Issues: Whether a penalty order under Section 129(3), passed 445 days after issuance of notice, is legally sustainable.

Analysis: Section 129(3) mandates that the penalty order be passed within seven days from service of the notice. The notice was issued on 16.08.2021, whereas the order was made only on 04.11.2022. In a fiscal statute, the prescribed timeline is mandatory and requires strict compliance; the substantial breach vitiated the detention and penalty proceedings.

Conclusion: The order passed under Section 129(3) was void ab initio and a nullity; the appellate order affirming it was set aside.

Issues: (i) Whether the revision proceedings were barred by limitation under Section 108(2)(b) of the Karnataka State Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether reversal of the appellate order and restoration of penalty under Section 129 of the Karnataka State Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 were justified.

Issue (i): Whether the revision proceedings were barred by limitation under Section 108(2)(b) of the Karnataka State Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 108(2)(b) prescribes a three-year limit for exercise of revisionary power. The pandemic-related exclusion of the period from 15 March 2020 to 28 February 2022 applies to judicial, quasi-judicial and departmental proceedings. On exclusion of the applicable period, the revisional order fell within the extended limitation period.

Conclusion: The revision proceedings were not barred by limitation, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether reversal of the appellate order and restoration of penalty under Section 129 of the Karnataka State Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 were justified.

Analysis: Section 68(1) requires the person in charge of a conveyance to carry the prescribed documents, and Rule 138(1) requires generation of the e-way bill before commencement of movement. The goods were unloaded at a location different from that covered by the available tax invoice and e-way bill. The requisite documents for delivery at that location were generated only after interception, and no evidence substantiated the asserted technical glitch. The absence of statutory documents in these circumstances established a wilful attempt to evade tax rather than a minor procedural lapse.

Conclusion: Penalty under Section 129(1) was legally valid, in favour of Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The revisional order restoring the statutory penalty for undocumented movement of goods remains operative.

Issues: (i) Validity of applying a turnover filter of Rs. 1 crore to Rs. 200 crores for selecting transfer-pricing comparables; (ii) Whether a software-product company was functionally comparable to a captive software-development service provider; (iii) Whether exclusion of comparables required a fresh arm's-length-price and comparability exercise on remand.

Issue (i): Validity of applying a turnover filter of Rs. 1 crore to Rs. 200 crores for selecting transfer-pricing comparables.

Analysis: Section 92C(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 does not prescribe a turnover filter. However, the Rs. 1 crore to Rs. 200 crores filter had a rational basis because comparability must be assessed with reference to functional profile, assets, risks, and material differences in the size and turnover of the tested party and comparable entities. A substantial variation in turnover can affect transaction pricing.

Conclusion: The turnover filter was valid and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether a software-product company was functionally comparable to a captive software-development service provider.

Analysis: The assessee provided software-development services to its associated enterprise and neither owned intellectual property nor developed or marketed software products. The proposed comparable was engaged in software-product development and in providing technology solutions and consultancy; its functional profile was therefore materially different.

Conclusion: The software-product company was not a valid comparable and was rightly excluded, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether exclusion of comparables required a fresh arm's-length-price and comparability exercise on remand.

Analysis: The transfer-pricing officer had already completed the comparability exercise and selected the final set of comparables. The remand required effect to be given to the exclusions directed on the identified grounds, and did not warrant reopening the entire determination of the arm's-length price.

Conclusion: No fresh comparability exercise was required; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The transfer-pricing computation must be given effect using comparables selected through a rational turnover and functional-comparability analysis, without reopening the completed exercise merely because specified entities are excluded.

Ratio Decidendi: Transfer-pricing comparables must be selected by reference to functional profile, assets, risks, and material scale; a rational turnover filter is permissible, and a software-product company cannot be compared with a captive software-development service provider where their functions materially differ.

