Issues: (i) Whether Section 147A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, retrospectively validating issuance of reassessment notices by jurisdictional Assessing Officers, is constitutionally valid; (ii) Whether notices under Section 148 issued by jurisdictional Assessing Officers without randomized automated allocation and faceless procedure are valid under Section 151A and the e-Assessment of Income Escaping Assessment Scheme, 2022.

Issue (i): Whether Section 147A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, retrospectively validating issuance of reassessment notices by jurisdictional Assessing Officers, is constitutionally valid.

Analysis: A retrospective validating enactment may neutralise a judicial decision only by curing the defect or removing the statutory foundation on which that decision rests; it cannot merely declare a contrary legal position or directly override judicial determinations. Section 147A purported to exclude faceless assessment units from the meaning of Assessing Officer for Sections 148 and 148A, but left Section 151A, the scheme framed thereunder, and the scheme under Section 130 unamended. It neither addressed the mandatory randomized automated allocation requirement nor removed the basis of the decisions holding that reassessment notices could be issued only through the faceless mechanism. The provision consequently conflicted with the continuing statutory scheme and amounted to legislative encroachment upon judicial power, contrary to the rule of law and the constitutional principle of separation of powers.

Conclusion: Section 147A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is unconstitutional and struck down, in favour of the assessees.

Issue (ii): Whether notices under Section 148 issued by jurisdictional Assessing Officers without randomized automated allocation and faceless procedure are valid under Section 151A and the e-Assessment of Income Escaping Assessment Scheme, 2022.

Analysis: Section 151A and Clause 3(b) of the e-Assessment of Income Escaping Assessment Scheme, 2022 expressly cover issuance of notices under Section 148 and require issuance through randomized automated allocation and in a faceless manner. The qualification referring to Section 144B applies to assessment or reassessment under Section 147 and cannot exclude issuance of notices under Section 148; such an interpretation would render the scheme ineffective. Notifications or executive instructions conferring concurrent jurisdiction cannot override the statutory scheme. Where the law prescribes a particular mode, the prescribed mode alone must be followed.

Conclusion: Notices under Section 148 issued by jurisdictional Assessing Officers otherwise than through randomized automated allocation and the faceless mechanism are invalid and liable to be set aside, in favour of the assessees.

Final Conclusion: The statutory faceless reassessment regime mandates that reassessment notices be issued only through the automated and faceless process prescribed under Section 151A and the applicable scheme.

Ratio Decidendi: A retrospective validating law is unconstitutional where it merely negates judicial rulings without curing the statutory defect underlying them; a reassessment notice must be issued in the mandatory faceless and randomized automated-allocation manner prescribed by the governing statutory scheme.

Issues: (i) Whether gold is a prohibited item within the meaning of the Customs Act, 1962; (ii) Whether the adjudicating authority was correct in imposing penalty under Section 112(i) of the Customs Act, 1962.

Issue (i): Whether gold is a prohibited item within the meaning of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: Section 2(33) includes goods whose import or export is subject to a prohibition under the Customs Act, 1962 or any other law in force; it is not confined to goods prohibited through a notification under Section 11. Import of gold was regulated by Reserve Bank of India notifications and circulars, and bulk import was restricted to authorised agencies, while passenger import was governed by the Baggage Rules. The persons concerned did not fall within either permitted category, and the gold was brought through an unauthorised land route.

Conclusion: Gold imported in contravention of applicable import restrictions is prohibited goods within Section 2(33) of the Customs Act, 1962, in favour of the Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether the adjudicating authority was correct in imposing penalty under Section 112(i) of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: Once the seized gold was prohibited goods, Section 112(i) governed the applicable penalty. The adjudicating order identified the goods as prohibited and imposed penalty on that basis. Failure to expressly specify the invoked clause does not invalidate an order where the authority possessed the statutory power and the order disclosed the basis for its exercise.

Conclusion: The adjudicating authority validly imposed penalty under Section 112(i) of the Customs Act, 1962, in favour of the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The modification of the penalties was unsustainable, and the original confiscation and penalty adjudication remains operative.

Ratio Decidendi: Goods subject to import restrictions under any law in force are prohibited goods under Section 2(33) of the Customs Act, 1962, and their improper importation attracts the penalty regime under Section 112(i).

