Issues: Whether the arrest of a person who appeared before the GST authorities pursuant to a pending court order prima facie violated personal liberty and overreached the judicial process.

Analysis: The person appeared with records at the stipulated time in compliance with the earlier direction. The arrest authorisation did not disclose that the appearance was pursuant to the pending proceedings, and the stated grounds for arrest were prima facie inconsistent with the person's presence and willingness to cooperate. The subsequent summons and recorded timing of arrest also indicated a prima facie irregularity requiring examination of the officers' conduct.

Outcome: Interim release was directed, with notice issued to the concerned officers to explain their conduct; the matter was listed for further hearing.

Issues: (i) Whether extraordinary writ jurisdiction could be invoked despite an unavailed statutory appeal and unexplained delay; (ii) Whether Section 6(2)(b) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 barred proceedings under Section 73 because of earlier proceedings initiated by the DGGI under Section 74; (iii) Whether conclusion of the DGGI proceedings and Section 75(13) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 precluded the separate demand.

Issue (i): Whether extraordinary writ jurisdiction could be invoked despite an unavailed statutory appeal and unexplained delay.

Analysis: The statutory scheme provided an efficacious appellate remedy against the adjudication order. The challenge raised jurisdictional and factual matters capable of consideration in appellate proceedings. The petitioner allowed the period for appeal to lapse and invoked writ jurisdiction after substantial delay; pendency of a rectification application did not extend the period for challenging the original order or sufficiently explain the delay.

Conclusion: Exercise of extraordinary writ jurisdiction was not warranted in view of the unavailed alternative remedy and unexplained delay and laches (against the assessee).

Issue (ii): Whether Section 6(2)(b) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 barred proceedings under Section 73 because of earlier proceedings initiated by the DGGI under Section 74.

Analysis: Section 6(2)(b) prevents parallel proceedings by different GST authorities only where they concern the same subject matter. The Section 73 proceedings concerned correct tax liability and admissibility of input tax credit under Section 16(2)(c), whereas the DGGI proceedings under Section 74 concerned fraudulent availment of input tax credit without actual supply and involved multiple noticees. An overlap in transactions or period, or a common factual background, did not establish identity of subject matter.

Conclusion: The proceedings were not on the same subject matter, and the bar under Section 6(2)(b) was not attracted (against the assessee).

Issue (iii): Whether conclusion of the DGGI proceedings and Section 75(13) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 precluded the separate demand.

Analysis: The DGGI proceedings against co-noticees were deemed concluded following payment by the principal noticee; no tax, interest, or penalty was imposed upon the petitioner in those proceedings. Section 75(13) requires a prior penalty upon the person for the same act or omission, which was not established. Closure of proceedings on a distinct statutory basis did not extinguish the independently determined liability.

Conclusion: Neither the conclusion of the DGGI proceedings nor Section 75(13) precluded the separate liability (against the assessee).

Final Conclusion: The jurisdictional and statutory objections did not invalidate the separate adjudication, while remedies available against any decision on the pending rectification application remained governed by law.

Ratio Decidendi: The prohibition on parallel GST proceedings under Section 6(2)(b) applies only where the proceedings concern an identical subject matter; common transactions, overlapping periods, or a common assessee are insufficient where the statutory basis and allegations materially differ.

Issues: (i) Whether Section 93 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 permits penalty proceedings against a legal representative to be commenced and determined after the death of the person alleged to have committed the contravention; (ii) Whether Section 93(1)(b) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is unconstitutional under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Issue (i): Whether Section 93 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 permits penalty proceedings against a legal representative to be commenced and determined after the death of the person alleged to have committed the contravention.

Analysis: Section 93 expressly covers tax, interest and penalty determined after death. Its language does not condition post-death determination upon the issuance of a show-cause notice or commencement of adjudication during the deceased's lifetime. The substantive contravention remains to be established under the applicable penal provision; Section 93 is the mechanism for determining and enforcing the resulting liability through the legal representative. Where Section 93(1)(b) applies, recovery is confined to the deceased's estate and only to the extent the estate can meet the charge. Fair hearing requirements under Section 126(3) remain applicable.

Conclusion: Section 93 permits proceedings for determination of penalty to be commenced after death against the legal representative, subject to satisfaction of its conditions; issuance of notice during the deceased's lifetime is not a prerequisite.

Issue (ii): Whether Section 93(1)(b) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is unconstitutional under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: Section 93(1)(b) preserves liability arising from the deceased's lifetime conduct without treating the legal representative as the wrongdoer. The provision provides a rational estate-representation mechanism, restricts recovery to estate assets, and retains adjudicatory safeguards, including an effective opportunity to contest the contravention, statutory basis and quantum. The representative's inability to personally explain the deceased's affairs cannot itself be treated as an admission, and an appellate remedy remains available.

