Issues: Whether reassessment proceedings for a period preceding approval of a corporate insolvency resolution plan could be initiated against the corporate debtor on the basis of fresh information.

Analysis: Approval of the resolution plan under Section 31 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 extinguished past claims, including statutory dues, relating to the period before its approval. The binding effect of the approved plan prevented a fresh reassessment from being commenced against the corporate debtor for that period, notwithstanding subsequently received information concerning alleged pre-plan transactions.

Conclusion: Reassessment proceedings for the pre-resolution-plan assessment year could not be initiated against the assessee; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the notice under section 274 read with section 270A was invalid for failing to specify the charge; (ii) Whether the difference between the income processed under section 143(1)(a) and the assessed income constituted under-reported income; (iii) Whether penalty at 200% for misreporting could be sustained where no case under section 270A(9) was established.

Issue (i): Whether the notice under section 274 read with section 270A was invalid for failing to specify the charge.

Analysis: The notice expressly identified the charge as under-reporting of income as a consequence of misreporting. It therefore disclosed the basis on which penalty proceedings were initiated and was not vague.

Conclusion: The notice was valid; decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the difference between the income processed under section 143(1)(a) and the assessed income constituted under-reported income.

Analysis: Sections 270A(2) and 270A(3) treat the difference between income assessed for the first time and income determined under section 143(1)(a), where a return has been furnished, as under-reported income. The assessed income exceeded the income processed under section 143(1)(a), and the resulting difference was consequently under-reported income.

Conclusion: The differential income constituted under-reported income; decided against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether penalty at 200% for misreporting could be sustained where no case under section 270A(9) was established.

Analysis: Enhanced penalty under section 270A(8) requires misreporting falling within the instances specified in section 270A(9). The assessment and penalty orders did not identify or establish any applicable instance of misreporting under those provisions, and merely levied penalty at the enhanced rate on the under-reported income.

Conclusion: Penalty at 200% for misreporting was unsustainable; penalty was directed to be levied at 50% of tax on the under-reported income, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The penalty is confined to the rate applicable to under-reporting of income and cannot be imposed at the enhanced rate prescribed for misreporting.

Ratio Decidendi: Enhanced penalty for misreporting under section 270A can be imposed only upon establishing that the case falls within a specified instance of misreporting under section 270A(9); under-reporting alone does not justify the enhanced rate.

Issues: (i) Whether written acceptance of enhanced import value precludes the importer from contesting reassessment; (ii) Whether declared transaction value may be rejected and enhanced solely on undisclosed contemporaneous-import/NIDB data without compliance with the statutory customs-valuation framework.

Issue (i): Whether written acceptance of enhanced import value precludes the importer from contesting reassessment.

Analysis: Written acceptance of reassessment under the statutory scheme relieves the proper officer only of the obligation to issue a speaking order. It does not amount to a waiver of the importer's statutory right to challenge either the formation of opinion for rejecting the declared value or the reassessment on merits. The acceptance letters did not disclose the alleged contemporaneous-import particulars, and could not conclusively establish an informed abandonment of the right to contest valuation.

Conclusion: Written acceptance of the enhanced value did not bar the importer from challenging the reassessment; this issue is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether declared transaction value may be rejected and enhanced solely on undisclosed contemporaneous-import/NIDB data without compliance with the statutory customs-valuation framework.

Analysis: Rejection of declared transaction value requires adherence to the mandatory procedure requiring formation and communication of grounds for reasonable doubt, followed by valuation under the prescribed sequential rules. Reliance solely on NIDB or contemporaneous-import data, without disclosed particulars, independent corroborative material, and cogent justification, does not satisfy those requirements.

Conclusion: The declared value could not lawfully be displaced solely on the basis of acceptance letters or unsupported NIDB/contemporaneous-import data; this issue is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The reassessment was legally unsustainable because mandatory customs-valuation safeguards were not followed and the importer's statutory challenge rights were not extinguished by written acceptance.

