Issues: Whether the original advance ruling could be modified or rectified to permit a DTA unit to claim exemption under Notification No. 134/94-Customs dated 22.06.1994 without complying with the condition under Section 65 of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: Regulation 21 permits modification only where an advance ruling was pronounced under a mistake of law or fact, while Regulation 22 permits rectification only of a mistake apparent from the record. Neither provision authorises reconsideration of the merits or removal of an express condition attached to an exemption notification. Notification No. 134/94-Customs dated 22.06.1994 makes the exemption conditional upon the specified operations being undertaken in accordance with Section 65 of the Customs Act, 1962. The original ruling had granted eligibility expressly subject to the notification conditions. Operational difficulty for a DTA unit, alternative safeguards such as bonds and traceability records, or conditions contained in other notifications cannot substitute the mandatory Section 65 condition.

Conclusion: The original ruling contains no apparent mistake or mistake of law or fact warranting rectification or modification; exemption under the notification remains conditional upon compliance with Section 65 of the Customs Act, 1962.

Issues: (i) Validity of a show-cause notice founded on reconciliation of ST-3 return figures despite the absence of transaction-specific allegations; (ii) Whether the dropping of service-tax demands concerning training services, offshore services, and services connected with drilling operations could be sustained without evidence or requisite verification.

Issue (i): Validity of a show-cause notice founded on reconciliation of ST-3 return figures despite the absence of transaction-specific allegations.

Analysis: The notice arose from an apparent short-payment disclosed through the service-tax returns. Relevant documents concerning the nature of the services were sought but not furnished by the registered person. In those circumstances, the objection that the notice lacked specific allegations as to the nature, place, or taxability of each transaction could not invalidate the proceedings.

Conclusion: The show-cause notice was valid, in favour of Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether the dropping of service-tax demands concerning training services, offshore services, and services connected with drilling operations could be sustained without evidence or requisite verification.

Analysis: The asserted rendering of services outside designated areas was unsupported by evidence, and the underlying service agreements were not examined. The order also did not examine the taxability of the initial six weeks of classroom training in India, verify the claimed discharge of tax under the reverse charge mechanism, or address services performed from the drilling optimisation centre in Navi Mumbai. Determination of liability under the taxable-service framework required verification of the nature and place of the services, the relevant consideration, and proof of tax payment.

Conclusion: The dropping of the demands could not be sustained; the liability requires fresh adjudication after allowing production of relevant evidence and a hearing, in favour of Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The service-tax liability must be reconsidered on a complete factual record, including the evidence relevant to taxable territory, designated areas, training activities, and claimed reverse-charge payment.

Ratio Decidendi: A service-tax demand cannot be dropped on unverified assertions regarding the nature or place of services or asserted reverse-charge payment where the material evidence required for verification has not been furnished.

Issues: (i) Whether witness summons should issue to the Assistant Commissioner of CGST under Order XVI Rule 1(2) and (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure; (ii) Whether witness summons should issue to the Principal of Jain College of Engineering.

Issue (i): Whether witness summons should issue to the Assistant Commissioner of CGST under Order XVI Rule 1(2) and (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Analysis: Order XVI Rule 1(2) and (3) does not impose an absolute bar on summoning a witness merely because the witness was not included in a timely list. A party seeking the Court's assistance must show sufficient cause for the delayed request and establish that the evidence is necessary for determining the real question in controversy. The unsuccessful effort to obtain GST-registration and invoice-related information through the Right to Information process sufficiently explained the need to summon the CGST officer. The proposed evidence was material to the defence disputing the GST number and validity of the invoices relied upon in the recovery claim.

Conclusion: Witness summons to the Assistant Commissioner of CGST shall issue. The issue is decided in favour of the Petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether witness summons should issue to the Principal of Jain College of Engineering.

Analysis: The proposed evidence concerning the respondent's alleged status as a student was not relevant to the construction-billing controversy and was unnecessary for deciding the dispute.

Conclusion: Witness summons to the Principal of Jain College of Engineering shall not issue. The issue is decided against the Petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The evidentiary record may be supplemented only with the CGST-related evidence concerning registration and invoices, while the proposed college-related evidence remains excluded.

