Issues: Whether a deposit made expressly without prejudice after a Section 7 insolvency petition was reserved for orders could justify closure of the proceeding without adjudicating objections concerning maintainability, financial debt and default.

Analysis: A deposit expressly made without prejudice to rights, remedies and contentions is not, by itself, an unconditional admission of liability or default. Although the deposit could be considered, it could not replace the determination required in a Section 7 proceeding where the corporate debtor had specifically disputed the petition's maintainability and the existence of financial debt and default. The subsequent demand asserting different components of interest, default interest and legal expenses could not independently establish a financial debt; each component required a contractual or statutory foundation and legal recoverability. Liberty to pursue legally maintainable claims did not amount to adjudication of those claims.

Conclusion: Closure of the Section 7 proceeding without deciding the appellant's objections to maintainability, financial debt and default was legally unsustainable.

Issues: (i) Whether death of an individual resolution applicant after CoC approval but before Adjudicating Authority approval makes the resolution plan unimplementable and permits liquidation under Section 33(1). (ii) Whether liquidation could be ordered and the Section 12A withdrawal application dismissed as infructuous while that application was pending.

Issue (i): Whether death of an individual resolution applicant after CoC approval but before Adjudicating Authority approval makes the resolution plan unimplementable and permits liquidation under Section 33(1).

Analysis: A resolution applicant is not an office-holder with non-heritable obligations, but occupies the position of a promisor within the statutory resolution process. Section 33(1) permits liquidation only where no plan is received within the CIRP period or where a CoC-approved plan is rejected under Section 31; death of the applicant is not an additional statutory ground. The objective of preserving the corporate debtor as a going concern requires examination of the continued viability of the plan rather than automatic liquidation. Where the request for resolution plan or the plan itself does not address the contingency, inherent powers may be used to require the CoC to assess whether the plan can be sustained, including whether an heir is eligible, qualified, free from Section 29A disqualification, and willing to implement it.

Conclusion: Death of the resolution applicant does not by itself render the plan unimplementable or authorise liquidation under Section 33(1); the liquidation order on that basis was unsustainable.

Issue (ii): Whether liquidation could be ordered and the Section 12A withdrawal application dismissed as infructuous while that application was pending.

Analysis: The withdrawal route under Section 12A remains available during the resolution process. Once the sole CoC member had resolved to withdraw the CIRP following settlement and the application was pending, liquidation could not be mechanically ordered without considering that statutory exit mechanism.

Conclusion: The pending Section 12A application must be considered in accordance with law, and its dismissal as infructuous could not be sustained.

Final Conclusion: The CIRP stands revived, with the statutory withdrawal request requiring adjudication before further steps are taken.

Ratio Decidendi: Death of a resolution applicant pending approval of a CoC-approved plan is not a statutory ground for liquidation under Section 33(1); the resolution process must instead explore continuation of the plan within the statutory framework before liquidation is resorted to.

Issues: Whether a successful purchaser of a corporate debtor as a going concern in liquidation is entitled to immunity under Section 32A for pre-sale investigations, proceedings, non-compliances, and consequential liabilities.

Analysis: Section 32A protection and the clean slate principle apply where a corporate debtor is sold as a going concern during liquidation, as they do upon successful completion of CIRP. Past liabilities that do not survive the insolvency process cannot be fastened upon the purchaser merely because the sale occurred in liquidation. The statutory immunity remains conditional upon fulfilment of the requirements prescribed by Section 32A. Reliefs seeking waivers or concessions from statutory authorities must be pursued before those authorities.

Conclusion: The purchasers are entitled to Section 32A protection in respect of the declined reliefs concerning past investigations, proceedings, non-compliances, penalties, and liabilities, subject to fulfilment of the statutory conditions.

Issues: (i) Whether non-compliance with Section 61 of the GST Act read with Rule 99 vitiated the show-cause notice; (ii) Whether invocation of Section 74A(5)(ii) of the GST Act lacked jurisdictional foundation; (iii) Whether writ jurisdiction under Article 226 should be exercised to interdict the show-cause notice at the threshold.

Issue (i): Whether non-compliance with Section 61 of the GST Act read with Rule 99 vitiated the show-cause notice.

