Issues: (i) Whether Entry 144's substitution to include Ready Mix Concrete under Notification No. 12/2016-Central Excise dated 01.03.2016 operates retrospectively and exempts site-manufactured Ready Mix Concrete for October 2014 to February 2016; (ii) Whether the extended limitation period for the duty demand was invocable.

Issue (i): Whether Entry 144's substitution to include Ready Mix Concrete under Notification No. 12/2016-Central Excise dated 01.03.2016 operates retrospectively and exempts site-manufactured Ready Mix Concrete for October 2014 to February 2016.

Analysis: Entry 144 of Notification No. 12/2012-Central Excise dated 17.03.2012 exempted concrete mix manufactured and used at the construction site. Notification No. 12/2016-Central Excise dated 01.03.2016 substituted the entry to expressly include Ready Mix Concrete. Binding authorities on substitution were applied to treat the amended entry as operating from the inception of the original exemption, particularly where it did not take away a substantive right or impose a penal consequence.

Conclusion: The substituted Entry 144 operated retrospectively from 17.03.2012, and the site-manufactured Ready Mix Concrete was exempt from central excise duty for the relevant period, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended limitation period for the duty demand was invocable.

Analysis: The accepted position was that the prevailing circulars and judicial views concerning excisability and exemption of Ready Mix Concrete created interpretative doubt, which did not justify invocation of the extended period under Section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was not invocable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The duty demand and the consequential interest and penalty cannot be sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: A substituted exemption entry may operate from the inception of the original entry where the substitution clarifies its scope without taking away substantive rights or imposing penal consequences.

Issues: (i) Whether the charge-sheet for offences under Sections 465, 468 and 471 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 required prior sanction under Section 80 of the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003; (ii) Whether the charge-sheet warranted quashing under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 on the grounds of delay, the petitioner not being named in the FIR, and factual denial of the transactions.

Issue (i): Whether the charge-sheet for offences under Sections 465, 468 and 471 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 required prior sanction under Section 80 of the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003.

Analysis: Section 80 restricts cognizance only of offences punishable under Sections 72 and 79 of the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003. The charge-sheet invoked independent offences of forgery and use of forged documents under the Indian Penal Code, 1860; consequently, the statutory sanction requirement was inapplicable.

Conclusion: Prior sanction under Section 80 of the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003 was not required for the IPC prosecution. The issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the charge-sheet warranted quashing under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 on the grounds of delay, the petitioner not being named in the FIR, and factual denial of the transactions.

Analysis: The charge-sheet contained specific allegations concerning creation and use of e-sugam documents and tax evasion. The reassessment material relied upon related to a different period. Whether the alleged transactions occurred and whether the petitioner created or used forged documents are disputed factual matters requiring trial. A person may be arrayed as an accused upon investigation even if not named in the FIR, and no thirty-day restriction for filing a charge-sheet applied to the IPC offences.

Conclusion: No ground existed to invoke inherent jurisdiction to quash the charge-sheet. The issue was decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The forgery-related allegations connected with the asserted tax-evasion transactions remain triable in the criminal proceeding.

Ratio Decidendi: A sanction provision confined to specified fiscal offences does not govern independent IPC charges, and inherent jurisdiction cannot be used to quash a charge-sheet where its resolution requires adjudication of disputed facts at trial.

Issues: (i) Whether intent to evade tax was a necessary condition for a penalty under Section 129 governing the November 2021 transaction; (ii) Whether the absence of an e-way bill alone could sustain a Section 129 penalty where the consignment carried a genuine e-invoice and there was no evidence of evasion; and (iii) Whether a final penalty order made fifty-seven minutes after the show-cause notice denied the mandatory opportunity of hearing.

Issue (i): Whether intent to evade tax was a necessary condition for a penalty under Section 129 governing the November 2021 transaction.

Analysis: For the period before 1 January 2022, Section 129(6) linked unpaid detention demands to Section 130, which required intent to evade tax. Section 129 was consequently not a stand-alone strict-liability provision for the transaction in question. The subsequent statutory amendment severing that linkage did not govern the November 2021 movement. The genuine, traceable e-invoice, matching tax returns, payment of output tax, absence of discrepancies on verification, and lack of any finding of concealment or evasion established that the documentation omission was not accompanied by mens rea.

