Issues: Whether dismissal of the statutory appeal on limitation and the underlying show-cause and adjudication proceedings could stand where the show-cause notice was uploaded only under the GST portal's 'Additional Notice and Orders' tab without separate intimation.

Analysis: Section 107 of the West Bengal Goods and Services Tax Act and the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 provides the appellate framework. The show-cause notice was uploaded only under the specified portal tab, without separate intimation, resulting in the petitioner being unable to respond. This denied an effective opportunity to contest the proposed demand and violated principles of natural justice. The statutory appeal had been dismissed solely on limitation without an examination on merits.

Conclusion: The show-cause notice, adjudication order and appellate order were set aside, with directions for issuance of a fresh show-cause notice, opportunity of hearing, and fresh reasoned adjudication in accordance with law.

Issues: Whether an ex parte GST adjudication order could stand where the show-cause notice was uploaded only under the 'Additional Notice and Orders' tab without separate intimation, preventing a response.

Analysis: An adverse GST adjudication requires effective notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond to the show-cause notice, in conformity with the principles of natural justice. Uploading the notice only under the specified portal tab, without separate intimation, left the assessee unable to submit a reply and constituted a denial of natural justice.

Conclusion: The ex parte adjudication order and consequential notices were set aside, with fresh adjudication to be undertaken after receipt of the assessee's reply and after affording an opportunity of hearing.

Issues: Whether the GST adjudication order was vitiated for being non-speaking and for non-application of mind to the taxpayer's reply.

Analysis: Section 73(9) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the corresponding State enactment required a reasoned adjudication of the show-cause notice. The adjudication order did not properly address the detailed reply filed by the taxpayer and contained no cogent reasons for its determination. Its cryptic nature disclosed non-application of mind and perversity. The merits of the tax demand were not examined.

Conclusion: The adjudication order was unsustainable for want of reasons and non-application of mind. A fresh determination is required after considering the taxpayer's reply and granting an adequate personal hearing, without any expression on the merits.

Issues: Whether cancellation of GST registration could be sustained when it was made mechanically without considering the registered person's reply to the show-cause notice.

Analysis: A cancellation decision must reflect due application of mind to the response furnished to the show-cause notice. The acknowledged reply was available on record, whereas the cancellation order proceeded on the erroneous basis that no reply had been filed. The show-cause notice and cancellation order consequently suffered from non-consideration of the reply and lacked proper application of mind. The merits concerning restoration of registration were left for fresh determination by the competent authority after hearing the petitioner.

Conclusion: The cancellation of registration was unsustainable for failure to consider the reply and required fresh consideration by the competent authority through a speaking and reasoned decision.

Issues: (i) Whether mechanical rejection of delay condonation seeking leave to respond to a show-cause notice was valid; (ii) Whether adjudication without a personal hearing could stand.

Issue (i): Whether mechanical rejection of delay condonation seeking leave to respond to a show-cause notice was valid.

Analysis: The explanation for failure to respond to the electronic notice was not addressed. The rejection contained no reasons for declining condonation and was therefore mechanical rather than a reasoned determination.

Conclusion: The rejection of condonation of delay was invalid and was set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether adjudication without a personal hearing could stand.

Analysis: The show-cause notice excluded a personal hearing despite the statutory requirement of such hearing for adjudication. Fair adjudication requires an effective opportunity to submit a reply and to be heard.

Conclusion: Adjudication without affording a personal hearing could not stand; the assessee must be given an opportunity to reply and be heard, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Further statutory adjudication must be undertaken only after receipt of the reply, grant of personal hearing, and issuance of a reasoned order.

Ratio Decidendi: A mechanical and unreasoned refusal to condone delay, coupled with denial of the statutorily required personal hearing, is inconsistent with fair adjudicatory procedure.

Issues: Whether the challenge to the demand on grounds of limitation, jurisdiction, and clubbing of different financial years should be entertained in writ jurisdiction despite the statutory appellate remedy.

Analysis: The questions concerning limitation, jurisdiction, and permissibility of clubbing different financial years involve disputed questions of fact and law that can be effectively adjudicated by the appellate authority under the statutory appeal mechanism. No merits determination was made, and all legal issues were left open.

Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of by relegating the petitioner to the statutory appellate remedy, with protection against coercive action until the appeal attains finality.

Issues: Whether the appellate order could stand where the petitioner was unable to file an appeal within the prescribed period because the adjudication order uploaded on the GST portal had not come to its notice.

Analysis: Section 107 of the West Bengal Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 prescribes the appellate remedy and limitation. The adjudication order had been uploaded under the 'Additional Notice and Orders' tab, and the petitioner became aware of it only upon receiving a recovery notice. In these circumstances, denial of an opportunity to pursue the statutory appeal warranted intervention and a merits-based hearing.