Analysis: Section 61 is a pre-adjudicatory mechanism confined to scrutiny of returns. Its procedure, including Rule 99, applies once scrutiny has in fact been initiated and discrepancies are noticed. Proceedings under Section 74A are independent and may be triggered by material obtained through scrutiny, audit, inspection, investigation or other credible independent verification. Here, the notice was founded on independent verification concerning allegedly bogus and non-existent sub-contractors, and not on a scrutiny of the petitioner's returns under Section 61.

Conclusion: Prior scrutiny under Section 61 and compliance with Rule 99 were not jurisdictional preconditions for the notice under Section 74A. The issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether invocation of Section 74A(5)(ii) of the GST Act lacked jurisdictional foundation.

Analysis: The notice alleged that input tax credit had been availed through fake documents and invoices relating to fictitious entities and without actual underlying supplies. Such allegations prima facie disclose fraudulent availment of input tax credit and satisfy the foundational threshold for initiating action under Section 74A(5)(ii). The truth of those allegations, including the existence and functioning of the sub-contractors and actual execution of work, requires evidentiary adjudication by the statutory authority.

Conclusion: The notice disclosed sufficient jurisdictional facts for invocation of Section 74A(5)(ii). The issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether writ jurisdiction under Article 226 should be exercised to interdict the show-cause notice at the threshold.

Analysis: A show-cause notice ordinarily does not warrant writ interference unless it is wholly without jurisdiction or falls within recognised exceptional circumstances. The asserted objections involve disputed facts and are available for determination in the statutory adjudication. No infringement of fundamental rights, breach of natural justice, want of jurisdiction, or surviving challenge to statutory validity was established.

Conclusion: No case for threshold interference under Article 226 was made out. The issue was decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the notice fails, while all factual and legal defences on the merits of the proposed tax demand remain available before the adjudicating authority.

Ratio Decidendi: Scrutiny of returns is not an invariable condition precedent to proceedings for determination of wrongly availed input tax credit where the proper officer acts on independent material that prima facie discloses fraud or fictitious supplies; disputed factual defences must ordinarily be addressed in statutory adjudication rather than writ jurisdiction.

Issues: (i) Whether the impugned findings rested on grounds beyond the show cause notice; (ii) Whether the authorised courier breached Regulations 13(i) and 13(j) of the Courier Imports and Exports (Clearance) Regulations, 2010; (iii) Whether penalties for attempted improper export and use of a false declaration could be imposed upon the courier for prohibited goods concealed in the export consignment.

Issue (i): Whether the impugned findings rested on grounds beyond the show cause notice.

Analysis: The show cause notice alleged only unauthorised outsourcing and deficient KYC verification by the appellant as an authorised courier. It neither alleged failure to obtain consignor authorisation nor treated the appellant as the consignor or exporter, and did not allege knowing use of a false declaration or conscious participation in the attempted export. Those were material factual and legal foundations of liability, not mere particulars or evidentiary inferences, and could not first be introduced in the adjudication order.

Conclusion: The findings based on consignor/exporter status, failure to obtain consignor authorisation, and knowing participation in the attempted export were beyond the show cause notice and were unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the authorised courier breached Regulations 13(i) and 13(j) of the Courier Imports and Exports (Clearance) Regulations, 2010.

Analysis: Regulation 13(i) requires verification through reliable, independent and authentic material; it does not itself require two identity documents. The genuine driving licence furnished proof of both identity and address, and absence of a second document did not establish a regulatory breach. Regulation 13(j) applies only where a regulatory function required or permitted under the Regulations is outsourced without written permission. Physical collection or pick-up of a consignment is not an assessment or clearance function of an authorised courier, and installation of software at an intermediary's premises did not establish outsourcing of a regulatory function.

Conclusion: Neither the use of one identity document nor outsourcing of physical pick-up established contravention of Regulations 13(i) or 13(j), in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether penalties for attempted improper export and use of a false declaration could be imposed upon the courier for prohibited goods concealed in the export consignment.