Ratio Decidendi: Written acceptance of reassessment waives only issuance of a speaking order and not the statutory right to challenge it; declared customs value cannot be enhanced solely on NIDB data without mandatory valuation safeguards and cogent supporting material.

Issues: Whether Boiler Support Steel Structures imported in completely knocked-down condition are classifiable as parts of boilers under tariff item 84029090, rather than as iron or steel structures under heading 7308 or prefabricated buildings under heading 9406.

Analysis: Under Rule 1 of the General Rules for the Interpretation of the Import Tariff, classification turns on the heading terms and relevant Section and Chapter Notes. Note 2(b) to Section XVI covers other parts suitable for sole or principal use with a particular machine, while heading 7308 excludes constructions clearly identifiable as machinery parts. The goods were fabricated to boiler-specific drawings, with predetermined dimensions, drilled connection points, structural attachments and unique tags corresponding to designated positions in the boiler support arrangement. Their objective identifiability, load-bearing and suspension functions, and inability to be used for another purpose without substantial re-engineering established their sole or principal use with the designated boiler system. The associated platforms, galleries, walkways and maintenance structures formed part of the same specifically engineered boiler-support arrangement. Heading 9406 was inapplicable because the goods neither constituted nor possessed the essential character of a prefabricated building.

Conclusion: The Boiler Support Steel Structures are identifiable machinery parts suitable for sole or principal use with boilers and are classifiable under tariff item 84029090 as other parts of boilers; classification under headings 7308 and 9406 is excluded.

Outcome: The application for condonation of delay was rejected and the special leave petition was dismissed as time barred.

Issues: Whether draft and final assessment orders passed without granting the requested personal hearing through video conferencing were valid.

Analysis: Section 144B(6)(vii) and (viii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 incorporates the principles of natural justice in faceless assessment and contemplates a personal hearing through video conferencing where requested. The requested facility could not be availed owing to technical glitches and not due to any default of the assessee; yet the draft assessment order was passed without providing the requested hearing.

Conclusion: The draft assessment order and consequential final assessment order were invalid for breach of the principles of natural justice. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether reassessment proceedings and the consequential assessment, demand and penalty notices issued against a company dissolved before issuance of the reassessment notice were valid.

Analysis: The company stood dissolved under Section 302(2) of the Companies Act, 2013 before the notice under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was issued. Dissolution ended its existence as a juristic person. A valid notice under Section 148 is the foundation for assumption of jurisdiction under Section 147; therefore, no reassessment could be initiated or completed against the dissolved entity. Framing an assessment against a non-existent entity is a substantive jurisdictional illegality and not a procedural defect capable of cure under Section 292B.

Conclusion: The notice under Section 148 and all consequential reassessment proceedings, assessment order, demand notice and penalty notice were void and were quashed, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether interim protection against suspension of the appellant's operations was warranted pending the contemplated inquiry.

Analysis: A strong prima facie case for interim relief was found. The suspension was prima facie not warranted pending inquiry, and the prescribed timeline under Regulation 11(3) appeared not to have been complied with. The merits of any pending inquiry were directed to remain uninfluenced by the impugned appellate order.

Outcome: The appeal was admitted on substantial questions of law, and interim stay was granted against the suspension order and consequential public notice pending inquiry.

Issues: (i) Whether owners of seized gold sold without prior notice under Section 150(1) are, if successful in the confiscation proceedings, entitled to its fair market value on the date of release rather than the sale proceeds received by Revenue; (ii) Whether the value of the gold should be released immediately against bank guarantees while Revenue's statutory appeal remains pending.

Issue (i): Whether owners of seized gold sold without prior notice under Section 150(1) are, if successful in the confiscation proceedings, entitled to its fair market value on the date of release rather than the sale proceeds received by Revenue.

Analysis: Section 150(1) mandates prior intimation to the owner before disposal of seized gold. That requirement was admittedly not followed. Revenue cannot rely on the amount realised in the 2021 sale where the owners were deprived of the statutory prior-notice protection.

Conclusion: If the petitioners succeed in the confiscation proceedings, they are entitled to the fair market value of the gold as on the date of the appellate decision directing release, and not merely the historical sale proceeds. Revenue cannot re-agitate this valuation issue before the Commissioner (Appeals).