Issues: Whether a penalty under Section 271D, imposed by an Assessment Unit after the Penalty Unit became operational under the Faceless Penalty Scheme, 2021, was without jurisdiction.

Analysis: Section 271D vested the power to impose the penalty in the competent prescribed authority. The Standard Operating Procedure dated 06.09.2022 operationalised the Penalty Unit for penalties under Chapter XXI of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The transitional arrangement under Paragraph 4(4) of the Faceless Penalty Scheme, 2021, permitting an Assessment Unit to act as a Penalty Unit, ceased to apply once the Penalty Unit became operational. Since the penalty order was issued thereafter by the Assessment Unit, that unit lacked jurisdiction to impose the penalty.

Conclusion: The penalty order under Section 271D was without jurisdiction and was quashed, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether a developer claiming under a joint development agreement, without established title or proof of payment for the landowner's share, could obtain release or substitution of land provisionally attached as proceeds of crime.

Analysis: Under the provisional-attachment regime of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, the claimant relied on a joint development agreement for part of the attached land. No registered sale deed established its ownership, and no material proved payment of the agreed consideration for the landowner's share under the supplementary arrangement. Despite an earlier opportunity to crystallise its rights through appropriate legal proceedings, no such title was established. The claimant had also conveyed plots to purchasers and did not furnish sufficient particulars of the unsold plots or its subsisting share. Its proposed deposit for substitution could not be accepted without proof of right and title in the relevant land.

Conclusion: The claimant's uncrystallised contractual interest did not justify exclusion of the land from attachment or substitution of the attached property.

Issues: Whether an adjudication order passed pursuant to a show-cause notice contemplating an adverse decision is invalid where the noticee was not informed of the date, time and venue of personal hearing.

Analysis: Section 75(4) requires an opportunity of hearing where an adverse decision is contemplated, irrespective of whether the person chargeable with tax or penalty specifically requests such hearing. The petitioner was not provided the date, time or venue of personal hearing, resulting in an infraction of that requirement. In view of the delay in approaching the Court, fresh adjudication was directed upon deposit of 10 per cent of the disputed tax.

Conclusion: The impugned adjudication order was set aside, conditional upon the required deposit, and the show-cause notice was directed to be adjudicated afresh after affording a personal hearing.

Issues: Whether reassessment notices under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for assessment year 2015-16, issued on or after 1 April 2021, were sustainable.

Analysis: The notices dated 09.04.2021 and 27.07.2022 fell within the adopted Supreme Court determination that all notices for assessment year 2015-16 issued on or after 1 April 2021 were required to be dropped, as they could not be completed within the period prescribed under the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020. The Revenue accepted the applicability of that determination.

Conclusion: The reassessment notices were unsustainable and were quashed.

Issues: Whether a determination under Section 73 could demand an amount exceeding that specified in the show cause cum demand notice and on grounds beyond those stated in that notice.

Analysis: Section 75(7) of the West Bengal Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and Section 75(7) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 confine a determination to the amount and grounds contained in the show cause notice. The notice was restricted to Rs. 1,13,55,828, whereas the determination aggregated to Rs. 2,25,47,046. A demand cannot exceed the notice amount or be confirmed on grounds not specified in the notice.

Conclusion: The determination was invalid to the extent that it exceeded the show cause cum demand notice. It was set aside and treated as a show cause notice, with the proper officer required to adjudicate after affording the assessee an opportunity of hearing.

Issues: Whether rubber contraceptives manufactured by the assessee qualify for deduction under Section 80IB despite Serial Nos. 27 and 28 of the Eleventh Schedule.

Analysis: Section 80IB provides a deduction for eligible industrial undertakings, subject to exclusions under the Eleventh Schedule. Serial Nos. 27 and 28 apply to the specifically identified products concerning crown corks and pilfer-proof caps, respectively, and cannot be expanded to cover every product made using rubber. Rubber contraceptives are not among the goods specifically covered by those entries. The principle of consistency and uniformity in application of law also applied, since the deduction had been accepted on identical facts for the remaining eligible years.

Conclusion: Rubber contraceptives do not fall within Serial Nos. 27 and 28 of the Eleventh Schedule, and the assessee is entitled to deduction under Section 80IB.