Issues: (i) Maintainability of the writ petitions despite the statutory remedy under FEMA; (ii) Applicability of Section 37A to an arrangement originating before its commencement but involving later payments; (iii) Whether the connected fund movements supplied jurisdictional facts for action under Section 4 read with Section 37A; (iv) Whether the seizure order recorded a valid reason to believe and could be supported by subsequent explanatory material; (v) Effect of regulatory and income-tax treatment of the transactions on the FEMA seizure; (vi) Validity of the NOC refusal under Rule 10 in the absence of disclosed reasons and a demonstrable nexus, including reliance on a subsequent seizure order.

Issue (i): Maintainability of the writ petitions despite the statutory remedy under FEMA.

Analysis: The alternative-remedy rule is discretionary and does not exclude writ review where the challenge concerns jurisdictional facts or the legality of the decision-making process. The seizure challenge raised the threshold applicability of Section 37A and the existence of recorded reasons, while the NOC rejection was challenged for absence of reasons and lacked an appellate remedy.

Conclusion: Both writ petitions were maintainable. Review of the seizure was confined to jurisdictional and decision-making issues, while the NOC rejection was amenable to review for breach of fair administrative action.

Issue (ii): Applicability of Section 37A to an arrangement originating before its commencement but involving later payments.

Analysis: Section 37A is prospective and cannot be applied to transactions completed before its commencement merely because their consequences continued. However, actual payments made after the provision came into force were distinct subsequent acts, not merely the subsistence of an earlier liability, and were alleged to be part of the connected arrangement under investigation.

Conclusion: Section 37A could not retrospectively govern the completed transactions of 2015, but it could be invoked with reference to the subsequent payments made after its commencement. This issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the connected fund movements supplied jurisdictional facts for action under Section 4 read with Section 37A.

Analysis: The foreign borrowings, NCD subscription, immediate onward transfer of NCD proceeds, share acquisition, subsequent amalgamation and later repayment of principal and interest were capable of being assessed as one connected arrangement under the substance-over-form approach. The rupee denomination of the NCDs, FPI status of the subscriber, and formal regulatory compliance did not preclude scrutiny of the alleged closed-loop movement of funds and round-tripping. These circumstances provided a prima facie basis to examine whether foreign exchange had been dealt with in contravention of Section 4; final proof remains for the statutory authority.

Conclusion: The material supplied the jurisdictional factual foundation for action under Section 37A and examination under Section 4. This issue was decided against the assessee, without finally determining the alleged contravention.

Issue (iv): Whether the seizure order recorded a valid reason to believe and could be supported by subsequent explanatory material.

Analysis: The seizure order itself recorded the connected movement of funds, their return to the foreign lender, the alleged absence of genuine capital infusion, and the closed-loop structure. Charts and diagrams placed before the Court only collated transactions already appearing in the order and did not add a new factual foundation. The delay and the operational character of the seized premises did not invalidate the threshold exercise of jurisdiction, though they remained relevant to continuation of seizure before the Competent Authority.

Conclusion: The recorded material supported the preliminary reason to believe under Section 37A(1), and the seizure was not vitiated by impermissible supplementation of reasons. This issue was decided against the assessee, subject to statutory confirmation proceedings.

Issue (v): Effect of regulatory and income-tax treatment of the transactions on the FEMA seizure.

Analysis: RBI and SEBI communications addressed identified features of the NCD transaction, while the income-tax proceedings concerned separate statutory questions. None of those proceedings determined whether the complete connected arrangement contravened Section 4 of FEMA. Their findings and regulatory treatment remain relevant material requiring fair consideration in the statutory proceedings.

Conclusion: The prior regulatory and tax treatment did not foreclose the FEMA inquiry or invalidate the seizure at the threshold. This issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (vi): Validity of the NOC refusal under Rule 10 in the absence of disclosed reasons and a demonstrable nexus, including reliance on a subsequent seizure order.

Analysis: Rule 10 contemplates applications by persons under investigation; pendency of an investigation alone cannot justify refusal. Although the proposed overseas treasury activities were capable of having a rational connection with the investigation, the rejection communication disclosed no reason or nexus. Confidentiality concerns could justify withholding sensitive particulars but not an entirely unreasoned decision. A seizure order made after the NOC refusal could not retrospectively supply its missing reasons. Since a response had been issued within the prescribed period, no deemed NOC arose.