Analysis: No cogent evidence established that the appellant knew of, participated in, or facilitated the misdeclaration or concealed pseudoephedrine hydrochloride. Filing a courier declaration based on the consignor's information, followed by discovery of ingeniously concealed prohibited goods, did not establish a knowing false declaration. The statutory ingredients of an act or omission rendering goods liable to confiscation under Section 114(i), and knowledge or intent under Section 114AA, were not proved.

Conclusion: Penalties under Sections 114(i) and 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962 were unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The alleged regulatory breaches and the evidentiary basis for penal liability failed; consequently, the penal action against the appellant could not survive.

Ratio Decidendi: An adjudication order cannot impose liability on material factual or legal grounds absent from the show cause notice, and penal liability of an authorised courier for concealed prohibited goods requires cogent proof of the applicable regulatory breach or knowing involvement.

Issues: (i) Whether release of the cash escrow under Regulation 15B(8) of the Buyback Regulations precludes an independent inquiry or finding of fraud under the PFUTP Regulations; (ii) Whether the fraud finding could be sustained without resolving material discrepancies in the historical trading data and SEBI's investigation reports.

Issue (i): Whether release of the cash escrow under Regulation 15B(8) of the Buyback Regulations precludes an independent inquiry or finding of fraud under the PFUTP Regulations.

Analysis: Regulation 14(3) requires deployment of a stipulated minimum amount for buyback, while Regulation 15B(8) prescribes the escrow-forfeiture consequences of non-compliance and enumerates exceptions to forfeiture. The escrow mechanism is confined to determining entitlement to release or forfeiture and neither defines fraud nor adjudicates its existence. Internal departmental notings are not binding determinations unless approved by the competent authority and communicated as a final order. Fraud under the PFUTP Regulations requires proof from reliable material on the balance of probabilities, assessed from the cumulative surrounding circumstances; it cannot rest on conjecture or suspicion alone.

Conclusion: Release of the escrow under Regulation 15B(8) does not bar an independent fraud inquiry or finding under the PFUTP Regulations. This issue is decided in favour of the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the fraud finding could be sustained without resolving material discrepancies in the historical trading data and SEBI's investigation reports.

Analysis: The alleged fraud was founded substantially on historical exchange trading data concerning available sell orders, prevailing prices and placement of buy orders. Material inconsistencies were identified between the investigation material and exchange data, and there was also an unresolved contradiction between the earlier investigation report recording no material price or volume impact from the corporate announcement and the later report alleging fraud. These factual discrepancies go to the evidentiary foundation of the fraud allegation. The statutory appellate forum has powers to obtain evidence, summon and examine relevant persons, and determine these factual matters.

Conclusion: The existing determination on fraud cannot be sustained without adjudicating the material evidentiary discrepancies; the fraud question must be freshly determined by the statutory appellate forum on the basis of accurate trading data and any corroborating circumstances. This issue is decided in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The escrow-forfeiture regime and the anti-fraud regime operate in separate fields, and a fraud finding must be founded on reliable evidence evaluated on the applicable standard of proof.

Ratio Decidendi: Satisfaction of conditions for release of a buyback escrow does not confer immunity from proceedings for fraudulent or unfair trade practices, which require an independent evidentiary determination on the balance of probabilities.

Issues: (i) Whether the NCLT, New Delhi Bench-II could exercise jurisdiction over a Section 95 application against a personal guarantor when the corporate debtor's CIRP was pending before the NCLT, Chandigarh Bench-II; (ii) Whether Rule 16(d) of the National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016 permits transfer of such proceedings between Benches in different territorial locations.

Issue (i): Whether the NCLT, New Delhi Bench-II could exercise jurisdiction over a Section 95 application against a personal guarantor when the corporate debtor's CIRP was pending before the NCLT, Chandigarh Bench-II.

Analysis: Section 60(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, operating notwithstanding Section 60(1), requires an insolvency or bankruptcy application concerning a personal guarantor to be filed before the same NCLT where the corporate debtor's CIRP or liquidation is pending. The provision mandates consolidation before one Adjudicating Authority to secure consistency and avoid parallel or conflicting proceedings.

Conclusion: In favour of the Appellant. The NCLT, New Delhi Bench-II lacked territorial and inherent jurisdiction over the Section 95 proceedings, which were coram non judice and non-est in law.

