Issues: Whether the Commissioner validly invoked revisional jurisdiction where the assessment accepted the assessee's claim concerning export quota-sale premium under Section 80HHC on the basis of a CBDT Office Memorandum.

Analysis: Section 263 permits revision only where the assessment order is both erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue; a mere loss of revenue or the Commissioner's disagreement with a legally sustainable view is insufficient. The assessment had accepted the treatment of export quota premium under Section 80HHC. The impugned judgment treated such premium as not falling within the specified export-incentive receipts under Sections 28(iiia) to 28(iiic), and consequently as subject to the exclusion contemplated by Explanation (baa) to Section 80HHC. Although the CBDT Office Memorandum bound departmental officers, it could not prevail over the statutory construction adopted in judicial proceedings. The finding that the Assessing Officer had not applied the applicable statutory criteria was found tenable.

Conclusion: The assessment order was erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue, and the Commissioner's exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 263 was justified.

Issues: (i) Whether the expiry of the CVD and anti-dumping duty notifications bars recovery proceedings for imports made while they were in force; (ii) Whether imports made under valid Advance Authorisations are exempt from Countervailing Duty and Anti-Dumping Duty after fulfilment of export obligations; (iii) Whether imports not covered by Advance Authorisations were shown to be castings for wind operated electricity generators under the levy notifications; and (iv) Whether the demand is sustainable within the normal period, the extended period and the statutory outer limit, together with consequential confiscation, fine, interest and penalties.

Issue (i): Whether the expiry of the CVD and anti-dumping duty notifications bars recovery proceedings for imports made while they were in force

Analysis: Duty liability, if any, attached on importation when the levy notifications were operative. Expiry by efflux of time was distinct from repeal, rescission or supersession and did not erase obligations incurred during the notifications' validity. Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962 remained the machinery for recovery of non-levied or short-levied duty, while Section 9A(8) of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 attracted the relevant Customs Act recovery framework for anti-dumping duty.

Conclusion: Expiry of the levy notifications did not bar demand or recovery proceedings for imports made during their currency. The issue is against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether imports made under valid Advance Authorisations are exempt from Countervailing Duty and Anti-Dumping Duty after fulfilment of export obligations

Analysis: Notification No. 18/2015-Customs dated 01.04.2015 granted conditional exemption from Countervailing Duty and Anti-Dumping Duty for imports under valid Advance Authorisations. Export Obligation Discharge Certificates, redemption certificates, utilisation certificates and discharged customs bonds evidenced completion of the prescribed export obligations. Unrevoked statutory authorisations and compliance certificates could not be disregarded collaterally.

Conclusion: Imports covered by valid Advance Authorisations and fulfilled export obligations were exempt from Countervailing Duty and Anti-Dumping Duty. The issue is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether imports not covered by Advance Authorisations were shown to be castings for wind operated electricity generators under the levy notifications

Analysis: The Product Under Consideration was confined to articles retaining the essential character of castings; it was not an end-use levy on every component used in wind operated electricity generators. The Revenue bore the burden to establish, component-wise and Bill of Entry-wise, that each article was a casting. Technical material, including metallurgical evidence and component-wise bifurcation, supported the characterisation of several goods as forged, fabricated, machined or other non-casting products, without comparable rebuttal evidence from the Revenue.

Conclusion: The non-Advance Authorisation imports were not proved to be castings within the Product Under Consideration, and no Countervailing Duty or Anti-Dumping Duty liability survived. The issue is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether the demand is sustainable within the normal period, the extended period and the statutory outer limit, together with consequential confiscation, fine, interest and penalties

Analysis: Invocation of the extended period under Section 28(4) of the Customs Act, 1962 required proof of deliberate suppression or wilful misstatement with intent to evade duty. The earlier show cause notice demonstrated prior departmental knowledge of the nature of the imports, defeating the allegation required for the extended period. The portion of the demand beyond the statutory five-year outer limit was also barred. Independently, the merits findings left no surviving duty liability even within the normal period.