Conclusion: The NOC refusal was unsustainable and was set aside in favour of the petitioner. The application must receive fresh, reasoned consideration; no entitlement to the NOC was determined.

Final Conclusion: The seizure remains subject to consideration by the Competent Authority, with the petitioner permitted to continue ordinary business operations from the secured premises without creating third-party interests. The NOC application requires a fresh and time-bound decision based on disclosed substantive grounds, and the regulatory authority must consider extension of the period for the proposed investment in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 37A does not retrospectively govern completed pre-commencement transactions, but recorded post-commencement payments alleged to form part of the same arrangement may provide the statutory basis for preliminary seizure, subject to confirmation proceedings.

Issues: (i) Whether a composite construction contract involving use of materials could be taxed as Commercial or Industrial Construction Service; (ii) Whether penalty for failure to pay service tax under reverse charge on Goods Transport Agency services was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether a composite construction contract involving use of materials could be taxed as Commercial or Industrial Construction Service.

Analysis: A contract involving rendition of services together with materials constitutes a distinct composite works contract. Commercial or Industrial Construction Service can apply only to services simpliciter. Such composite works contracts were not taxable before 01.06.2007 and, thereafter, could be taxed only as Works Contract Service if they satisfied the applicable definition; they could not be classified as Commercial or Industrial Construction Service.

Conclusion: The demand under Commercial or Industrial Construction Service, with consequential interest and penalties, was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether penalty for failure to pay service tax under reverse charge on Goods Transport Agency services was sustainable.

Analysis: The tax demand and interest relating to Goods Transport Agency services were not contested. Section 80 of the Finance Act, 1994 was invoked in relation to the penalty imposed under Section 76.

Conclusion: The penalty under Section 76 for Goods Transport Agency services was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: A material-inclusive composite construction contract cannot sustain a levy under Commercial or Industrial Construction Service, while the Goods Transport Agency tax liability remains unaffected and the related penalty is waived.

Ratio Decidendi: A composite contract involving services and materials is a works contract and cannot be subjected to service tax under Commercial or Industrial Construction Service, which applies only to services simpliciter.

Issues: Whether a penalty order under Section 129(3), issued 28 days after service of notice, is valid.

Analysis: Section 129(3) mandates that the proper officer pass the penalty order within seven days from service of notice. The statutory use of "shall" makes the prescribed timeline mandatory, particularly under a fiscal statute requiring strict construction. Since the notice was issued on 28.06.2019 and the penalty order was made only on 26.07.2019, the mandatory time limit was breached.

Conclusion: The penalty order issued beyond the mandatory period under Section 129(3) is void ab initio and a nullity in law.

Issues: (i) Whether the taxpayer's unutilised input tax credit had accumulated because the GST rate on inputs exceeded the rate on output supplies, within clause (ii) of the first proviso to Section 54(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; and (ii) Whether paragraph 3.2 of Circular No. 135/05/2020-GST dated 31.03.2020 barred the taxpayer's refund claim.

Issue (i): Whether the taxpayer's unutilised input tax credit had accumulated because the GST rate on inputs exceeded the rate on output supplies, within clause (ii) of the first proviso to Section 54(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Clause (ii) permits refund of unutilised input tax credit where it has accumulated because the tax rate on inputs is higher than that on output supplies. The inputs, including perfumes, fragrances, chemicals and packaging materials, were commercially distinct from the outward supply of agarbati. Those inputs attracted GST at 12% to 18%, whereas the output attracted GST at 5%, resulting in an inverted duty structure.

Conclusion: The refund arose from an inverted duty structure under clause (ii) of the first proviso to Section 54(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and was admissible in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether paragraph 3.2 of Circular No. 135/05/2020-GST dated 31.03.2020 barred the taxpayer's refund claim.