Conclusion: Intent to evade tax was a mandatory condition for imposing the Section 129 penalty in the applicable statutory regime, and its absence rendered the demand unsustainable. In favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the absence of an e-way bill alone could sustain a Section 129 penalty where the consignment carried a genuine e-invoice and there was no evidence of evasion.

Analysis: Each motorcycle was individually traceable through engine and chassis numbers recorded in the e-invoice, along with the invoice reference number, acknowledgement number, and QR code. The declared quantity, value, description, destination, and tax treatment matched the returns, and physical verification disclosed no discrepancy other than non-generation of the e-way bill. The regulated registration requirements for two-wheelers also made a clandestine untaxed sale implausible on these facts.

Conclusion: A Section 129 penalty could not be sustained solely for non-generation of the e-way bill where the transaction was genuine and no intent to evade tax was established. In favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether a final penalty order made fifty-seven minutes after the show-cause notice denied the mandatory opportunity of hearing.

Analysis: Section 75(4) required an opportunity of hearing before an adverse decision. The fifty-seven-minute interval between the notice and final order afforded no meaningful opportunity to respond to the proposed demand or for consideration of the explanation and supporting material. This denied the principles of natural justice and constituted a jurisdictional defect.

Conclusion: The order passed within fifty-seven minutes of the show-cause notice was vitiated for denial of the mandatory opportunity of hearing. In favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The tax-and-penalty demand lacked both the required evidentiary foundation of intent to evade tax and a valid adjudicatory process; the deposited amount is refundable with applicable interest, while lawful treatment of the documentation lapse remains open.

Ratio Decidendi: Under the pre-amendment Section 129 regime, an e-way-bill omission unsupported by intent to evade tax cannot sustain a penalty, particularly where the statutory hearing opportunity is illusory.

Outcome: The writ petition was closed with liberty to approach the Court afresh; the earlier protection was continued for 90 days.

Issues: (i) Whether the police may investigate an FIR alleging offences under the Maharashtra Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 when offences under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 arise from the same transaction; (ii) Whether the FIR and ongoing investigation were liable to be quashed at the preliminary stage.

Issue (i): Whether the police may investigate an FIR alleging offences under the Maharashtra Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 when offences under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 arise from the same transaction.

Analysis: Section 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 applies to offences under other laws unless the special enactment contains a contrary provision regulating investigation or trial. The Maharashtra Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 contains no express exclusion of police powers, and Section 72 requires police officers to assist proper officers in implementing the Act. The offences alleged under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 are distinct from the offences under the fiscal statute; the special statute therefore does not displace police investigation of such penal offences.

Conclusion: Police investigation was legally permissible; the issue was decided against the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether the FIR and ongoing investigation were liable to be quashed at the preliminary stage.

Analysis: An FIR merely sets the investigative process in motion and is not an exhaustive account of the case. The investigation remained pending, the petitioner was not named as an accused, and evidence had yet to be collected before filing of a charge-sheet.

Conclusion: No ground existed to declare the investigation illegal or to quash the FIR; the issue was decided against the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The statutory GST framework does not bar regular police action where distinct offences under general criminal law accompany the alleged fiscal offences, and intervention during the ongoing investigation was unwarranted.

Ratio Decidendi: In the absence of an express statutory exclusion, general criminal procedure permits police investigation of distinct penal offences arising alongside offences under a special fiscal statute.

Issues: The constitutional challenge to statutory conditions governing input tax credit and the challenge to denial of input tax credit based on a supplier's non-payment of tax were raised; no final adjudication took place.

Outcome: The petitioner was permitted to pursue the statutory appellate remedy, with the proposed appeal treated as filed within limitation if lodged within 60 days.

Issues: Whether the writ petition warranted restoration despite the available statutory appellate remedy and the alleged overlap between proceedings.

