Issues: Whether costs could be imposed on the department while allowing its application to summon and examine a witness and place additional documents on record under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Analysis: Section 311 confers discretion to summon, examine, recall or re-examine a witness at any stage of proceedings, and mandates such exercise where the evidence is essential to a just decision. The additional documents were found necessary for deciding the facts in issue, and their proof was necessary after they were permitted to be brought on record. The provision operates to secure truth and justice without favouring either side.

Conclusion: Costs could not be imposed on the department in the circumstances while granting its application under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an application under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is allowed on a finding that the proposed evidence is necessary for deciding the facts in issue, costs are unwarranted in the circumstances merely for permitting its production and proof.

Issues: (i) Whether a prescribed income-tax authority may issue a scrutiny notice where the assessee's case is centralised with another assessing officer. (ii) Whether writ interference is warranted against information notices at the show-cause stage.

Issue (i): Whether a prescribed income-tax authority may issue a scrutiny notice where the assessee's case is centralised with another assessing officer.

Analysis: Section 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 names both the assessing officer and the prescribed income-tax authority, while Rule 12E of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 provides for prescription of the latter. The notification authorising the issuing officer was not challenged. The statutory language contains no express exclusion for centralised cases or restriction to cases where the assessing officer is unavailable.

Conclusion: The prescribed authority was competent to issue the notice despite centralisation of the case with another assessing officer. The issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether writ interference is warranted against information notices at the show-cause stage.

Analysis: The information notices did not determine liability, and the assessee could present its explanations and jurisdictional objections during assessment. An alternative statutory remedy by way of appeal would be available after an assessment order.

Conclusion: Writ interference at the show-cause stage was not warranted. The issue is decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessment proceedings may continue, with jurisdictional objections available to the assessee before the assessing and appellate authorities.

Ratio Decidendi: A notified prescribed income-tax authority may issue a scrutiny notice notwithstanding centralisation with another assessing officer; preliminary information notices do not ordinarily warrant writ interference where objections and statutory appellate remedies remain available.

Issues: Whether interest paid on import duty is refundable where timely duty payment was not reflected on the ICEGATE portal because of technical glitches, although the Bills of Entry were filed after 13.04.2023.

Analysis: Section 47 of the Customs Act, 1962 and the Customs (Waiver of Interest) 3rd Order dated 17.04.2023 were applied in the context of the Electronic Cash Ledger technical failure. The advisory dated 27.07.2023 acknowledged that the ICEGATE system inability continued until that date. The date limitation in the waiver order did not defeat relief where the importer had initiated payment in time and the delay in reflecting credit resulted from the portal malfunction.

Conclusion: Interest paid because of the ICEGATE technical failure is refundable, and waiver of interest is available notwithstanding that the Bills of Entry were filed after 13.04.2023.

Issues: Whether a show-cause notice issued under Section 74 could be quashed in writ jurisdiction on grounds concerning limitation and alleged inclusion of another entity's turnover.

Analysis: A challenge to a show-cause notice is maintainable only where the issuing authority lacks competence. The notice afforded an opportunity to submit a reply and avail personal hearing, while the objections concerning limitation and attribution of turnover required determination by the competent authority. No lack of jurisdiction of the issuing authority was alleged.

Conclusion: The show-cause notice was not liable to be interfered with in writ jurisdiction; the objections may be raised before the competent authority.

Issues: (i) Whether a Bill-to/Ship-to transaction under Section 10(1)(b) of the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is legally valid; (ii) Whether the supply in question was a Bill-to/Ship-to transaction supported by valid invoices and e-way bills; (iii) Whether penalty under Section 129(1)(a) of the Central and Chhattisgarh GST Acts, 2017 was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether a Bill-to/Ship-to transaction under Section 10(1)(b) of the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is legally valid.

Analysis: Section 10(1)(b) contemplates a supply in which goods are delivered by the supplier to a recipient or other person on the direction of a third person, who is deemed to have received the goods. Such a transaction involves an original supplier, an intermediate buyer, and an ultimate consignee. Direct dispatch to the consignee, coupled with onward invoicing by the intermediate buyer, is a recognised arrangement where the transactions are genuine, documented, accounted for, and taxed in accordance with law.

Conclusion: A genuine and duly documented Bill-to/Ship-to transaction is legally permissible.

Issue (ii): Whether the supply in question was a Bill-to/Ship-to transaction supported by valid invoices and e-way bills.

Analysis: The original supplier's e-invoices identified the intermediate buyer as the Bill-to party and the ultimate recipient as the Ship-to party. The onward e-invoices identified the ultimate recipient, and the e-way bills corresponded with those invoices and were generated before interception. Under Rule 138(2) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017, the person causing movement, including the consignor or consignee as applicable, may generate the e-way bill. The transport arrangement and factory-gate records supported genuine movement of the goods.