Conclusion: The extended period was unavailable, the demand beyond five years was time-barred, and no demand survived even for the normal period; consequential confiscation, redemption fine, interest and penalties were unsustainable. The issue is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The conditional exemption for compliant Advance Authorisation imports was available, and the remaining imports were not established to fall within the notified casting product category; consequently, no trade-remedial duty or consequential fiscal liability remained.

Issues: Whether the refund of service tax paid on ocean freight was barred by the limitation prescribed under Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

Analysis: Section 11B, applicable to service-tax refunds through Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994, requires a refund claim to be filed within one year from the relevant date, which in other cases is the date of payment of duty or tax. The payment was made on 24.07.2018, whereas the refund claim was filed on 23.09.2020. The statutory authorities and the Tribunal possess only the jurisdiction conferred by the statute and cannot disregard the prescribed limitation. A claim founded on the alleged unconstitutionality of a levy lies outside the statutory refund mechanism and must be pursued through the constitutional remedy under Articles 226 or 32 of the Constitution of India.

Conclusion: The refund claim was time-barred under Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944; the issue was decided against the assessee.

Issues: Whether delayed payment of monthly duty, where only declared packing machines were operated and the remaining machines were sealed or inoperative, attracted the higher-duty computation under the seventh proviso to Rule 9 rather than interest liability under the second proviso to Rule 9.

Analysis: The second proviso to Rule 9 governs failure to pay the determined monthly duty by the due date and requires payment of the outstanding duty with interest. The seventh proviso applies only where non-payment continues while packing machines continue to be operated, and provides for computation on the higher of the declared operating machines or machines available for production. Treating every delayed payment as automatically attracting the seventh proviso would deprive the second proviso of independent operation. The declared operation of four machines had been accepted for determination of duty, and no reliable evidence established operation or misdeclaration of the remaining eighteen sealed machines. Machines sealed by the Department were not machines available for production, consistently with the departmental clarification.

Conclusion: The seventh proviso to Rule 9 was not attracted. The assessee's delayed-payment liability was governed by the second proviso to Rule 9, and the differential duty demand computed by including eighteen sealed or inoperative machines was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether a former 100% EOU, after debonding and conversion into a DTA unit, may avail CENVAT credit of eligible duties paid on inputs and capital goods at the time of debonding.

Analysis: Rule 3(1) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 confers the substantive entitlement to credit of eligible duties, while Rule 9 prescribes the documentary basis for availing it. The proviso inserted in Rule 3(1) by Notification No. 35/2008-CE(N.T.) is to be harmoniously construed with the object of avoiding cascading of duties and cannot operate as an exclusive or restrictive source of credit limited to central excise duty paid on capital goods. Upon debonding and payment of assessed duty, the inputs and capital goods became duty-paid goods available for DTA manufacture; their prior duty-free procurement during EOU operations does not bar credit of the duty actually paid at debonding. The commercial decision to exit the EOU scheme, without blameworthy conduct, does not establish that the credit was inadmissible.

Conclusion: CENVAT credit of eligible duties paid on inputs and capital goods at debonding is admissible to the DTA unit, and the denial of such credit cannot be sustained.

Issues: (i) Whether refund of Rs.28,66,198 sanctioned in de novo proceedings could be treated as erroneous for want of one-to-one correlation between inputs and exported goods and the related alleged deficiencies; (ii) Whether the finding that repayment of drawback removes the bar to refund remained open for reconsideration; (iii) Whether consequential effect had to be given to the final order concerning Rs.9,03,190; and (iv) Whether the recovery proceeding should have been kept in abeyance pending the related appeal.

Issue (i): Whether refund of Rs.28,66,198 sanctioned in de novo proceedings could be treated as erroneous for want of one-to-one correlation between inputs and exported goods and the related alleged deficiencies.

Analysis: Rule 5 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004, read with Notification No. 11/2002-CE (N.T.) dated 01.03.2002, does not require item-wise or one-to-one correlation between particular duty-paid inputs and particular exported goods. It is sufficient that the inputs were used in manufacture and that accumulated credit became incapable of utilisation because the finished goods were exported. The verification report confirmed the relevant purchase orders, input documents and export documents, with only short-shipment discrepancies already excluded. The alleged deficiencies were therefore contrary both to the governing legal requirement and to the verified record.