Conclusion: The appellate order was quashed, and the appellate authority was required to entertain and decide the appeal on merits after affording an opportunity of hearing.

Issues: (i) Whether an anticipatory-bail application is premature solely because the applicant has been summoned under Section 70 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and no formal arrest authorization under Section 69 has been issued; (ii) Whether anticipatory bail should be granted on the facts of the investigation.

Issue (i): Whether an anticipatory-bail application is premature solely because the applicant has been summoned under Section 70 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and no formal arrest authorization under Section 69 has been issued.

Analysis: Section 69 concerns the power of arrest, whereas Section 70 permits summoning a person to give evidence or produce material in an inquiry. A summons does not by itself establish arrest or confer an automatic right to pre-arrest protection. Equally, the absence of an existing arrest authorization is not an absolute bar where tangible circumstances disclose a real, genuine and reasonable apprehension of arrest. The searches, seizure of material, substantial alleged revenue implications and arrest of a connected accused provided an objectively founded apprehension in this matter.

Conclusion: The application was maintainable and was not premature; this issue was decided in the applicant's favour.

Issue (ii): Whether anticipatory bail should be granted on the facts of the investigation.

Analysis: Anticipatory bail protects personal liberty but remains an exceptional remedy requiring a balance with effective investigation. The gravity and organized nature of the alleged evasion, the material collected, the investigation into machinery, raw materials, manufacturing, clearances and financial and electronic trails, the arrest of a connected accused, repeated summons and alleged non-cooperation supported the stated need for further interrogation. Custodial interrogation was not treated as an end in itself, but could not be ruled out at the existing stage of investigation. An undertaking to cooperate could not by itself displace the investigating authority's lawful powers.

Conclusion: The circumstances did not warrant extension of pre-arrest protection; this issue was decided against the applicant.

Final Conclusion: A genuine apprehension of arrest permits invocation of anticipatory-bail jurisdiction before a formal arrest order, but relief depends on a fact-specific balance between personal liberty and the legitimate requirements of effective investigation.

Ratio Decidendi: Mere issuance of a summons under Section 70 does not make an anticipatory-bail application premature where a reasonable apprehension of arrest is objectively established; however, such apprehension alone does not justify pre-arrest protection when investigation-specific factors support the need for further interrogation.

Issues: (i) Whether the Arbitrator had jurisdiction to determine the liquidator's authority to represent the joint venture and continue the arbitral reference; (ii) Whether rejection of the joint venture constituent's application for intervention and termination of arbitration warranted supervisory interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

Issue (i): Whether the Arbitrator had jurisdiction to determine the liquidator's authority to represent the joint venture and continue the arbitral reference.

Analysis: Sections 5 and 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 require minimal judicial intervention and recognise the Tribunal's competence to rule on jurisdictional questions. The arbitration agreement and its invocation on behalf of the joint venture were undisputed, and the arbitral proceedings had commenced under Section 21. A dispute concerning the authority of the liquidator to represent the joint venture concerns representation and continuation of the reference, not the existence of the arbitration agreement or the Tribunal's subject-matter jurisdiction. Such questions require determination within the arbitral process.

Conclusion: The Arbitrator had jurisdiction to determine the liquidator's authority to represent the joint venture and continue the reference; the issue was decided against the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether rejection of the joint venture constituent's application for intervention and termination of arbitration warranted supervisory interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: Article 227 intervention in an ongoing arbitration is confined to exceptional cases involving a patent lack of inherent jurisdiction apparent without detailed argument. No such defect arose from the Arbitrator's determination. The constituent had notice of the liquidator's assertion of authority and the proposed arbitral proceedings, but did not promptly object or seek appropriate relief when called upon to clarify its position. Its later request was directed to extinguishing the joint venture's claim after the evidentiary stage had concluded. This conduct supported findings of acquiescence, bad faith, and an attempt to derail the arbitral process, rather than exceptional circumstances warranting supervisory relief.

Conclusion: Supervisory interference under Article 227 was not warranted; the issue was decided against the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The arbitral reference remains subject to the statutory arbitral framework, with disputes concerning representation and authority to be addressed through that framework rather than interlocutory supervisory review.

Ratio Decidendi: In the absence of a patent lack of inherent jurisdiction, Article 227 cannot be invoked to review an interlocutory arbitral determination under Section 16; a dispute concerning authority to represent a joint venture is for determination by the Arbitral Tribunal.

Issues: (i) Whether contractual service-tax reimbursement covered service tax directly paid under the reverse charge mechanism on input services availed for the project; (ii) Whether an award in an international commercial arbitration could be set aside for patent illegality or as contrary to public policy for allowing such reimbursement.

Issue (i): Whether contractual service-tax reimbursement covered service tax directly paid under the reverse charge mechanism on input services availed for the project.