Conclusion: The supply was a Bill-to/Ship-to transaction supported by valid e-invoices and e-way bills, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether penalty under Section 129(1)(a) of the Central and Chhattisgarh GST Acts, 2017 was sustainable.

Analysis: The e-way bills had been generated by the person responsible for arranging the transport before the vehicle was intercepted. Therefore, the original supplier's alleged failure to generate the e-way bill could not independently justify detention when the goods were accompanied by the requisite documentary evidence.

Conclusion: The penalty was unsustainable and Section 129(1)(a) did not apply, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Detention and penal action cannot be sustained merely because the original supplier did not generate the e-way bill where a genuine Bill-to/Ship-to supply is evidenced by valid invoices and an e-way bill generated by the person causing movement.

Ratio Decidendi: In a genuine and documented Bill-to/Ship-to supply, Rule 138(2) is satisfied when the person causing movement generates the e-way bill; penalty under Section 129 cannot rest solely on the original supplier not generating it.

Issues: Whether a departmental GST appeal involving a disputed penalty below the prescribed monetary threshold could be admitted without establishing an applicable exception under the departmental litigation policy.

Analysis: Section 120 of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 authorises monetary limits for departmental appeals. The applicable circular fixed a threshold of Rs. 20,00,000 for appeals before GSTAT. As the dispute concerned only penalty, the disputed amount was Rs. 3,35,286, which was below that threshold. An exception to the threshold had to be specifically pleaded and supported by material. Authorisation under Section 112(3) was distinct from compliance with the monetary-limit policy and did not itself establish an exception. No material established a recurring legal issue, any other specified exception, or a case-specific and reasoned exercise of the Commissioner's residual power to contest the matter.

Conclusion: The departmental appeal was not maintainable for want of an established exception to the applicable monetary-limit policy.

Issues: Whether a departmental appeal involving disputed tax below the prescribed monetary limit was maintainable without establishing a recognised exception.

Analysis: Section 120 of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 authorises monetary-limit instructions regulating departmental appeals. The applicable circular fixed a threshold of Rs. 20,00,000 before the Tribunal and required only the aggregate disputed tax, rather than interest or penalty, to be considered where tax is in dispute. The disputed CGST and SGST components together were below that threshold. Section 112(3) permits the Commissioner to direct an application to the Tribunal, but such authorisation does not dispense with compliance with the monetary-limit policy. A recognised exception had to be specifically pleaded and supported; where the residual exception based on the interests of justice or revenue was invoked, the record had to disclose the Commissioner's case-specific reasoned opinion. No such exception or material was established. The departmental monetary-limit instructions were binding upon the Revenue, and maintainability had to be determined before entering upon the merits.

Conclusion: The departmental appeal was not maintainable and could not be admitted for adjudication on the merits because no recognised exception to the applicable monetary limit was established.

Issues: Whether the assessment could be made without granting the assessee an effective opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses after the Assessing Officer issued a second notice for cross-examination.

Analysis: The earlier judicial direction required the witnesses to be made available for cross-examination and a fresh assessment to be made after giving due regard to that exercise, in conformity with principles of natural justice. Although the assessee failed to attend at the originally fixed time, the subsequent issuance of notices to the assessee and both witnesses for another date amounted to condonation of that lapse. As the assessee and counsel attended on the subsequent date but the witnesses did not, the Assessing Officer could not treat the earlier missed opportunity as exhaustion of the right to cross-examine.

Conclusion: The assessment made without providing effective cross-examination was vitiated; the assessee must be afforded an opportunity to cross-examine both witnesses before a fresh assessment, subject to payment of the stipulated witness costs.

Issues: (i) Whether interest under Section 132B(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was payable on requisitioned cash from the expiry of 120 days after requisition until completion of assessment; (ii) Whether compensatory interest was payable for retention of requisitioned cash after assessment despite no express statutory provision.

Issue (i): Whether interest under Section 132B(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was payable on requisitioned cash from the expiry of 120 days after requisition until completion of assessment.

Analysis: Section 132B(4)(a) provides for simple interest at one-half per cent for every month or part of a month, and Section 132B(4)(b) fixes the period from the day immediately following expiry of 120 days after execution of the requisition to completion of assessment. The 120-day period expired on 25.04.2012 and the assessment was completed on 20.03.2014.

Conclusion: Simple interest at one-half per cent for every month or part thereof was payable from 26.04.2012 to 20.03.2014.

Issue (ii): Whether compensatory interest was payable for retention of requisitioned cash after assessment despite no express statutory provision.

Analysis: Section 132B(3) requires the forthwith release of seized assets remaining after discharge of liabilities. As no tax liability was determined, continued retention after assessment was contrary to that mandate. The absence of an express provision for post-assessment interest did not displace the restitutionary principle or preclude compensatory interest in writ jurisdiction. Whether the Revenue earned interest on the retained cash was immaterial, since compensation addresses deprivation of the use of money.