Conclusion: Section 93(1)(b) is neither discriminatory nor manifestly arbitrary and is constitutionally valid under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Final Conclusion: Post-death adjudication of fiscal liability is legally sustainable under Section 93, but the factual requirements for representative liability, proof of contravention, service, quantum and the effect of the adjudication order remain open for determination in the statutory process.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a fiscal statute expressly authorises tax, interest or penalty to be determined after death and confines recovery to the deceased's estate, proceedings may be initiated against the legal representative after death without prior commencement against the deceased.

Issues: (i) Whether compulsory generation and carriage of an e-way bill under Rule 138 applied to inter-State movement on 24 November 2017; (ii) Whether detention, seizure and penalty for non-production of an e-way bill were sustainable on that date.

Issue (i): Whether compulsory generation and carriage of an e-way bill under Rule 138 applied to inter-State movement on 24 November 2017.

Analysis: Rule 138 was substituted by Notification No. 27/2017-Central Tax dated 30.08.2017, but its compulsory operational date for e-way bill compliance was subsequently notified. The nationwide mandatory requirement was brought into force from 1 April 2018, which was after the interception on 24 November 2017.

Conclusion: No; compulsory e-way bill compliance under Rule 138 did not apply on 24 November 2017. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether detention, seizure and penalty for non-production of an e-way bill were sustainable on that date.

Analysis: The goods corresponded with the tax invoice and transport documents, and no discrepancy was found in their quantity, weight or description. The buyer and seller were bona fide dealers, the vehicle was on its designated route, and no material established tax evasion or an intention to evade tax. Since the mandatory e-way bill requirement was not in force on the relevant date, proceedings under Sections 129 and 122 could not rest on its non-production.

Conclusion: No; detention, seizure and penalty for non-production of an e-way bill on that date were unsustainable. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: Non-production of an e-way bill before Rule 138 became compulsory could not constitute a breach supporting detention or penal action where the accompanying transaction documents were genuine and no tax-evasion intent was shown.

Ratio Decidendi: Detention and penalty for failure to carry an e-way bill cannot be sustained where the compulsory requirement under Rule 138 had not come into force on the date of movement and no tax evasion is established.

Issues: Whether penalty for transport of goods with an expired e-way bill containing details of a vehicle wholly different from the vehicle actually carrying the goods was sustainable.

Analysis: Section 68 requires prescribed documents to accompany goods in transit, while Explanation (2) to Rule 138(3) requires Part B of the e-way bill to contain correct vehicle particulars for a valid movement. The limited relaxation under Circular No. 64/38/2018-GST applies to minor errors in one or two digits or characters and does not extend to substitution of an entirely different vehicle. An incomplete or incorrect e-way bill gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of intention to evade tax; such intention may be inferred from surrounding circumstances. Here, the e-way bill had expired, named a different vehicle, and the stated diversion and delay were unsupported by a timely explanation or credible material rebutting that presumption.

Conclusion: The penalty was validly imposed and the concurrent findings were sustained against the assessee.

Issues: Whether an adjudication order uploaded only under the 'Additional Notice and Orders' tab, without separate intimation and without an effective opportunity of hearing, could be sustained.

Analysis: Adjudication under Section 73 of the applicable GST enactments must conform to principles of natural justice. The order was uploaded only under the 'Additional Notice and Orders' tab without separate intimation, and the petitioner had made out a prima facie case regarding the absence of an effective hearing. A fresh determination therefore required consideration of the reply, an opportunity of hearing, and a reasoned adjudication.

Conclusion: The impugned adjudication order was unsustainable and required fresh adjudication after affording an opportunity of hearing.

Issues: (i) Whether a monetary refund of unutilised input tax credit can constitute tax erroneously refunded under Section 73 of the Chhattisgarh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether jurisdiction under Section 73 is barred unless the refund order in FORM GST RFD-06 is first reversed through departmental appeal or revision; (iii) Whether Sections 73 and 50 of the Chhattisgarh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 authorise interest on an erroneous refund; (iv) Whether the operation of Rule 89(5), subsequently upheld by the Supreme Court, or the later insertion of Rule 88B renders the interest demand impermissibly retrospective; and (v) Whether the rate, period and quantified interest demand require interference.