Issues: Whether the entire amount of alleged bogus purchases was liable to disallowance under Section 69C of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The assessee carried on wholesale trading in industrial chemicals, and procurement from unregistered dealers could not be ruled out. The corresponding sales were not disputed in the assessment or appellate proceedings. In these circumstances, disallowance of the full purchase amount was not justified; only the profit element embedded in the unverified purchases required estimation.

Conclusion: A lump-sum gross-profit disallowance of 5% of the alleged bogus purchases was sustained, with the balance addition deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the 3% tolerance under transfer-pricing law applies where the arm's-length benchmark is based on a single internal comparable. (ii) Whether the corporate guarantee adjustment should be benchmarked at 0.5%. (iii) Whether a separate notional-interest adjustment on outstanding receivables can be sustained without verifying the treatment of comparable third-party export receivables.

Issue (i): Whether the 3% tolerance under transfer-pricing law applies where the arm's-length benchmark is based on a single internal comparable.

Analysis: The third proviso to Section 92C(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, read with Rule 10CA(7) of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 and the notified 3% transfer-pricing tolerance band, governed the determination. The margin earned in the non-AE and domestic segment was used as an internal comparable to benchmark the AE segment. A dataset containing a single value has that value as its arithmetical mean; Rule 10CA(7) does not require more than one comparable for the tolerance to operate. The variation between the declared AE margin and the arm's-length margin adopted was within 3%.

Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to the 3% tolerance benefit, and the transfer-pricing adjustment for the two- and three-wheeler segment was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the corporate guarantee adjustment should be benchmarked at 0.5%.

Analysis: The corporate guarantee commission was required to be benchmarked having regard to the distinct nature of a corporate guarantee as compared with a bank guarantee. On identical facts, the applicable arm's-length corporate guarantee rate had been determined at 0.5%.

Conclusion: The corporate guarantee adjustment must be recomputed by applying a 0.5% guarantee commission, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether a separate notional-interest adjustment on outstanding receivables can be sustained without verifying the treatment of comparable third-party export receivables.

Analysis: The asserted uniform policy of not charging interest on delayed receivables from both AE and third-party export customers was material to the proposed notional interest on receivables. The assertion required verification through documentary evidence before determining whether any separate transfer-pricing adjustment was warranted.

Conclusion: The receivables issue was remitted for verification; no interest adjustment shall be made if the absence of interest charged to third-party export customers is substantiated.

Final Conclusion: The vehicle-segment pricing was accepted within the notified tolerance, the corporate guarantee benchmark was limited to 0.5%, and the receivables adjustment requires factual verification.

Ratio Decidendi: A notified transfer-pricing tolerance under Rule 10CA(7) applies even where the dataset comprises a single internal comparable, since its arithmetical mean is that value.

Issues: (i) Eligibility of CENVAT credit on telecom towers and pre-fabricated shelters as movable goods, capital goods/accessories, or inputs used for telecommunication services; (ii) Eligibility of CENVAT credit on erection, commissioning, and related services used for towers and pre-fabricated shelters; (iii) Eligibility of CENVAT credit on rent-a-cab, outdoor catering, authorised service station, and tour-operator services for the relevant pre-2011 period; (iv) Eligibility for SEZ exemption where mobile services were supplied to SEZ subscribers but mobile facilities could also be used outside the SEZ.

Issue (i): Eligibility of CENVAT credit on telecom towers and pre-fabricated shelters as movable goods, capital goods/accessories, or inputs used for telecommunication services.

Analysis: Under Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, the permanency, intendment, functionality, and marketability tests establish that towers and pre-fabricated shelters, though fixed by nuts and bolts for stability, can be dismantled, relocated, reassembled, and sold without alteration of their essential character. Their attachment is for stable and effective functioning of antennas, not for permanent beneficial enjoyment of land or buildings. Towers and shelters support BTS and antennas falling under Chapter 85 of the Central Excise Tariff Act and are accessories to such capital goods under Rule 2(a)(A)(iii) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004. Being used to provide mobile telecommunication output service, they also qualify as inputs under Rule 2(k) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.