Conclusion: The sanctioned refund could not be treated as erroneous on the stated grounds and remains sustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the finding that repayment of drawback removes the bar to refund remained open for reconsideration.

Analysis: The earlier unchallenged finding that full repayment of drawback removes the bar to refund under Rule 5 had attained finality. Res judicata applies between successive stages of the same proceeding. A remand confined to documentary verification and quantification does not reopen an independently determined legal issue that was neither remanded nor challenged.

Conclusion: The drawback issue was not open for reconsideration, and repayment of drawback did not bar the refund, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether consequential effect had to be given to the final order concerning Rs.9,03,190.

Analysis: The earlier final determination had found the denial of this amount unsustainable. As the record did not establish implementation of that determination, only its execution remained, including any necessary verification of quantum and residual statutory requirements consistent with the earlier final order.

Conclusion: Consequential effect must be granted in respect of Rs.9,03,190 to the extent not already implemented, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether the recovery proceeding should have been kept in abeyance pending the related appeal.

Analysis: Pendency of an appeal without a stay does not suspend the operation of the challenged order, and proceeding with recovery adjudication was not jurisdictionally improper. However, the recovery under Section 11A(1) of the Central Excise Act rested entirely on the refund being erroneous. Once that premise failed, the principal recovery and the consequential interest under Section 11AB of the Central Excise Act lost their foundation.

Conclusion: Refusal to keep the proceeding in abeyance was valid, but the recovery demand and interest are unsustainable; the substantive result is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The sanctioned refund remains effective, recovery and interest are without foundation, and the unimplemented amount must receive effect in accordance with law.

Issues: (i) Whether the search of the advocate's cabin and seizure of documents and CPU were invalidated by advocate-client privilege; (ii) Whether investigation material placed in a sealed cover had to be disclosed to the petitioner; (iii) Whether absence of a show-cause notice to the investigated entity invalidated the search or summons; (iv) Whether later attribution of a role to the petitioner amounted to an impermissible change of investigative stand; (v) Whether alleged procedural departures, including non-compliance with departmental instructions and the absence of a personal hearing before seizure, invalidated the search; and (vi) Whether recorded reasons to believe validly supported the search authorization.

Issue (i): Whether the search of the advocate's cabin and seizure of documents and CPU were invalidated by advocate-client privilege.

Analysis: Section 67(2) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 permits a search of authorised premises upon the prescribed statutory satisfaction. The cabin was an integral part of the premises covered by the authorization. Advocate-client privilege attaches to the nature and circumstances of professional communications, not to every item found in an advocate's office or possession.

Analysis: The material indicating possible involvement by the advocate in the affairs under investigation justified inquiry into conduct beyond professional representation, without determining ultimate liability. The investigated client's subsequent consent enabled disclosure of that client's material but neither retrospectively validated the search nor permitted access to unrelated client data. Safeguards restricting use of the cloned data protect privileged communications and confidential information of other clients.

Conclusion: Advocate-client privilege did not invalidate the search or seizure, which remain subject to safeguards for privileged and unrelated client material.

Issue (ii): Whether investigation material placed in a sealed cover had to be disclosed to the petitioner.

Analysis: The sealed material comprised statements and other records obtained in an ongoing investigation and was used only to assess whether there was a basis for continuing the investigation, not to determine liability. Sections 192(5) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 and 130 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 reflect the principle that investigative records and confidential official communications are not ordinarily disclosed where disclosure may prejudice the investigation.

Conclusion: Copies of the sealed-cover investigation material were not required to be furnished at the ongoing-investigation stage.

Issue (iii): Whether absence of a show-cause notice to the investigated entity invalidated the search or summons.

Analysis: A show-cause notice is an adjudicatory step that may follow completion of investigation. Search and summons during investigation do not depend upon prior issuance of such notice.

Conclusion: The absence of a show-cause notice did not invalidate the search or summons.