Ratio Decidendi: Omission to file a witness list within time does not preclude issuance of a witness summons under Order XVI Rule 1(3) where sufficient cause is shown and the evidence is necessary to resolve the real controversy.

Issues: (i) Whether the disputed Hyundai vehicle models were covered by Entry 52B of Notification No. 05/2017-Compensation Cess (Rate) dated 11.09.2017 and liable to Compensation Cess at 22%; (ii) Whether the differential Compensation Cess, interest and penalties were recoverable under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 on the basis of suppression of facts with intent to evade tax.

Issue (i): Whether the disputed Hyundai vehicle models were covered by Entry 52B of Notification No. 05/2017-Compensation Cess (Rate) dated 11.09.2017 and liable to Compensation Cess at 22%.

Analysis: Entry 52B required cumulative fulfilment of the requirements concerning engine capacity, length, SUV identity and ground clearance. The engine-capacity and length conditions were undisputed, while manufacturer brochures, advertisements and product specifications established that the models were popularly known as SUVs. The 2023 amendment expressly defined ground clearance as unladen ground clearance and applied prospectively; however, its prospective operation did not prescribe laden measurement for the earlier period. A laden-condition qualification could not be read into the unamended fiscal entry through strict construction. Manufacturer specifications were relevant evidence of the vehicles' physical characteristics. ARAI certification remained technical evidence of measurement but was not conclusive of fiscal classification. The disclosed unladen ground clearances exceeded 170 mm.

Conclusion: Entry 52B applied and Compensation Cess was chargeable at 22%, in favour of Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether the differential Compensation Cess, interest and penalties were recoverable under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 on the basis of suppression of facts with intent to evade tax.

Analysis: Self-assessment did not relieve the taxpayer of the independent statutory responsibility to determine and discharge the correct cess rate. The lower rate was applied despite the vehicles satisfying the higher-rate entry, and the short-payment was detected through investigation. The material was found sufficient to establish suppression of facts with intent to evade tax, supporting the statutory recovery consequences.

Conclusion: The differential Compensation Cess, statutory interest and penalties were recoverable, in favour of Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The lower 20% cess rate was unavailable because the vehicles fulfilled the higher-rate classification under Entry 52B using their unladen ground clearance, and the original fiscal liability consequently governs.

Ratio Decidendi: A loading-condition qualification absent from a fiscal classification entry cannot be read into it to obtain a lower rate; classification follows the product's commercial identity and relevant manufacturer specifications.

Issues: (i) Whether an alleged excess input tax credit claim can be sustained merely by comparing Form GSTR-3B with Form GSTR-2A without verifying input tax credit reversals and the net credit position; (ii) Whether the difference between Table 9 of Form GSTR-9 and Table 9P of Form GSTR-9C establishes short-paid output tax without reconciliation of the underlying records; (iii) Whether a demand for short reversal of input tax credit under Rules 42 and 43 can be sustained without identifying and segregating actual common credit.

Issue (i): Whether an alleged excess input tax credit claim can be sustained merely by comparing Form GSTR-3B with Form GSTR-2A without verifying input tax credit reversals and the net credit position.

Analysis: A demand under Section 73 requires verification of the actual net input tax credit position. The return data showed that input tax credit reversals in Table 4(B) of Form GSTR-3B exceeded the credit availed. A comparison of gross credit figures with Form GSTR-2A, while disregarding those reversals, did not determine whether any excess credit remained or whether there was an actual revenue loss.

Conclusion: The alleged excess input tax credit demand was unsustainable without giving effect to reversals and determining the net input tax credit position.

Issue (ii): Whether the difference between Table 9 of Form GSTR-9 and Table 9P of Form GSTR-9C establishes short-paid output tax without reconciliation of the underlying records.

Analysis: The two return fields reflected different reporting parameters, including the effect of input tax credit reversals. The disclosed reconciliation explanation was not scrutinised, and the difference was treated as unpaid tax without verification of sales ledgers, tax invoices, and financial books. A portal-based comparison alone was insufficient to determine output-tax liability.

Conclusion: The return mismatch did not by itself establish short-paid tax and required a detailed factual reconciliation.

Issue (iii): Whether a demand for short reversal of input tax credit under Rules 42 and 43 can be sustained without identifying and segregating actual common credit.