Analysis: An appeal against the impugned order was maintainable under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. The question of overlapping demands could be examined by the Appellate Authority, including an application for exemption from pre-deposit to the extent permissible in law. The challenge to the notifications remained pending consideration before the Supreme Court and was not adjudicated.

Outcome: The restoration application was dismissed, with liberty to pursue the statutory appeal within the stipulated period.

Issues: (i) Whether restoration of registration could be made conditional upon cash reversal or payment of disputed input tax credit, coupled with an automatic-void clause, without notice and statutory adjudication; (ii) Whether cancellation of registration based on alleged wrongful availment of input tax credit was sustainable when the show-cause notice alleged only non-existence of the registered premises.

Issue (i): Whether restoration of registration could be made conditional upon cash reversal or payment of disputed input tax credit, coupled with an automatic-void clause, without notice and statutory adjudication.

Analysis: The appellate power under Section 107(11) permits confirmation, modification or annulment of the order under appeal, but an order requiring payment of tax or wrongly availed input tax credit requires a notice to show cause and compliance with the prescribed adjudicatory process and limitation. The cancellation proceedings concerned non-existence of the business premises, not entitlement to input tax credit. A conditional affidavit expressing willingness to reverse credit after verification did not dispense with statutory notice, inquiry and a meaningful opportunity to respond. The cash-deposit direction therefore travelled beyond the scope of the registration appeal and violated natural justice.

Conclusion: The condition requiring cash payment or reversal of disputed input tax credit within seven days, including the automatic-void clause, was invalid and unenforceable in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether cancellation of registration based on alleged wrongful availment of input tax credit was sustainable when the show-cause notice alleged only non-existence of the registered premises.

Analysis: The show-cause notice was confined to alleged non-existence at the declared place of business. The original cancellation order introduced wrongful availment of input tax credit from certain suppliers as a separate basis, although no demand or allegation concerning such credit had been made in the notice. Confirmation on a ground outside the notice was inconsistent with Section 75(7).

Conclusion: The cancellation order founded on a ground beyond the show-cause notice was legally unsustainable; the registration cancellation was revoked in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Registration stands restored without the impugned cash-deposit condition, while lawful fresh proceedings concerning any alleged wrongful input tax credit remain open to the competent authority.

Ratio Decidendi: In a registration-cancellation appeal, an appellate authority cannot impose an input tax credit recovery or reversal condition on matters outside the show-cause notice unless the statutory notice, opportunity and adjudicatory requirements for such determination are fulfilled.

Issues: Whether an assessee may raise a fresh claim before the revisional authority under Section 264 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 without having filed a revised return within the prescribed time.

Analysis: Revisional jurisdiction may entertain a new question of law or point of law only on the facts already available before the assessing authority. It cannot be used to introduce a fresh claim requiring facts not forming part of the assessment record, as that would effectively permit revision of the return after expiry of the statutory period. The appellate powers of the Tribunal under Section 254 are distinct and do not enlarge the revisional authority's power or the assessing authority's jurisdiction to entertain a claim otherwise than through a timely revised return.

Conclusion: A fresh claim not made through a revised return filed within time cannot be raised before the revisional authority under Section 264; the issue is decided against the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether factual reconciliation of turnover discrepancies between VAT returns and income-tax books warrants quashing reassessment notice in writ jurisdiction; (ii) Whether a notice issued after four years was invalid for absence of failure to disclose fully and truly material facts; (iii) Whether rejection of preliminary objections to the reassessment notice was legally valid.

Issue (i): Whether factual reconciliation of turnover discrepancies between VAT returns and income-tax books warrants quashing reassessment notice in writ jurisdiction.

Analysis: The recorded reasons identified a substantial difference between sales disclosed in VAT returns and turnover recorded in the income-tax accounts. The explanation that the difference arose from MRP-based VAT reporting and components such as duty, freight and local taxes requires factual verification under the applicable State law and records during reassessment. Such merits-based reconciliation does not warrant adjudication in writ jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The factual reconciliation does not invalidate the reassessment notice and is to be addressed in reassessment proceedings; against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether a notice issued after four years was invalid for absence of failure to disclose fully and truly material facts.