Issue (ii): Whether the value of the gold should be released immediately against bank guarantees while Revenue's statutory appeal remains pending.

Analysis: A departmental appeal under Section 129D(2) against the order declining confiscation remains pending. The merits of that appeal, including the objections concerning abatement and confiscation, were left for the appellate authority. An expedited determination with procedural safeguards was regarded as sufficient to balance the parties' interests.

Conclusion: The request for immediate disbursement against bank guarantees is rejected. The Commissioner (Appeals) must determine the departmental appeal on or before 31 December 2026, following which the prescribed conditional payment directions will apply.

Final Conclusion: Disposal of seized gold without the mandated prior notice fixes the applicable valuation, upon the owners' eventual success, at the prevailing fair market value rather than the amount realised on sale; the unresolved confiscation dispute remains for appellate adjudication.

Ratio Decidendi: Where seized gold is disposed of without the statutory prior notice required to its owner, the owner who ultimately succeeds is entitled to its fair market value at the time release becomes due, rather than the historical sale realisation.

Issues: Whether an importer's written acceptance of enhanced assessable value prevents it from challenging the reassessment, and whether declared transaction value may be rejected solely on NIDB or contemporaneous-import data without compliance with the prescribed valuation requirements.

Analysis: Under Section 17(5), an importer's written acceptance of reassessment relieves the proper officer only from issuing a speaking order; it does not waive or extinguish the statutory right to challenge the reassessment. Rejection of declared transaction value under Section 14 and Rule 12(2) requires formation and communication of reasonable doubt regarding the truth or accuracy of the declared value. The acceptance letters did not disclose the alleged contemporaneous-import data or furnish independent material supporting rejection of the declared value. Reassessment based solely on NIDB data, without cogent corroborative evidence and compliance with the sequential valuation rules, is unsustainable.

Conclusion: Written acceptance of enhanced value did not preclude the importer from contesting reassessment, and the enhancement of value without compliance with the mandatory customs-valuation requirements was unsustainable. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether an importer's written acceptance of reassessment waives the statutory right to challenge enhancement of declared value; (ii) Whether transaction value may be rejected and enhanced solely on NIDB/contemporaneous-import data and an acceptance letter without compliance with valuation rules.

Issue (i): Whether an importer's written acceptance of reassessment waives the statutory right to challenge enhancement of declared value.

Analysis: Section 17(5) of the Customs Act, 1962 confines the consequence of written acceptance of reassessment to dispensing with a speaking order. Such acceptance does not amount to abandonment of the statutory right to question the proper officer's formation of opinion or the merits of reassessment. Rule 12(2) of the Customs Valuation (Determination of Value of Imported Goods) Rules, 2007 does not contemplate waiver of that substantive right.

Conclusion: Written acceptance of enhanced value does not bar the importer from challenging reassessment; decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether transaction value may be rejected and enhanced solely on NIDB/contemporaneous-import data and an acceptance letter without compliance with valuation rules.

Analysis: Section 14 of the Customs Act, 1962 read with Rule 12(2) requires formation and communication of reasonable doubt regarding the truth or accuracy of the declared transaction value before proceeding to valuation under the sequential rules. Enhancement founded solely on NIDB or contemporaneous-import data requires independent, cogent and justiciable material. An acceptance letter lacking particulars of comparable imports does not establish compliance with those requirements.

Conclusion: Rejection of transaction value and enhancement solely on NIDB/contemporaneous-import data and an unsupported acceptance letter, without compliance with the valuation framework, is unsustainable; decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The statutory right to contest reassessment remains intact, and any departure from declared transaction value must rest on communicated reasons and verifiable material satisfying the customs valuation framework.

Ratio Decidendi: Written acceptance under Section 17(5) only dispenses with a speaking order and does not extinguish the statutory right to challenge reassessment; enhancement of declared value must comply with the mandatory requirements governing rejection of transaction value and cannot rest solely on uncorroborated external data.