Analysis: Rules 42 and 43 require identification of specific credit and common credit before applying the exempt-to-taxable turnover ratio to the actual common input tax pool. The demand proceeded by treating the entire input tax credit as common credit and without verifying the substantial reversals disclosed in the returns.

Conclusion: The proposed proportional reversal was invalid because the requisite segregation and verification of common credit had not been undertaken.

Final Conclusion: The demand determinations rested on unreconciled return discrepancies and omitted essential verification of primary records; fresh de novo verification is necessary before any tax, interest, or penalty liability can be determined.

Ratio Decidendi: A GST demand founded on return discrepancies cannot be sustained without verification of the net input tax credit position after accounting for reversals and, under Rules 42 and 43, identification of actual common credit before applying proportional reversal.

Issues: (i) Whether the Company Court had jurisdiction in the winding-up to adjudicate title to seized paintings claimed by the liquidation estate; (ii) Whether five identified paintings formed part of the liquidation estate notwithstanding a rival claimant's asserted entitlement under family consent terms; and (iii) Whether sale of the five identified paintings should proceed through an expert-assisted art-auction process.

Issue (i): Whether the Company Court had jurisdiction in the winding-up to adjudicate title to seized paintings claimed by the liquidation estate.

Analysis: Sections 446(2)(b) and 446(2)(d), read with Section 456 of the Companies Act, 1956, empower the Company Court to take custody of property to which the company appears entitled and to determine the consequential question of title. The earlier determination of jurisdiction had attained finality and had not been disturbed in appeal.

Conclusion: The Company Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate title to the paintings for purposes of the winding-up.

Issue (ii): Whether five identified paintings formed part of the liquidation estate notwithstanding a rival claimant's asserted entitlement under family consent terms.

Analysis: The asset register, purchase vouchers, seizure record, police affidavits and gallery confirmation furnished a coherent and corroborated basis to identify the five paintings as company assets. The applicable standard was preponderance of probabilities. The rival claimant, despite repeated opportunities, adduced no evidence of title and declined to enter the witness box, warranting an adverse inference. The family consent terms concerned possession and enjoyment among family members, covered only the art then in dispute, and neither bound the company nor established title against it.

Conclusion: The five identified paintings form part of the liquidation estate, and the rival claim to them fails. No determination of title is made in respect of the remaining paintings.

Issue (iii): Whether sale of the five identified paintings should proceed through an expert-assisted art-auction process.

Analysis: Works of art require a specialised sale mechanism rather than a routine asset-auction platform. Engagement of an art expert and an appropriate art auction house would promote value maximisation and price discovery for the liquidation estate.

Conclusion: The five identified paintings may be sold through an expert-assisted art-auction process formulated by the Official Liquidator and the appointed expert.

Final Conclusion: The liquidation estate is entitled to realise the five identified assets for satisfaction of stakeholder claims, while competing claims concerning the remaining paintings are preserved for separate adjudication.

Ratio Decidendi: In winding-up, the Company Court may determine title to property appearing to belong to the company on a preponderance of probabilities based on reliable corporate records and corroborative material, particularly where a rival claimant fails to substantiate title.

Issues: Whether the impugned properties could be retained under attachment as proceeds of crime under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002.

Analysis: Sections 2(u), 2(1)(y), and 3 require property alleged to be proceeds of crime to have a demonstrable nexus with criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. The payments received under the debenture subscription agreements, consultancy arrangements, and dairy-business sale arrangement were independent commercial transactions. Significant payments preceded the relevant bank disbursement, and no material established a link between the later payments and any alleged criminal proceeds. Official banking investments and loans, without material showing illegality or diversion, could not by themselves be treated as proceeds of crime.

Conclusion: The amounts and the attached properties were not shown to constitute proceeds of crime; continuation of the attachment was unwarranted.

Issues: Whether an adjudication order confirming input tax credit demand could stand without examining the objection that the demand overlapped with proceedings initiated by central GST officers and was barred by Section 6(2)(b) of the GST enactments.

Analysis: The objection concerned an overlapping tax demand and the statutory bar on parallel proceedings, as central GST notices were stated to cover, in part, the same period and input tax credit. The adjudicating authority confirmed the demand, interest and penalty without examining that material contention. A reasoned adjudication required determination of the asserted overlap and statutory bar; the merits of the input tax credit demand were left open.