Analysis: The VAT returns forming the basis of the turnover discrepancy were not shown to have been required to be furnished with, or otherwise disclosed during, the original income-tax assessment. The material difference between VAT turnover and the profit-and-loss account provided a basis to invoke the extended period for reassessment on the ground of possible escapement of income.

Conclusion: The notice issued beyond four years was valid; against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether rejection of preliminary objections to the reassessment notice was legally valid.

Analysis: The notice was issued before 01.04.2021, when the procedure under Section 148A was not applicable. Under the applicable procedure, preliminary objections were confined to jurisdictional matters, whereas the objections raised substantially concerned the merits of the proposed reassessment. The objections therefore did not require the proceedings to be dropped at the threshold.

Conclusion: Rejection of the preliminary objections was legally valid; against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The reassessment may proceed, with factual and merits-based contentions remaining available for consideration in accordance with law, other than the jurisdictional challenge already determined.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a reassessment notice is founded on a material turnover discrepancy apparent from VAT returns not shown to have been disclosed in the original income-tax assessment, factual reconciliation is a matter for reassessment rather than writ review, and the extended reopening period may validly be invoked.

Issues: Whether rejection of declarations under the Sabka Vishwas Legacy Dispute Resolution Scheme, 2019, because the disclosed amount did not match the departmental record, required reconsideration where the assessee accepted the amount stated in the show-cause notice as final for the purposes of the Scheme.

Analysis: The statutory scheme under Section 120 of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2019 is a tax amnesty scheme intended to settle eligible legacy disputes. The declarations had been rejected solely because the amount disclosed did not correspond with the Authority's records. The assessee agreed that its liability for the Scheme could be determined on the amount quantified in the show-cause notice and undertook not to dispute that amount. In those circumstances, recalculation of liability under the Scheme after affording the assessee an opportunity to present its case would advance settlement of the dispute.

Conclusion: The Designated Committee shall reconsider the declarations under the Scheme by treating the amount stated in the show-cause notice as the final liability for that purpose, after giving the assessee an opportunity to present its case.

Issues: Whether refund of service tax paid by an importer under reverse charge on ocean freight was correctly allowed.

Analysis: The service-tax levy under Notification No. 15/2017-ST dated 13.04.2017 and Notification No. 16/2017-ST dated 13.04.2017 had been quashed by the jurisdictional High Court. In the absence of a stay of that decision, judicial discipline required its application. The appeal was also below the monetary threshold prescribed under the departmental litigation policy.

Conclusion: The refund of service tax paid on ocean freight was correctly allowed, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the successful tenderer could collect the prescribed fee of Rs. 50 plus GST separately from the performers; (ii) Whether the tenderer could obtain reimbursement from the Board of GST which he was not permitted to collect separately.

Issue (i): Whether the successful tenderer could collect the prescribed fee of Rs. 50 plus GST separately from the performers.

Analysis: A supplier's statutory liability to pay GST is distinct from its right to pass the tax burden to the recipient, which depends on the contractual terms. The tender authorised collection of Rs. 50 per performance and stipulated that the scheduled collections were inclusive of all taxes. No tender term conferred a right to charge an additional sum towards GST.

Conclusion: The tenderer was not entitled to collect Rs. 50 plus GST separately from the performers; decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the tenderer could obtain reimbursement from the Board of GST which he was not permitted to collect separately.

Analysis: The statutory obligation to discharge GST could not, without a statutory or contractual basis, be converted into an obligation of the Board to reimburse the tenderer. No such entitlement was established under the tender documents or law.

Conclusion: The tenderer was not entitled to reimbursement of GST from the Board; decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The tender rate was tax-inclusive, and the statutory GST liability did not create an independent contractual right either to recover an additional amount from performers or to seek reimbursement.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory liability to pay GST does not by itself confer a right to recover the tax separately from the recipient; that right is governed by the contractual terms of the transaction.

Issues: Whether writ jurisdiction should be exercised against a GST adjudication order on the allegation that cross-examination of revenue officers was wrongly refused, despite the availability of a statutory appeal.