Issue (iv): Whether later attribution of a role to the petitioner amounted to an impermissible change of investigative stand.

Analysis: Investigation may develop as further material is collected. Earlier identification of one person as handling operational or financial matters does not exclude examination of another person's potentially active or consequential role.

Conclusion: The subsequent examination of the petitioner's role did not constitute an impermissible change of investigative stand.

Issue (v): Whether alleged procedural departures, including non-compliance with departmental instructions and the absence of a personal hearing before seizure, invalidated the search.

Analysis: Administrative instructions, circulars and digital-evidence procedures cannot override or curtail the statutory search power under Section 67 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. A procedural departure, absent a demonstrated breach of a mandatory statutory requirement affecting authorization or jurisdiction, does not render a search void. A personal hearing was not a precondition to seizure during an authorised search, and the prescribed safeguards regulated subsequent access to the CPU.

Conclusion: The alleged procedural departures did not invalidate the search or seizure.

Issue (vi): Whether recorded reasons to believe validly supported the search authorization.

Analysis: The statutory threshold required material capable of supporting the competent authority's reasons to believe, rather than proof of guilt or a final finding on the allegations. The recorded material disclosed a sufficient basis for exercise of the search power.

Conclusion: The recorded reasons to believe validly supported the search authorization.

Final Conclusion: The statutory investigation may continue using cloned data confined to material relevant to the entity under investigation, while privileged communications and confidential information of unrelated clients remain protected by the prescribed safeguards.

Issues: Whether Styrene Butadiene Rubber Latex, marketed as SBR Latex, is classifiable as "rubber" under Entry No. 96 of Schedule II-B of the Uttarakhand Value Added Tax Act or as unclassified goods under the residuary entry.

Analysis: Entry No. 96 employs the unqualified expression "rubber" and does not restrict its scope to natural rubber or exclude synthetic rubber. SBR Latex is admittedly Styrene Butadiene Rubber in latex form; its synthetic origin or physical form does not displace its essential character as rubber. The Schedule demonstrates that the legislature used express exclusionary language where intended, whereas no such exclusion appears in Entry No. 96. A commodity having a reasonable claim to a specified entry should not be relegated to a residuary entry. The Revenue, seeking classification under the higher-rated residuary entry, did not establish that synthetic SBR Latex was excluded from the specified entry. The products' use as waterproofing, bonding, or concrete additives is immaterial where their nature and composition answer the description of rubber.

Conclusion: SBR Latex is covered by the expression "rubber" in Entry No. 96 of Schedule II-B and is taxable at the rate applicable to that entry, not as unclassified goods.

Issues: (i) Whether proceedings under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, were barred by Section 6(2)(b) owing to earlier State proceedings under Section 73 concerning input tax credit from M.R. Enterprises; (ii) Whether writ interference was warranted in respect of factual adjudication grievances where a statutory appeal under Section 107 was available.

Issue (i): Whether proceedings under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, were barred by Section 6(2)(b) owing to earlier State proceedings under Section 73 concerning input tax credit from M.R. Enterprises.

Analysis: Section 6(2)(b) bars proceedings only where both authorities seek to adjudicate the identical liability or contravention. A common assessee, financial year, supplier name, or similar tax liability does not alone establish the same subject matter. The later proceedings were founded on alleged fraudulent availment of input tax credit through invoices unsupported by actual supply of goods, and the material did not establish that this precise contravention had already been adjudicated in the earlier State proceedings. Distinct GSTINs of entities bearing the same trade name were relevant, though not conclusive, circumstances.

Conclusion: The bar under Section 6(2)(b) was not attracted, and the Central proceedings were not ex facie barred. The issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether writ interference was warranted in respect of factual adjudication grievances where a statutory appeal under Section 107 was available.

Analysis: Objections concerning consideration of the reply, supply of relied-upon material, genuineness and receipt of goods, fraud or suppression, overlapping liability, and the sustainability of tax, interest and penalty required review of the adjudication record and disputed factual material. Section 107 provides an appellate remedy competent to determine those matters. No exceptional circumstance justified exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 in substitution of that remedy.