Conclusion: The adjudication made without deciding the overlapping-demand objection was set aside for fresh determination in accordance with law.

Issues: Whether delay in furnishing Form No. 10 for claiming accumulation under Section 11(2) could be condoned under Section 119(2)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The claim for accumulation was disclosed in the original return filed within time and in the audit report in Form No. 10B; hence, the omission to furnish Form No. 10 was not an afterthought. The contemporaneous record supported the explanation of inadvertence, and there was no material to disbelieve it. The accumulated amount was recorded as invested in fixed deposits falling within the prescribed modes under Section 11(5). Furnishing Form No. 10 was treated as a directory procedural requirement, and its filing before issuance of the intimation constituted substantial compliance. Section 119(2)(b), being intended to mitigate undue hardship arising from non-wilful non-compliance, warranted condonation in view of the substantial adverse effect on the charitable trust's corpus and activities.

Conclusion: The delay in furnishing Form No. 10 was liable to be condoned, and the claim for accumulation under Section 11(2) could not be denied solely because of delayed filing of that form.

Issues: (i) Whether the draft assessment order under Section 144C(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, made after expiry of the limitation prescribed by Section 153, was without jurisdiction; (ii) Whether the availability of a statutory appeal barred exercise of writ jurisdiction where the assessment proceedings were alleged to be without jurisdiction.

Issue (i): Whether the draft assessment order under Section 144C(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, made after expiry of the limitation prescribed by Section 153, was without jurisdiction.

Analysis: For the relevant assessment year, the period under the third proviso to Section 153(1), as extended by Section 153(4) upon reference to the Transfer Pricing Officer, expired on 31 December 2023. Section 144C(1) required the Assessing Officer to make and forward the draft assessment order within that applicable period. The draft order was made only thereafter. The subsequent final assessment order, demand notice and penalty notice were founded on that time-barred draft order. The later insertions in Sections 153 and 144C reinforced this construction, though the conclusion did not depend upon them.

Conclusion: The draft assessment order was barred by limitation and without jurisdiction; the consequential final assessment order, demand notice and penalty show-cause notice could not survive. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the availability of a statutory appeal barred exercise of writ jurisdiction where the assessment proceedings were alleged to be without jurisdiction.

Analysis: The availability of an alternative statutory remedy is a rule of judicial self-restraint and not an absolute bar to jurisdiction under Article 226. Where the impugned proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction, the writ court may entertain the challenge. The undisputed expiry of the assessment limitation established such a jurisdictional defect.

Conclusion: The statutory appellate remedy did not preclude writ relief against proceedings that were without jurisdiction. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Expiry of the statutory period for making and forwarding the draft assessment order rendered the assessment process jurisdictionally invalid, notwithstanding the availability of an appellate remedy.

Ratio Decidendi: A draft assessment order under Section 144C(1) must be made and forwarded within the applicable limitation period under Section 153; a draft order made thereafter is without jurisdiction and cannot sustain consequential assessment proceedings.

Issues: Whether the aggregate disallowance of the claimed house-property loss and deductions under Sections 80C and 80D could be sustained on the evidence produced.

Analysis: The claims for house-property loss and Chapter VI-A deductions required evidentiary substantiation. The material produced was partly self-serving and contained inconsistencies, making it unsuitable for accepting the claims in full. Given the limited quantum involved, an ad hoc estimation of income at 10 per cent of the aggregate disallowance was considered appropriate.

Conclusion: The aggregate additions were restricted to Rs. 36,344, being 10 per cent of Rs. 3,63,437, taxable at normal rates rather than under Section 115BBE.

Issues: Whether the addition arising from the alleged cash transactions should be confined to an estimated 8% profit element rather than the entire amount.

Analysis: In the assessee's prior assessment years, the departmental authorities had accepted estimation of income at 8% in respect of similar cash transactions. Applying that consistent treatment to the year in question, the addition was directed to be computed only at 8% of the alleged transaction amount of Rs. 2,87,345.

Conclusion: The addition is restricted to Rs. 22,987, being 8% of Rs. 2,87,345; the balance of the addition cannot stand.