Issue (i): Whether a monetary refund of unutilised input tax credit can constitute tax erroneously refunded under Section 73 of the Chhattisgarh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 54(3) permits refund of unutilised input tax credit. Once accumulated credit is converted into a monetary payment, it is a statutory refund; if it exceeds the entitlement under Section 54(3) read with Rule 89(5), it falls within the erroneous-refund limb of Section 73. The separate expression concerning input tax credit wrongly availed or utilised addresses ledger-stage credit and does not exclude a cash refund originating from input tax credit. The strict construction of taxing statutes does not require an exclusion unsupported by the enacted text.

Conclusion: A monetary refund of unutilised input tax credit is capable of being treated as an erroneous refund under Section 73. Against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether jurisdiction under Section 73 is barred unless the refund order in FORM GST RFD-06 is first reversed through departmental appeal or revision.

Analysis: Sections 107(2) and 108 provide appellate and revisional routes to test the legality or propriety of a refund order, whereas Section 73 provides an independent demand-and-determination mechanism for an amount erroneously refunded. None of those provisions makes prior appeal or revision a jurisdictional precondition for Section 73. The Section 73 power is not a general authority to reopen concluded refund adjudications or to disregard a subsisting appellate determination; on the facts, however, no appellate order affirming the refund existed and the notice was founded on the governing Rule 89(5) computation.

Conclusion: Non-invocation of Section 107(2) or Section 108 did not oust Section 73 jurisdiction in the circumstances of the case. Against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether Sections 73 and 50 of the Chhattisgarh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 authorise interest on an erroneous refund.

Analysis: Section 73(1), (5), (8) and (9) repeatedly link an erroneous refund with interest payable under Section 50. This supplies substantive statutory authority rather than an interest charge based on implication. Interest is compensatory and is not conditional on fraud, fault, or the absence of departmental error in sanctioning the refund. Payment of only the principal amount does not result in statutory closure under Section 73(8), which requires payment of the tax together with applicable interest.

Conclusion: Sections 73 and 50 jointly authorise interest on an erroneous refund. Against the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether the operation of Rule 89(5), subsequently upheld by the Supreme Court, or the later insertion of Rule 88B renders the interest demand impermissibly retrospective.

Analysis: The substituted Rule 89(5) was operative from 01.07.2017, before both the refund application and the refund sanction. The subsequent Supreme Court decision upheld the existing rule and did not create a new liability. Rule 88B concerns computation of interest and neither creates nor extinguishes the statutory charge arising from Sections 73 and 50. A contrary High Court ruling operative for part of the period did not suspend the rule or create an interest-free interval.

Conclusion: The interest demand is not an impermissible retrospective levy. Against the assessee.

Issue (v): Whether the rate, period and quantified interest demand require interference.

Analysis: The refund was credited on 13.02.2019 and the principal amount was repaid on 08.11.2021. Interest at 18% per annum for 999 days was arithmetically consistent with the quantified demand, and no alternative rate, period, or computation was established.

Conclusion: The interest demand of Rs.44,51,491/- was correctly sustained. Against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The statutory interest liability arising from repayment of the erroneous inverted-duty refund remains enforceable.

Ratio Decidendi: A monetary refund of unutilised input tax credit exceeding statutory entitlement may be recovered as an erroneous refund under Section 73, and Section 73 read with Section 50 carries compensatory interest without requiring prior reversal of the original refund order through appeal or revision.

Issues: Whether alleged outward supplies taxable at 18% were required to be included while determining the turnover of inverted rated supplies and adjusted total turnover for computing refund of accumulated input tax credit under the inverted duty structure.

Analysis: The refund formula under Rule 89(5) requires correct determination of the turnover of inverted rated supplies and adjusted total turnover. Although the Revenue asserted that three outward invoices attracted GST at 18%, it did not produce the relevant invoices or supporting documents, and the appellate order did not address those alleged supplies. The factual basis necessary to ascertain the admissible refund was therefore not available.

Outcome: Fresh verification and a reasoned determination of the eligible refund were directed after affording both parties an opportunity of hearing.

Issues: Whether service tax paid under the pre-GST regime on advances for flat bookings subsequently cancelled after commencement of GST can be availed as input tax credit under the GST law.

Analysis: Input tax and input tax credit under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 concern specified GST levies charged on supplies made to a registered person. Service tax paid under Chapter V of the Finance Act, 1994 does not fall within that definition. Section 142(5) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 specifically governs a post-appointed-day claim for refund of tax paid under the existing law in respect of services not ultimately provided, requiring the claim to be dealt with under the existing law and the amount payable in cash. A taxpayer cannot unilaterally use the electronic credit ledger to adjust such a service-tax refund claim without statutory authority.

Conclusion: Refundable service tax paid under the Finance Act, 1994 on cancelled flat bookings cannot be claimed as input tax credit under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; the refund must be pursued under the mechanism in Section 142(5).