Analysis: The earlier defect under Section 75(7) of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 had been rectified, relied-upon documents were supplied, and the petitioner had cross-examined the panch witnesses. The evidentiary effect of those statements and the proof of the panchnama required a merits assessment appropriate for appellate proceedings. Although the immunity-based reason under Section 157 for refusing cross-examination of the revenue officers was unsustainable, that error did not itself establish an automatic right to their cross-examination; the necessity of such cross-examination is fact-specific. The principles of natural justice objection may be raised before the appellate authority, which may order cross-examination or obtain an appropriate report if warranted.

Conclusion: Writ jurisdiction was not exercised; the challenge concerning cross-examination and the evidentiary issues was left open for determination in the statutory appeal.

Issues: Whether the writ court had roster determination to entertain a challenge to summons issued under customs law.

Analysis: Schedule B of the Appellate Side Rules specifically assigns revenue and tax-law matters, including search and seizure, adjudication proceedings and miscellaneous revenue matters, to Group IV. The substantive grievance arose from summons issued under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962. The ancillary requests concerning preservation of CCTV footage, presence of an advocate during interrogation and alleged human-rights violations did not create an overlap with the residuary group, particularly when no prior complaint regarding the alleged torture had been made to any authority.

Conclusion: The writ court lacked determination to hear the matter; the petitioners were granted liberty to approach the appropriate court having determination.

Issues: (i) Tariff classification of the Motherboard, Chassis and Power Supply Unit proposed for assembly of the Industrial Computing Platform. (ii) Applicability of BIS certification requirements to the Power Supply Unit. (iii) Eligibility of the Power Supply Unit for basic-customs-duty exemption under Serial No. 4 of Notification No. 25/2005-Cus. dated 01.03.2005.

Issue (i): Tariff classification of the Motherboard, Chassis and Power Supply Unit proposed for assembly of the Industrial Computing Platform.

Analysis: Under Rule 1 of the General Rules for the Interpretation of the Import Tariff, classification follows the terms of the headings and the relevant Section and Chapter Notes. The complete Industrial Computing Platform satisfies Note 6(A) to Chapter 84 and is an automatic data processing machine under Heading 8471; however, the separately imported components do not constitute a complete automatic data processing machine. The Motherboard is expressly described under Tariff Item 8473 30 20. The model-specific Chassis, having no independent tariff description and being suitable solely or principally for the Industrial Computing Platform, is classifiable as an other part of a machine of Heading 8471 under Note 2(b) to Section XVI. The Power Supply Unit converts AC power into regulated DC power and has the essential characteristics of a static converter or rectifier. Since it is independently specified under Heading 8504, Note 2(a) to Section XVI requires classification in that heading rather than as a part under Heading 8473.

Conclusion: The Motherboard is classifiable under Tariff Item 8473 30 20, the Chassis under Tariff Item 8473 30 99, and the Power Supply Unit under Tariff Item 8504 40 29 of the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975.

Issue (ii): Applicability of BIS certification requirements to the Power Supply Unit.

Analysis: A Power Supply Unit classified under Tariff Item 8504 40 29 falls within CTH 8504.40. Serial No. 18 of the First Schedule to the Machinery and Electrical Equipment Safety (Omnibus Technical Regulation) Order, 2024 covers power semiconductor converters and their assemblies, sub-assemblies and components under that tariff heading.

Conclusion: The Power Supply Unit is subject to the applicable BIS certification requirements at the time of importation.

Issue (iii): Eligibility of the Power Supply Unit for basic-customs-duty exemption under Serial No. 4 of Notification No. 25/2005-Cus. dated 01.03.2005.

Analysis: Serial No. 4 exempts static converters for automatic data processing machines and their units, excluding static converters for cellular mobile phones. The Power Supply Unit is a static converter intended to provide regulated DC power to the Industrial Computing Platform, which is an automatic data processing machine, and the material does not indicate its use for cellular mobile phones.

Conclusion: The Power Supply Unit is eligible for exemption from basic customs duty under Serial No. 4 of Notification No. 25/2005-Cus. dated 01.03.2005, subject to fulfilment of the prescribed conditions and import-time verification.