Issue (ii): Whether Rule 16(d) of the National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016 permits transfer of such proceedings between Benches in different territorial locations.

Analysis: Rule 16(d), read with Rule 2(7) of the National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016 and Section 60(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, empowers the President of the NCLT to transfer a case from one Bench to another when circumstances warrant. This power is not confined to transfers within the same territorial jurisdiction where transfer is required to give effect to the mandatory forum prescribed by Section 60(2).

Conclusion: In favour of the Appellant. The restrictive interpretation limiting Rule 16(d) to intra-territorial transfers was incorrect.

Final Conclusion: Proceedings against the personal guarantor must be instituted before the NCLT, Chandigarh Bench-II, being the Adjudicating Authority where the corporate debtor's CIRP was pending; the creditor remains at liberty to pursue proceedings before the competent forum in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the corporate debtor's CIRP or liquidation is pending before an NCLT, Section 60(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 mandatorily fixes the forum for personal-guarantor insolvency proceedings at that same NCLT, and Rule 16(d) permits inter-Bench transfer to enforce that mandate.

Issues: Whether the direction requiring repayment of the amount released to the complainant under Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was liable to be set aside because it was made by the trial court rather than the appellate court.

Analysis: The proviso to Section 148(3) mandates repayment, with stipulated interest, of an amount released to the complainant where the appellant is acquitted. The complainant had also undertaken before the appellate court to repay the amount subject to disposal of the appeal. Although the refund direction ought ordinarily to have been made by the appellate court, the subsequent deposit of the amount pursuant to court directions and the complainant's failure to comply promptly did not justify interference with the refund direction.

Conclusion: Upon acquittal of the accused, the complainant was bound to repay the released amount, and the refund direction was sustained against the petitioner.

Issues: Whether documents already relied upon in the show cause notice and a related additional ground could be placed on record in the appeal.

Analysis: The requested documents did not constitute additional evidence, as they had already been relied upon in the show cause notice. The proposed ground only highlighted their corroborative effect and did not introduce a new ground. No objection arose to citing further authorities or withdrawing reliance on previously cited authorities.

Conclusion: The request to place the documents on record and amend the appeal was allowed.

Issues: Whether rectification jurisdiction under section 154 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be invoked to make a fresh disallowance under section 14A read with Rule 8D of the Income-tax Rules, 1962, where no such disallowance had been made in the original scrutiny assessment.

Analysis: Section 154 permits rectification only of an obvious, patent and self-evident mistake apparent from the record; it does not confer a power of review or permit fresh adjudication. A disallowance under section 14A read with Rule 8D requires examination of the accounts and statutory satisfaction under section 14A(2) regarding the correctness of the assessee's claim. Availability of exempt-income and investment figures in the record does not itself establish such a mistake.

Conclusion: The fresh disallowance under section 14A read with Rule 8D was outside rectification jurisdiction; the rectification order to that extent was quashed and the addition was deleted.

Issues: (i) Whether compensation for compulsorily acquired agricultural land situated in Hazira Notified Area was chargeable to capital gains tax; (ii) Whether compensation for built-up assets was entitled to deduction of cost of acquisition at 60%.

Issue (i): Whether compensation for compulsorily acquired agricultural land situated in Hazira Notified Area was chargeable to capital gains tax.

Analysis: Agricultural land in the Hazira Notified Area was outside a municipal area and did not constitute a capital asset under Section 2(14)(iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The land records established agricultural operations, and the acquisition was compulsory. The requirements for exemption under Section 10(37) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 were also satisfied. Compensation attributable to that land was therefore not liable to capital gains tax.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee. The addition of Rs. 53,58,334 towards long-term capital gains on compensation for agricultural land was deleted.

Issue (ii): Whether compensation for built-up assets was entitled to deduction of cost of acquisition at 60%.

Analysis: The separate compensation received for assets such as structures and improvements required computation after allowing a reasonable cost of acquisition. On the identical acquisition facts, 60% of the compensation for such assets was regarded as an appropriate cost of acquisition.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee to the limited extent that 60% of Rs. 1,16,41,667 must be allowed as the cost of acquisition.