Conclusion: Towers and pre-fabricated shelters are movable goods eligible for CENVAT credit as capital goods/accessories and as inputs for telecommunication services. In favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Eligibility of CENVAT credit on erection, commissioning, and related services used for towers and pre-fabricated shelters.

Analysis: Since towers and pre-fabricated shelters are not immovable property, the services used for their erection, commissioning, and associated site activities retain their nexus with the provision of telecommunication output service. The inclusive definition of input service in Rule 2(l) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 encompasses services used in relation to setting up operations, and there is no break in the CENVAT chain for such input services.

Conclusion: CENVAT credit is admissible on erection, commissioning, and related services used for towers and pre-fabricated shelters. In favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Eligibility of CENVAT credit on rent-a-cab, outdoor catering, authorised service station, and tour-operator services for the relevant pre-2011 period.

Analysis: Notification No. 3/2011-Central Excise (N.T.) dated 01.03.2011 does not extend to authorised service station, tour-operator, or rent-a-cab services. Further, the relevant period was from 2004 to 2008, preceding the notification; consequently, its restriction concerning personal use or consumption in relation to outdoor catering could not be applied.

Conclusion: CENVAT credit on the specified services cannot be denied by applying the post-period notification. In favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Eligibility for SEZ exemption where mobile services were supplied to SEZ subscribers but mobile facilities could also be used outside the SEZ.

Analysis: Mobile services were supplied to subscribers situated in SEZ units, and use of the mobile facility outside the SEZ does not alter that supply. For the post-10.02.2006 period, Sections 26 and 51 of the Special Economic Zones Act, 2005 support the applicable tax exemption and its overriding effect.

Conclusion: The SEZ exemption under Notification No. 4/2004 is available and cannot be denied merely because mobile facilities may be used outside the SEZ. In favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: CENVAT credit is available on telecom towers, shelters, and the services integrally connected with their deployment, while the claimed service credits and SEZ exemption remain legally sustainable for the relevant periods.

Ratio Decidendi: Equipment affixed only to ensure operational stability, but capable of dismantling, relocation, and resale, remains movable; where it functions as an accessory or input for output service, CENVAT credit cannot be denied on the basis of immovability.

Issues: (i) Whether the limitation prescribed by Section 11B applies to a refund of unutilized Cenvat credit sought after closure of the business and surrender of excise registration; (ii) Whether Form-R under Section 35F can be used to claim refund of accumulated unutilized Cenvat credit that is not a pre-deposit.

Issue (i): Whether the limitation prescribed by Section 11B applies to a refund of unutilized Cenvat credit sought after closure of the business and surrender of excise registration.

Analysis: Cenvat credit is a consequence of duty paid, and its refund is governed by the statutory refund mechanism under Section 11B. For a claim arising upon closure of a factory, the limitation period operates from surrender of the registration. A claim lodged more than six years after surrender was beyond the prescribed period.

Conclusion: The refund claim was time-barred under Section 11B, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether Form-R under Section 35F can be used to claim refund of accumulated unutilized Cenvat credit that is not a pre-deposit.

Analysis: Section 35F and Form-R concern refund of a pre-deposit. Accumulated and unutilized Cenvat credit does not constitute a pre-deposit and cannot be claimed through that procedure.

Conclusion: The refund application in Form-R was not maintainable, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The accumulated Cenvat credit was not refundable through the claim presented after surrender of registration.

Ratio Decidendi: A post-closure refund claim for accumulated unutilized Cenvat credit must satisfy the limitation under Section 11B, and the pre-deposit refund procedure under Section 35F is unavailable where the amount claimed is not a pre-deposit.

Issues: (i) Whether the cancelled GST registration and rejection of revocation could be restored; (ii) Whether the penalty order under Section 122(1)(vii) for the 2024-25 period should be remitted for fresh adjudication.

Issue (i): Whether the cancelled GST registration and rejection of revocation could be restored.

Analysis: The cancellation and revocation-rejection orders were governed by the applicable framework for restoration of GST registration. Restoration was made subject to compliance with the stipulated requirements under that framework.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee, the GST registration may be restored subject to compliance with the applicable stipulations.

Issue (ii): Whether the penalty order under Section 122(1)(vii) for the 2024-25 period should be remitted for fresh adjudication.