Analysis: The circular clarification concerns cases in which input and output supplies are the same goods attracting different rates at different points of time. The later clarification preserved refund where a contemporaneous rate differential exists, including specified concessional supplies. Since the inputs and output supplies were distinct goods, the same-goods clarification did not apply. CBIC circulars bind departmental officers but have only persuasive value before the Tribunal.

Conclusion: Paragraph 3.2 of Circular No. 135/05/2020-GST dated 31.03.2020 did not bar the refund claim, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The statutory requirements for refund of accumulated input tax credit due to the input-output tax rate differential were satisfied, and the circular clarification could not displace that entitlement.

Ratio Decidendi: Refund of unutilised input tax credit is available where a higher rate of tax on inputs than on commercially distinct output supplies creates an inverted duty structure; a circular confined to same-goods rate changes cannot enlarge the statutory restriction on such refund.

Issues: (i) Whether the rejection of condonation by applying the general CBDT circular instead of the specific circular governing delayed returns claiming Section 80P deduction was valid; (ii) Whether the 34-day delay in filing the return for assessment year 2020-21 warranted condonation under CBDT Circular No. 13/2023 dated 26.07.2023

Issue (i): Whether the rejection of condonation by applying the general CBDT circular instead of the specific circular governing delayed returns claiming Section 80P deduction was valid

Analysis: Section 80AC(ii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 bars deductions under the relevant Chapter unless the return is filed within the time prescribed by Section 139(1). However, CBDT Circular No. 13/2023 dated 26.07.2023 specifically authorises consideration of applications by cooperative societies for condonation of delayed returns claiming deduction under Section 80P for assessment years 2018-19 to 2022-23. CBDT Circular No. 09/2015 dated 09.06.2015 concerns delayed refund claims and claims for carry-forward or set-off of losses, and could not govern this specialised category. The refusal also failed to address the specific circular expressly relied upon and improperly treated the earlier appellate disallowance as a bar despite preservation of the condonation remedy. The specific beneficial circular therefore prevailed over the general circular.

Conclusion: The rejection of the condonation application was invalid and unsustainable; this issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the 34-day delay in filing the return for assessment year 2020-21 warranted condonation under CBDT Circular No. 13/2023 dated 26.07.2023

Analysis: Clauses 6(i) and 6(ii) of CBDT Circular No. 13/2023 require examination of whether delay resulted from circumstances beyond the assessee's control and, where relevant, delayed statutory audit. The audit report, which had to be routed through the State Audit Department, was received after the due date during COVID-19 restrictions. The subsequent interval was explained by the application for condonation, the departmental response advising filing under Section 139(4), and filing shortly thereafter. These circumstances established genuine hardship. The beneficial condonation scheme required liberal application and not a hypertechnical approach.

Conclusion: The 34-day delay is liable to be condoned; this issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The delayed return is eligible for consideration of the claim for deduction under Section 80P of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: A specific CBDT circular governing condonation for cooperative societies claiming Section 80P deduction prevails over a general circular, and documented circumstances beyond the assessee's control establishing genuine hardship warrant liberal condonation of delay.

Issues: Whether the show cause notice alleging misclassification of nuts, bolts, washers, hand tools and allied scaffolding items under the Customs Tariff was sustainable despite binding decisions settling the applicable tariff classifications.

Analysis: Binding coordinate-bench rulings had already quashed materially identical show cause notices and treated the relevant classifications of scaffolding items under the specified tariff headings as settled. That position had attained finality, and the respondents did not dispute the applicability of those decisions. Consistent application of binding precedent and judicial discipline required the same treatment.

Conclusion: The impugned show cause notice was unsustainable and was quashed and set aside.

Issues: Whether the direction for investigation by the Serious Fraud Investigation Office and the continuing ex parte ad interim injunction should operate pending final disposal of the injunction petition.

Analysis: The injunction petition had not been finally heard, and issues concerning the plaintiff's entitlement to sue in relation to the provident fund trust and the alleged defalcation required determination by the Trial Judge. A prior determination of those issues while requiring affidavits in the pending injunction petition could prejudice the defendants.