Final Conclusion: The land-compensation addition was deleted, and the computation relating to compensation for built-up assets must be revised by allowing the directed cost-of-acquisition deduction.

Issues: Whether imported goods, after completion of Customs formalities, could be withheld for non-payment of detention charges, container detention charges, ground rent or demurrage accruing during Customs detention.

Analysis: Regulation 6(1)(l) of the Handling of Cargo in Customs Areas Regulations, 2009 and Regulation 10(1)(l) of the Sea Cargo Manifest and Transhipment Regulations, 2018 prohibit recovery of rent or demurrage for goods detained or seized by Customs. The goods remained under Customs detention, Customs formalities culminated in reassessment and payment of duty, and detention-waiver certificates were issued. Delays attributable to Customs authorities or disputes between the shipping line and custodian could not be transferred to the importer or justify withholding physical delivery.

Conclusion: The importer is entitled to release and physical delivery of the goods without liability for detention charges, container detention charges, ground rent or demurrage for the certified period of Customs detention; any inter se liability among the concerned authorities remains open for determination in accordance with law.

Issues: Whether breach of the prescribed investment conditions by a charitable trust results in denial of exemption and taxation at the maximum marginal rate of its entire income, or only of the income connected with the breach.

Analysis: Applying the settled interpretation of Section 13(1)(d), the proviso to Section 164(2), and Circular No. 387 dated 06.07.1984, forfeiture of exemption upon a contravention is confined to the part of income that loses exemption. Eligibility for exemption is distinct from forfeiture of exemption arising from a statutory breach.

Conclusion: The maximum marginal rate is chargeable only on the non-conforming portion of income; exemption under Section 11 cannot be denied in respect of the trust's entire income.

Issues: (i) Whether royalty and fees for technical services were taxable on receipt basis rather than accrual basis; (ii) Whether consideration from supply of software constituted taxable royalty; (iii) Whether the consortium arrangement constituted an association of persons; (iv) Whether income from offshore supply of goods was taxable in India; and (v) Whether an ad hoc transfer-pricing adjustment was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether royalty and fees for technical services were taxable on receipt basis rather than accrual basis.

Analysis: Article 12 of the India-Germany Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement employs the expressions "paid" and "received" in respect of royalties and fees for technical services. The receipt-basis treatment had consistently been accepted in earlier years and no distinguishing facts were shown for the relevant assessment years.

Conclusion: Royalty and fees for technical services are taxable on receipt basis and not on accrual basis, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether consideration from supply of software constituted taxable royalty.

Analysis: The software supplied was standard software under restricted, non-exclusive and non-transferable licences, without transfer of any copyright rights. Binding precedent applicable to such end-user and distributor transactions establishes that consideration for use or resale of software, without a right to exploit copyright, is not royalty under the Act or the treaty.

Conclusion: Consideration from supply of software is not taxable as royalty, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the consortium arrangement constituted an association of persons.

Analysis: Section 2(31) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 read with the applicable principles requires, among other elements, a common design to earn income, common management, and sharing of profits or losses for an association of persons. The consortium members had separate and identifiable scopes of work, separately invoiced and received their respective consideration, retained separate profits and losses, and indemnified one another for individual defaults. Joint and several liability to the customer was only a contractual safeguard and did not establish a joint enterprise.

Conclusion: The consortium arrangement did not constitute an association of persons, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether income from offshore supply of goods was taxable in India.

Analysis: The Protocol to Article 7 of the India-Germany Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement and the settled treatment of comparable offshore supplies in earlier years governed the issue. In the absence of distinguishing facts, the established position that income from offshore supply of goods was not chargeable to tax in India applied.

Conclusion: Income arising from offshore supply of goods is not taxable in India, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (v): Whether an ad hoc transfer-pricing adjustment was sustainable.

Analysis: Section 92C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 requires determination of arm's length price through the prescribed transfer-pricing methods and a proper analysis of the relevant transactions. Differences in reported values were explained by receipt-basis accounting and differences in the transactions reported by the assessee and its associated enterprises. In the absence of defects in the transfer-pricing analysis, and where corresponding transactions had been benchmarked in associated enterprises' cases, a flat 10% mark-up could not be imposed.