Conclusion: Interest at 6% per annum was payable from 21.03.2014 until actual release of the cash on 15.01.2017.

Final Conclusion: The statutory entitlement for the pre-assessment period and restitutionary compensation for the unjustified post-assessment retention together required payment of interest for the entire period of delayed release.

Ratio Decidendi: Where seized cash is required to be forthwith released after assessment determines no tax liability, unjustified retention warrants compensatory interest on restitutionary principles notwithstanding the absence of an express statutory provision for the post-assessment period.

Issues: Whether an order imposing penalty under Section 270A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be passed while the assessee's appeal against the relevant assessment order was pending before the Appellate Tribunal under Section 253 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 275(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 requires penalty proceedings to remain in abeyance where the relevant assessment order is the subject of a pending appeal before the Appellate Tribunal. The appeal had been filed and remained pending when the penalty order was made; whether the Assessing Officer had been intimated of the appeal was immaterial.

Conclusion: The penalty order passed during the pendency of the Tribunal appeal contravened Section 275(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and could not stand, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether an adjudicating authority may confirm GST tax and penalty exceeding the amounts proposed in the show-cause notice, contrary to Section 75(7).

Analysis: Section 75(7) was treated as mandatory and as restricting the adjudicating authority from confirming a demand greater than that proposed in the show-cause notice. The notice proposed tax and penalty of Rs. 16,20,000 each, whereas the adjudication order confirmed tax and penalty of Rs. 25,28,400 each.

Conclusion: No; confirmation of tax and penalty exceeding the amounts proposed in the show-cause notice was without jurisdiction and invalid, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether an ex parte GST adjudication order could stand when the taxpayer's request for relied-upon documents and for cross-examination had not been addressed.

Analysis: The Revenue could not dispute the asserted procedural error. The ex parte order was therefore set aside, and the adjudicating authority was directed to furnish the available relied-upon documents, exclude from reliance any documents not furnished, consider any cross-examination request through a reasoned order, and thereafter undertake fresh adjudication.

Conclusion: The ex parte adjudication was set aside for fresh proceedings after disclosure of relied-upon documents and determination of the cross-examination request, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the amended pre-deposit requirement under Section 107(6) applies to a statutory appeal against a penalty-only order where the show-cause notice was issued before 1 October 2025.

Analysis: Section 107(6) governs the pre-deposit required for maintaining a statutory appeal. The liability imposed was solely penalty, and the show-cause notice initiating the proceedings preceded the amendment effective from 1 October 2025. These facts attracted the applicable principles governing pre-deposit in penalty-only proceedings initiated before that amendment.

Conclusion: The assessee is entitled to the benefit of the applicable pre-deposit principles for the penalty-only proceedings, and the requirement under Section 107(6) shall be determined accordingly.

Issues: Whether deduction under the first proviso to section 36(1)(viia)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is an alternative to deduction under the main clause and is unavailable once the main-clause deduction has been allowed.

Analysis: Section 36(1)(viia)(a) permits deduction for provisions for bad and doubtful debts within the prescribed ceiling, while the first proviso addresses provisions for assets classified under RBI guidelines as doubtful or loss assets. The expression "at its option" vests the choice of claiming the special statutory benefit in the assessee and cannot be treated as surplusage. Reading the proviso as an alternative mechanism controlled by the Assessing Officer would deprive that expression of operative effect. The proviso, enacted to address banking-sector provisioning for specified assets, must receive effect within its express factual requirements and statutory limits.

Conclusion: The first-proviso deduction is not automatically exhausted or barred merely because deduction under section 36(1)(viia)(a) has been allowed. The issue is answered in favour of the assessee, subject to satisfaction of the prescribed conditions, RBI classification requirement and statutory ceiling.

Issues: (i) Whether the bond and bank-guarantee requirements for provisional release of the seized consignment required modification; (ii) Whether demurrage and other charges on the detained consignment were liable to be waived.

Issue (i): Whether the bond and bank-guarantee requirements for provisional release of the seized consignment required modification.

Analysis: The tariff value justified securing the assessable value through a bond. However, fine and penalty would become recoverable only if the investigation established the Revenue's case and after the consequential litigation; their quantification at the provisional-release stage was premature. The previous final clearance of a consignment from the same exporter on the basis of a certificate of origin also supported recalibration of the security conditions.

Conclusion: The issue was determined partly in favour of the assessee. Provisional release was made subject to a bond of Rs.9,05,73,295 and a bank guarantee of Rs.1,00,00,000.

Issue (ii): Whether demurrage and other charges on the detained consignment were liable to be waived.

