Issues: Whether reassessment initiated through a notice issued more than three years after the end of the relevant assessment year was valid when the approval was granted by the Principal Commissioner rather than the authority specified under section 151(ii).

Analysis: The consequential notice under section 148 was issued in July 2022, after expiry of three years from the end of assessment year 2016-17. Section 151, as amended, distinguishes cases based on whether more than three years have elapsed and mandates approval from the specifically designated higher authority under section 151(ii) in the latter category. Approval by the Principal Commissioner did not meet that mandatory jurisdictional safeguard. The conversion of an earlier notice under the old reassessment regime into deemed proceedings under section 148A(b) did not dispense with compliance with the statutory conditions, including competent sanction, for the consequential notice issued after the order under section 148A(d).

Conclusion: The notice under section 148 was invalid for want of approval from the competent authority under section 151(ii); consequently, the reassessment and assessment framed under sections 147 and 144B, including the addition under section 68, were set aside.

Issues: Whether penalty for concealment was sustainable where the assessee claimed knowingly inadmissible deductions in a revised return and filed the correct return only after detection.

Analysis: Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 permits penalty where income is concealed. The revised return claimed excess deductions under Chapter VI-A despite the assessee's awareness that they were not allowable, resulting in an improper refund claim. The correct income was disclosed only after detection during survey proceedings and issuance of reassessment notice. The explanation that the tax consultant had misled the assessee did not displace the finding of conscious concealment.

Conclusion: The penalty for concealment under Section 271(1)(c) was validly imposed and sustained.

Issues: (i) Whether notice and an opportunity of hearing were duly afforded to the mortgagee bank in the benami adjudication; (ii) Whether the benami property mortgaged as collateral was liable to be released on the bank's claim of priority under SARFAESI.

Issue (i): Whether notice and an opportunity of hearing were duly afforded to the mortgagee bank in the benami adjudication.

Analysis: The bank's own recovery measures and its representation to the authorities established its knowledge of the pending adjudication. The statutory framework permits a person claiming an interest in the property to approach the Adjudicating Authority, including through addition as a party, and treats service on one of several persons holding property as valid in the circumstances specified by the Act. No prejudice resulted from the bank's non-participation, particularly as service of the notice and reference was recorded.

Conclusion: The plea of absence of notice and denial of hearing is rejected, against the appellant bank.

Issue (ii): Whether the benami property mortgaged as collateral was liable to be released on the bank's claim of priority under SARFAESI.

Analysis: Attachment under the benami regime is directed towards confiscation of property found to be benami, rather than recovery of a debt. Rights created to defeat the purposes of that regime are void. Accepting priority of a secured creditor over a benami property would enable evasion of confiscation through a subsequent mortgage. The bank possessed other mortgaged securities furnished by the borrower and guarantors and was required to pursue those securities first; if any dues remained unrecovered, it could invoke the statutory claim mechanism.

Conclusion: Release of the mortgaged benami property is declined, against the appellant bank.

Final Conclusion: The mortgage claim does not displace the confirmed benami attachment, and any unrecovered claim may be pursued through the available statutory mechanism.

Issues: Whether an appeal electronically filed beyond the outer condonable period under Section 61(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, solely because of a technical failure in the tribunal's e-filing system, could be treated as having been presented within time.

Analysis: Section 61(2) prescribes a mandatory thirty-day limitation period with a further condonable period of fifteen days, and does not empower the appellate tribunal to condone delay beyond that limit. However, limitation runs only when the forum is capable of receiving a bona fide filing. The registry report established that timely e-filing attempts were frustrated by OTP-delivery and backend failures in the e-filing system, without any negligence, laches, ignorance of law, or fault attributable to the appellant. The principle of actus curiae neminem gravabit, together with the principle reflected in Order VII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, permits exclusion of the period during which the tribunal's system was non-functional and treatment of the first bona fide e-filing attempt as the date of presentation.

Conclusion: The statutory outer limit did not prevent exclusion of the period lost solely because of the tribunal's system failure; the appeal was required to be reconsidered by treating the bona fide initial filing attempt as the relevant date of presentation.