Outcome: The direction for investigation by the Serious Fraud Investigation Office was stayed, the impugned order was limited to 31 December 2026, and all merits issues were left open for determination in the injunction petition.

Issues: Whether the lease deeds created a security interest entitling the lessor development authorities to classification as secured creditors under the resolution plan.

Analysis: The Explanation to Section 3(31) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, inserted by the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2026, was treated as clarificatory and retrospectively applicable. A security interest must arise from an agreement or arrangement between parties and cannot rest merely on a charge created by operation of law. The mortgage clause created priority only for unearned increase upon a mortgage sale or foreclosure and did not constitute a present, general charge securing lease premium, rent or other arrears. The clause permitting recovery of arrears as land revenue was a statutory recovery mechanism, not a consensual charge. A decision concerning a separate tripartite sub-lease containing an unconditional first charge over all dues was factually distinguishable.

Conclusion: The lease deeds did not create a security interest, and the authorities' claims remained unsecured statutory or operational dues.

Ratio Decidendi: A security interest under the Code must arise from a consensual agreement or arrangement and cannot be founded solely on a statutory charge; a contingent priority clause that does not secure the relevant debt does not create secured-creditor status.

Issues: (i) Whether execution of the appellant's works contracts qualified as original works taxable on 40% of the gross amount under Rule 2A(ii)(A), rather than 70%; (ii) Whether the demand founded only on a mismatch between the income-tax return and ST-3 return, without scrutiny of books of account, was sustainable; (iii) Whether the extended period under Section 73(1) was invocable.

Issue (i): Whether execution of the appellant's works contracts qualified as original works taxable on 40% of the gross amount under Rule 2A(ii)(A), rather than 70%.

Analysis: The work order concerned execution of original works. Rule 2A(ii)(A) applied a 40% taxable-value measure, whereas the 70% measure applied for a different category of works contract. On the applicable 15% service-tax rate, the liability was 6% of the contract value and, under the reverse-charge arrangement, the service provider's share was 3%. The recorded tax payments covered that liability.

Conclusion: The contracts were execution of original works taxable on 40% of the total amount charged, and valuation at 70% was inapplicable. This is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the demand founded only on a mismatch between the income-tax return and ST-3 return, without scrutiny of books of account, was sustainable.

Analysis: The discrepancy arose because an invoice recorded on accrual basis in the relevant year was reflected in Form 26AS in the succeeding year when the recipient deducted and deposited TDS. The show-cause notice was based on return data without examination of the books of account or other admissible evidence establishing the consideration received. Books of account could not be disregarded on that basis alone.

Conclusion: A demand based solely on a return mismatch without examination of the books of account was unsustainable. This is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the extended period under Section 73(1) was invocable.

Analysis: The notice issued on 20.10.2021 was beyond the normal thirty-month period. Tax payments and relevant information had been disclosed, and no basis establishing the requisite suppression or other statutory ground for extended limitation was shown.

Conclusion: The extended period was not invocable and the demand was barred by limitation. This is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The differential service-tax demand and consequential penal liability lacked a sustainable statutory, evidentiary, and limitation basis.

Issues: Whether an adjudication order under the Uttar Pradesh GST law could be sustained where no personal hearing was afforded after the originally fixed hearing date.

Analysis: Section 75(4) requires that a personal hearing be provided in the circumstances contemplated by the provision, while Section 75(5) regulates adjournments of such hearing. No hearing occurred on the date originally fixed, no subsequent hearing date was intimated, and the adjudication order was passed over nine months later. As no adjournment had been sought by the assessee, the absence of a fresh hearing opportunity constituted a complete breach of the statutory hearing requirement and of natural justice.

Conclusion: The adjudication was invalid for denial of a reasonable opportunity of personal hearing.

Issues: Whether the Assessing Officer could reopen, under Sections 147 and 148, the deduction claim that formed part of a final settlement order under Section 245D(4).