Analysis: No reply had been filed to the show-cause notice and the opportunities of personal hearing were not availed. Fresh adjudication was directed upon deposit of 10% of the disputed tax in cash and submission of a reply with supporting documents, with the existing penalty order to be treated as an addendum to the show-cause notice.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee, the penalty order was remitted for fresh adjudication, conditional upon the prescribed deposit and response.

Final Conclusion: Registration restoration remains subject to the applicable stipulations, and the penalty proceedings require a fresh merits determination after compliance with the directed requirements.

Issues: Whether the demand concerning belated availment of input tax credit required reconsideration under the amended Section 16(4) of the GST enactments.

Analysis: The amendment to Section 16(4) of the GST enactments, brought into effect from 27.09.2024, statutorily regularised belated availment of input tax credit. Eligibility for such credit nevertheless remains dependent on fulfilment of the other conditions under the applicable Act and Rules. Fresh adjudication of demands unrelated to Section 16(4) was made conditional upon deposit of 50% of the disputed tax in cash and submission of a reply with supporting material.

Conclusion: The demand relating to belated availment of input tax credit must be freshly adjudicated under the amended provision, subject to satisfaction of the remaining statutory conditions.

Issues: Whether waiver of interest under Section 128A of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, read with the Circular dated 15.10.2024, is available for delayed payment of admitted self-assessed tax without proceedings under Section 73, and whether its denial violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: The Circular confines the waiver benefit to demands or proceedings under Section 73, including cases where tax has been paid and the Section 73 demand concerns only interest or penalty. Delayed payment of admitted self-assessed tax instead attracts interest under Section 50 and is directly recoverable under Section 75(12). The distinction between disputed tax determined through Section 73 proceedings and self-assessed tax is founded on a valid classification having a nexus with the statutory scheme.

Conclusion: Waiver under Section 128A is unavailable for interest arising from delayed payment of admitted self-assessed tax where no proceedings under Section 73 were initiated; the exclusion does not offend Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Issues: (i) Whether publication of Form G under Regulation 36A(1) requires prior approval by the Committee of Creditors of eligibility criteria under Section 25(2)(h); (ii) Whether liquidation under Section 33(1)(a) may be declined after expiry of the CIRP period without a resolution plan because the delay was attributable to stakeholders; (iii) Whether the finding that the Corporate Debtor was not a going concern was sustainable; (iv) Whether a pending application under Section 65 barred liquidation under Section 33; (v) Whether non-impleadment of the suspended board vitiated the liquidation order; and (vi) Whether alternatives short of liquidation were inadequately considered.

Issue (i): Whether publication of Form G under Regulation 36A(1) requires prior approval by the Committee of Creditors of eligibility criteria under Section 25(2)(h).

Analysis: Section 25(2)(h) requires prospective resolution applicants to satisfy criteria formulated by the resolution professional with approval of the Committee of Creditors. Regulation 36A(1) mandates timely publication of Form G but does not dispense with that approval. Form G operationalises the invitation contemplated by Section 25(2)(h); therefore, publication cannot proceed without approved eligibility criteria. The 66% threshold under Section 33(2) applies to an affirmative decision to liquidate during CIRP and does not govern ordinary Committee of Creditors deliberations concerning publication of Form G.

Conclusion: Prior Committee of Creditors approval of eligibility criteria was necessary before publication of Form G. The issue was decided against the Appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether liquidation under Section 33(1)(a) may be declined after expiry of the CIRP period without a resolution plan because the delay was attributable to stakeholders.

Analysis: Section 33(1)(a) uses imperative language requiring liquidation where the CIRP period has expired without receipt of a resolution plan under Section 30(6). The exceptional flexibility recognised for extending insolvency timelines does not permit an indefinite suspension of liquidation merely because of Committee of Creditors deadlock or lack of diligence during CIRP. No timely application for extension or exclusion was made despite the CIRP having remained unresolved for more than five years.

Conclusion: Expiry of the CIRP period without a resolution plan required liquidation under Section 33(1)(a). The issue was decided against the Appellant.

Issue (iii): Whether the finding that the Corporate Debtor was not a going concern was sustainable.