Issues: (i) Whether the first appellate orders, which did not address the material grounds, satisfied the requirement of a reasoned and speaking order; (ii) Whether the appeals should be sent for fresh adjudication where the first appellate authority failed to decide the grounds on merits and the original adjudications involved unresolved procedural objections.

Issue (i): Whether the first appellate orders, which did not address the material grounds, satisfied the requirement of a reasoned and speaking order.

Analysis: The principles of natural justice require a quasi-judicial appellate authority to record cogent reasons and deal with material grounds of challenge. The appellate orders merely stated that satisfactory evidence had not been produced and affirmed the original orders, without addressing the several substantive grounds or the authorities relied upon. Identical cryptic findings in all three matters disclosed a failure to exercise appellate jurisdiction and did not constitute reasoned or speaking orders.

Conclusion: The first question is answered in favour of the assessees; the first appellate orders violated the requirement of a reasoned and speaking decision.

Issue (ii): Whether the appeals should be sent for fresh adjudication where the first appellate authority failed to decide the grounds on merits and the original adjudications involved unresolved procedural objections.

Analysis: A decision on merits at the second appellate stage would deprive the aggrieved party of an effective appellate tier. The original adjudications were passed ex parte, while objections concerning the sufficiency of the show-cause notices, identification and availability of relied-upon documents, and effective opportunity of hearing under Section 75(4) remained unresolved. Fresh adjudication on the original record, after clearly identifying and making available the relied-upon material, permitting replies and reconciliation, and granting an effective personal hearing, was necessary.

Conclusion: The second question is decided in favour of the assessees; the appellate and original orders are set aside for fresh adjudication by the original adjudicating authorities in accordance with law.

Final Conclusion: The disputed tax liabilities must be determined afresh after compliance with procedural fairness, consideration of the assessees' objections, and reasoned findings on the evidence.

Ratio Decidendi: An appellate authority must adjudicate material grounds and give reasons for its conclusions; a cryptic affirmance that fails to do so warrants setting aside, with fresh adjudication where procedural objections at the original stage remain unresolved.

Issues: Whether writ jurisdiction should be exercised against a GST adjudication order despite an efficacious statutory appellate remedy, where non-consideration of replies and absence of an attributed role were alleged.

Analysis: The existence of a statutory appellate remedy, coupled with detailed and disputed factual issues concerning the petitioners' replies, role in the transactions, accounts, invoices and alleged ineligible input tax credit, made writ adjudication inappropriate. The relied-on decision concerning the requirement of a speaking order was distinguishable because it concerned an individual assessee, whereas the impugned adjudication was a common and extensive order involving numerous firms and individuals.

Conclusion: Writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked to bypass the statutory appellate remedy where determination of the allegations requires examination of disputed facts by the Appellate Authority.

Issues: Whether recovery under Form GST DRC-13 should continue pending consideration of the petitioner's application under Section 112(9) after filing a second appeal.

Analysis: The recovery notice preceded the second appeal. The petitioner was permitted to invoke Section 112(9) before the concerned authority, which was directed to decide that application and the pending request for withdrawal of recovery proceedings in accordance with law.

Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of with a direction to decide the applications within fifteen days, and recovery was restrained until their disposal.

Issues: Whether recovery of alleged excess budgetary support, founded on ITC reflected in GSTR-2A, could be sustained without proper consideration of the taxpayer's reconciliation, invoices and explanation regarding the non-availability of such ITC for utilisation.

Analysis: Under the Budgetary Support Scheme, support was linked to Central Tax and Integrated Tax paid through the cash ledger after utilisation of eligible ITC. Where the alleged excess support resulted from ITC reflected in GSTR-2A, the taxpayer was entitled to establish through relevant documents that such ITC was ineligible or unavailable for utilisation. The authority was required to consider each explanation and supporting document and record reasons for its acceptance or rejection. That exercise was not properly undertaken.

Conclusion: The recovery and consequential adjustment orders were set aside, and the matter was remitted for fresh consideration after an effective hearing and a reasoned determination of the taxpayer's explanations and documents.

Issues: Whether reversal of input tax credit of Compensation Cess pertaining to earlier tax periods, but reflected during the refund period, must reduce Net ITC for refund of unutilized credit attributable to zero-rated supplies.