Conclusion: The ad hoc 10% transfer-pricing adjustment is unsustainable and stands deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessments for both years require recomputation by giving effect to the receipt-basis taxation, non-royalty treatment of software receipts, absence of an association of persons, non-taxability of offshore supply income, and deletion of the ad hoc transfer-pricing adjustment.

Issues: (i) Whether compensation for termination of the distribution arrangement was taxable as business income or as long-term capital gains
(ii) Whether the taxable termination compensation could exceed the amount actually received
(iii) Whether depreciation was allowable on non-compete fee paid to protect use of an acquired trademark
(iv) Whether the 10% disallowances of staff welfare and other miscellaneous expenses were sustainable
(v) Whether corporate office expenses and head-office depreciation could be allocated to the Section 80IB eligible units
(vi) Whether finance costs, research and development costs, and foreign travel expenses required allocation to the Section 80IB eligible units
(vii) Whether additional head-office expenses and common export sales-promotion expenses were correctly allocated to the eligible export unit
(viii) Whether 90% of miscellaneous income, the deferred sales-tax discount, and termination compensation was reducible from business profits under Section 80HHC
(ix) Whether the Section 80IB deduction had to be reduced while computing the Section 80HHC deduction under Section 80IA(9)
(x) Whether the additional ground on the sales-tax prepayment discount under Section 41(1) should be admitted and reconsidered

Issue (i): Whether compensation for termination of the distribution arrangement was taxable as business income or as long-term capital gains

Analysis: Section 28(ii)(c) covers compensation received on termination of an agency. The contractual features, including predetermined margins, control over pricing, reimbursement of statutory levies, product-visibility obligations, and limited freedom of termination, established a principal-agent relationship notwithstanding the distributorship label. The termination did not impair the profit-making apparatus or capital structure, and the payment represented compensation for loss of business within the ordinary trading framework.

Conclusion: The termination compensation was a revenue receipt taxable as business income under Section 28(ii)(c), and not as long-term capital gains; against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the taxable termination compensation could exceed the amount actually received

Analysis: Although the agreement contained a compensation formula referring to Rs. 5 crore, the material established that the parties mutually settled the payment at Rs. 4.56 crore. No evidence established receipt or accrual of the balance amount, and commercial settlement decisions could not be replaced by a higher notional amount.

Conclusion: The addition was restricted to Rs. 4.56 crore and the balance was directed to be deleted; in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether depreciation was allowable on non-compete fee paid to protect use of an acquired trademark

Analysis: The non-compete covenant, obtained contemporaneously with acquisition of the trademark, restrained the former registered user from competing for 20 years and protected the trademark's commercial value. Such enduring protection constituted a depreciable intangible asset and a business or commercial right of similar nature within Explanation 3 to Section 32(1)(ii).

Conclusion: Depreciation on the non-compete fee was allowable; in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether the 10% disallowances of staff welfare and other miscellaneous expenses were sustainable

Analysis: Only broad classifications of the staff welfare and miscellaneous expenses were furnished, without supporting sub-details or vouchers for verification. The facts were accepted as comparable to the earlier year in which a restricted 10% disallowance had been sustained. The expenses were therefore not fully established as incurred wholly and exclusively for business.

Conclusion: The 10% disallowances of both expense categories were sustained; against the assessee.

Issue (v): Whether corporate office expenses and head-office depreciation could be allocated to the Section 80IB eligible units

Analysis: For determining profits derived from an eligible unit, only expenditure having a direct nexus with that unit's operations is allocable. The eligible units had absorbed their own relevant manufacturing, marketing, and finance costs in standalone accounts, whereas general corporate office expenditure and depreciation lacked such direct nexus.

Conclusion: Allocation of the corporate office expenses and head-office depreciation was directed to be deleted; in favour of the assessee.

Issue (vi): Whether finance costs, research and development costs, and foreign travel expenses required allocation to the Section 80IB eligible units

Analysis: Allocation of finance cost required verification whether the eligible units generated surplus cash and had used no borrowed or dealership-deposit funds. Allocation of research and development cost depended on whether the expenditure related to products manufactured in the eligible units. Foreign travel expenditure required examination of actual unit-wise allocation, since export turnover alone was not a sufficient basis for further allocation.