Conclusion: Writ interference was not warranted, and the issue is decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the jurisdictional bar fails, while factual and merits-based objections remain for determination through the statutory appellate framework.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 6(2)(b) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 applies only upon identity of the liability or contravention under adjudication; common factual background, assessee, period, or similar tax exposure is insufficient.

Issues: Whether the writ challenge to an Order-in-Original should be entertained notwithstanding the statutory appellate remedy.

Analysis: Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 provides a statutory appeal against the Order-in-Original. The objection under Section 6(2)(b) requires examination of disputed facts concerning the nature, factual foundation, transactions and overlap, if any, between the State GST and DGGI proceedings. Such jurisdictional objection, along with the challenge to the demand and evidentiary findings, can be examined by the appellate authority.

Conclusion: The petitioner must pursue the statutory appellate remedy; the objection under Section 6(2)(b) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and all merits issues are left open for determination by the appellate authority.

Issues: (i) Whether writ jurisdiction should be exercised against an Order-in-Original despite the statutory appeal under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether proceedings initiated under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 were barred by Section 6(2)(b) of that Act owing to earlier State GST proceedings; and (iii) Whether a consolidated show cause notice under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 covering multiple financial years was without jurisdiction.

Issue (i): Whether writ jurisdiction should be exercised against an Order-in-Original despite the statutory appeal under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: An adjudicated demand is appealable under Section 107. Issues concerning the evidentiary basis of the demand, alleged fraudulent input tax credit, suppliers, and the claimed overlap of State and Central proceedings require factual assessment appropriately undertaken in the statutory appeal. The requirement of pre-deposit does not, by itself, justify bypassing that remedy, and no patent jurisdictional infirmity was established.

Conclusion: Writ jurisdiction was not liable to be exercised; the issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether proceedings initiated under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 were barred by Section 6(2)(b) of that Act owing to earlier State GST proceedings.

Analysis: Section 6(2)(b) bars parallel proceedings only on the same subject matter, namely an identical or overlapping tax liability, deficiency, or obligation arising from the same contravention. The applicable inquiry is whether the proceedings concern identical liability or alleged offence on the same facts and seek identical demand or relief. The State proceedings under Section 73 of the Delhi Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 concerned ineligible input tax credit, whereas the Central proceedings arose from allegations of fraudulent invoices issued by fictitious or non-existent entities, utilisation of credit for export-related integrated tax liability, and refund claims. Overlap in period, transactions, or input tax credit claims was insufficient by itself.

Conclusion: Section 6(2)(b) did not bar the Central proceedings merely because the proceedings overlapped in respect of input tax credit; the issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether a consolidated show cause notice under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 covering multiple financial years was without jurisdiction.

Analysis: Sections 73(3), 73(10), 74(3), and 74(10) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 do not prohibit a consolidated notice under Section 74 merely because it covers more than one financial year. Questions of limitation, satisfaction of the ingredients for invoking Section 74, and period-wise quantification remain available for statutory appellate examination.

Conclusion: A consolidated show cause notice covering multiple financial years was not inherently without jurisdiction; the issue was decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the adjudicated demand must be pursued through the statutory appellate mechanism, where all permissible grounds remain open for determination independently on merits.

Ratio Decidendi: A writ challenge to a GST adjudication ordinarily will not be entertained where an efficacious statutory appeal is available and no patent jurisdictional infirmity is established.

Issues: (i) Whether exclusion of a substantial shareholder from management and the financial benefits of a quasi-partnership company constituted oppression under Sections 241 and 242 of the Companies Act, 2013; (ii) Whether the shareholder's disengagement from the company, competing business and alleged absence from board meetings disqualified him as a director or defeated the oppression petition; (iii) Whether an inter se Swiss Challenge bidding process for the shareholding could be ordered despite the pre-emptive rights under the articles of association.

Issue (i): Whether exclusion of a substantial shareholder from management and the financial benefits of a quasi-partnership company constituted oppression under Sections 241 and 242 of the Companies Act, 2013.