Issues: Whether an ex parte assessment order could be sustained where it was not passed on the scheduled hearing date and no notice of the subsequent hearing date was served.

Analysis: In exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the validity of an assessment order issued under Section 73 of the GST Act was tested against the principles of natural justice. Where the authority neither decides the matter on the fixed date nor communicates the next date of hearing, an ex parte order results from denial of a fair opportunity of personal hearing.

Conclusion: The ex parte assessment order was invalid for breach of the principles of natural justice and was set aside, with a direction for fresh hearing and a reasoned order in accordance with law.

Issues: Whether the penalty imposed under Section 125, exceeding the maximum limit prescribed under the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, was sustainable.

Analysis: The petitioner had furnished the return, discharged the tax liability, and paid the applicable late fee. The penalty of Rs. 50,000 imposed under Section 125 exceeded the maximum limit prescribed under the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Conclusion: The penalty was unsustainable for exceeding the statutory maximum and was set aside along with the show-cause notice.

Issues: Whether the generation of three digitally signed personal-hearing notices on the same date, bearing different numbers and fixing different hearing dates and times, required scrutiny of the State Tax portal and notice-generation process.

Analysis: The three notices were issued and digitally signed within minutes of each other while specifying separate dates and times for personal hearing. This was treated as a serious system lacuna capable of permitting manipulation. A report on the portal functioning and the process enabling such notices was directed from the Chief Commissioner of State Tax, and a fresh appellate order was directed.

Outcome: Report and fresh appellate order directed; matter listed for further hearing.

Issues: Whether the reassessment notice for Assessment Year 2018-19, issued after expiry of three years from the end of the relevant assessment year with approval of the Principal Commissioner of Income-tax, was valid under the applicable reassessment regime.

Analysis: Under Sections 148, 148A and 151 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, where more than three years have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year, prior approval for issuing a reassessment notice is required from the authority specified in Section 151(ii), namely the Principal Chief Commissioner, Principal Director General, Chief Commissioner or Director General. The notice dated 02.04.2022 was issued after the three-year period for Assessment Year 2018-19 had expired, but approval was obtained only from the Principal Commissioner of Income-tax. No extension of time for replying to the Section 148A(b) notice had been sought, and therefore exclusion of such time for limitation purposes was inapplicable. A non-speaking dismissal of a Special Leave Petition does not attract the doctrine of merger or affirm the reasoning of the High Court.

Conclusion: The notice issued without sanction from the authority prescribed by Section 151(ii) was invalid; consequently, the reassessment lacked valid jurisdiction and was quashed.

Issues: (i) Whether the final assessment order was barred by limitation for being passed beyond the period prescribed under section 153; (ii) whether a permanent establishment can be established by relying on an earlier assessment of another group entity without examining the applicable treaty conditions and current-year facts; (iii) whether the Multilateral Instrument or its spirit could be applied to determine the existence of a permanent establishment for assessment year 2020-21; (iv) whether profits could be attributed at 30% solely on the basis of earlier assessments without a functional analysis.

Issue (i): Whether the final assessment order was barred by limitation for being passed beyond the period prescribed under section 153.

Analysis: A subsequent statutory amendment clarified that section 153 governs the draft assessment order, while section 144C governs the time limit for the final order following Dispute Resolution Panel directions, where the amendment applies retrospectively.

Conclusion: The limitation challenge was rejected, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether a permanent establishment can be established by relying on an earlier assessment of another group entity without examining the applicable treaty conditions and current-year facts.

Analysis: The treaty enquiry requires examination of the substance of the arrangements, actual conduct, functions and risks for the relevant year. A fixed place enquiry requires examination of premises at the assessee's disposal, while a service permanent establishment requires examination of the applicable conditions for furnishing services through personnel. Earlier arrangements and the claimed business realignment remain relevant factual considerations.

Conclusion: Another group entity's acceptance of an earlier assessment does not itself establish a permanent establishment or operate as an estoppel against the assessee. The existence of a permanent establishment remains for fresh determination, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the Multilateral Instrument or its spirit could be applied to determine the existence of a permanent establishment for assessment year 2020-21.