Analysis: Chapter XIX-A creates a distinct settlement mechanism. Once a settlement application is allowed to proceed, exclusive jurisdiction vests in the Settlement Commission; the settlement process concerns the return for the relevant assessment year, including statutory deductions reflected in the computation of total income. A final order under Section 245D(4) carries statutory finality under Section 245I in respect of matters stated in it. The Revenue participates in the settlement process and may place material before the Settlement Commission. Where fraud or misrepresentation is alleged, the prescribed route is an application under Section 245D(6), not reassessment by the Assessing Officer. The Revenue had invoked that remedy, and its application was rejected.

Conclusion: The Assessing Officer lacks jurisdiction to initiate reassessment of a matter covered by a final settlement order under Section 245D(4); reopening is permissible only through the statutory mechanism under Section 245D(6) where fraud or misrepresentation is established.

Ratio Decidendi: Statutory finality attaching to a settlement order excludes reassessment jurisdiction over matters covered by that order, subject only to the fraud-or-misrepresentation mechanism provided in the settlement scheme.

Issues: (i) Whether the Trial Court could modify its earlier direction under Section 91 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and decline production of the Satisfaction Note, authorisation warrant and panchnama connected with the income-tax search; (ii) Whether recall of PW-15 for further cross-examination under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was essential to the just decision of the criminal case.

Issue (i): Whether the Trial Court could modify its earlier direction under Section 91 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and decline production of the Satisfaction Note, authorisation warrant and panchnama connected with the income-tax search.

Analysis: Section 91 requires the document sought to be necessary or desirable at the relevant stage of the proceeding; its existence alone does not warrant compulsory production. The earlier direction was procedural and interlocutory, and did not finally determine substantive rights, admissibility, recovery, or any defence. A prior Division Bench ruling had specifically scrutinised the validity of the warrant and search on the underlying confidential material and addressed the procedural objections concerning the search. Consequently, the continued necessity of calling for the same foundational record could validly be reassessed. The statutory restriction on disclosure of reasons to believe did not preclude limited judicial scrutiny where validity of an authorisation was directly challenged, but did not create a general entitlement to disclosure or require repeated production after the prior scrutiny.

Conclusion: The refusal to compel further production of the documents was valid; the issue is decided against the Petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether recall of PW-15 for further cross-examination under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was essential to the just decision of the criminal case.

Analysis: Recall under Section 311 is not automatic and depends upon whether the proposed evidence is essential to a just decision. The stated object of recall was to confront PW-15 with the Satisfaction Note, but that document was not on record and its production had been declined. PW-15 had already been substantially cross-examined on the preliminary inquiry, authorisation, search of the premises, recovery, and allegation of planting. No independent purpose showing that further examination was essential survived beyond the unavailable proposed confrontation.

Conclusion: Recall of PW-15 was not essential to the just decision of the case; the issue is decided against the Petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The challenged procedural orders remain undisturbed, without any expression on the merits of the criminal charges, which remain for determination in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Production under Section 91 and recall under Section 311 require a continuing showing of necessity or essentiality; neither power is attracted where the intended evidentiary purpose no longer survives and the relevant matters have already been adequately addressed.

Issues: Whether a voluntary deposit made during investigation could be appropriated towards differential customs duty relating to imports beyond the limitation period under Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962, in settlement proceedings.

Analysis: The amount had been voluntarily deposited during investigation, and the proprietor had admitted the total differential duty liability and requested adjustment of that deposit towards the relevant import period. The statements and the purpose of the deposit were neither retracted nor controverted by material placed before the Court. The appropriation was not a fresh statutory demand or recovery under Section 28, but concerned adjustment of an amount already voluntarily paid. In judicial review, the factual findings of the Settlement Commission could not be re-appreciated absent jurisdictional error, breach of natural justice, manifest legal error, or lack of evidentiary support.

Conclusion: Appropriation of the voluntary deposit towards the differential duty relating to imports beyond the limitation period was valid and did not amount to enforcement of a time-barred demand under Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962.

Issues: Whether the writ petition challenging the customs adjudication and the rejection of the statutory appeal for non-compliance with pre-deposit should be entertained despite an efficacious appellate remedy.