Issues: Whether reassessment could be sustained where no addition was made in respect of the income forming the recorded reason for reopening, but additions were made on other matters.

Analysis: Section 147, read with Explanation 3, permits assessment of other income noticed in a validly reopened proceeding, but does not remove the requirement that the income forming the recorded reason for reopening be assessed or reassessed. The long-term capital gains identified in the recorded reasons were not added; the disallowance under Section 54F and the addition under income from other sources were distinct matters. The binding jurisdictional rule therefore precluded sustaining the reassessment solely on those other additions.

Conclusion: The reassessment under Section 143(3) read with Section 147 was unsustainable and was quashed; the consequential additions, including the disallowance under Section 54F, could not survive.

Issues: (i) Whether reopening of the assessment was valid under Section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (ii) Whether an addition based on third-party statements without affording cross-examination was sustainable; (iii) Whether the loan-credit addition was sustainable on the evidence of genuineness and repayment.

Issue (i): Whether reopening of the assessment was valid under Section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Reassessment jurisdiction requires an independent reason to believe, founded on relevant material, that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. The recorded reasons neither identified a failure to disclose material facts nor demonstrated independent verification of the existing assessment records. They proceeded on factually incorrect material and borrowed satisfaction, without tangible material establishing escapement of income.

Conclusion: The reopening was invalid and is quashed, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether an addition based on third-party statements without affording cross-examination was sustainable.

Analysis: Where an addition rests on third-party statements or material, principles of natural justice require disclosure of such material and an effective opportunity to rebut it, including cross-examination of the persons whose statements are relied upon. The absence of that opportunity left the material untested.

Conclusion: The addition founded on third-party statements without cross-examination was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the loan-credit addition was sustainable on the evidence of genuineness and repayment.

Analysis: The loan transactions were recorded in the books and supported by ledger accounts, PAN particulars, bank statements, confirmations, and repayment details. Subsequent repayment of the loans supported the genuineness of the credits and did not justify their treatment as unexplained cash credits.

Conclusion: The loan-credit addition was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The invalid reopening and the independent defects in the loan-credit addition render the reassessment demand unsustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: Reassessment jurisdiction cannot be invoked on borrowed satisfaction or factually incorrect reasons lacking independently verified tangible material establishing escapement of income.

Issues: Whether an addition for unexplained money could be sustained solely on an unsigned excel sheet recovered from a third party, without cross-examination of the relevant persons or independent corroborative evidence.

Analysis: The material relied upon consisted of an unsigned third-party excel sheet that did not identify or bear the signature of the assessee. An adverse addition founded on such material required an opportunity to cross-examine the persons connected with it and independent evidence establishing that the alleged cash payment had actually been made. In the absence of cross-examination and corroboration, the excel sheet remained an unreliable third-party document incapable of supporting the addition.

Conclusion: The addition under Section 69A read with Section 115BBE of the Income-tax Act, 1961, was unsustainable and was deleted.

Issues: Whether cash receipts recorded in the regular books as collections from identified business debtors could be treated as unexplained money under Section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 69A applies where money is established to be unexplained. The disputed receipts were recorded in the regular books and were supported by party-wise ledgers, identified debtor particulars, audited accounts, sales and purchase registers, stock records and VAT returns. No defect was identified in the underlying business records, the books were not rejected, and no independent verification was undertaken from the identified parties. The absence of debtor confirmations alone could not displace the documentary evidence or establish unexplained money. Acceptance of Specified Bank Notes during demonetisation, without contrary material connecting the receipts to undisclosed income, also did not establish an unexplained source. Suspicion could not substitute proof.

Conclusion: The receipts were not established to be unexplained money under Section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the addition was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the addition for unexplained investment in intangible assets and the consequential depreciation disallowance required verification; (ii) Whether the assessed-income computation, based on adjustments in the intimation under section 143(1), involved duplication of disallowances.

Issue (i): Whether the addition for unexplained investment in intangible assets and the consequential depreciation disallowance required verification.

Analysis: Section 69 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 applies to investments whose nature and source remain unexplained, while section 115BBE governs their taxation. The difference between the recorded cost of intangible assets and the supporting documents produced could not be determined without examining the books of account, invoices, agreements, ledgers, payment records, salary records, and evidence concerning software customisation and development. The depreciation disallowance was consequential to the addition.