Analysis: The contractual clauses excluded service tax from the contractor's ordinary tax liabilities and provided for its reimbursement upon actual and genuine payment to the concerned department. Services such as manpower, transport, security and other input services availed for execution of the project formed an integral part of the project contract. The expression "in respect of this contract" confined reimbursement to project-related services, but did not exclude services obtained through subcontractors. The arbitral finding allowed only the amount directly deposited by the contractor under the reverse charge mechanism on proof of payment, while rejecting the component paid through vendors where proof of actual deposit was unavailable.

Conclusion: The directly paid service tax on project-related input services was reimbursable under the contract; this issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether an award in an international commercial arbitration could be set aside for patent illegality or as contrary to public policy for allowing such reimbursement.

Analysis: Section 34(2A) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 confines the ground of patent illegality to arbitrations other than international commercial arbitrations. Further, the arbitral interpretation permitting reimbursement of proven service tax paid for project-related input services was reasonable and did not conflict with the express contractual terms. It therefore did not offend the public policy of India.

Conclusion: Patent illegality was unavailable as a ground of challenge, and the reimbursement finding did not conflict with public policy; this issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The arbitral award granting reimbursement of the proven service-tax amount for project-related input services remains enforceable.

Ratio Decidendi: In an international commercial arbitration, patent illegality is not an available ground to set aside an award, and a reasonable contractual interpretation allowing reimbursement of proven project-related service tax does not conflict with public policy.

Issues: Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked on an allegation of suppression where the Department already possessed the material facts and had issued an earlier show-cause notice on the same or similar facts.

Analysis: The assessee had regularly filed ST-3 returns, and the information forming the basis of the subsequent demand was already available to the Department when the earlier show-cause notice was issued. The same or similar facts could not subsequently constitute suppression of facts; the subsequent notice ought to have been confined to the normal limitation period.

Conclusion: Invocation of the extended period of limitation was unsustainable because no suppression of facts could be alleged against the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether verification of the conveyance contravened Rule 138B of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017; (ii) Whether writ jurisdiction should be exercised despite the statutory appellate remedy under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Issue (i): Whether verification of the conveyance contravened Rule 138B of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017.

Analysis: Rule 138B permits physical verification by a proper officer authorised by the Commissioner or an empowered officer. The record established that the physical verification was undertaken by an authorised proper officer. Following the earlier remand, a fresh notice was issued, relevant materials were supplied, an opportunity of personal hearing was given, and the reply was considered before the confiscation order was made.

Conclusion: The verification did not contravene Rule 138B, and no jurisdictional defect or breach of natural justice was established.

Issue (ii): Whether writ jurisdiction should be exercised despite the statutory appellate remedy under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: The existence of an alternative statutory remedy does not absolutely bar writ jurisdiction, but its exercise requires exceptional circumstances, including breach of fundamental rights, violation of natural justice, excess of jurisdiction, or a challenge to the validity of legislation. None of those circumstances was established. The grievance regarding supply of relied-upon documents and the assessment of the adjudicatory record required factual examination within the appellate framework.

Conclusion: Writ jurisdiction was declined, and the petitioner was required to pursue the statutory appellate remedy.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the confiscation adjudication remains amenable to examination by the competent appellate authority under the statutory scheme.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a GST adjudication follows notice and opportunity of hearing and no exceptional ground for writ intervention is established, factual or procedural grievances must be pursued through the statutory appellate remedy rather than under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Issues: Whether an erroneously entered respondent on the Tribunal portal may be corrected after registration of the appeal.

Analysis: Rule 26 of the GSTAT (Procedure) Rules, 2025 permits rectification of clerical and similar errors, while Rule 32(1) permits amendment of a defective appeal form upon sufficient cause. The record showed that the respondent was incorrectly selected on the portal although the proper State tax authority was identified in the original appeal memorandum and the impugned order. The erroneous portal entry was a curable and non-fatal procedural defect, and the proper respondent required service. As the portal did not provide a post-registration correction mechanism, re-upload of the corrected appeal documents and Registry action for portal correction were required.

Conclusion: Substitution of the correctly described respondent was permitted, with consequential correction of the portal record.

Issues: Whether a departmental GST appeal involving disputed tax below the prescribed monetary limit could be admitted without the Revenue pleading and proving a recognised exception.

Analysis: Section 120 of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 permits litigation-control instructions regulating departmental appeals. The applicable circulars fixed a monetary threshold of Rs. 20,00,000 for appeals before GSTAT, subject to specified exceptions. The disputed tax of Rs. 7,36,272 was below that threshold. Authorisation under Section 112(3) of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 was distinct from compliance with the monetary-limit policy. The Revenue was required to identify and substantiate a specified exception or produce a case-specific recorded opinion of the Commissioner under the residual exception. No such material was produced.

Conclusion: The departmental appeal was not maintainable for admission and could not proceed to adjudication on merits.