Analysis: Going-concern status depends on continuing business operations, employees, revenue generation, and operational activity, rather than mere ownership of assets. The identified land, shops, vehicle, and sale proceeds were subject to litigation, attachment, sale, or third-party custody, while no material established continuing business operations, employees, income, or trading after commencement of CIRP.

Conclusion: The finding that the Corporate Debtor was not a going concern was sustainable. The issue was decided against the Appellant.

Issue (iv): Whether a pending application under Section 65 barred liquidation under Section 33.

Analysis: Section 65 provides for penal consequences for fraudulent or malicious initiation of insolvency proceedings; it does not automatically annul a final admission order or suspend an otherwise ripe liquidation proceeding. A belated Section 65 application challenging the basis of CIRP could not operate as an automatic bar where the admission order had not been directly challenged and had attained finality.

Conclusion: Pendency of the Section 65 application did not bar liquidation under Section 33. The issue was decided against the Appellant.

Issue (v): Whether non-impleadment of the suspended board vitiated the liquidation order.

Analysis: The suspended board's right to participate in Committee of Creditors meetings does not create an unqualified right to be impleaded in every CIRP application. The Section 33(1)(a) inquiry turned on the objective facts of expiry of CIRP and non-receipt of a resolution plan. Prolonged non-cooperation and delayed engagement with the process, coupled with a full appellate opportunity to address all contentions, established absence of prejudice sufficient to vitiate the order.

Conclusion: Non-impleadment of the suspended board did not vitiate the liquidation order. The issue was decided against the Appellant.

Issue (vi): Whether alternatives short of liquidation were inadequately considered.

Analysis: Publication of Form G and further resolution efforts were considered repeatedly by the Committee of Creditors but did not secure the requisite support. The prolonged deadlock, absence of a resolution plan, expiry of the CIRP period, and lack of an operating business brought the matter within the time-bound insolvency framework. Commercial wisdom concerning further resolution efforts could not be substituted by appellate assessment.

Conclusion: Alternatives short of liquidation were sufficiently considered and no infirmity was established. The issue was decided against the Appellant.

Final Conclusion: The statutory liquidation consequence upon expiry of CIRP without a resolution plan remained applicable notwithstanding the unresolved Committee of Creditors deadlock, the pending Section 65 application, and the suspended board's objections.

Ratio Decidendi: Publication of Form G requires Committee of Creditors-approved eligibility criteria under Section 25(2)(h), and expiry of CIRP without a resolution plan activates the mandatory liquidation consequence under Section 33(1)(a) absent a timely extension or exclusion.

Issues: (i) Whether cash deposits in specified bank notes claimed to arise from cash sales were liable to be treated as unexplained credits under section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (ii) Whether the enhanced tax treatment under section 115BBE of the Income-tax Act, 1961 applied to Assessment Year 2017-18.

Issue (i): Whether cash deposits in specified bank notes claimed to arise from cash sales were liable to be treated as unexplained credits under section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The claim that the deposits represented festive-season cash sales from a new showroom was not substantiated by sale invoices or day-to-day item-wise stock records. The exceptional volume of cash sales immediately preceding demonetisation, absence of sufficient staff and corresponding expenditure, and the inability to verify stock availability supported the finding that the source of deposits was not proved. The gross-profit component embedded in the claimed sales had already been reduced while computing the addition, negating double taxation.

Conclusion: The cash deposits were rightly treated as unexplained credits under section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961; this issue is against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the enhanced tax treatment under section 115BBE of the Income-tax Act, 1961 applied to Assessment Year 2017-18.

Analysis: The law governing an assessment year is that in force on its first day. The amendment enhancing the tax consequences under section 115BBE became effective from 01.04.2017 and contained no express retrospective operation; it therefore applied from Assessment Year 2018-19 onwards, not to Assessment Year 2017-18.

Conclusion: Section 115BBE of the Income-tax Act, 1961, as amended, was inapplicable to Assessment Year 2017-18, and tax on the sustained addition must be charged at normal rates; this issue is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The addition for unexplained cash deposits remains sustained, while the consequential tax computation must be made at the normal applicable rate.

Ratio Decidendi: In the absence of express retrospectivity, an amendment enhancing tax liability under section 115BBE of the Income-tax Act, 1961 operates prospectively and cannot govern Assessment Year 2017-18.