Analysis: The relevant Multilateral Instrument provisions were not applicable to that assessment year; the enquiry is governed by the applicable provisions of Article 5 of the India-UK tax treaty.

Conclusion: Neither the Multilateral Instrument provisions nor their spirit can be invoked for assessment year 2020-21, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether profits could be attributed at 30% solely on the basis of earlier assessments without a functional analysis.

Analysis: Attribution requires examination of functions performed, assets employed and risks assumed. Accepted arm's length remuneration is relevant but does not alone establish that all functions and risks relevant to the alleged permanent establishment were adequately remunerated.

Conclusion: The ad hoc 30% attribution cannot stand on the earlier-assessment basis alone. Any attribution remains for fresh determination if a permanent establishment is established, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The existence of a permanent establishment and any attributable profits remain open for fresh, year-specific examination under the applicable treaty and law.

Ratio Decidendi: Permanent establishment and profit attribution enquiries require examination of the applicable treaty conditions and relevant functions and risks; another entity's accepted assessment and an ad hoc attribution cannot substitute for that examination.

Issues: (i) Whether donations forming part of mandatory corporate social responsibility expenditure are eligible for deduction under Section 80G of the Income-tax Act, 1961 despite their non-deductibility under Section 37(1) of that Act. (ii) Whether the assessment order allowing that deduction was erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue so as to permit revision under Section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Whether donations forming part of mandatory corporate social responsibility expenditure are eligible for deduction under Section 80G of the Income-tax Act, 1961 despite their non-deductibility under Section 37(1) of that Act.

Analysis: Explanation 2 to Section 37(1) excludes mandatory corporate social responsibility expenditure under Section 135 of the Companies Act, 2013 from business-expense deduction. That exclusion operates only in computing business income and does not bar an independent statutory deduction under Chapter VI-A where the payment otherwise qualifies as a donation under Section 80G.

Conclusion: Donations forming part of mandatory corporate social responsibility expenditure were eligible for deduction under Section 80G, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessment order allowing that deduction was erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue so as to permit revision under Section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Revisionary jurisdiction requires both an erroneous assessment order and prejudice to the interests of the Revenue. The assessment record showed that the Assessing Officer sought particulars and supporting documents for Chapter VI-A deductions under Section 142(1), and the assessee furnished donation details and receipts. The claim was thus examined with application of mind. A different view on the deduction did not render the assessment erroneous.

Conclusion: The assessment order was neither erroneous nor prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue; revision under Section 263 was invalid, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The revisionary order was quashed and the assessment allowing the Section 80G deduction for the qualifying corporate social responsibility donations remained undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: Revisionary jurisdiction cannot be invoked where an assessment, after inquiry and application of mind, adopts the legally sustainable view that disallowance of mandatory corporate social responsibility expenditure under Section 37(1) does not bar a qualifying Section 80G deduction.

Issues: Whether penalty for under-reporting of income under Section 270A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be sustained where the income declared in the original return and processed under Section 143(1) remained unchanged in reassessment without any addition or disallowance.

Analysis: Section 270A(2)(a) requires a comparison between the assessed income and the income determined on processing of the return to establish under-reporting. The original return disclosed income of Rs. 45,83,888, which was accepted on processing under Section 143(1). The same income was returned in response to reassessment proceedings and was ultimately accepted without any variation. The statutory conditions for treating the entire returned income as under-reported were therefore not established.

Conclusion: The penalty under Section 270A was unsustainable and was directed to be deleted.

Issues: Whether interest earned by a co-operative society from investments with a co-operative bank qualifies for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 80P(2)(d) permits deduction of interest or dividend income received from investments with another co-operative society. A co-operative bank remains a species of co-operative society for this purpose. Section 80P(4), which excludes a co-operative bank itself from claiming the deduction, does not disentitle a co-operative society from claiming deduction on interest received from a co-operative bank.

Conclusion: Interest received by the agricultural co-operative society from a co-operative bank is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the addition is deleted.