Issues: (i) Whether Section 6(3)(b) of FEMA applied to the 2006-2008 contraventions despite its later omission; (ii) Whether the foreign remittances and delayed or mismatched share allotments contravened the applicable FEMA Regulations and attracted civil penalties without proof of mens rea; (iii) Whether confiscation of the Barakhamba Road property under Section 13(2) of FEMA was warranted; (iv) Whether the individual directors were liable and whether the penalties imposed on the appellants required modification.

Issue (i): Whether Section 6(3)(b) of FEMA applied to the 2006-2008 contraventions despite its later omission.

Analysis: Section 6(3) was omitted through the Finance Act, 2015 only with effect from 15.10.2019. As the relevant foreign remittances and alleged breaches occurred between 2006 and 2008, the provision was operative when the contraventions arose.

Conclusion: Section 6(3)(b) of FEMA governed the relevant contraventions notwithstanding its subsequent omission, against the appellants.

Issue (ii): Whether the foreign remittances and delayed or mismatched share allotments contravened the applicable FEMA Regulations and attracted civil penalties without proof of mens rea.

Analysis: The foreign remittances were investment funds, yet the prescribed reports of receipt and share allotment were not furnished within the stipulated periods. Shares were also allotted to an entity other than the remitter, and the funds were deployed for acquisition of immovable property in a restricted real-estate sector. These acts breached Paragraphs 2, 8, 9(1)(A), and 9(1)(B) of Schedule I to Regulation 5(1) and the RBI Master Circular. Penalty under Section 13(1) is civil regulatory liability; its text does not require willful conduct, intention, or mens rea. Administrative difficulty, eventual regularisation, and absence of loss did not displace the established contraventions.

Conclusion: The corporate appellant committed the established FEMA contraventions and incurred civil penalty without any requirement to prove mens rea, against the corporate appellant.

Issue (iii): Whether confiscation of the Barakhamba Road property under Section 13(2) of FEMA was warranted.

Analysis: Section 13(2) authorises discretionary confiscation in addition to monetary penalty and requires that discretion to be exercised judiciously on the facts. A substantial part of the foreign remittances was used to acquire the property, while the remittance-and-share transaction and investment in the restricted sector were themselves non-compliant.

Conclusion: Discretionary confiscation of the property was justified, against the corporate appellant.

Issue (iv): Whether the individual directors were liable and whether the penalties imposed on the appellants required modification.

Analysis: No evidence established that the non-managing director was in charge of, or responsible for, the company's business when the contraventions occurred. Conversely, the managing director admitted a managerial role, disclosed the initial incorrect declarations concerning remittances, and did not establish that the contraventions occurred without his knowledge or despite due diligence. The monetary sanctions required reduction in the circumstances.

Conclusion: The penalty imposed on the non-managing director was set aside in her favour. The managing director remained personally liable, but his penalty was reduced to Rs. 5,00,000; the corporate appellant's penalty was reduced to Rs. 50,00,000.

Final Conclusion: Civil FEMA liability of the corporate appellant and the managing director remains, with reduced monetary sanctions and confiscation of the property, whereas the director not shown to be responsible for the company's affairs bears no personal penal liability.

Ratio Decidendi: A breach of a civil statutory obligation under Section 13(1) of FEMA attracts penalty once the contravention is established, without proof of mens rea unless the statute expressly makes guilty intention an ingredient.

Outcome: The reassessment notice for Assessment Year 2014-15 and all consequential proceedings were quashed and set aside.

Issues: Whether the Tribunal's common order disposing of seven appeals was sustainable despite being unreasoned and having been issued for appeals heard and pronounced on different dates.

Analysis: The common order contained no meaningful consideration of the parties' contentions or the issues arising from the assessments. It also purported to dispose of two sets of appeals that had been heard and pronounced on different dates. These defects demonstrated undue haste, procedural irregularity and absence of the reasoned adjudication expected from the final fact-finding appellate authority.

Conclusion: The Tribunal's common order could not be sustained; the underlying appeals are to receive fresh and independent adjudication by a Bench other than the Bench that issued the impugned order, with all merits left open.

Issues: Whether deduction under section 80P(2) could be allowed through rectification where the return was filed after the due date under section 139(1).