Conclusion: The addition for unexplained investment and the consequential depreciation disallowance are remitted for fresh verification and adjudication.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessed-income computation, based on adjustments in the intimation under section 143(1), involved duplication of disallowances.

Analysis: Verification was required by comparing the original and revised returns, the intimation under section 143(1), the computation of income, tax audit report, and assessment order to ascertain whether the disputed expenses had already been disallowed and whether the assessment duplicated those disallowances.

Conclusion: The computation issue is remitted for verification and fresh adjudication.

Final Conclusion: The disputed additions and computation adjustments must be reconsidered on verification of the relevant records after providing a reasonable opportunity to furnish supporting evidence and explanations.

Issues: (i) Whether the relevant date of import for applying an import-policy restriction under the Foreign Trade Policy is the date of shipment or dispatch or the date of filing of the Bill of Entry or clearance for home consumption; (ii) Whether Notification No. 02/2026-27 applies to goods dispatched and arrived in India before its electronic Gazette publication merely because the Bills of Entry were filed thereafter.

Issue (i): Whether the relevant date of import for applying an import-policy restriction under the Foreign Trade Policy is the date of shipment or dispatch or the date of filing of the Bill of Entry or clearance for home consumption.

Analysis: Paragraph 1.05(b) of the Foreign Trade Policy, read with paragraphs 2.17(a) and 11.11 of the Handbook of Procedures, 2023, defines the date of import by reference to shipment or dispatch from the supplying country. For air imports, the relevant Airway Bill evidencing departure from the last airport in the exporting country is determinative. The Bill of Entry or out-of-charge date is relevant under Section 15 of the Customs Act, 1962 for determining the rate of customs duty, but does not govern the applicability of an import-policy restriction under the Foreign Trade Policy.

Conclusion: The relevant date of import for the import-policy restriction is the shipment or dispatch date determined under the Foreign Trade Policy and Handbook of Procedures, not the post-notification Bill of Entry or clearance date. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether Notification No. 02/2026-27 applies to goods dispatched and arrived in India before its electronic Gazette publication merely because the Bills of Entry were filed thereafter.

Analysis: A notification acquires legal force only upon its electronic Gazette publication and cannot operate retrospectively without statutory authority. The restrictive notification could therefore operate only prospectively and could not affect goods already dispatched and arrived before publication. Its clauses excluding transitional arrangements did not alter this position. A subsequent executive memorandum lacked statutory force and could neither override the policy-defined date of import nor retrospectively expand the notification's application; conditional import authorisations did not redress that entitlement.

Conclusion: No. The restrictive notification is inapplicable to goods dispatched and arrived before its electronic Gazette publication, notwithstanding subsequent filing of Bills of Entry. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Goods whose shipment or dispatch predates the effective publication of a restrictive import-policy amendment remain governed by the pre-existing import policy, and that position cannot be altered through a subsequent executive clarification.

Ratio Decidendi: For import restrictions under the Foreign Trade Policy, the policy-defined shipment or dispatch date governs the date of import; the customs clearance date applicable to duty assessment and an executive clarification cannot retrospectively vary that policy framework.

Issues: Whether cognizance for an alleged contravention of Section 217(4) of the Companies Act, 2013 was liable to be quashed.

Analysis: At the cognizance stage, scrutiny is confined to the complaint and supporting material for determining whether a prima facie case exists; defence material and explanations cannot be evaluated through a mini-trial. The complaint and supporting documents disclosed allegations of non-cooperation with the investigation, and the cognizance order reflected application of mind to that material.

Conclusion: The cognizance and issuance of process for the alleged offence under Section 217(4), punishable under Section 217(6), of the Companies Act, 2013 were not liable to be quashed.

Issues: Whether the delay in filing the statutory appeal should be condoned.

Analysis: The appeal was filed 28 days after the three-month filing period, within the additional month contemplated by Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. Although supporting documents had not been produced before the appellate authority, the explanation for the delay appeared genuine.

Conclusion: The delay was condoned and the rejection of the appeal was set aside. The appeal was directed to be re-presented for determination on merits after a hearing.