Analysis: The company was a closely held family concern operating as a quasi-partnership. The shareholder respondents, who collectively held over 40% and included a founder, were excluded from management and deprived of remuneration and benefits through which company profits had historically been distributed. Important financial decisions were taken without their participation. Their exclusion occurred without due process or justification and frustrated their legitimate expectation to participate in management and share in the company's financial benefits.

Conclusion: The conduct amounted to oppression under Sections 241 and 242 of the Companies Act, 2013, in favour of the shareholder respondents.

Issue (ii): Whether the shareholder's disengagement from the company, competing business and alleged absence from board meetings disqualified him as a director or defeated the oppression petition.

Analysis: The settlement contemplated the shareholder's exit on payment of the agreed consideration and expressly allowed competing business, subject only to non-use of company data. The agreed consideration was not fully paid. No evidence established misuse of confidential data or solicitation of employees. Further, the appellants did not prove service of notices for board meetings or minutes upon the shareholder; therefore, absence from meetings could not result in vacation of office under Section 167(1)(b) of the Companies Act, 2013. The company's filings also continued to show him as a director.

Conclusion: The shareholder was not shown to have incurred disqualification or committed conduct defeating the oppression petition, in favour of the shareholder respondents.

Issue (iii): Whether an inter se Swiss Challenge bidding process for the shareholding could be ordered despite the pre-emptive rights under the articles of association.

Analysis: Section 242(2)(b) of the Companies Act, 2013 authorises an order for purchase of a member's shares by other members or the company. The earlier settlement for purchase of the respondent shareholder's shares, followed by his reciprocal offer to purchase the appellants' shares, substantially met the purpose of the pre-emptive provisions. As both factions were willing and capable of purchasing the other's shares, and mutual trust had irretrievably broken down, supervised inter se bidding through the Swiss Challenge Method was an appropriate, transparent and non-arbitrary exit mechanism.

Conclusion: The inter se Swiss Challenge bidding process was validly directed and the challenge to it failed, in favour of the shareholder respondents.

Final Conclusion: The equitable exit mechanism under Section 242(2)(b) of the Companies Act, 2013 appropriately resolves the established oppression and irreconcilable breakdown within the quasi-partnership company.

Ratio Decidendi: Where oppression in a closely held quasi-partnership company is accompanied by an irretrievable breakdown of trust and both shareholder groups are willing to acquire the other's interest, Section 242(2)(b) permits a supervised Swiss Challenge process to determine a fair exit arrangement.

Issues: Whether the penalty order in Form GST MOV-09 could be sustained without determining whether the e-way bill accompanying the vehicle was fabricated or was genuine but omitted the vehicle number due to a technical glitch.

Analysis: The e-way bill produced showed a generation time of 11:34 a.m., rendering the explanation for non-reflection of the vehicle number implausible. However, the system-generated e-way bill without the vehicle number required verification to ascertain whether it was fabricated or was a genuine bill affected by a technical glitch.

Conclusion: The impugned penalty order could not be sustained pending verification of the authenticity and validity of the e-way bill, requiring fresh determination by the proper officer.

Issues: (i) Whether the assessment order and DRC-7 could confirm a demand beyond the scope of the show cause notice and without accounting for tax already paid; (ii) Whether cancellation of GST registration for discontinuance of business could be refused solely because of an outstanding tax demand.

Issue (i): Whether the assessment order and DRC-7 could confirm a demand beyond the scope of the show cause notice and without accounting for tax already paid.

Analysis: The detailed assessment order and DRC-7 travelled beyond the tax proposal in the show cause notice. Although the detailed order recorded payment of Rs. 47,57,105 through belated GSTR-3B returns and appropriated it towards the demand, the DRC-7 did not account for that payment and confirmed the entire demand. A tax determination must remain within the scope of the show cause notice.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee, the assessment order was set aside for fresh adjudication after issuance of a fresh show cause notice, conditional on payment of 50% of the tax demand proposed in the original notice.

Issue (ii): Whether cancellation of GST registration for discontinuance of business could be refused solely because of an outstanding tax demand.