Analysis: Section 80AC makes deductions under Chapter VI-A, including section 80P(2), unavailable where the return is not furnished by the due date under section 139(1). Section 143(1)(a)(v) specifically permits disallowance of such deduction while processing a belated return. Since the return was admittedly late, the disallowance conformed to law and disclosed no mistake apparent from the record capable of rectification under section 154.

Conclusion: Deduction under section 80P(2) was not allowable, and rejection of the rectification application was valid, against the assessee.

Issues: Whether confiscation became absolute because the redemption option was not exercised within the stipulated period, despite the Customs authorities failing to quantify the applicable duty after a timely request.

Analysis: Sections 125 and 126 of the Customs Act, 1962 ordinarily require a person granted an option to redeem confiscated goods to exercise it within the stipulated time, failing which confiscation becomes absolute. However, the petitioner applied within the prescribed 120-day period for quantification of duty, while the authorities had quantified only the redemption fine and penalty and did not respond to the request. The failure to redeem within time could therefore not be attributed solely to the petitioner, and the rule concerning absolute confiscation was inapplicable on these facts.

Conclusion: The petitioner remained entitled to redeem the gold bars upon payment of the quantified duty, redemption fine, penalty, and applicable interest.

Issues: (i) Classification of oven roasted almonds and oven roasted pistachios; (ii) Classification of oven roasted cashew nuts; (iii) Availability of preferential-duty benefit under Serial No. 172 of Notification No. 46/2011-Customs dated 01.06.2011.

Issue (i): Classification of oven roasted almonds and oven roasted pistachios.

Analysis: Heading 2008 covers nuts otherwise prepared or preserved, and the HSN Explanatory Notes specifically include dry-roasted, oil-roasted and fat-roasted nuts. The disclosed oven-heating process at 350 F for 10-15 minutes was consistent with roasting in its ordinary and commercial sense, with no material indicating that it was merely drying. As no separate tariff item applies to almonds or pistachios, Rule 1 supports classification under the entry for other roasted nuts and seeds.

Conclusion: Oven roasted almonds and oven roasted pistachios are classifiable under CTI 2008 19 91, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Classification of oven roasted cashew nuts.

Analysis: The goods undergo a roasting process and fall within Heading 2008. Tariff item 2008 19 10 expressly and specifically covers cashew nuts that are roasted, salted, or roasted and salted. That specific entry prevails over the general entry for other roasted nuts and seeds.

Conclusion: Oven roasted cashew nuts are classifiable under CTI 2008 19 10, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Availability of preferential-duty benefit under Serial No. 172 of Notification No. 46/2011-Customs dated 01.06.2011.

Analysis: Notification entitlement depends not only on tariff classification but also on fulfilment of its conditions, including originating status and the prescribed documentary proof. These requirements require verification by the jurisdictional customs authorities at importation under the applicable rules of origin framework.

Conclusion: The notification benefit is available only where the jurisdictional customs authorities verify fulfilment of all prescribed notification and origin conditions.

Final Conclusion: The ruling determines the applicable tariff items for roasted pistachios, almonds and cashew nuts, while preferential treatment remains contingent on origin-based compliance and customs verification.

Ratio Decidendi: Where nuts have undergone a process consistent with roasting, their classification is governed by the specific tariff entry for roasted nuts, with a product-specific entry prevailing over a general entry.

Issues: Whether an assessment order is sustainable when the date fixed for personal hearing precedes the deadline for filing a reply to the show-cause notice.

Analysis: The statutory procedure requires a meaningful opportunity of hearing before an adverse determination. Fixing the hearing before expiry of the time granted for filing a reply deprives the taxable person of an effective opportunity to respond and breaches the principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: The assessment order was invalid for breach of the principles of natural justice; the petitioner must be afforded an opportunity to file a reply followed by a personal hearing.

Issues: Whether input tax credit for financial year 2018-19 could be denied despite the retrospective insertion of Section 16(5), where the GSTR-3B returns were filed by 30 November 2021.