Analysis: Section 54(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 read with Rule 89(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 permits refund of unutilized input tax credit on zero-rated supplies and defines Net ITC as credit availed during the relevant period. The reversal in question represented residual unutilized Cess credit from earlier periods, made after sanction of the prior refund, and had no nexus with the Cess credit availed for the relevant refund period. The available returns and electronic credit ledger established the Net ITC availed during the relevant period. Paragraph 43(c) of Circular No. 125/44/2019-GST dated 18.11.2019 cannot be construed to require deduction of every reversal reflected during the refund period irrespective of the period to which the underlying credit relates, as a circular cannot enlarge or override the statutory refund formula.

Conclusion: The earlier-period Cess reversal was not deductible from Net ITC for the relevant refund period; the sanctioned refund was valid, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether reversal of input tax credit relating to an earlier tax period, but reflected during the refund period, must reduce Net ITC for computing refund of unutilized cess credit attributable to zero-rated supplies.

Analysis: Rule 89(4) confines Net ITC to input tax credit actually availed and attributable to the relevant refund period. The reversal in question related to credit of an earlier period and was not included in the credit availed for the refund period; it could therefore not be deducted from the Net ITC used in the refund formula. The departmental assertion that the reversal formed part of the relevant-period ITC lacked support in the records available on the GST portal. Paragraph 43(c) of the circular was required to be construed consistently with Rule 89(4) and could not expand the statutory formula by treating every reversal recorded during the period as a reduction of relevant-period credit. Administrative circulars may bind departmental authorities but cannot override statutory provisions or curtail a statutory refund entitlement.

Conclusion: Reversal of credit pertaining to an earlier tax period does not reduce Net ITC for the relevant refund period; the refund of accumulated cess credit was held admissible.

Issues: Whether reversal during the refund period of compensation-cess input tax credit attributable to earlier tax periods reduces "Net ITC" for a zero-rated-supply refund.

Analysis: Section 54(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 read with Rule 89(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 permits refund of unutilised input tax credit for zero-rated supplies, with "Net ITC" confined to credit availed during the relevant period. The reversal of compensation-cess credit was attributable to earlier tax periods, represented residual unutilised credit after an earlier refund, and was not part of the credit availed for the refund period. The reversal could therefore not be deducted from the relevant-period Net ITC. Paragraph 43(c) of Circular No. 125/44/2019-GST could not be construed to require deduction of every reversal reported during the refund period regardless of the period to which the underlying credit related, since an administrative circular cannot enlarge or override the statutory refund formula.

Conclusion: The refund of accumulated compensation-cess input tax credit was correctly computed and sanctioned; the issue was answered in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the rejection of the application for condonation of delay and the appellate order were valid when the application was decided on merits before the scheduled personal hearing.

Analysis: The application sought condonation of delay in filing an application for revocation of cancellation of registration. The show-cause notice fixed a personal hearing on 24.10.2025, but the application was rejected on 21.10.2025. A proceeding for condonation of delay required examination of the justification for delay and could not be converted into an adjudication on the merits of the revocation application. Although the appeal was filed under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, the appellate authority likewise could not decide the merits of the underlying revocation matter in an appeal concerning delay condonation.

Conclusion: The rejection order, appellate order, and show-cause notice were invalid and were quashed, with fresh proceedings to be undertaken in accordance with law.

Issues: Whether rejection of the refund claim could be sustained where the appellate authority introduced grounds under Rule 96A, Rule 96B and Rule 89(4)(c) of the GST Rules that were not alleged in the show-cause notice.

Analysis: The show-cause notice forms the foundational basis of the proceedings and defines their permissible scope. The appellate order expanded that scope by relying on additional grounds under the GST Rules, without affording an opportunity to respond to them. This was contrary to the principles of natural justice and required fresh consideration on the basis of a comprehensive reply, hearing, and a reasoned speaking order.

Conclusion: The original rejection and the appellate order were unsustainable and were set aside; entitlement to the refund was left for fresh adjudication.

Issues: Whether the challenge to curtailment of benefits under the budgetary-support scheme required adjudication in light of the binding precedent governing such claims.

Analysis: The challenge was covered by the earlier decision applying the Supreme Court's ruling, under which affected claimants were permitted to seek consideration of their claims through representations to the State Government and the GST Council. No independent adjudication on the validity of the notification was undertaken.

Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of with liberty to submit representations to the State Government and the GST Council for consideration in accordance with law.

Issues: Whether an appeal concerning a penalty not exceeding fifty thousand rupees should be admitted.

Analysis: Section 112(1) permits an aggrieved person to appeal against an order passed under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. Under Section 112(2), the Appellate Tribunal has discretion to refuse admission where the tax, input tax credit, fine, fee or penalty determined by the impugned order does not exceed fifty thousand rupees. The penalty determined against the appellant was fifty thousand rupees.

Conclusion: The appeal was refused admission in exercise of the discretion under Section 112(2) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.