Conclusion: The allocations were remitted for fresh verification and determination in accordance with the stated principles.

Issue (vii): Whether additional head-office expenses and common export sales-promotion expenses were correctly allocated to the eligible export unit

Analysis: The additional head-office allocation required verification of the proper sales-turnover basis, including local and export sales. The attribution of common export sales-promotion expenditure also required factual examination of the extent to which it related to the eligible export unit, rather than a mechanical turnover allocation.

Conclusion: Both allocation questions were remitted for factual verification and fresh determination.

Issue (viii): Whether 90% of miscellaneous income, the deferred sales-tax discount, and termination compensation was reducible from business profits under Section 80HHC

Analysis: Section 80HHC permits deduction only for profits derived from export activity, requiring a direct nexus between the receipt and export of goods. Miscellaneous income, savings from deferred sales-tax liability, and compensation for termination of a distribution arrangement were each a step removed from the export business and did not satisfy the derived-from-export requirement.

Conclusion: Reduction of 90% of those receipts from business profits for Section 80HHC computation was sustained; against the assessee.

Issue (ix): Whether the Section 80IB deduction had to be reduced while computing the Section 80HHC deduction under Section 80IA(9)

Analysis: Section 80IA(9) does not require reduction of eligible profits at the stage of computing the Section 80HHC deduction merely because Section 80IB relief has been claimed. The restriction against double deduction operates while allowing the aggregate Chapter VI-A relief, which cannot exceed gross total income. The relevant facts and figures required verification.

Conclusion: The computation was remitted for fresh determination in accordance with the applicable Section 80IA(9) principles.

Issue (x): Whether the additional ground on the sales-tax prepayment discount under Section 41(1) should be admitted and reconsidered

Analysis: The additional ground raised a pure legal question concerning whether the discounted prepayment of deferred sales-tax liability resulted in remission or cessation of a trading liability under Section 41(1). The relevant material was already on record, but the taxability issue had not been examined on merits.

Conclusion: The additional ground was admitted and remitted for statutory determination; no final finding on taxability was made.

Final Conclusion: The termination payment remains chargeable as business income only to the extent actually received, the acquired non-compete right is depreciable, unrelated corporate-overhead allocation is excluded from eligible-unit profits, and the identified allocation and sales-tax questions require fresh statutory determination.

Ratio Decidendi: Compensation for ending an agency-like commercial arrangement is a revenue receipt taxable as business income where termination does not impair the assessee's profit-making apparatus or source of income, notwithstanding the arrangement's distributorship label.

Issues: Whether the subsequently obtained GST registration could be restored despite cancellation of an earlier GST registration that the petitioner did not intend to revive.

Analysis: The petitioner had not carried on business under the earlier registration and did not seek its revival. Continuing cancellation of the subsequent registration would restrict the petitioner from carrying on business and paying tax; no impediment to its restoration was found.

Conclusion: The subsequent GST registration was directed to be restored, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether anticipatory bail can be maintained solely on summons issued under Section 70 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, when no order authorising arrest under Section 69 of that Act has been passed and communicated.

Analysis: Summons under Section 70 do not make the summoned person an accused and do not, by themselves, create a legally sustainable apprehension of arrest. An order under Section 69, founded on reasons to believe and communicated to the person concerned, is the sine qua non for seeking pre-arrest protection. Searches, an ongoing investigation, and a possible future arrest cannot substitute for that foundational order.

Conclusion: In the absence of an order under Section 69 authorising and communicating arrest, the applications for anticipatory bail were premature and not maintainable.

Issues: (i) Whether a Regional Rural Bank deemed to be a co-operative society under Section 22 of the Regional Rural Banks Act, 1976, remains entitled to deduction under Section 80P of the Income-tax Act, 1961 after insertion of Section 80P(4); (ii) Whether revision under Section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was valid where the original assessment allowed the deduction on that basis.

Issue (i): Whether a Regional Rural Bank deemed to be a co-operative society under Section 22 of the Regional Rural Banks Act, 1976, remains entitled to deduction under Section 80P of the Income-tax Act, 1961 after insertion of Section 80P(4).