Analysis: Section 16(5) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 retrospectively regularises input tax credit relating to financial years 2017-18 to 2020-21 where the return under Section 39 was filed by 30 November 2021. The amendment is curative and applies from 1 July 2017. Returns for April 2018 to March 2019 filed within the prescribed extended cut-off are consequently regularised.

Conclusion: The denial of input tax credit solely on account of delayed filing of the returns is unsustainable where the returns were filed by 30 November 2021, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the adjudication order was invalid for want of effective notice and an opportunity of personal hearing.

Analysis: The show-cause notice and adjudication order were uploaded only under the GST portal tab labelled 'Additional Notice and Orders', without separate intimation. This prevented the petitioner from responding to the notice. The absence of an effective opportunity to reply or receive a personal hearing constituted a breach of the principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: The adjudication order was invalid for violation of principles of natural justice and was set aside for fresh adjudication after affording a personal hearing, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether dismissal of the statutory appeal solely on limitation, in the circumstances concerning communication of the show-cause notice and adjudication order, warranted interference and fresh adjudication on merits.

Analysis: The appeal had been dismissed only on limitation and without examination on merits. On the peculiar facts, including the claimed lack of actual intimation of the notice uploaded on the portal and subsequent knowledge of the adjudication order, a prima facie case was made out. Interference was warranted to ensure adjudication after an effective opportunity of hearing.

Conclusion: The appellate and adjudication orders were set aside, and the matter was directed to be reconsidered on merits through a fresh reasoned adjudication after hearing the petitioner.

Issues: Whether the rejection of the applications for condonation of delay without an effective opportunity to substantiate the explanation of reliance on a professional adviser was sustainable.

Analysis: Valid electronic service under Rule 127 determines the commencement of limitation but does not answer whether sufficient cause prevented timely filing. Sufficient cause requires an evidence-based examination of the assessee's bona fides, conduct, the alleged professional default, the circumstances of discovery, and the promptness of subsequent action; it cannot be accepted automatically or rejected solely on the premise that a company must bear its adviser's default. The absence of an effective opportunity to furnish supporting affidavits, correspondence and other material, together with the ex parte assessment, the substantial addition and the connected penalty proceedings, required a justice-oriented exercise of discretion. The merits of the assessment, addition and penalty remained open.

Conclusion: The condonation applications must be reconsidered independently in each appeal after an effective hearing and upon specific findings regarding sufficient cause, without any determination on the merits of the quantum addition or penalty.

Issues: Whether the cash deposits disclosed through a revised computation during assessment constituted under-reporting of income in consequence of misreporting, warranting penalty at 200 per cent and disentitling the assessee from immunity.

Analysis: Section 270A distinguishes ordinary under-reporting from under-reporting arising from misreporting under section 270A(9). The revised computation included the entire cash deposits, the consequential tax was paid, and the computation was accepted in the assessment. Neither the assessment order nor the penalty proceedings identified the applicable limb of section 270A(9) or established the ingredients of misreporting. The assessee had not challenged the quantum addition and had applied for immunity within time after payment of tax and interest. On these facts, disclosure in the revised computation could at most amount to under-reporting and not misreporting.

Conclusion: The penalty for misreporting was unsustainable, and the assessee was entitled to immunity from penalty.

Issues: Whether belated filing of Form No. 10B disentitled a charitable trust from exemption under sections 11 and 12.

Analysis: The requirement to furnish the audit report in Form No. 10B was treated as procedural and directory rather than mandatory. The audit report had been obtained before filing the return, and identical claims of the trust for adjacent assessment years had been accepted. A statutory exemption cannot be refused solely on the technical ground of delayed furnishing of the prescribed audit report where there is substantial compliance.

Conclusion: Belated filing of Form No. 10B did not justify denial of exemption; the claim under section 11 was directed to be allowed.

Issues: Whether deduction of employees' provident fund and employee state insurance contributions was allowable where payment was credited on the next working day following bank holidays.

Analysis: The two employee-contribution payments were cleared and deposited on 17 June 2019 because the immediately preceding dates were Saturday and Sunday bank holidays. The delay was therefore not attributable to any intentional default by the assessee.

Conclusion: The disallowance of employees' provident fund and employee state insurance contributions was unsustainable, and the deduction was allowable in favour of the assessee.