Analysis: Discontinuance of business is an express ground for cancellation under Section 29(1)(a) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. Section 29(3) preserves the statutory power to recover outstanding amounts even after cancellation; therefore, an outstanding demand does not by itself justify rejecting an application for cancellation.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee, the rejection of the cancellation application was set aside and the application was directed to be reconsidered in accordance with law.

Final Conclusion: Fresh tax proceedings must be founded on a proper notice and account for payments already made, while cancellation of registration must be assessed independently of the continuing statutory recovery mechanism.

Issues: Whether an adjudication imposing tax, interest and penalty under the GST law can be made without granting a personal hearing merely because the assessee did not opt for one.

Analysis: Section 75(4) mandates an opportunity of hearing where a written request is made or where an adverse decision is contemplated. The requirement applies independently when the proposed adjudication is adverse and is not displaced by the absence of a request for personal hearing.

Conclusion: An adverse adjudication under Section 74 imposing tax, interest and penalty without affording an opportunity of hearing is invalid, notwithstanding that the assessee did not opt for a personal hearing.

Issues: Whether the rejection of the application for stay of disputed tax demand pending appeal warranted interference and an unconditional stay.

Analysis: Section 220(6) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 permits consideration of a stay of demand during the pendency of an appeal. The impugned order did not address the material grounds bearing on the petitioner's challenge, including the limitation applicable to the reassessment notice. A prima facie case on limitation existed, although that question remained for final determination in the appellate proceedings. The assessment was also high-pitched, the addition being nearly five times the returned income, and the inference of financial soundness from turnover did not properly reflect the petitioner's income.

Conclusion: The petitioner was entitled to an unconditional stay of the entire disputed demand pending disposal of its appeal.

Issues: (i) Whether a declaration in the return can override Form No. 10-IEA already filed to opt out of the new tax regime; (ii) Whether the section 143(1) adjustment was invalid for want of prior intimation; and (iii) Whether deductions under the old tax regime must be considered when the CPC applies that regime.

Issue (i): Whether a declaration in the return can override Form No. 10-IEA already filed to opt out of the new tax regime.

Analysis: Section 115BAC requires the statutory option concerning the tax regime to be exercised through the prescribed Form No. 10-IEA. The assessee had filed that form opting out of the new regime, whereas the subsequently filed return contained a conflicting selection. A contrary entry in the return could not replace or reverse the option exercised through the prescribed form.

Conclusion: Form No. 10-IEA governed the tax-regime option, and the conflicting return declaration was ineffective. The issue is against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the section 143(1) adjustment was invalid for want of prior intimation.

Analysis: The assessee did not produce material from the income-tax portal or otherwise establish non-receipt of the prior intimation. The decision concerning an admitted failure to issue notice or proposed adjustment was factually distinguishable.

Conclusion: The challenge to the section 143(1) adjustment for alleged absence of prior intimation fails. The issue is against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether deductions under the old tax regime must be considered when the CPC applies that regime.

Analysis: Having treated the assessee as opted out of the new regime and subjected income to the old regime, the corresponding deductions available under that regime required consideration. The matter required limited verification of the eligible deductions.

Conclusion: Deductions eligible under the old tax regime must be considered where that regime is applied. The issue is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessment is restored for limited consideration of deductions eligible under the old tax regime.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statutory tax-regime option is required to be exercised through a prescribed form, a conflicting declaration in the return cannot supersede that form.

Issues: Whether the Tribunal's exclusion of certain comparable companies for determining the arm's length price was contrary to Rule 10B or vitiated by perversity.

Analysis: Chapter X of the Income-tax Act, 1961 provides the statutory framework for transfer-pricing determination. Selection or exclusion of comparables is a factual, data-driven exercise that must conform to Rule 10B of the Income-tax Rules. Findings on comparability ordinarily do not warrant interference unless shown to be contrary to law or perverse. The Tribunal excluded two companies on the basis of functional dissimilarity, and Revenue produced no material establishing that the factual finding was erroneous or perverse.

Conclusion: The exclusion of the comparables was upheld, and the substantial questions of law were answered in favour of the assessee.