Final Conclusion: The ruling determines the tariff treatment, regulatory compliance requirement and duty-exemption eligibility of the proposed imported components according to their respective functions and specific tariff descriptions.

Ratio Decidendi: Under Note 2 to Section XVI, a component independently covered by a specific Chapter 84 or 85 heading is classifiable in that heading, while a component suitable solely or principally for an automatic data processing machine and lacking separate tariff coverage is classifiable as a part of that machine.

Issues: Whether acquittal under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 merely because the cheque was issued towards a time-barred debt was sustainable.

Analysis: The transaction, execution of the cheque, its dishonour, issuance of demand notice, and non-payment were established. Issuance of a cheque towards a time-barred debt is not prohibited and operates as an acknowledgment of liability and revival of the debt; the debt consequently does not remain unenforceable merely because the underlying transaction was earlier barred by limitation.

Conclusion: The Magistrate erred in treating the time-barred character of the underlying debt as a bar to prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Issues: Whether the reassessment notice issued after expiry of the ordinary limitation period was valid where the underlying information arose from a third-party search falling within the exclusion to the procedure under section 148A.

Analysis: The alleged escaped income was Rs. 2,50,000, below the threshold for the extended limitation period under section 149(1)(b); consequently, the notice under section 148 had to be issued by 31.03.2023 under section 149(1)(a). The Revenue relied on the period consumed in issuing and responding to the notice under section 148A(b) for exclusion of time. The information was, however, derived from documents and material obtained in a search of another person after 01.04.2021, placing the matter within clause (c) of the first proviso to section 148A, under which the section 148A procedure did not apply. The use of that excluded procedure could not generate an exclusion of time for limitation purposes. The Insight Portal was only the channel of communication and did not alter the search-derived character of the information. Participation in the proceedings and absence of prejudice could not cure the jurisdictional defect.

Conclusion: The notice under section 148 dated 12.04.2023 was time-barred and without jurisdiction, and the reassessment founded on it was quashed.

Issues: (i) Validity of revision under section 263 based on a Departmental Valuation Officer's report received after completion of assessment; (ii) Whether the Departmental Valuation Officer's report was invalid for having been received beyond six months.

Issue (i): Validity of revision under section 263 based on a Departmental Valuation Officer's report received after completion of assessment.

Analysis: The assessment accepted the declared cost of acquisition despite the Assessing Officer having made a valuation reference to verify that value. The subsequently received valuation report, available when the revisional record was examined, disclosed a material difference in valuation. Clause (b) of Explanation 1 to section 263 includes all records available at the time of the Principal Commissioner's examination, including such subsequently received material.

Conclusion: The revision under section 263 was validly exercised because the assessment was erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue; against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the Departmental Valuation Officer's report was invalid for having been received beyond six months.

Analysis: Clause (v) of Explanation 1 to section 153 excludes, for limitation purposes, the period from the valuation reference until actual receipt of the valuation report. The statutory scheme therefore did not render the report a nullity merely because it was received after six months, and the assessment could have awaited its receipt.

Conclusion: The valuation report was not invalid merely because of its delayed receipt; against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessment is to be redetermined after examination of the valuation report and after affording the assessee an opportunity of hearing.

Ratio Decidendi: For revision under section 263, the record includes material available when the revisional authority examines it, and an assessment completed without considering a valuation report sought by the Assessing Officer may be revised where that omission is prejudicial to the Revenue.

Issues: Whether dividend of Rs. 1,02,83,600 received during the assessment year 2013-14 was eligible for exemption under Section 10(34) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Exemption under Section 10(34) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 applied to the dividend actually received during the relevant year. The corporate resolutions and financial statements established that dividend at Rs. 2.50 per share, pertaining to the year ended 31 March 2012, was approved on 3 August 2012 and received during the relevant assessment year. The amount adopted in the assessment represented a proposed dividend at Rs. 1 per share for the succeeding financial year and could not be substituted for the dividend actually received.

Conclusion: The entire dividend receipt of Rs. 1,02,83,600 was eligible for exemption under Section 10(34) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the disallowance of Rs. 62,16,690 was deleted.