Issues: Whether use of the consignee's former address in two tax invoices and corresponding e-way bills, despite an otherwise documented movement of goods, justified imposition of a transit penalty under Section 129.

Analysis: Section 129 permits a transit penalty only where the established contravention attracts that provision. Invoice and transit-document requirements under Section 31, Rule 46, Section 68 and Rules 138 and 138A remain mandatory; however, strict civil liability does not dispense with proof of a breach warranting the particular penalty. The applicable legal approach requires an assessment whether a documentary address discrepancy is technical and bona fide or evidences an intent to evade tax. Section 126(6) does not authorise reduction of a valid percentage-based penalty under Section 129; applicability of Section 129 must first be established.

Analysis: The goods were accompanied by invoices, e-way bills and bilty documents, and physical verification confirmed their description, quantity and quality. The purchaser was identified, and the former address was supported by its historical connection with the purchaser and retention of outdated customer data. No different purchaser, fictitious transaction, diversion, clandestine unloading, repeated use of documents, or suppression of value was established. The address mismatch alone, in those circumstances, did not establish a substantive transit violation. Proportionality supported distinguishing the explained documentary error from conduct concealing a taxable movement.

Conclusion: The explained use of the former consignee address did not attract Section 129, and the disputed transit penalty was unsustainable in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the initial intra-State movement from the consignor's place of business to the transporter's place of business for onward transport qualified under the third proviso to Rule 138(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017, such that leaving Part B unfilled did not contravene the Rules or attract penalty under Section 129 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether mens rea is an essential requirement for a penalty under Section 129 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Issue (i): Whether the initial intra-State movement from the consignor's place of business to the transporter's place of business for onward transport qualified under the third proviso to Rule 138(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017, such that leaving Part B unfilled did not contravene the Rules or attract penalty under Section 129 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Rule 138 generally requires conveyance details in Part B, but its third proviso creates an express statutory exception for movement, within the same State and up to 50 km, from the consignor's place of business to the transporter's place of business for further transportation. Explanation 2 preserves that exception. Section 129 applies only where goods move in contravention of the Act or Rules. The recorded movement was from the consignor's depot to the transporter's warehouse within Uttar Pradesh, over a distance below 30 km, for consolidation before onward dispatch. The final consignee's location did not alter the character of this initial journey.

Conclusion: The movement fell within the third proviso to Rule 138(3); leaving Part B unfilled was permitted and did not constitute a contravention attracting penalty under Section 129. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether mens rea is an essential requirement for a penalty under Section 129 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Mens rea may be material where the statutory scheme makes intention, fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression relevant, but Section 129 does not expressly make an intent to evade tax an indispensable element. A strict civil penalty may therefore follow upon proof of an actual contravention. Section 126 does not supply a general power to reduce or waive the fixed percentage penalty under Section 129. However, the threshold requirement remains an established breach of the Act or Rules; a statutory exception cannot be disregarded to create such a breach.

Conclusion: Mens rea is not invariably required for a penalty under Section 129, but no penalty can arise without an actual contravention. As the omission was expressly permitted, absence of mens rea was not determinative and the penalty could not be sustained. This issue operates in favour of the assessee in the present case.

Final Conclusion: The express exception governing the initial stage of transportation precluded treating the unfilled Part B as a statutory violation, leaving the imposed fiscal liability without legal foundation.

Ratio Decidendi: A penalty under Section 129 cannot be imposed where the third proviso to Rule 138(3) permits conveyance details in Part B to remain unfilled during the qualifying initial intra-State movement from the consignor's premises to the transporter's premises for further transportation.

Issues: (i) Whether goodwill arising on amalgamation is an intangible asset eligible for depreciation under Section 32(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (ii) Whether the Revenue could, for the first time before the High Court, invoke the restriction under the fifth proviso to Section 32(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Whether goodwill arising on amalgamation is an intangible asset eligible for depreciation under Section 32(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Explanation 3(b) to Section 32(1) treats goodwill as an asset for depreciation purposes. The question stood settled by the binding determination that goodwill is an asset within that Explanation and is eligible for depreciation.

Conclusion: Goodwill is a depreciable intangible asset and depreciation thereon is allowable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the Revenue could, for the first time before the High Court, invoke the restriction under the fifth proviso to Section 32(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The proposed restriction had neither been specifically raised before nor decided by the appellate authorities. It did not constitute an independent substantial question of law arising from the Tribunal's order.

Conclusion: The Revenue cannot raise the fifth-proviso restriction for the first time before the High Court; no substantial question of law arises on that basis, against the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The assessee's entitlement to depreciation on goodwill remains undisturbed, and the unraised statutory restriction cannot be introduced at the appellate stage.

Ratio Decidendi: Goodwill falls within the statutory category of depreciable assets, and a new issue not raised or adjudicated before the lower appellate authorities cannot be made the basis of a substantial question of law.