Analysis: Regulation 6(1)(l) prohibits a Customs Cargo Service Provider from charging rent or demurrage on goods that are seized, detained or confiscated, subject to any other applicable law.

Conclusion: The issue was determined in favour of the assessee. Complete waiver of demurrage and other charges for the detained consignment was directed.

Final Conclusion: The provisional-release safeguards were recalibrated to protect revenue without requiring security for unascertained penal liabilities, and the detained consignment was entitled to waiver of demurrage and related charges.

Ratio Decidendi: Security for provisional release must adequately protect revenue, but cannot be fixed by prematurely quantifying fine and penalty before investigation establishes the underlying liability.

Issues: (i) Whether the show-cause notice was invalid because it was issued by an Assistant Commissioner and later corrected by corrigendum, and for want of pre-notice consultation; (ii) Whether differential customs duty could be demanded under Section 28 without first challenging self-assessment; (iii) Whether the imported CKD e-bike components were classifiable as complete electrically operated motorcycles under CTH 87116020; (iv) Whether the goods qualified for concessional duty under Serial No. 531A(1), or alternatively Serial No. 531A(2), of Notification No. 50/2017-Customs dated 30.06.2017; (v) Whether confiscation and penalty were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the show-cause notice was invalid because it was issued by an Assistant Commissioner and later corrected by corrigendum, and for want of pre-notice consultation.

Analysis: An officer designated as an officer of customs under Section 2(34) of the Customs Act, 1962 is a proper officer for the assigned function. A corrigendum issued before adjudication that merely corrected the clause making the notice answerable to the Principal Commissioner caused no prejudice and related back to the notice. The record also showed receipt of the pre-consultative letter.

Conclusion: The show-cause notice and adjudication proceedings were valid, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether differential customs duty could be demanded under Section 28 without first challenging self-assessment.

Analysis: Recovery proceedings for duty not levied or not paid under Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962 are distinct from refund proceedings. The existence of self-assessment did not bar issuance of a notice for recovery of differential duty.

Conclusion: Differential duty could be demanded under Section 28 without prior challenge to self-assessment, against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the imported CKD e-bike components were classifiable as complete electrically operated motorcycles under CTH 87116020.

Analysis: Rule 2(a) of the General Rules for the Interpretation of the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 requires classification by the identity and essential character of goods as presented for assessment. An incomplete vehicle may retain the essential character of a complete vehicle despite absence of items such as a battery or charger. The imported goods were declared as e-bikes in CKD condition with pre-assembled essential parts and components.

Conclusion: The goods possessed the essential character of complete electrically operated motorcycles and were correctly classified under CTH 87116020, against the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether the goods qualified for concessional duty under Serial No. 531A(1), or alternatively Serial No. 531A(2), of Notification No. 50/2017-Customs dated 30.06.2017.

Analysis: The exemption under Serial No. 531A(1) required a knocked-down kit containing all necessary components for assembly of the complete vehicle. Battery packs, chargers and electric compressors were admittedly not imported. The alternative exemption had not been claimed in the Bills of Entry and could not be claimed subsequently.

Conclusion: The claimed concessional and alternative exemption benefits were unavailable, against the assessee.

Issue (v): Whether confiscation and penalty were sustainable.

Analysis: Confiscation under Section 111(m) of the Customs Act, 1962 and imposition of redemption fine are legally distinct. The absence of redemption fine did not invalidate confiscation or the penalty under Section 112(a)(ii) of the Customs Act, 1962.

Conclusion: The confiscation and penalty were sustainable, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The denial of the claimed exemption and the consequential customs liability were maintained.

Issues: Whether the impugned orders, being consequential implementation of prior binding appellate directions, warranted appellate interference.

Analysis: The order under challenge merely reiterated earlier appellate directions, already affirmed by the Supreme Court, and supplied no independent factual or legal finding affecting the merits of the company petition. The connected directions were consequential compliance measures. Entertaining the challenge would indirectly reopen the affirmed appellate directions.

Conclusion: The consequential orders did not warrant appellate interference and remain governed by the finality of the prior affirmed directions.

Issues: Whether cancellation, refund and no-show charges recovered by an airline from passengers constitute consideration for a distinct declared service of agreeing to tolerate an act.

Analysis: Section 66E(e) of the Finance Act, 1994 applies where an agreement is intended to tolerate an act for consideration. The passenger-airline contract is intended for carriage of the passenger in return for fare; cancellation charges operate only upon the passenger's failure to perform that contract. Such charges are liquidated damages compensating the airline for breach and do not arise from a separate agreement to tolerate cancellation or default. The absence of a service charge makes the question of abatement immaterial.

Conclusion: Cancellation, refund and no-show charges are compensation for breach of contract and are not taxable as consideration for tolerating an act under Section 66E(e) of the Finance Act, 1994.