Analysis: Article 226 jurisdiction is ordinarily not exercised where the statute provides an efficacious redressal mechanism, particularly where the challenge requires examination of disputed facts and merits. The Customs Act, 1962 provides appellate remedies, and the prescribed pre-deposit under Section 129E is a mandatory condition for entertaining an appeal. Financial hardship did not justify bypassing that statutory condition. The objections concerning cross-examination, evidentiary value and retraction of statements, confiscation, and penalty were merits issues for the competent statutory forum.

Conclusion: Exercise of writ jurisdiction was not warranted; the petitioner must pursue the available statutory appellate remedy. All merits issues were left open for independent determination by the appellate forum.

Issues: Whether the demand under Rule 6(3) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004, in relation to electricity generated using bagasse and the related demand concerning press-mud, was sustainable.

Analysis: Bagasse is agricultural waste or residue and does not result from a process of manufacture within Section 2(f) of the Central Excise Act, 1944. The deeming provision concerning marketability under Section 2(d) cannot apply where no process amounting to manufacture is established. Consequently, Rule 6 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004, is inapplicable to bagasse. The demand in relation to electricity was founded on the contrary premise. The Revenue also could not compel adoption of the payment option under Rule 6(3), and reversal of proportionate Cenvat credit was equivalent to non-availment of such credit.

Conclusion: The Rule 6(3) demand, with consequential interest and penalty, was unsustainable and the impugned order was set aside.

Issues: (i) Whether Article 11 of the loan agreement, authorising repossession and sale of the hypothecated vehicle, conformed to RBI recovery safeguards and the Indian Contract Act, 1872; (ii) Whether the Company's repossession and sale of the vehicle were unlawful and warranted compensation; and (iii) Whether the writ petition could be dismissed on the ground of delay.

Issue (i): Whether Article 11 of the loan agreement, authorising repossession and sale of the hypothecated vehicle, conformed to RBI recovery safeguards and the Indian Contract Act, 1872.

Analysis: Section 35-A of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 gives statutory force to RBI directions. The applicable fair-practice framework prohibits harassment and use of force in recovery, requires lawful seizure, and requires a repossession clause to provide adequate notice, a fair procedure for possession, an opportunity to cure default, and a transparent sale process. Article 11 purported to terminate the borrower's rights without notice, authorised entry wherever the vehicle might be located, did not prescribe a possession or sale procedure, and allowed the Company unilaterally to waive notice.

Conclusion: Article 11 does not conform to the RBI safeguards or the requirement of contractual fairness under the Indian Contract Act, 1872, and does not meet the legal standard of a valid repossession clause to that extent.

Issue (ii): Whether the Company's repossession and sale of the vehicle were unlawful and warranted compensation.

Analysis: No seven-day pre-repossession notice was issued, despite such notice being a contractual precondition to repossession. Possession was taken at night by breaking the steering lock and without a memorandum signed by the borrower, contrary to the requirement of peaceful and lawful recovery. The conduct breached the RBI fair-recovery safeguards and arbitrarily deprived the borrower of the vehicle used for livelihood, attracting Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.

Conclusion: The repossession and consequent sale were unauthorised and arbitrary; the borrower is entitled to restitution and compensation, although the completed sale is not set aside.

Issue (iii): Whether the writ petition could be dismissed on the ground of delay.

Analysis: The borrower promptly reported the incident as theft and pursued remedial proceedings in that bona fide belief. Continuing traffic challans relating to the vehicle after its alleged sale also required explanation. No prejudice from the alleged delay was established.

Conclusion: The writ petition was not liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay.

Final Conclusion: The loan accounts are to be closed, the sale proceeds refunded with interest, and compensation and costs paid to the borrower, while the sale of the vehicle remains undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: A financier's contractual right of self-help repossession is enforceable only through a fair and lawful process complying with binding RBI recovery safeguards, including prior notice, an opportunity to cure, peaceful possession, and a transparent sale procedure.