Issues: (i) Whether recovery of duty drawback under Rule 16, which prescribes no limitation period, was initiated within a reasonable period; (ii) Whether the availability of a statutory appeal barred the writ petition where the recovery order was passed after unreasonable delay.

Issue (i): Whether recovery of duty drawback under Rule 16, which prescribes no limitation period, was initiated within a reasonable period.

Analysis: Rule 16 permits recovery of erroneously or excessively paid drawback but contains no express limitation period. Such power must therefore be exercised within a reasonable period determined by the circumstances. The recovery related to drawback availed in 2010, whereas the notice was issued in 2018 and the order followed in 2022. There was no allegation of fraud or suppression and no explanation for the prolonged delay. In the absence of fraud, the principle that fraud defeats limitation could not justify delayed recovery; the adopted precedent treated three years as the maximum reasonable period for such recovery.

Conclusion: The recovery proceedings were barred by limitation and were in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the availability of a statutory appeal barred the writ petition where the recovery order was passed after unreasonable delay.

Analysis: Although an appeal was available under Section 128(1), the recovery order was without statutory authority because the proceedings had been initiated beyond a reasonable period. The alternative appellate remedy did not require relegation to appeal in those circumstances.

Conclusion: The writ petition was maintainable and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The delayed drawback recovery lacked statutory authority, rendering the consequential coercive action unsustainable and requiring restoration of the amount recovered.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statute authorises recovery without prescribing limitation, the power must be exercised within a reasonable period; unexplained prolonged delay, absent fraud or suppression, invalidates the recovery.

Issues: (i) Whether filing Form 10-IC binds the domestic company to concessional taxation under section 115BAA despite non-compliance with statutory conditions; and (ii) whether an adjustment disallowing additional depreciation on that basis can be made in an intimation under section 143(1).

Issue (i): Whether filing Form 10-IC binds the domestic company to concessional taxation under section 115BAA despite non-compliance with statutory conditions.

Analysis: Section 115BAA permits concessional taxation only where its prescribed conditions are cumulatively fulfilled. The return claimed additional depreciation, which is barred under section 115BAA(2)(i), made no corresponding reversal or adjustment, and computed tax under the normal regime. The tax audit report also contained no reference to concessional taxation. These facts established substantive non-compliance with the mandatory conditions, rendering the option invalid under the proviso to section 115BAA(1), notwithstanding the filing of Form 10-IC.

Conclusion: The section 115BAA option was invalid, and the assessee was not liable to be taxed under the concessional regime. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether an adjustment disallowing additional depreciation on that basis can be made in an intimation under section 143(1).

Analysis: The proposed disallowance depended upon the disputed legal and factual question whether the assessee had validly exercised and retained the option under section 115BAA. Such a determination, particularly after the assessee's clarification and the apparent non-fulfilment of statutory conditions, exceeded the limited scope of a prima facie adjustment under section 143(1).

Conclusion: The adjustment disallowing additional depreciation under section 143(1) was beyond the permissible scope of that provision and was deleted. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The additional depreciation claim remains governed by the normal provisions because the purported concessional-tax option stood invalidated by non-compliance with its mandatory conditions.

Ratio Decidendi: A section 143(1) adjustment cannot impose taxation under section 115BAA solely because Form 10-IC was filed where the return demonstrates non-fulfilment of mandatory conditions that invalidate the option.

Issues: Whether the reassessment notice was invalid because it was issued by an Income-tax Officer allegedly lacking pecuniary jurisdiction.

Analysis: Section 120 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 contemplates jurisdiction based on directions of the competent authorities and permits concurrent exercise of jurisdiction by more than one Assessing Officer. CBDT Instruction No. 1/2011 dated 31.01.2011 governs administrative allocation of work and does not independently create or extinguish statutory jurisdiction. Section 127 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 permits transfer of any case, without limitation by monetary thresholds; a valid transfer order vests complete jurisdiction in the transferee Assessing Officer. The assessment records did not establish whether such a transfer order existed.

Conclusion: Pecuniary allocation under administrative instructions does not, by itself, invalidate the notice; verification of a transfer order under Section 127 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and fresh adjudication of the jurisdictional challenge are required.