Analysis: The assessee's status as a Regional Rural Bank was consistently accepted. Section 22 creates a specific statutory deeming fiction treating a Regional Rural Bank as a co-operative society for income-tax purposes. That fiction had not been overridden by Section 80P(4). The exclusion in Section 80P(4) applies to co-operative banks, whereas the assessee was not shown to fall within the relevant categories of primary co-operative bank or primary credit society.

Conclusion: A Regional Rural Bank deemed to be a co-operative society under Section 22 remains eligible for deduction under Section 80P; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether revision under Section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was valid where the original assessment allowed the deduction on that basis.

Analysis: The original assessment correctly granted the deduction by applying the statutory deeming fiction under Section 22. Since the assessment was legally sustainable, it could not be regarded as erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue so as to justify revision.

Conclusion: The assumption of revisionary jurisdiction under Section 263 was invalid; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The statutory deeming fiction preserves the assessee's entitlement to the co-operative society deduction and leaves no basis for revising the original assessment.

Ratio Decidendi: A Regional Rural Bank deemed to be a co-operative society for income-tax purposes under Section 22 retains the deduction available under Section 80P unless that deeming fiction is expressly overridden; the exclusion applicable to co-operative banks under Section 80P(4) does not apply without establishing that status.

Issues: (i) Whether the bank's Government securities constituted stock-in-trade and the related depreciation was allowable; (ii) Whether the brokerage payment was allowable following the Assessing Officer's post-remand determination; (iii) Whether unclaimed customer balances involved a taxable remission or cessation of trading liability.

Issue (i): Whether the bank's Government securities constituted stock-in-trade and the related depreciation was allowable.

Analysis: Under Section 145 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, a taxpayer may value stock-in-trade at the lower of cost or market value. A consistent method of accounting and valuation cannot be displaced merely because another method is preferred. The governing position treated Government securities held by the bank as stock-in-trade.

Conclusion: The Government securities were stock-in-trade and the related depreciation claim was allowable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the brokerage payment was allowable following the Assessing Officer's post-remand determination.

Analysis: Following remand by the Tribunal, the Assessing Officer considered and allowed the claim during the pendency of the appeal.

Conclusion: The brokerage payment stood allowed, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether unclaimed customer balances involved a taxable remission or cessation of trading liability.

Analysis: Section 41(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 applies only where a trading liability, for which an allowance or deduction was obtained, has been remitted or has ceased. Amounts remaining unclaimed by customers do not become taxable where the bank's legal obligation to repay them continues.

Conclusion: The unclaimed balances did not constitute taxable income through remission or cessation of trading liability, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The bank's securities were treated as trading stock, its brokerage-related claim remained allowed, and the unclaimed customer balances were not taxable on a cessation-of-liability basis.

Issues: (i) Whether the exporter was entitled to service-tax exemption under Notification No. 18/2009-S.T. dated 07.07.2009 when the half-yearly return claiming exemption was filed after the deadline prescribed by the notification; (ii) Whether penalty under Section 76 of the Finance Act, 1994 was validly imposed.

Issue (i): Whether the exporter was entitled to service-tax exemption under Notification No. 18/2009-S.T. dated 07.07.2009 when the half-yearly return claiming exemption was filed after the deadline prescribed by the notification.

Analysis: The notification made exemption conditional upon submission of the certified half-yearly return and prescribed documents within 15 days of completion of the relevant period. Although the Service Tax Rules permitted filing of a belated return on payment of the applicable fine, the notification independently imposed a shorter and unchallenged deadline for availing exemption. Its conditions were clear and the delayed return did not satisfy them.

Conclusion: The exemption was unavailable owing to non-compliance with the notification's time condition, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether penalty under Section 76 of the Finance Act, 1994 was validly imposed.

Analysis: The penalty was computed at a rate higher than that prescribed by Section 76, which then provided for Rs. 100 per day of continuing failure or 1% of tax per month, whichever was higher, subject to a ceiling of 50% of service tax.

Conclusion: The penalty levy was set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The service-tax exemption claim fails for delayed compliance with the notification, while the incorrectly computed penalty cannot be sustained.