credit.

Analysis: The remand report accepted that the amount represented the assessee's share of profit from partnership firms. Such share of profit is exempt under Section 10(2A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Conclusion: The addition representing the exempt share of partnership profit was unsustainable and was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The impugned additions relating to the share transactions and exempt partnership-profit receipts were deleted, with consequential recognition of the claimed capital-loss and acquisition-cost benefits.

Issues: Whether disallowance under Section 14A read with Rule 8D is permissible for Assessment Year 2017-18 where no exempt income was earned.

Analysis: Section 14A read with Rule 8D does not warrant a disallowance where the assessee has not earned or received exempt income during the relevant year. The amendment introduced by the Finance Act, 2022 operates prospectively from Assessment Year 2022-23 and does not govern Assessment Year 2017-18.

Conclusion: No disallowance under Section 14A read with Rule 8D could be made; the disallowance was directed to be deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether a regular assessment under section 143(3) could be made for an assessment year preceding a post-01.04.2021 search without recourse to sections 147 and 148; (ii) Whether absence of prior approval under section 148B, or reliance on a general administrative approval, invalidated the assessment.

Issue (i): Whether a regular assessment under section 143(3) could be made for an assessment year preceding a post-01.04.2021 search without recourse to sections 147 and 148.

Analysis: Explanation 2 to section 148 creates a statutory deeming fiction that search-related information suggests escapement of income for the specified preceding assessment years. The post-search reassessment machinery under sections 147 and 148 is a special statutory regime which prevails over the general scrutiny provisions under sections 143(2) and 143(3), applying the principle of generalia specialibus non derogant. Availability of time to issue a scrutiny notice, administrative selection for scrutiny, or participation in such proceedings cannot replace the prescribed jurisdictional notice or confer jurisdiction by waiver or participation. Administrative instructions cannot override statute.

Conclusion: For the preceding assessment year covered by Explanation 2 to section 148, jurisdiction had to be assumed through sections 147 and 148 and not by a direct assessment under section 143(3); the impugned assessment was without jurisdiction.

Issue (ii): Whether absence of prior approval under section 148B, or reliance on a general administrative approval, invalidated the assessment.

Analysis: Section 148B imposes mandatory prior approval by the specified authority before an assessment, reassessment, or recomputation is made for an assessment year covered by Explanation 2 to section 148. The statutory approval requires independent application of mind to the relevant seized material. A supervisory or administrative approval issued under a general circular is distinct from, and cannot substitute for, the statutory safeguard. No approval traceable to section 148B was established.

Conclusion: Non-compliance with the mandatory prior-approval requirement under section 148B independently rendered the assessment void ab initio.

Final Conclusion: The jurisdictional defects nullified the assessment, with the consequential additions and merits disputes having no surviving foundation and remaining open.

Ratio Decidendi: For a preceding assessment year covered by Explanation 2 to section 148 following a post-01.04.2021 search, assessment must proceed through sections 147 and 148 with prior approval under section 148B; a direct assessment under section 143(3) without these mandatory safeguards is void for want of jurisdiction.

Issues: Whether the presumptive-profit addition computed at 8% of bank-account credits was sustainable.

Analysis: The assessment was completed under the best-judgment and reassessment provisions. The banking pattern showed substantial withdrawals corresponding to deposits, and the assessee's registered cooperative activities involved granting and recovering agricultural loans. The credit and debit entries consequently supported the explanation that they represented loan disbursements and recoveries. No material identified any other business activity, nor was a factual basis established for estimating profit at 8% of the deposits.

Conclusion: The presumptive-profit addition was unsustainable and was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether revisionary jurisdiction could be exercised after the assessment dispute had been conclusively settled under the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme.

Analysis: A final settlement under the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme closes the dispute concerning the relevant tax arrears. Issuance of the full and final settlement order by the competent authority renders the underlying assessment dispute incapable of being reopened through revisionary proceedings.

Conclusion: Revision under Section 263 was impermissible after final settlement under the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme; the original assessment remained restored.